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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Topic: Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration under 
the Dual Legal System 
6LQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHµUHIRUPDQGRSHQLQJXS¶SROLF\&KLQDKDVDFKLHYHG
significant economic growth in the past three decades.1 $VDQLPSRUWDQWERRVWHUIRU&KLQD¶V
economic development, foreign investment and trade have also experienced a considerable 
increase.2  
The vast volume of foreign investment and trade brings both opportunities and 
challenges: accompanying the rapid development of foreign investment and trade is the 
increasing number of commercial disputes between Chinese and foreign parties. 3  The 
resolution of these commercial disputes naturally becomes a growing concern for foreign 
businessmen, as it directly determines whether their rights can be adequately protected and 
their disputes can be satisfactorily resolved in China. 
+RZHYHU &KLQD¶V OLWLJDWion and arbitration systems are still relatively immature.4 
They face considerable difficulties in developing themselves at a pace that can satisfy 
                                                 
1 2YHUWKHSDVWWKUHHGHFDGHV&KLQD¶V*'3KDVLQFUHDVHGIURPPHUHO\WULOOLRQLQWRWULOOLRQ
in 2015. In terms of GDP, China now ranks second in the world, running after the United States. The 
statistics are obtained from the World Bank database. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/. Last visited 
in December 2016. 
2 In terms of foreign investment, China now ranks second in the world, running after the United States. The 
net flow of foreign direct investment coming into China has surged from 0.43 billion in 1982 to 250 billion 
in 2015 (The data before 1982 is not available). In terms of international trade, China now also ranks second 
behind the United States. The sum of imports and exports of goods and services in China has jumped from 
42.54 billion in 1982 to 4474 billion in 2015. The statistics are obtained from the World Bank database. 
Available at http://data.worldbank.org. Last visited in December 2016. 
3 7RWKHDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJH there is now no reliable and systematic statistics which directly show the 
exact number of foreign-related commercial disputes arise every year. Some foreign-related commercial 
disputes are resolved through negotiation and mediation, and the number of these disputes is not available. 
However, the increase in the number of foreign-related commercial disputes can be partly reflected in the 
increasing foreign-related caseloads of Chinese courts and arbitration institutions. For detailed statistics, 
see the following Figures 1, 2, 3 and 7 in Sections 4.2 and 5.3.1. 
4 )ROORZLQJ WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI WKH SROLF\ RI µUHIRUP DQG RSHQLQJ XS¶ LQ  OHJDO UHIRUP WRZDUGV
modernization also started in the 1980s. However, the progress of legal reforms in the initial years was 
relatively slow. In terms of litigation and arbitration, two basic procedural laws for litigation and arbitration 
SURFHHGLQJVWKH&LYLO3URFHGXUH/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDDQGWKH$UELWUDWLRQ/DZRIWKH
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDZHUHQRW formally promulgated until 1992 and 1994 respectively. The issue 
UHJDUGLQJKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQV\VWHPVLVIXUWKHUGLVFXVVHGLQWKH
following Sections 4.2 and 5.2 
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IRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVDQGWUDGHUV¶XUJHQWQHHGVIRUUHOLDEOHOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQVHUYLFHV5 
Despite the efforts China has made to reform its litigation and arbitration systems, doubts 
are VWLOOUDLVHGDERXW&KLQHVHFRXUWVDQGDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶FDSDELOLWLHVWRHQVXUHWKH
legal protection of foreign investment and trade.6  
To provide foreign businessmen with a safer and more friendly legal environment, a 
dual legal system is established in China, in which foreign investors and traders are provided 
with special, if not favourable, treatment in law and practice. Under Chinese law, cases with 
WKHIROORZLQJHOHPHQWVDUHFODVVLILHGDVµIRUHLJn-UHODWHGFRPPHUFLDOFDVHV¶⎹ཆ୶һṸ
Ԧ): (1) one or two parties are foreigners, stateless persons or foreign legal persons; (2) the 
subject matter is located in foreign territories; (3) the establishment, modification or 
termination of the legal relationship occurs in foreign territories; (4) oQHRU WZRSDUWLHV¶
habitual residence is outside China; and (5) other conditions that can be recognized as 
µforeign-related¶. 7  Accordingly, the resolution of foreign-related commercial cases is 
separated from domestic ones in Chinese courts and arbitration institutions. 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Weixia Gu, 'Arbitration in China', in Tom Ginsburg and Shahla F. Ali (eds.), International 
Commercial Arbitration in Asia (Juris Publishing, 2013), pp. 77-79; Randall Peerenboom and Xin He, 
'Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, Causes and Prognosis', (2009) FLJS (Foundation for Law, Justice 
and Society) 'Rule of Law in China: Chinese Law and Business' programme reports, pp. 1-2. Available at 
http://www.fljs.org/content/dispute-resolution-china-patterns-causes-and-prognosis. Last visited in June 
2016; Stanley B. Lubman, 'Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years', 20 (2000) 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, pp. 419-423. 
6 This was especially evident in the early years after the 1978 reform. At that time, the under-developed 
VWDWXVRI&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQV\VWHPVLQHYLWDEO\OHGWRIRUHLJQSDUWLHV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRUHVROYH
their disputes in Chinese courts and arbitration institutions. Given that Chinese parties were also unwilling 
to resolve the disputes in foreign jurisdictions, many disputes between foreign and Chinese parties were 
resolved via negotiation and mediation in which local governments played an important role in helping 
ERWK VLGHV WR UHDFK VHWWOHPHQW DJUHHPHQWV )RU JHQHUDO GLVFXVVLRQRQ&KLQD¶V OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ
systems in the 1980s and 1990s, see Donald C. Clarke, 'Dispute Resolution in China', 5 (1991) Journal of 
Chinese Law, pp. 245-296; Sally Lord Ellis and Laura Shea, 'Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in 
the People's Republic of China', 6 (1981) International Trade Law Journal, pp. 155-175; Jun Ge, 
'Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China', 15 (1996) 
Pacific Basin Law Journal, pp. 122-137. A more detailed introduction to foreign-related commercial 
dispute resolution in the 1980s and 1990s is provided in the following Section 3.3.1. 
7 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁һ䇹䇬⌅ǊⲴ䀓䟺), 
⌅䟺[2015]5ਧ (Fa Shi [2015] No.5), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 30 January 2015, Article 
522.  
It should be noted that the scope of foreign-related civil and commercial cases was first officially defined 
in law in 1982, and has experienced two major expansions in 1988 and 2012 respectively. The 
interpretation to this definition in judicial practice also shows a dynamic characteristic. A more detailed 
LQWURGXFWLRQ WR WKH FKDQJLQJ GHILQLWLRQ RI µIRUHLJQ-UHODWHG FRPPHUFLDO FDVHV¶ LQ ODZ DQG SUDFWLFH LV
provided in the following Section 3.2.2. 
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Following the dual-track approach, a set of legal settings specially designed for 
foreign-related commercial cases is introduced into the litigation and arbitration systems. 
For example, while most first instance domestic cases are resolved by courts at the basic 
level, first instance foreign-related commercial disputes are normally allocated to 
intermediate or higher level courts in economically-developed areas, so that foreign-related 
commercial disputants can receive better litigation services provided by more competent 
judges and courts. 8  In arbitration, to reduce the possibility of undue denial on the 
enforceability of foreign-related arbitration awards in judicial review, a court decision 
denying the enforceability of a foreign-related arbitration award can only become valid with 
the approval of the SPC through a prior reporting mechanism, while such approval is not 
necessary if a court decides not to enforce a domestic arbitration award.9 Apart from these 
two representative examples, many other special legal settings for foreign-related 
commercial cases, such as more flexible methods for the service of foreign-related litigation 
documents, more internationalized standards for the judicial review of foreign-related 
arbitration awards, and more freedom for foreign-related commercial disputants to 
designate foreign laws and choose foreign courts/arbitration institutions, can also be found 
in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration.10 
By conditionally providing these special legal provisions for foreign-related 
commercial cases, the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration can 
be enhanced in a more efficient manner, rather than simply waiting for the development of 
the general litigation and arbitration systems which needs unremitting efforts and a 
relatively long period of time. By and large, the introduction of the dual legal systems 
provides an important solution to the contradiction between foreign-related commercial 
diVSXWDQWV¶XUJHQWGHPDQGVfor reliable dispute resolution services in Chinese courts and 
DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG WKH GLIILFXOWLHV LQ IXQGDPHQWDOO\ UHIRUPLQJ &KLQD¶V JHQHUDO
litigation and arbitration systems within a short time.11  
However, since foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration are 
IXQGDPHQWDOO\URRWHGLQ&KLQD¶VJHQHUDOOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQV\VWHPVDOLPLWHGQXPEHU
of special legal settings for foreign-related commercial cases can only provide partial 
solutions to the problems in the general systems. Meanwhile, the sole introduction of special 
legal settings into law also does not necessarily lead to an effective implementation of these 
                                                 
8 A more detailed introduction to the centralized jurisdiction is provided in the following Section 4.4.1. 
9 A more detailed introduction to the prior reporting mechanism is provided in the following Section 5.4.1. 
10 Main statutory differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and 
arbitration is discussed in the following Sections 4.4 and 5.4. 
11 $PRUHGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRQWKHUROHRIWKHGXDOOHJDOV\VWHPLQ&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWDQGWUDGHLV
provided in the following Section 3.2.1. 
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special legal rules in practice. In other words, to what extent these special legal settings can 
enhance the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration is a question 
that needs to be tested. 
Furthermore, constant legal reforms have been carried out in both foreign-related and 
general legal systems over the past three decadHV 7RGD\¶V IRUHLJQ-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration systems are quite different from what they were in the 1980s and 
1990s. Then, what is the current status of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration systems? Can these two mechanisms provide quality litigation and arbitration 
services to disputants now?  The answers to these questions are vital for both foreign-related 
commercial disputants who want to find reliable dispute resolution services in Chinese 
courts and arbitration institutions, and REVHUYHUV RI &KLQD¶V OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ
systems who want to explore the relationship between domestic and foreign-related 
commercial cases and the role of the dual legal system in litigation and arbitration. 
Existing literature provides some answers to these questions. There are many in-depth 
VWXGLHVLQWR&KLQD¶Vgeneral litigation and arbitration systems, which shows that the overall 
quality of litigation and arbitration services has been gradually enhanced over the past few 
decades, though deficiencies still remain to be tackled in future reforms.12 However, most 
RI WKHVH VWXGLHV¶PDLQ WDUJHWV DUH WKH JHQHUDO OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ V\VWHPV DQG WKH
findings in these studies thus can only partially reflect the current status of foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration. In comparison with studies on the general litigation 
and arbitration systems, the number of specialized studies on foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration is still relatively small. 13  MeanwhLOH &KLQD¶V OLWLJDWLRQ DQG
arbitration systems are more frequently discussed in a separate manner in existing literature, 
while a comprehensive evaluation of litigation and arbitration systems under a common 
                                                 
12 $VVKRZQLQ WKHVHVWXGLHV OHJDO UXOHV LQ&KLQD¶V OLWLgation and arbitration are more modernized than 
before, while Chinese courts and arbitration institutions are also increasingly developed. But, disputants 
may still encounter problems in terms of independence, autonomy and enforcement, while the 
implementaWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHVLQSUDFWLFHUHPDLQVSUREOHPDWLF)RUVWXGLHVVXUYH\LQJ&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQG
arbitration, see e.g. Giovanni Pisacane, Lea Murphy and Calvin Zhang, Arbitration in China: Rules & 
Perspectives (Springer, 2016); Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis (Hart 
Publishing, 2013); Yuwen Li, The Judicial System and Reform in Post-Mao China: Stumbling Towards 
Justice (Ashgate, 2014); Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (Kluwer Law International, 
2012); Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher, Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in 
Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
13 An increasing number of specialized studies on foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration are 
published in recent years, though the overall number is still rather limited in comparison with studies on 
the general litigation and arbitration systems in China. See e.g. Fan Yang, Foreign-Related Arbitration in 
China: Commentary and Cases (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Qiao Liu, Wenhua Shan and Ren 
Xiang, China and International Commercial Dispute Resolution (Brill, 2016). 
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analytical framework is less common.14 Overall, studies providing an updated, systematic 
DQG FRPSUHKHQVLYH RYHUYLHZ RI &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration systems are still relatively scarce. 
This research aims to fill in this gap in the literature and to add to the discussion on 
the resolution of foreign-related commercial cases in Chinese courts and arbitration 
institutions. With a systematic examination of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration systems at the current stage and a comprehensive evaluation of these two 
mechanisms under a common analytical framework, this research attempts to show the 
status quo of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, to identify the remaining 
deficiencies in these two mechanisms and to propose possible solutions to the deficiencies. 
It should be noted that although domestic and foreign-related commercial disputes 
receive different treatment in many aspects, they also share many common institutional and 
procedural settings in litigation and arbitration. As mentioned, a limited number of special 
legal settings cannot be a panacea to all the problems in the general systems. Many pitfalls 
in the general litigation and arbitration systems are still affecting the quality of foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration. The discussion on foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration will inevitably overlap the analysis of the general litigation and 
arbitration systems. Thus, to gain a complete understanding of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration, this research studies not only the special institutional and 
procedural settings for foreign-related commercial cases, but also the general legal settings 
for both domestic and foreign-related commercial cases, provided that the issues concerned 
affect the resolution of foreign-related commercial cases in Chinese courts and arbitration 
institutions.  
1.2 Research Questions and Sub-Questions 
The central question of this research is: 
What is the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in 
the light of the core principles of litigation and arbitration, and what are the 
remaining deficiencies in these two mechanisms at the current stage in China? 
                                                 
14 Some studies cover both foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in discussion. However, 
the discussion on foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in these studies is actually still 
conducted in a relatively separate manner, though they are indeed listed together in one book. See e.g. 
Michael J. Moser, Managing Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law 
International, 2007). 
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The central research question can be further broken down into three sub-questions as 
follows: 
(1) What are the core principles which litigation and arbitration systems should 
follow, why are these core principles important for these two mechanisms, and 
how can these core principles be fulfilled in litigation and arbitration? 
A premise for the evaluation of litigation and arbitration mechanisms is to find suitable 
criteria. At the theoretical level, this research identifies the core principles which litigation 
and arbitration systems should follow, explores the importance of these core principles in 
litigation and arbitration, and clarifies the specific requirements for the fulfilment of these 
core principles in litigation and arbitration. By answering this question, a common 
analytical framework for the evaluation of litigation and arbitration systems can be 
established. The core principles and the specific requirements for their fulfilment in 
litigation and arbitration will then be used as the criteria for the evaluation of foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration. 
(2) What are the institutional and procedural settings for foreign-related 
commercial cases, what are the main differences between domestic and foreign-
related commercial cases, and how do these differences affect the resolution of 
foreign-related commercial cases in China’s litigation and arbitration? 
Another important step before the evaluative analysis is to obtain a proper 
understanding on the institutional and procedural settings for foreign-related commercial 
cases in litigation and arbitration. A systematic invesWLJDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VGXDO-track legal 
design illustrates not only how foreign-related commercial disputes are resolved in litigation 
and arbitration from commencement to closure, but also the differences between domestic 
and foreign-related commercial cases and the effects of these differences in litigation and 
arbitration. By answering this question, the judicial and arbitral institutions that handle 
foreign-related commercial cases and the judicial and arbitral proceedings for the resolution 
of foreign-related commercial cases will be described and examined. 
(3) Whether and to what extent the core principles are fulfilled in the law and 
practice of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, what are the 
remaining deficiencies in these two mechanisms, and how can these deficiencies 
be tackled in future legal reforms in China? 
Following the previous discussion, an evaluative analysis is conducted by applying 
the aforementioned analytical framework to the law and practice of foreign-related 
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commercial litigation and arbitration. The evaluation analysis shows whether the core 
principles are formally recognized in law and substantially followed in practice, while the 
legal or practical obstacles which hinder the fulfilment of the core principles in foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration can also be identified. By answering this 
question, the research identifies the remaining deficiencies in these two mechanisms and 
reveals the underlying reasons behind them. Based on these findings, the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of these two mechanisms can be shown, and the recommendations for 
future legal reforms can be made. 
1.3 Research Methods: An Evaluative Approach to Foreign-Related Commercial 
Litigation and Arbitration 
A large part of tKLV UHVHDUFK IDOOV LQWR WKH FDWHJRU\ RI µHYDOXDWLYH¶ VWXGLHVZKLFK
H[DPLQHµZKHWKHUUXOHVZRUNLQSUDFWLFHRUZKHWKHUWKH\DUHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKGHVLUDEOH
PRUDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDLPV¶15 But, in contrast with the publications which score the 
performance of certain specific legal reform projects with a systematic model of indicators 
and calculations, 16  this research does not focus on directly scoring foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration in China. Instead, it lays the emphasis on examining 
and evaluating the current status of these two mechanisms. It aims to identify the remaining 
deficiencies which still plague the further development of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration, analyses the underlying reasons behind and proposes possible 
solutions for these deficiencies in future legal reforms. 
To achieve these objectives, the research first sets up a common analytical framework 
for the evaluation of litigation and arbitration systems. By studying international legal 
documents and literature, the research identifies the core principles which are commonly 
followed in litigation and arbitration systems. As discussed later in Chapter 2, these core 
principles can be roughly categorized into four groups, namely accessibility, competence of 
adjudicators, fairness of proceedings, and efficiency and enforcement. These four sets of 
core principles, along with the specific requirements for their fulfilment in law and practice, 
FDQEHXVHGDVWKHFULWHULDIRUWKHHYDOXDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VIRreign-related commercial litigation 
and arbitration systems.  
                                                 
15 9DQ +RHFNH FDWHJRUL]HV OHJDO UHVHDUFK LQWR VHYHQ W\SHV µH[SODQDWRU\¶ µHPSLULFDO¶ µKHUPHQHXWLF¶
µORJLFDO¶ µLQVWUXPHQWDO¶DQG µHYDOXDWLYH¶Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which 
Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing, 2011), p. v. 
16 For comments on such kinds of evaluation projects, see e.g. Frans L. Leeuw, 'Can Legal Research Benefit 
from Evaluation Studies?', 7 (2011) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 52-65; Charles Tremper, Sue Thomas and 
Alexander C. Wagenaar, 'Measuring Law for Evaluation Research', 34 (2010) Evaluation Review, pp. 242-
266.  
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Following the theoretical discussion, the research then studies the institutional and 
procedural designs of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration systems in China. 
By connecting the law and practice of these two mechanisms with the pre-identified core 
principles, the research evaluates whether and to what extent these core principles are 
recognized in law and followed in practice. For example, to evaluate whether the core 
principle of accessibility is fulfilled in these two mechanisms, the research investigates 
whether disputants can find an easy access to courts and arbitration institutions, whether 
their paths to litigation and arbitration proceedings are blocked by any legal or practical 
obstacles, and whether they can easily find information or any other necessary support 
which help them to readily start the process of dispute resolution in courts and arbitration 
institutions. Through the evaluation, the research shows whether and to what extent the 
disputants can find quality legal services in foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration. More importantly, the findings in the evaluation can point out the remaining 
deficiencies in these two mechanisms, based on which corresponding recommendations can 
be made for the reform of these two mechanisms in the future. 
More specifically, there are mainly four kinds of research methods applied in this 
research, namely (1) literature study, (2) doctrinal legal analysis, (3) case study and data 
analysis, and (4) internal comparative analysis. First, relevant literature is studied to find 
out the core principles of litigation and arbitration which are widely recognized in 
international legal documents and literature, while the specific requirements for fulfilment 
RIWKHFRUHSULQFLSOHVLQODZDQGSUDFWLFHDUHDOVRDQDO\VHGEDVHGRQVFKRODUV¶ILQGLQJVDQG
comments in the literature. 
Second, a classic doctrinal approach is adopted to study the meanings of legal 
provisions regulating foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration. 
Through the doctrinal analysis, the research shows the institutional and procedural settings 
in which foreign-related commercial cases are resolved. The question whether the core 
principles of litigation and arbitration are clearly recognized at the regulatory level can in 
the meantime be ascertained. 
Third, case study and data analysis are used to find out whether the core principles of 
litigation and arbitration are substantially fulfilled at the practical level. On the one hand, 
important cases which reflect how legal provisions are interpreted and applied in practice 
are studied to show whether legal rules are implemented in a proper manner to ensure the 
fulfilment of the core principles in the practice of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration. On the other hand, important data such as the enforcement rate and average 
length of proceedings are analysed to show the performance of litigation and arbitration 
systems in resolving foreign-related commercial cases from different aspects. 
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Fourth, internal comparative analysis is conducted when necessary to more directly 
show the merits and drawbacks of different legal settings in foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration. To begin with, the legal provisions regulating domestic and 
foreign-related commercial cases are directly compared to show the main statutory 
differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases, and how these 
differences affect their resolution in litigation and arbitration. Meanwhile, based on the 
findings in the examination and evaluation, foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration are compared to show the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two 
mechanisms with regard to the core principles. 
To sum up, through a study of international legal documents and literature, the 
research first establishes a common analytical framework which uses the core principles of 
litigation and arbitration as the criteria for the evaluation of litigation and arbitration 
systems. The research then examines the institutional and procedural settings of foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration, and clarifies the main differences between 
domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration. Following the 
examination, the research evaluates these two mechanisms on the basis of the core 
principles and shows their relative advantages and disadvantages in foreign-related 
commercial dispute resolution. Through doctrinal analysis, case study and data analysis, the 
research analyses whether and to what extent the core principles are fulfilled in the law and 
practice of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, while the remaining 
deficiencies in these two mechanisms can in the meantime be identified, based on which 
the recommendations can be made for reforming these two mechanisms in the future. 
1.4 Research Limitations 
This research has several limitations.  
First, the discussion of foreign-related commercial disputes in this research should be 
distinguished from the debates on investor-state investment disputes. As an important legal 
remedy for foreign investors to protect their interests against national expropriation, the 
resolution of investor-state investment disputes has a distinctive treaty-based feature, the 
legal basis of which is normally connected with international investment treaties, especially 
bilateral international treaties (BITs). In contrast with foreign-related commercial disputes 
between equal contracting parties, investor-state investment disputes normally arise 
between unequal disputing parties (foreign investors and host states), and they do not 
necessarily involve contractual relations. Unlike commercial disputes which are normally 
resolved via civil litigation or commercial arbitration, investor-state investment disputes are 
normally resolved through administrative litigation at the national level or investor-state 
arbitration at the international level. For example, many investor-state disputes are 
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arbitrated in the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).17 From 
this perspective, investor-state dispute settlement is fundamentally different from the 
resolution of foreign-related commercial disputes before national civil courts and 
international commercial arbitration institutions. 18  
Second, this research attempts to provide an integrated and holistic examination and 
evaluation of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. Since this research 
covers a wide range of sectors including both domestic and foreign-related law and practice, 
judicial and arbitral institutions and proceedings, as well as normative and positive 
discussion and analysis, it may not be as detailed as those studies focusing on one or two 
specific legal issues in litigation and arbitration. Rather, the research lays more emphasis 
on connecting fragmented specific issues and providing a comprehensive picture of the 
resolution of foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration.  
Third, this research is restricted by the relatively limited empirical data and first-hand 
field-VWXG\PDWHULDOV$VQRWLFHGE\&ODUNH LQIRUPDWLRQSXEOLFDWLRQLQ&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQ
and arbitration is relatively unsystematic and unreliable.19 This obstacle is also evident, if 
not more serious, in the research on foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. 
Most accessible data is derived from the general litigation and arbitration systems, while 
only limited materials are specially published to show the status of foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration.20 Nonetheless, since the resolution of domestic and 
foreign-related commercial disputes shares many common institutional and procedural 
settings, the empirical information on the general litigation and arbitration systems can at 
least partly reflect the status of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. 
                                                 
17 See Jane Y. Willems, 'The Settlement of Investor State Disputes and China: New Developments on 
ICSID Jurisdiction', 8 (2011) South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, pp. 14-19. 
18 For an introduction to the topic of investment treaties and investor-state disputes relating to China, see 
Wenhua Shan, China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership (Brill, 2015), 
pp. 180-214; Gallagher Nora and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 299-381. See also Monika C. E. Heymann, 'International Law and the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Relating to China', 11 (2008) Journal of International Economic Law, 
p. 507-526; Stephan W. Schill, 'Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties 
of the People's Republic of China', 15 (2007) Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, pp. 
73-118. 
19 See Donald C. Clarke, 'Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System', in Erik G. Jensen and 
Thomas C. Heller (eds.), Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 191-192. 
20 The issue that the information publication of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration is 
relatively inadequate is further discussed in the following Section 6.4.3. 
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Therefore, this limitation can be partly overcome in this research by collecting and using 
related empirical materials on the general litigation and arbitration systems. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Apart from this introductory chapter, the thesis consists of six chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides the analytical framework for the evaluation of foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration in subsequent chapters. It first reviews and 
summarizes the core principles of litigation and arbitration which are widely recognized in 
international legal documents and literature. Then, the specific requirements for the 
fulfilment of the core principles and the substantial effects of the core principles on litigation 
and arbitration are studied to show how and why the core principle should be fulfilled in 
litigation and arbitration.  
&KDSWHUVWXGLHV&KLQD¶VGXDOOHJDOV\VWHPIRUGRPHstic and foreign-related issues, 
the general legal context for foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. It first 
illustrates the origins and evolution of the dual system and its impacts on foreign-related 
commercial dispute resolution. Then, an overview on the main options of foreign-related 
commercial dispute resolution, namely negotiation, mediation, arbitration and litigation, is 
provided. 
Chapters 4 and 5 follow a similar structure, which provide a systematic examination 
of the institutional and procedural settings of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration. They both start with a review on the development of the two mechanisms in 
history, which explain how foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration 
mechanisms have been gradually established and developed since the 1978 reform. These 
two chapters then depict the institutional designs of Chinese courts and arbitration 
institutions, highlight the statutory differences between domestic and foreign-related 
commercial cases in litigation and arbitration, and provide an overview on the proceedings 
of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration from commencement to closure.  
Chapter 6 conducts an evaluative analysis which connects the pre-identified core 
principles with the law and practice of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration 
at the current stage. Apart from commenting on whether and to what extent the core 
principles are realized in these two mechanisms from a general perspective, the chapter 
further studies contentious issues regarding the fulfilment of the core principles in foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration, identifies the remaining deficiencies that 
plague the further development of these two mechanisms and reveals the underlying reasons 
behind these deficiencies. In addition, the chapter also provides an internal comparative 
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analysis to show the relative advantages and disadvantages of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration with regard to the core principles. 
Chapter 7 draws together the findings and thoughts from previous chapters and 
answers the research questions in a more systematic manner. It highlights the remaining 
deficiencies in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, and makes 
recommendations accordingly. The thesis then ends with some thoughts on the role of the 
dual legal system in the future reform of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration.
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Chapter 2 Core Principles of Litigation and Arbitration: A 
Common Analytical Framework for Evaluating Litigation and 
Arbitration Systems 
2.1 Introduction 
Litigation and arbitration play an important role in dispute resolution. In contrast with 
consensual dispute resolution mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation, litigation and 
arbitration provide disputants with a binding and enforceable decision rendered by an 
authoritative third party, which puts an end to the dispute in case that amicable settlement 
fails.21 As adjudicative mechanisms, litigation and arbitration share many characteristics in 
common, while they also have several differences in terms of procedural designs. To a large 
H[WHQW WKHVHWZRPHFKDQLVPVLQFUHDVLQJO\VXSSOHPHQWHDFKRWKHUE\VHUYLQJGLVSXWDQWV¶
diverse needs with their complementary procedural settings, rather than simply competing 
with each other in terms of forum shopping.22 
For the purpose of this research, this chapter studies the core principles of litigation 
and arbitration systems. By studying the core principles listed in international legal 
documents and literature, a common analytical framework for evaluating litigation and 
arbitration systems is established, which serves as the main criteria for the evaluation of 
&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQ-related litigation and arbitration systems in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, the core principles of litigation 
and arbitration listed in international legal documents and literature are briefly reviewed 
and summarized, based on which a set of core principles that are commonly followed in 
litigation and arbitration systems can be identified. The second part further discusses the 
connotations of the core principles, the specific requirements that litigation and arbitration 
                                                 
21 Different dispute resolution mechanisms can be roughly divided into two categories. One is more 
consensual: through relatively amicable and flexible mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation, 
disputants reach a mutual agreement on the re-allocation based on their own decisions. The other is more 
adjudicative: through relatively adversarial and formal mechanisms such as arbitration and litigation, a 
binding decision is rendered on the re-allocation based on the decision of an adjudicative body. From this 
perspective, litigation and arbitration are important dispute resolution mechanisms for disputants who need 
binding and enforceable decisions reached in an adjudicative process. See Michael L. Moffitt and Robert 
C. Bordone, The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (Jossey-Bass, 2005), pp. 1-4. See also Edwin H. 
Greenebaum, 'Lawyers' Agenda for Understanding Alternative Dispute Resolution', 68 (1993) Indiana Law 
Journal, pp. 779-782. 
22 Judith Resnik, 'Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Disputes Resolution and Adjudication', 10 
(1995) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, pp. 211-214. The similarities and differences of litigation 
and arbitration are further discussed in the following Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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systems should meet for fulfilling these core principles and the substantial effects of these 
core principles on litigation and arbitration systems, which shows how and why these core 
principles should be fulfilled in litigation and arbitration. 
2.2 Core Principles of Litigation and Arbitration in International Legal Documents 
and Literature: A Summarizing Review 
What should a desirable litigation or arbitration system be like? Many international 
organizations and scholars attempted to answer this question by defining the core principles 
of litigation and arbitration. Although they may describe the core principles with different 
DSSURDFKHV µIXQGDPHQWDO VLPLODULWLHV¶ FDQ EH IRXQG LQ WKHLU VWDWHPHQWV 23  These 
µIXQGDPHQWDO VLPLODULWLHV¶ ODUJHO\ FRPH IURP WKH FRPPRQ QDWXUH RI OLWLJDWLRQ DQG
arbitration as adjudicative mechanisms and their common role of promoting dispute 
UHVROXWLRQDQGVHFXULQJULJKWVSURWHFWLRQ0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKHVHµIXQGDPHQWDOVLPLODULWLHV¶
in the core principles of litigation and arbitration can serve as the basis for the establishment 
of a common analytical framework for evaluating litigation and arbitration systems. By 
VXPPDUL]LQJWKHVHµIXQGDPHQWDOVLPLODULWLHV¶IRXUVHWVRIFRUHSULQFLSOHVFDQEHLGHQWLILHG
for the purpose of this thesis. As shown below, they are: (1) accessibility, (2) competence 
of adjudicators, (3) fairness of proceedings, and (4) efficiency and enforcement.24 
2.2.1 Core Principles of Litigation in International Legal Documents and Literature 
In many international human rights documents, several core principles of litigation are 
laid down to ensure people can effectively vindicate their rights before courts.25 Article 10 
                                                 
23 $VVWDWHGE\+D]DUGHWDOµLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRNHHSLQPLQGWKDWDOOPRGHUQV\VWHPVRIFLYLOSURFHGXUH
have fundamental similarities. These similarities result from the fact that a procedural system must respond 
WRVHYHUDOLQKHUHQWUHTXLUHPHQWV¶$OWKRXJKGLIIHUHQWLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGVFKRODUVPD\PDNH
different statements on the principles of litigation and arbitration systHPVFHUWDLQµfundamental similarities¶
can still be found among them. After all, litigation and arbitration, as two adjudicative mechanisms, share 
many common characteristics, which provide the basis for the establishment of a common evaluation 
framework for litigation and arbitration systems. Geoffrey Hazard, Michele Taruffo, Rolf Sturner and 
Antonio Gidi, 'Introduction to the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure', 33 (2001) New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 772. 
24 $VDUJXHGE\$QGUHZVµ7KHUHLVDZLGHDUUD\RIIXQGDPHQWDODQGLPSRUWDQWSULQFLSOHVRIFLYLOMXVWLFH
7KHOLVWVFDQDOPRVWRYHUZKHOPXV$QGVRZHQHHGSRLQWHUVDQGJURXSLQJV¶Neil Andrews, 'Fundamental 
Principles of Civil Procedure: Order Out of Chaos', in Xandra E. Kramer and C. H. Rhee (eds.), Civil 
Litigation in a Globalising World (Springer, 2012), pp. 33-34. Mirroring his arguments, a common 
evaluation framework composed of four sets of core principles is established in this thesis to serve as the 
PDLQFULWHULDIRUWKHIROORZLQJHYDOXDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQ-related commercial litigation and arbitration 
systems in subsequent chapters. 
25 ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHFRUHSULQFLSOHVRIOLWLJDWLRQKDYHDFORVHFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIµDFFess 
WRMXVWLFH¶$VDEDVLFKXPDQULJKWµDFFHVVWRMXVWLFH¶HPSKDVL]HVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGEHHQWLWOHGWRHIIHFWLYH
legal mechanisms to vindicate their rights in case of violation. Accordingly, litigation systems need to fulfil 
a set of requirements to ensure the effective protection of human rights. This is also why statements on the 
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RI WKH  8QLYHUVDO 'HFODUDWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV 8'+5 VWDWHV WKDW µHYHU\RQH LV
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent DQGLPSDUWLDOWULEXQDO¶
for determining his/her rights and obligations. Article 14 (1) of the 1966 International 
&RYHQDQWRQ&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDO5LJKWV,&&35DOVRHPSKDVL]HVWKDWµDOOSHUVRQVVKDOOEH
HTXDO EHIRUH WKH FRXUWVDQG WULEXQDOV¶ DQG µEH HQWLWled to a fair and public hearing by a 
FRPSHWHQWLQGHSHQGHQWDQGLPSDUWLDOWULEXQDOHVWDEOLVKHGE\ODZ¶ 
Similarly, Article 6 (1) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
SURYLGHVWKDWµHYHU\RQHLVHQWLWOHGWRDIDLUDQGSXEOLFKHDULQJZLWKLn a reasonable time by 
DQLQGHSHQGHQWDQGLPSDUWLDOWULEXQDOSUHYLRXVO\HVWDEOLVKHGE\ODZ¶7KLVVWDWHPHQWLVDOVR
reiterated in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR). 26  It can be found that all these international human rights documents actually 
provide similar statements on the core principles for litigation systems: the proceedings 
should be accessible, fair and transparent, while the tribunals should be competent, 
independent and impartial. 
On the basis of international human rights documents, the scope of the core principles 
of litigation has been further broadened by new generation international guidelines on 
litigation. Apart from reiterating the importance of traditional core principles, these legal 
instruments also lay emphasis on more practical issues such as efficiency and enforcement. 
For example, apart from highlighting the importance of independence, impartiality, 
transparency and accessibility, the Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) also 
stresseVWKDWµWKHHQIRUFHPHQWRIFRXUWRUGHUVLVDQHVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQWRIWKHULJKWWRDIDLU
WULDODQGDOVRDJXDUDQWHHRIWKHHIILFLHQF\RIMXVWLFH¶27  
Similarly, in the International Framework for Court Excellence, timeliness and 
certainty, equivalent to other traditional principles (equity, fairness, independence, 
impartiality, competence, integrity, transparency and accessibility), are recognized as ten 
µNH\ YDOXHV¶ WKDW FRXUWV VKRXOGSUHVHUYH ,Q WKH81,'52,73ULQFLSOHV RI7UDQVQDWLRQDO
                                                 
core principles of litigation can be frequently found in international human rights documents. See European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 'Access to Justice in Europe: An Overview of Challenges 
and Opportunities', (2011) FRA reports on access to justice, pp. 14-16. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2011/access-justice-europe-overview-challenges-and-opportunities. 
Last visited in June 2016. 
26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), proclaimed by the Presidents of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 7 December 2000. 
27  Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) (2010), adopted by the Consultative Council of 
European Judges in November 2010, Paragraph 17. 
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&LYLO3URFHGXUHµSURPSWUHQGLWLRQRIMXVWLFH¶DQGµHIIHFWLYHHQIRUFHPHQW¶DUHDOVROLVWHGDV
WZRRIWKHLPSRUWDQWµVWDQGDUGVIRUDGMXGLFDWLRQRIWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRPPHUFLDOGLVSXWHV¶28 
Similar statements on the core principles of litigation can also be found in the literature. 
2QHH[DPSOHLV$QGUHZ¶VµIRXUFRUQHU-VWRQHV¶RIFLYLOMXVWLFH+HVXJJHVWVFODVVLI\LQJWKH
SULQFLSOHVRIOLWLJDWLRQXQGHUWKHµIRXUFRUQHU-VWRQHV¶RIFLYLOMXVWLFHLQFOXGLQJµDFFHVVWR
legal advice and dispute-UHVROXWLRQV\VWHPV¶µHTXDOLW\DQGIDLUQHVVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV¶µD
IRFXVHGDQG VSHHG\SURFHVV¶ DQG µDGMXGLFDWRUVRI LQWHJULW\¶+H IXUWKHUFODULILHV WKDW WKH
FRQQRWDWLRQV RI WKH µIRXU FRUQHU-VWRQHV¶ DUH µUHJXODWLQJ DFFHVV WR FRXUW DQG WR MXVWLFH¶
µHQVXULQJ WKH IDLUQHVVRI WKHSURFHVV¶ µmaintainiQJ D VSHHG\ DQG HIIHFWLYHSURFHVV¶ DQG
µDFKLHYLQJMXVWDQGHIIHFWLYHRXWFRPHV¶29 Similarly, in the report of the European Union 
$JHQF\ IRU )XQGDPHQWDO 5LJKWV )5$ µHIIHFWLYH DFFHVV¶ µIDLU SURFHHGLQJV¶ µWLPHO\
UHVROXWLRQ¶µDGHTXDWHUHGUHVV¶DQGµHIILFLHQF\DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶DUHLGHQWLILHGDVWKHILYH
NH\HOHPHQWVFRQVWLWXWLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIµDFFHVVWRMXVWLFH¶30 In short, it can be found that 
the core principles identified in literature are basically consistent with the statements in 
international legal documents, though the exact descriptions of the core principles may be 
relatively different. 
2.2.2 Core Principles of Arbitration in International Legal Documents and Literature 
The descriptions on the core principles of arbitration in international legal documents 
are rather similar to those in international legal documents for litigation.31 For example, in 
WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\¶V5HVROXWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH81&,75$/0RGHO/DZ
IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPHUFLDO $UELWUDWLRQ 81&,75$/0RGHO /DZ µIDLr and efficient 
VHWWOHPHQW¶LVHPSKDVL]HGDVWKHJRDORILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPHUFLDODUELWUDWLRQ32 Similarly, 
                                                 
28 UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (2004), adopted by the International Institute 
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in April 2004, Principles 7 and 27. 
29 Neil Andrews (2012), supra note 24, pp. 19, 33 and 34. 
30 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2011), supra note 25, pp. 14-16. 
31 It should be noted that arbitration has played an increasingly important role in ensuring justice and 
protecting rights in recent yearV$VLGHQWLILHGLQ&DSSHOOHWWLDQG*DUWK¶VFODVVLFZRUNRQDFFHVVWRMXVWLFH
starting from the third wave of access to justice movement in the 1970s, the role of arbitration and other 
alternative legal mechanisms in the promotion of access to justice has been increasingly recognized.  From 
this perspective, litigation and arbitration are all important legal mechanisms for the settlement of 
GLVSXWDQWV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWVDQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWV%\DQGODUJHWKH\DOOVHUYHWKHFRPPRQ
role of promoting access to justice. This can also partly explain why the descriptions on the core principles 
of arbitration are rather similar to those on litigation in international legal documents. Mauro Cappelletti 
and Bryant Garth, 'Access to Justice: the Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights 
Effective', 27 (1978) Buffalo Law Review, pp. 196-227. 
32 See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/72 (Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) and Resolution 60/33 (Revised 
articles of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on 
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WKH81&,75$/$UELWUDWLRQ5XOHVFODULI\WKDWWKHSDUWLHVVKRXOGEHµWUHDWHGZLWKHTXDOLW\¶
DQGWKDWµXQQHFHVVDU\GHOD\DQGH[SHQVH¶VKRXOGEHDYRLGHG33 The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules also confirm that the arbitrator appointed by the appointing authority should be 
independent and impartial.34 The UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure 
GLUHFWO\VWDWHWKDWµWKHVH3ULQFLSOHVDUHHTXDOO\DSSOLFDble to international arbitration, except 
to the extent of being incompatible with arbitration proceedings, for example, the Principles 
UHODWHGWRMXULVGLFWLRQSXEOLFLW\RISURFHHGLQJVDQGDSSHDO¶35  
Similar arguments can also be found in the literature on the core principles of 
arbitration. In Goldberg et al.¶V FODVVLF ZRUN LW LV DUJXHG WKDW DUELWUDWLRQ VKRXOG EH
procedurally accessible, fair and efficient.36 Brunet lists autonomy, fairness, neutrality, 
expertise, privatization, efficiency and finality as WKH µFRUHYDOXHV¶RIDUELWUDWLRQ37 Born 
LGHQWLILHV WKH µNH\ REMHFWLYHV¶ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPHUFLDO DUELWUDWLRQ DV DXWRQRP\ DQG
flexibility, neutrality, competence and expertise, confidentiality and privacy, amicable 
settlement, efficiency, enforceability and finality of arbitration awards.38  
It can be found that many core principles of litigation, such as accessibility to the 
procedures, professional quality of adjudicators, fairness of the proceedings, efficiency of 
the processes and enforcement of the outcomes, are also listed as the core principles of 
arbitration in international legal documents and literature, though the exact wording can be 
different. However, it should also be noted that not all the core principles of litigation are 
fully compatible with arbitration proceedings. Arbitration also has its own particular designs 
in terms of autonomy, flexibility, privacy and finality.39 
                                                 
International Trade Law and the recommendations regarding the interpretation of Article II (2)). This 
statement can also be found in Article VII (1) of the 1958 New York Convention. 
33 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), adopted by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on 15 December 1976 and revised on 6 December 2010, Articles 6 (7) and 17 (1). 
34 Ibid., Articles 11 and 12. 
35 6HH µ&RPPHQW 3-(¶ XQGHU WKH µ6FRSH DQG ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ¶ LQ WKH  81,'52,7 3ULQFLSOHV RI
Transnational Civil Procedure. 
36 Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, Nancy H. Rogers and Sarah Rudolph Cole, Dispute Resolution: 
Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012), pp. 5-8. 
37  Edward Brunet, 'The Core Values of Arbitration', in Edward Brunet, Richard E. Speidel, Jean E. 
Sternlight and Stephen H. Ware (eds.), Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 3-28. 
38 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2014), pp. 70-92. 
39 For example, the autonomy of parties and the flexibility of proceedings are emphasized throughout the 
UNCITRAL Model Law for International Commercial Arbitration, while these issues are normally not 
listed as core principles in international guidelines for litigation. See UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (2006), adopted by United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on 21 June 1985 and amended on 7 July 2006, Articles 10, 11, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28. 
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2.2.3 A Common Set of Core Principles for Evaluating Litigation and Arbitration 
Systems 
The review above shows that litigation and arbitration follow many common core 
principles such as accessibility, independence, impartiality, professionalism, fairness, 
efficiency and enforceability, though arbitration does have its own particular designs on 
several procedural issues such as autonomy, flexibility, privacy and finality. These 
similarities largely come from their inherent common adjudicative nature. As adjudicative 
mechanisms, litigation and arbitration provide a platform for disputants to resolve their 
disputes by presenting their claims before third-party adjudicators with evidence and 
statements. In contrast to decisions in negotiation and mediation which are reached by the 
parties and voluntarily followed by themselves, decisions in litigation and arbitration are 
given by third-party adjudicators and compulsorily enforced with the support of state 
power.40 7KHUHIRUHZKHWKHU WKHGHFLVLRQLQDOLWLJDWLRQRUDUELWUDWLRQFDVHFDQEHDµEHVW
DSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWKHFRUUHFWRXWFRPH¶LVDFUXFLDOLVVXHIRUWKHSDUWLHV41 
This inherent need imposes strict requirements on adjudicators and proceedings in 
litigation and arbitration. The adjudicators need to be competent, so that they can ascertain 
the facts correctly and apply the laws properly. The proceedings need to be fair, so that the 
parties can obtain equal and sufficient opportunities to defend their claims.42 Furthermore, 
OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ V\VWHPV VKRXOG DOVR VDWLVI\ GLVSXWDQWV¶ QHHGV LQ DFFHVVLELOLW\
efficiency and enforcement. Without ensured accessibility, disputants cannot readily begin 
the proceedings, let alone resolve their disputes in litigation and arbitration. Without 
reasonable efficiency, a delayed delivery of results may become valueless for the parties.43 
                                                 
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules specify that arbitration awards should be final and not open 
to the public, unless so agreed by the parties or necessary to become public in courts or other legal 
proceedings. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 34 (2). However, the confidentiality of the 
proceedings and the non-appealability of arbitration awards are also not fully consistent with the 
transparency requirements and appeal proceedings in litigation.  
40 For a brief analysis on the nature of adjudicative and consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, see 
Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone (2005), supra note 21, pp. 386-407. 
41 The answers to the questions such as how correct is correct and how just is just are essentially subjective. 
But, the just result or the correct outcome can be approached in a relative sense through proper legal and 
institutional designs in dispute resolution mechanisms. See Jon O. Newman, 'Rethinking Fairness 
Perspectives on the Litigation Process', 94 (1985) Yale Law Journal, p. 1646.  
42 Edwin H. Greenebaum (1993), supra note 21, pp. 778-779. 
43 7KHWHUPµHIILFLHQF\¶LVXVHGLQ this thesis in a relatively narrow sense, which mainly refers to the issues 
RI WLPHDQG H[SHQVH+RZHYHU LW VKRXOGEHQRWHG WKDW WKH FRQQRWDWLRQRI WKH WHUP µHIILFLHQF\¶ FDQEH
different in legal studies. For example, in law and economics literature, whether a litigation or arbitration 
system is efficient can be discussed from the perspective that whether it is socially optimal. See e.g. 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, 'An Economic Analysis of Arbitration versus Litigation for Contractual Disputes', 
59 (2016) Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 393-4410; Anne Van Aaken and Torner Broude, 'Arbitration 
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Without effective enforcement, the disputants may only find the confirmation of their rights 
on paper without substantial remedies to compensate their damages. 
To sum up, litigation and arbitration systems, at least in a general sense, follow a 
similar set of core principles. Based on the aforementioned core principles listed in 
international legal documents and literature, a common analytical framework can be 
established, in which the core principles can serve as the criteria for the evaluation of 
litigation and arbitration systems. These four sets of core principles include: (1) accessibility 
(access to litigation and arbitration proceedings), (2) competence of adjudicators 
(independence, impartiality, integrity and neutrality), (3) fairness of proceedings (due 
process, formality/autonomy and transparency/confidentiality), and (4) efficiency (time and 
expense) and enforcement (finality and enforceability).  
However, simply listing the core principles is insufficient for the evaluation of 
litigation and arbitration systems. The following Section 2.3 continues to study the 
connotations of the core principles, the specific requirements for the fulfilment of the core 
principles in litigation and arbitration systems and the substantial effects of these core 
principles on litigation and arbitration proceedings. Meanwhile, it should be noted that 
litigation and arbitration lay diverging emphases on several procedural issues. Accordingly, 
the specific requirements are not always the same in litigation and arbitration. These 
differences between litigation and arbitration are also covered in the following Section 2.3 
to clarify how the core principles are fulfilled in a relatively different manner in litigation 
and arbitration. 
2.3 Fulfilment of the Core Principles in Litigation and Arbitration: Specific 
Requirements and Substantial Effects 
2.3.1 Accessibility: The Procedural Precondition for Substantive Justice 
3URFHGXUDODFFHVVLELOLW\LVFORVHO\OLQNHGWREXWQRWWKHVDPHDVWKHQRWLRQRIµDFFHVV
WRMXVWLFH¶44 $VGHILQHGLQ&DSSHOOHWWLDQG*DUWK¶VFODVVLFZRUNWKHFRQFept of access to 
justice is two-fold: legal mechanisms, such as litigation and arbitration,45 should be both (1) 
                                                 
from a Law & Economics Perspective', (2016) Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series No. 16-37, pp. 1-25. Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860584. Last visited in June 2016; Steven Shavell, 
'Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis', 24 (1995) Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1-24. 
44  +RZHYHU LW VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW WKH WHUP µDFFHVV WR MXVWLFH¶ DUH QRUPDOly not directly used in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOGRFXPHQWVRUOLWHUDWXUH7KHQRWLRQRIµDFFHVVWRMXVWLFH¶LVIUHTXHQWO\UHSUHVHQWHGE\
RWKHUVLPLODUWHUPVVXFKDVµWKHULJKWWRDQHIIHFWLYHUHPHG\¶DQGµWKHULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO¶)RUWHUPLQRORJ\
see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2011), supra note 25, pp. 14-15. 
45 Traditionally, litigation is the main legal mechanism to ensure access to justice. However, the rise of the 
ADR movement in the 1970s has largely changed the landscape of dispute resolution. Arbitration, as well 
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equally accessible and (2) substantively just, so that people can find reliable legal 
mechanisms to resolve their disputes and protect their rights.46  To a large extent, the first 
half of this concept, namely procedural accessibility, is the precondition for substantive 
justice in the second half. Without assured procedural accessibility, disputants cannot gain 
access to litigation and arbitration systems, which renders subsequent proceedings 
meaningless, let alone providing disputants with just results in the end. 47  
(1) Accessibility Requirements in Litigation 
In litigation, whether a disputant can readily find access to courts mainly relies on 
three issues. First, an appropriate set of jurisdiction rules should be clearly stated in law, so 
that disputants can readily find the proper courts to submit their disputes. Second, a suitable 
case-filing mechanism should be established, so that the submissions of disputants can be 
processed properly and the following proceedings can be started in a timely manner. Third, 
necessary information on courts and proceedings should be clearly stated and easily 
accessed by disputants, so that the disputants can find the requirements for the submissions 
of their cases and adequately prepare for the following litigation proceedings.48  
Meanwhile, legal aid should be provided to ensure all the disputants can find equal 
access to courts.49 Litigation proceedings may incur high cost. Disputants need to pay both 
the litigation fees and the attorney fees. Although the cost may not be a major concern for 
all the disputants,50 disputants who suffer from financial difficulties may find their access 
to courts blocked for cost reasons. They may also face the disadvantageous situation that 
they cannot obtain reasonable legal representation in litigation proceedings, if they cannot 
afford the high cost for the attorney fees. As a consequence, the cost of litigation 
proceedings should be reduced for the poor to remove the financial obstacles before their 
                                                 
as other ADR mechanisms, has been playing an increasingly important role in ensuring access to justice in 
the past few decades. See Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1978), supra note 31, pp. 196-227; Austin 
Sarat, 'The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the Critical 
Assumptions', 37 (1985) Rutgers Law Review, pp. 319-336; Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, 
Nancy H. Rogers and Sarah Rudolph Cole (2012), supra note 36, pp. 4-6. 
46 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1978), supra note 31, pp. 196-227. 
47 Deborah L. Rhode, 'Access to Justice', 69 (2001) Fordham Law Review, pp. 1786-1787. 
48  Recommendations No. R (81) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures 
Facilitating Access to Justice (1981), adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 May 1981, Principles 
1 and 2. 
49 For a classic theoretical discussion on the issue of legal aid, see John S. Bradway, 'Legal Aid: Its Concept, 
Organization and Importance', 14 (1954) Louisiana Law Review, pp. 554-567. See also E Johnson, 'Access 
to Justice: Legal Representation of the Poor' (2001) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences, pp. 8048-8055. 
50 For example, the litigation cost is not necessarily a major concern for commercial disputants, especially 
those multinational corporations, though they may also want to reduce the cost spent in litigation 
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access to courts, while disputants suffering from financial difficulties should also be 
financially supported to enable them to find suitable legal representation in courts.51 
(2) Accessibility Requirements in Arbitration 
In arbitration, the mandate of the arbitration tribunal to adjudicate disputes comes from 
the mutual consent of the parties. As a consequence, whether arbitration proceedings can 
be accessible largely depends on the availability of valid arbitration agreements, the very 
µXQGHUSLQQLQJ¶ RI DUELWUDWLRQ SURFHHGLQJV52 In the 1958 New York Convention, written 
agreements, defined legal relationship and arbitrable subject matters are set up as the three 
basic requirements that valid arbitration agreements should meet.53 Apart from these three 
basic requirements, other extra requirements regarding the validity of arbitration 
agreements should be avoided, because undue extra requirements may increase the burden 
of the parties in drafting arbitration agreements and exert negative effects on the 
accessibility of arbitration proceedings. This is particularly important for the parties who 
are relatively unfamiliar with arbitration laws in foreign jurisdictions. Their accessibility to 
arbitration proceedings may be affected if there are undue additional requirements which 
they cannot adequately fulfil, even though they have the true intention to arbitrate their 
disputes.54 
0HDQZKLOHWKHSULQFLSOHRIµKompetenz-Kompetenz¶Competence-Competence) and 
the principle of separability should also be recognized in law. The principle of competence-
competence requires that arbitration tribunals should be entitled to the right to rule on their 
own jurisdiction.55 This principle guarantees that the validity of arbitration agreements can 
be directly decided by the arbitration tribunal and the arbitration tribunal should not be 
subject to other authoritative bodies such as arbitration institutions or courts when deciding 
                                                 
51 Recommendation No. R (93) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Effective Access to 
the Law and to Justice for the Very Poor (1993), adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 January 1993, 
Articles 1 and 3. 
52 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 5. 
53 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958), adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in June 1958 and came into force on 
7 June 1959, Article II. For a useful analysis of these requirements, see Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra 
note 52, pp. 20-38. 
54 Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, pp. 18-20. 
55 However, it should be noted that the power of the arbitration tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction is 
not unlimited. The courts can review the issues of the validity of arbitration agreements in the process of 
judicial review. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), Article 16 and 
Paragraphs 25 & 26 in the explanatory note. 
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the jurisdiction issue.56 The principle of separability enables arbitration agreements to be 
separated from other contractual terms, so that the validity of arbitration agreements will 
not be affected if other contractual terms turn out to be invalid. These two principles 
guarantee that the procedural accessibility to arbitration proceedings will not be affected by 
external issues such as undue judicial intervention or other invalid contractual terms. 
2.3.2 Competence of Adjudicators: Professionalism, Independence, Impartiality, 
Integrity and Neutrality 
The competence of adjudicators directly determines whether just decisions can be 
made in litigation and arbitration. As discussed later, the competence of adjudicators should 
be understood in a broader sense, which refers to not only the professional quality of 
adjudicators, but also several important attributes of adjudicators as the neutral third, 
including independence, impartiality and integrity. 
(1) Professional Quality: The Basis for Adjudicators to Properly Handle Cases 
Both litigation and arbitration emphasize the professional quality of adjudicators. 
Judges and arbitrators need sufficient legal knowledge, adjudicative experience and 
professional skills to hold hearings and render decisions. Their professional quality directly 
determines whether the facts can be correctly ascertained and the laws can be properly 
applied.57  
,QOLWLJDWLRQ MXGJHV¶SURIHVVLRQDOTXDOLW\SOD\VDFHQWUDOUROHLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI
courts.58 A suitable qualification mechanism should be established to ensure that potential 
judges receive systematic legal education and master necessary legal knowledge. Proper 
training mechanisms should also be developed for recruited judges to continually enhance 
their professional skills. Besides, reasonable treatment regarding salary, welfare and career 
prospects should be provided to judges, so that the courts can attract and retain professional 
judges and maintain the overall professional quality of the courts at an appropriate level.59 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ralph Cavanagh and Austin Sarat, 'Thinking about Courts: Toward and Beyond Jurisprudence of Judicial 
Competence', 14 (1980) Law & Society Review, p. 380. 
58 )RUH[DPSOHMXGJHV¶SURIHVVLRQDOTXDOLW\LVQRUPDOO\DNH\LQGLFDWRULQMXGLFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHVXUYH\V
Peter A. Joy, 'A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example', 52 (2001) South Carolina Law 
Review, pp. 690-692. 
59 Peverill Squire, 'Measuring the Professionalization of U. S. State Courts of Last Resort', 8 (2008) State 
Politics and Policy Quarterly, p. 225. 
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Equally important is the internal court management, which decides whether the 
workload assigned to judges is appropriate.60 Too heavy workload will inevitably affect the 
performance of judges in adjudication. Accordingly, courts should set up proper rules to 
ensure that judges are not under the pressure of excessive workload. For example, judges 
should be free from non-adjudicative work. Administrative tasks should be assigned to 
MXGJHV¶ DVVLVWDQWV DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH VWDII LQ FRXUWV VR WKDW MXGJHV¶ QRQ-adjudicative 
workload can be reduced and they can concentrate more on the adjudicative work.61 
Slightly different from litigation, arbitration not only pays attention to the general 
SURIHVVLRQDO TXDOLW\ RI DUELWUDWRUV EXW DOVR OD\V D VSHFLDO HPSKDVLV RQ DUELWUDWRUV¶
specialized expertise in commerce. 62  Unlike judges in litigation who are normally 
generalists and randomly appointed by the courts, arbitrators in international commercial 
arbitration are expected to be specialists in commerce and purposefully selected by the 
parties. Professional arbitrators are required to understand the nature of commerce, the 
features of international commercial transactions and the peculiarities of specialized 
commercial industries.63 Therefore, arbitration institutions should provide disputants with 
sufficient support to ensure selected arbitrators have the specialized knowledge and 
experience for handling their disputes.  
(2) Independence, Impartiality, Integrity and Neutrality: The Importance of the Neutral 
Third 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Recommendation No. R (86)12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning Measures 
to Prevent and Reduce the Excessive Workload in the Courts (1986), adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 16 September 1986, Article I. 
62 This is evident in both sFKRODUV¶FRPPHQWVDQGHPSLULFDOVWDWLVWLFV)RUVFKRODUV¶FRPPHQWVVHHHJ
Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, 'Why Do Business Use (or not Use) Arbitration Clauses?', 
25 (2010) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, pp. 14-15; Hayford Stephen and Ralph Peeples, 
'Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue', 10 (1995) Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution, p. 408. For empirical studies, see e.g. Christian Buhring-Uhle, 'A Survey on 
Arbitration and Settlement in International Business Disputes', in Christopher R. Drahozal and Richard W. 
Naimark (eds.), Towards a Science of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2005), p. 54; 
Queen Mary School of International Arbitration, 'Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry 
Perspectives', (2013) Queen Mary School of International Arbitration research projects, p. 8. Available at 
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2013/index.html. Last visited in June 2016. 
63 Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, pp. 80-82; Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, pp. 4-5. However, 
it should be noted that some experiment courts with a special focus on commercial disputes have been 
established in recent years, which share some similarities with commercial arbitration in the recruitment 
and appointment of adjudicators. Unlike traditional courts, the expertise of judges in commerce is 
particularly emphasized in these courts. See Christopher R. Drahozal, 'Business Courts and the Future of 
Arbitration', 10 (2009) Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 491-507. 
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Judges and arbitrators need to be professional, so that they can handle cases properly, 
while they also need to be independent and impartial, so that their decisions are not biased 
or manipulated.64 Independence and impartiality have a close connection between each 
other. Judges and arbitrators are expected to be impartial, disinterested and unbiased before 
the parties and to be able to decide the disputes based only on facts and laws.65 Their 
impartiality, however, is at risk when they cannot independently make their own decisions 
or, more specifically, when they are affected by undue interference from the parties, court 
officials, government organs, the media and the public. Thus, to a large extent, the 
maintenance of impartiality is on the premise of a sound status of independence.66 
Judicial independence is a basic principle in litigation.67 As argued by Larkins, judicial 
LQGHSHQGHQFHQRWRQO\VHFXUHVWKHSRVLWLRQRIMXGJHVDVWKHµQHXWUDOWKLUG¶DQGHQDEOHVWKHP
WRµHQDFWQHXWUDOMXVWLFH¶EXWDOVRSURWHFWVMXGJHVIURPWKHPDQLSXODWLRQRISROLWLFDORUJDQV
which provides courts with the leverage to restrict government power.68  
The requirements of judicial independence are illustrated from different perspectives 
in literature. First, from the perspective of the decision-making process, a fundamental form 
of judicial independence is the so-FDOOHG µGHFLVLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ 'HFLVLRQDO
                                                 
64 Independence and impartiality are important characters of both judges in litigation and arbitrators in 
arbitration. For related literature on litigation, see e.g. John Ferejohn, 'Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence', 72 (1999) South Carolina Law Review, pp. 353-384; Frances 
Kahn Zemans, 'The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence', 72 (1999) Southern California 
Law Review, pp. 625-656; Christopher M. Larkins, 'Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis', 44 (1996) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 605-626; 
Owen M. Fiss, 'The Limits of Judicial Independence', 25 (1993) University of Miami Inter-American Law 
Review, pp. 57-76. For related literature on arbitration, see e.g. Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, 'Judicial 
Independence in International Tribunals', 93 (2009) California Law Review, pp. 1-74; Ilhyung Lee, 
'Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International Arbitrator (with Survey Results)', 31 (2008) 
Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 603-633; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 'The Party-Appointed Arbitrator 
in International Controversies: Some Reflections', 30 (1995) Texas International Law Journal, pp. 59-70. 
65 Christopher M. Larkins (1996), supra note 64, p. 608; Ilhyung Lee (2008), supra note 64, p. 606. 
66  In a strict sense, there are subtle conceptual differences between independence and impartiality. 
Independence requires that judges and arbitrators are not influenced by others and freely make the decisions 
by themselves. Impartiality, on the other hand, not only requires that judges and arbitrators independently 
decide cases by themselves, but also emphasizes that judges and arbitrators themselves are disinterested 
and unbiased. But, there is no substantial need to draw a clear line between independence and impartiality, 
DV WKH\ ERWK DLP WR HQVXUH WKH µQHXWUDO MXVWLFH¶ 6HH Ilhyung Lee (2008), supra note 64, pp. 605-607; 
Christopher M. Larkins (1996), supra note 64, pp. 608-611. 
67 John Ferejohn (1999), supra note 64, p. 353; Owen M. Fiss (1993), supra note 64, p. 57. 
68 Christopher M. Larkins (1996), supra note 64, pp. 608-609. 
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independence requires that judges should be free from any undue interference in litigation 
proceedings and be able to make their own decisions based on facts and laws.69 
Second, from the perspective of sources of interference, judicial independence can be 
IXUWKHUEURNHQGRZQLQWRWKUHHIRUPVQDPHO\µSDUW\GHWDFKPHQW¶LQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKH
SDUWLHV µLQGLYLGXDO DXWRQRP\¶ LQGHSHQGHQFH IURP RWKHU MXGJHV VXSHULRUV DQG
bureaucratic control of thHMXGLFLDOV\VWHPDQGµSROLWLFDO LQVXODULW\¶LQGHSHQGHQFHIURP
political organs and the public).70 Similarly, by separating the interference inside or outside 
WKH MXGLFLDU\ MXGLFLDO LQGHSHQGHQFH FDQ EH FDWHJRUL]HG DV µLQWHUQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ DQG
µH[WHUQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ 71  Simply put, judges should be independent from undue 
interference from any other persons or entities, regardless of whether these persons or 
entities are inside or outside judicial systems. 
Third, from the perspective of the protection of jXGJHV MXGJHV¶ µSHUVRQDO
LQGHSHQGHQFH¶VKRXOGEHUHWDLQHG7KHDSSRLQWPHQWDVVHVVPHQWSURPRWLRQSXQLVKPHQW
demotion, removal and remuneration of judges should be based on appropriate pre-set rules 
and be free from undue interference, so that judges can independently make the decisions 
without worrying that their decisions may lead to adverse consequences.72 Meanwhile, the 
MXGLFLDU\ DV D FROOHFWLYH HQWLW\ VKRXOGPDLQWDLQ LWV µLQVWLWXWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ DQG EH
strong enough to maintain its independent position in the general socio-political system, so 
that it can withstand the pressure outside the judiciary and provide adequate institutional 
protection for judges.73   
However, it should be noted that judicial independence should not be interpreted in a 
narrow sense. Mere assurance of judicial independence does not necessarily lead to a just 
result, as judges may become partial or biased if they do not strictly adhere to professional 
ethics. Similar to any other power, the power to adjudicate is also vulnerable to abuse 
                                                 
69 Frances Kahn Zemans (1999), supra note 64, p. 628. 
70 Owen M. Fiss (1993), supra note 64, pp. 58-60. 
71 6LPLODU WR )LVV¶V FODVVLILFDWLRQ LQWHUQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH PDLQO\ UHIHUV WR LQGHSHQGHQFH IUHH IURP WKH
interference of senior judges and higher level courts. External independence main refers to independence 
from the interference of the parties, political organs and the public. See Randall Peerenboom, 'Judicial 
Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions', (2008) La Trobe Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2008/11, p. 3. Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1283179. Last visited in June 2016. 
72 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985), adopted by the Seventh United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1985, Paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 18 
and 19. 
73 John Ferejohn (1999), supra note 64, pp. 353-356. 
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without appropriate limitation and supervision.74 Thus, judges should be independent but 
they should also be held responsible for their misbehaviour.75 One representative example 
RI MXGJHV¶PLVEHKDYLRXU LVFRUUXSWLRQ0DQ\VWXGLHV VXJJHVW WKDWcorruption has already 
become a major threat to the integrity and impartiality of judges.76  
To maintain integrity and impartiality, judges are expected to strictly follow 
professional ethics,77 which requires two kinds of efforts, both internal and external.78 On 
the one hand, judges should improve their personal moral level and maintain self-discipline 
internally. On the other hand, external mechanisms for the assurance of judicial ethics 
should also be developed. For example, legal documents should be issued within the 
judiciary to provide judges with the necessary guidance on professional ethics.79 
                                                 
74 For example, Ferejohn suggests that sole protection of independence cannot guarantee that judges will 
DFWSURSHUO\LQDGMXGLFDWLRQ-XGJHV¶LQVXODWLRQIURPWKHRXWVLGHZRUOGVKRXOGEe limited, otherwise the 
judiciary will rule without any constraint, which may lead the abuse of the adjudicative power. Ibid. 
75 It should be noted that there is a natural tension between independence and accountability. For a useful 
analysis on this issue, see Francesco Contini and Richard Mohr, 'Reconciling Independence and 
Accountability in Judicial Systems', 3 (2007) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 26-43. 
76  See e.g. Petter Langseth, 'Strengthening Judicial Integrity Against Corruption', (2001) 'Global 
Programme Against Corruption' Conference Papers. Available at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp10.pdf. Last visited in June 2016; Cyrille Fijnaut 
and Leo Huberts, 'Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement', in C. J. C. F. Fijnaut and L. Huberts (eds.), 
Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 3-37; Mark E. Warren, 
'What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?', 48 (2004) American Journal of Political Science, pp. 328-
343. 
77 +HUHWKHWHUPµLQWHJULW\¶PDLQO\UHfers to the requirement that judges and arbitrators should follow their 
SURIHVVLRQDOHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV%XWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHFRQQRWDWLRQVRIWKHWHUPµLQWHJULW\¶PD\EH
GLIIHUHQWLQOLWHUDWXUH)RUH[DPSOHµMXGLFLDOLQWHJULW\¶FDQUHIHUWRWKH µFRPSOHWHQHVV¶RIWKHMXGLFLDU\LQ
academic debates. See e.g. Jeffrey Goldworthy, 'The Preamble, Judicial Independence and Judicial 
Integrity', 11 (2000) Forum Constitutionnel, pp. 60-64; Elbert P. Tuttle and W. Russell, 'Preserving Judicial 
Integrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judiciary under the "Blending" of Powers', 37 (1988) Emory 
Law Journal, pp. 587-612.  
6FKRODUVPD\DOVRXVHµLQWHJULW\¶DVDQRYHU-arching principle in litigation. For example, Henderson and 
$XWKHPDQOLVWHLJKWHHQµMXGLFLDOLQWHJULW\SULQFLSOHV¶LQWKH,)(6¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO)RXQGDWLRQIRU(OHFWRUDO
Systems) model framework for monitoring judicial reforms. Keith Henderson and Violaine Autheman, 
'Global Best Practices: A Model State of the Judiciary Report-A Strategic Tool for Promoting, Monitoring 
and Reporting on Judicial Integrity Reforms', (2004) IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) 
Rule of Law White Paper Series. Available at http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20 
PaperReport/2004/26/WhitePaper_6_FINAL.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. 
78 Soeharno Jonathan, 'Is Judicial Integrity a Norm? An Inquiry into the Concept of Judicial Integrity in 
England and the Netherlands', 3 (2007) Utrecht Law Review, p. 22. 
79 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Judges: 
Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities (2010), adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 
November 2010, Paragraphs 72 and 73; Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) (2010), 
Paragraphs 18 and 19. 
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Similar to judges in litigation, arbitrators in arbitration should also fulfil the 
requirements of independence, impartiality and integrity, so that they can maintain a neutral 
SRVLWLRQEHIRUHWKHSDUWLHV+RZHYHULWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHWHUPµQHXWUDOLW\¶LVQRUPDOO\
understood in a more strict sense in arbitration. As argued by Lalive, although neutrality 
FDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµV\QRQ\PRXV¶ZLWKLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGimpartiality, it bears a particular 
PHDQLQJ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI DUELWUDWLRQ ZKLFK µJRHV IXUWKHU WKDQ LQGHSHQGHQFH RU
LPSDUWLDOLW\¶ 80  This extra meaning normally refers to the neutrality in nationality: 
arbitrators, the sole or presiding arbitrators in particular, are expected to be neutral in 
nationality.81  
As evident in both empirical studies and academic debates, the neutrality of the sole 
or presiding arbitrator is particularly valued by disputants in international commercial 
arbitration.82 It is not difficult to understand why such an emphasis on neutral nationality 
exists in international commercial arbitration. Generally speaking, when selecting the sole 
or presiding arbitrator, one party will naturally prefer to choose an arbitrator who has the 
same nationality as them or at least avoid choosing an arbitrator who has the same 
nationality as the other party.83 As a consequence, to maintain the equal status, the parties 
need to agree on appointing an arbitrator whose nationality is different from both sides as 
the sole or presiding arbitrator, so that the overall neutrality of the arbitration tribunal can 
be achieved.84 This is also why the sole or presiding arbitrator in an arbitration tribunal is 
                                                 
80 Pierre Lalive, 'On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of Arbitration', in Claude Reymond 
and Eugene Bucher (eds.), Swiss Essays on International Arbitration (Schulthess Polygraphisher Verlag, 
1984), p. 24. 
81 In a broader sense, all the arbitrators in the arbitration tribunal should be independent, impartial and 
neutral. However, such requirements on the party-appointed arbitrators is normally less strict than those on 
the sole/presiding arbitrator. For example, in a three-arbitrator tribunal, each party can select one arbitrator 
as they wish, and the third presiding arbitrator is mutually selected by the parties or designated by the 
corresponding authorities. It is a common practice that the two party-appointed arbitrators can have the 
same nationalities as the parties who appointed them. But, the third presiding arbitrator is normally 
expected to have a neutral nationality which is different from both parties, so that the overall neutrality of 
the arbitration tribunal can be guaranteed. Ibid. 
82 For empirical surveys, see e.g. Queen Mary School of International Arbitration (2013), supra note 62, p. 
8; Christian Buhring-Uhle (2005), supra note 62, p. 25. )RUVFKRODUV¶FRPPHQWVVHHHJChristopher R. 
Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware (2010), supra note 62, p. 25; Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. Keer, 
'International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business 
People', 30 (2002) International Business Lawyer, p. 30. 
83 Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 74; Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, p. 3. 
84 In a broader sense, a neutral substantive law, a neutral arbitration language, a neutral arbitration seat and 
a neutral place of oral hearing are also important to the parties. These issues are normally selected based 
RQSDUWLHV¶DJUHHPHQWVDQGWKHQHXWUDOLW\RIWKHVHLVVXHVGHSHQGVPRUHRQWKHSDUWLHVWKDQWKHDUELWUDWLRQ
institutions. Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 74.  
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normally required to have a neutral nationality that is diffeUHQW IURP WKH SDUWLHV¶
nationalities.85 
2.3.3 Fairness of Proceedings: Due process, Party Autonomy, Transparency and 
Confidentiality 
The parties should be provided with equal and sufficient opportunities to defend their 
claims with evidence and statements. As discussed later, litigation and arbitration are rather 
similar to each other in this regard. However, as a private dispute resolution mechanism 
which is fundamentally based on the consent of the parties, arbitration lays a particular 
emphasis on the autonomy of the parties and the flexibility of the proceedings, while 
litigation pays more attention to the formality of the proceedings. Meanwhile, litigation and 
arbitration also diverge from each other on the openness of the proceedings. While 
transparency is recognized as a basic principle to be fulfilled in litigation, privacy is 
normally more emphasized in arbitration. 
(1) Due Process: The basis for a Fair Procedure 
Due process is a complicated notion, the connotations of which are quite wide in 
academic debates.86 In terms of litigation proceedings, due process, in its basic sense, refers 
to procedural safeguards in hearings, which provides equal and sufficient opportunities for 
the disputing parties to defend their claims with speech and evidence.87 In FrLHQGO\¶VFODVVLF
DQGLQIOXHQWLDODUWLFOHKHOLVWVWKHEDVLFUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWDKHDULQJVKRXOGIXOILOWREHµGXH¶
First, as mentioned in the last section, the decision-making tribunals should be impartial. 
Second, the parties should be given timely, clear and sufficient notifications about the 
                                                 
85 This requirement can be found in Article 6 (3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See also Ilhyung 
Lee (2008), supra note 64, p. 607. 
86 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States constitution, namely the due process clauses, 
are important issues in American academic debates. The Supreme Courts of the United StatHV¶
interpretations to these clauses in Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge cases sparked off heated 
academic debates, which covers not only procedural and judicial sectors, but also substantive, 
administrative and legislative fields. For a general discussion on this issue, see Jason Parkin, 'Adaptable 
Due Process', 160 (2012) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1309-1377. See also Richard H. 
Fallon, 'Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies', 93 (1993) 
Columbia Law Review, pp. 309-373; Martin H. Redish and Lawrence C. Marshall, 'Adjudicatory 
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process', 95 (1986) Yale Law Journal, pp. 455-505; 
Lawrece H. Tribe, 'Structural Due Process', 10 (1975) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 
pp. 269-321. 
+RZHYHU DVGLVFXVVHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJSDUDJUDSKV LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ WKH WHUP µGXHSURFHVV¶ LV XVHG LQ D
relatively narrow sense in this thesis, which mainly refers to the procedural requirements that ensures the 
availability of equal and sufficient opportunities for the parties to defend their claims in litigation and 
arbitration. 
87 Henry J. Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing', 123 (1975) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 1277. 
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upcoming proceedings, so that they can make necessary preparations. Third, the parties 
should be able to challenge the claims that are adverse to them. Fourth, the parties should 
be entitled to present, examine and contest the evidence, and the decisions should be based 
only on the evidence that has been presented and examined. Fifth, the parties should have 
the right to counsel. Lastly, the decisions rendered by the tribunals should be in writing, and 
they should illustrate the facts that are found and the reasoning for the decisions.88 
These basic requirements are also observable in arbitration. By and large, arbitration 
shares a similar procedural structure as litigation. 89As noticed by Sabatino, the basic 
procedural rights of prior notice, debate, evidence and counsel are also recognized in 
DUELWUDWLRQZKLFKJLYHVDUELWUDWLRQDµOLWLJDWLRQOLWH¶DSSHDUDQFH90 However, compared with 
litigation, arbitration pays less attention to the formality and rigorousness of proceedings. 
Rather, as exemplified by optional written hearings, simplified discovery proceedings and 
the omission of the appeal procedure, arbitration lays greater emphasis on the possibility of 
providing less lengthy and resource-consuming proceedings to strike a balance between 
fairness and efficiency.91 Thus, with regard to due process requirements, litigation and 
arbitration proceedings are roughly analogous to each other in a general sense, though these 
UHTXLUHPHQWVDUHIXOILOOHGLQDOHVVµVWULQJHQW¶PDQQer in arbitration.92  
(2) Party Autonomy and Flexibility: The Particular Emphasis of Arbitration 
,Q FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK OLWLJDWLRQ¶V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH IRUPDOLW\ RI WKH SURFHHGLQJV
arbitration pays more attention to party autonomy and the flexibility of the proceedings. 
While litigation proceedings are generally fixed and relatively rigorous, arbitration 
SURFHHGLQJVDUHQRUPDOO\VXEMHFWWRPRGLILFDWLRQEDVHGRQWKHSDUWLHV¶GHVLJQDWLRQ 
                                                 
88 It should that these requirements, as pointed out by Friendly, are not only applicable to litigation, but 
also to other kinds of hearings as long as they determine the rights and duties of individuals. Ibid., pp. 
1279-1295. 
89 See Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi, 'Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International Arbitration', 
3 (2015) Groningen Journal of International Law, pp. 111-116; Jeffrey Waincymer, 'Promoting Fairness 
and Efficiency of Procedures in International Commercial Arbitration: Identifying Uniform Model Norms', 
3 (2010) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, p. 31; Matti S. Kurkela, Santtu Turunen and Conflict 
Management Institute, Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 1-12. 
90 Jack M. Sabatino, 'ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded within 
Alternative Dispute Resolution', 47 (1998) Emory Law Journal, p. 1349. 
91 Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi (2015), supra note 89, p. 124; Jeffrey Waincymer (2010), supra note 
89, p. 60. But, of course, aVWRGD\¶VDUELWUDWLRQEHFRPHVLQFUHDVLQJO\OLWLJDWLRQ-like, the parties can also 
choose to conduct their arbitration proceedings in a more litigation manner. Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
'Arbitration: The "New Litigation"' (2010) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 11-19. 
92 Jack M. Sabatino (1998), supra note 90, p. 1349. 
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3DUW\DXWRQRP\LVRQHLPSRUWDQWLIQRWWKH³SDUDPRXQW´YDOXHLQDUELWUDWLRQ.93 It is 
also a fundamental principle, which is extensively studied in theory,94 widely accepted in 
law95 and generally followed in practice.96 ,QWRGD\¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPHUFLDODUELWUDWLRQ
the parties have the freedom to decide many procedural issues in arbitration proceedings 
according to their own specific needs, as long as their decisions are not against public 
interest and mandatory legal rules. They can decide whether to conduct an ad hoc arbitration 
or opt for institutional arbitration. They can designate the laws governing substantive 
matters, as well as the rules applicable to procedural matters such as the validity of their 
arbitration agreements. They also have the freedom to decide arbitrators, the arbitration seat, 
the arbitration language as well as other major or minor procedural issues in international 
commercial arbitration.97 
The fulfilment of the principle of party autonomy in arbitration is important to the 
parties because they can find more certainty and predictability if the procedural issues can 
be ascertained before they initiate arbitration proceedings. 98  This is also why party 
                                                 
93 (GZDUGGHVFULEHGSDUW\DXWRQRP\DVWKH³SDUDPRXQWYDOXH´LQDUELWUDWLRQEdward Brunet (2006), supra 
note 37, pp. 3-7. For the importance of party autonomy in international commercial arbitration, see also 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, 'The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape 
of Dispute Resolution', 8 (2007) Nevada Law Journal, pp. 462-473; Rachel Engle, 'Party Autonomy in 
International Arbitration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability', 15 (2002) Transnational Lawyer, 
pp. 349-356. 
94 The doctrine of party autonomy is an important topic in the field of private international law. See e.g. 
Mo Zhang, 'Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of Contractual Choice of Law', 20 
(2006) Emory International Law Review, pp. 511-561; Edith Friedler, 'Party Autonomy Revisited: A 
Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-law Problem', 37 (1989) Kansas Law Review, pp. 471-527. See also Fleur 
Johns, 'Performing Party Autonomy', 71 (2008) Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 243-271. 
95 Born provides a comprehensive summary of major legal rules concerning international commercial 
arbitration and the recognition of party autonomy in these legal rules. See Gary Born (2014), supra note 
38, pp. 97-217. See also Friedrich K. Juenger, 'The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law', 60 (2000) 
Louisiana Law Review, p. 1141. 
96 In the practice of modern international commercial arbitration, nearly all the participants, including 
parties, arbitrators, arbitration institutions and courts, pay at least due respect to the principle of party 
autonomy. See Thomas J. Stipanowich (2007), supra note 93, p. 436; Rachel Engle (2002), supra note 93, 
pp. 324-325. See also Ar. Gor. Seyda Dursun, 'A Critical Examination of the Role of Party Autonomy in 
International Commercial Arbitration and an Assessment of its Role and Extent', 1 (2012) Yalova 
Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Dergisi, pp. 162-164. 
97 The autonomy of the parties in designating procedural issues, such as arbitrators, seat, language, hearing 
place, procedural rules and substantive laws, is confirmed in the UNICTRAL Model Law and the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), 
Articles 10, 11, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28 (1); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Articles 8, 9, 10, 18, 19 
and 35. 
98 Simply put, if the parties can acknowledge the governing rules in advance, they can then act accordingly 
and also predict the outcomes of their behaviour based on the rules. This can largely increases the certainty 
and predictability of commercial activities and potential dispute resolution processes. See Rachel Engle 
(2002), supra note 93, pp. 323-356; Friedrich K. Juenger (2000), supra note 95, pp. 1133-1150.  
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autonomy is one of the most attractive merits of arbitration for businessmen.99 Furthermore, 
party autonomy also enables the parties to tailor their own arbitration proceedings and thus 
largely increases the flexibility of arbitration proceedings. The parties can select the modes 
of hearings (oral or written, adversarial or inquisitional and open or closed). They can decide 
the scope of discovery and the mode of evidence presentation and examination. They can 
also decide the time, place and length of hearings.100 As a result, commercial disputants can 
adjust the details of arbitration proceedings to fit their own specific needs in arbitration. 
Overall, the essence of party autonomy is the respect to WKHSDUWLHV¶ZLOODQGFRQVHQW
LQWKHSURFHHGLQJVRUDVDUJXHGE\%UXQHWµDOORFDWLQJGLVSXWLQJSRZHUDQGIUHHGRPWRWKH
GLVSXWDQWV¶101  $V D FRQVHTXHQFH WR HQVXUH SDUW\ DXWRQRP\ LQ DUELWUDWLRQ WKH SDUWLHV¶
freedom in designating the aforementioned arbitral issues should be recognized in both 
national laws and institutional arbitration rules, while the autonomy of the parties should 
also be substantially respected in practice.102 
(3) Transparency and Confidentiality: The Diverging Designs of Litigation and 
Arbitration 
Litigation and arbitration also diverge from each other in the procedural preferences 
RYHU WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ ,Q OLWLJDWLRQ WUDQVSDUHQF\ UHIHUV WR WKH µRSHQ
RSHUDWLRQ¶RIWKHMXGLFLDU\103 It requires that necessary information on judicial work should 
be publicly accessible, which enables the public to scrutinize the work of courts.104 In a 
narrow sense, court decisions and hearings should be open to the public.105 In a broad sense, 
important issues regarding the administration of courts, such as personnel, funds and 
judicial statistics, should also be transparent to the public.106  
                                                 
99 Christopher R. Drahozal (2009), supra note 63, pp. 491-507; Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, 
pp. 3-4. 
100 Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 85. 
101 Edward Brunet (2006), supra note 37, p. 3. 
102 Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, p. 2. 
103 Alvaro Herrero and Gaspar Lopez, 'Access to Information and Transparency in the Judiciary: A Guide 
to Good Practices from Latin America', (2010) World Bank Governance Working Paper Series, p. 9. 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-1259011531325/6598384-
1268250334206/Transparency_Judiciary.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. 
104 Hon. T. S. Ellis, 'Sealing, Judicial Transparency and Judicial Independence', 53 (2008) Villanova Law 
Review, p. 940. 
105 If a public hearing may harm morals, public order or national security, the hearing can be held with 
closed doors when necessary. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), opened for 
signature on 16 December 1966 and came into force on 23 March 1976, Article 14 (1). 
106 Alvaro Herrero and Gaspar Lopez (2010), supra note 2010, pp. 3-5. 
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The fulfilment of judicial transparency can bring many positive effects to litigation 
proceedings. First, judicial transparency tightens the connections between courts and the 
public, which can enhance the authority and legitimacy of the judiciary and increase the 
SXEOLF¶VFRQILGHQFHDQGWUXVWLQFRXUWV107 Second, transparency also plays an important role 
in strengthening independence, impartiality and integrity.108   Under the surveillance of the 
public, improper activities such as judicial corruption or undue interference will be more 
easily revealed. Thus, there is a larger possibility that the wrongdoers can be held 
responsible for their misbehaviour. Subject to this deterrence effect, judges have stronger 
incentives to follow professional ethics, while corruption activities and undue interference 
on judges can be reduced. Third, more transparency also generates more predictability. 
Disputants can make more accurate predictions about the results of their cases based on 
published court decisions. 109  In short, judicial transparency is an important tool for 
connecting the judiciary and the society. It also provides a channel for the public to monitor 
the work of courts, which ensures the realization of other important values such as 
independence, impartiality and integrity with its deterrence effects.    
Unlike litigation which is principally open to the public, arbitration proceedings are 
normally private and confidential. 110  Commercial disputants can benefit from the 
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings to more effectively protect their business 
information and preserve their public reputation. The private and closed atmosphere can 
also ease the tension between the parties, which enables them to better maintain their 
relationship.  Businessmen can thus focus more on the cases without worrying about 
unpredictable side effects caused by the publication of the cases.111 
But, it should be noted that although confidentiality is a perceived merit of arbitration 
among many scholars and practitioners, its substantial fulfilment in practice faces many 
                                                 
107 Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen and Albert Klijn, 'The Effects of Judicial Transparency on Public Trust: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment' (2015) Public Administration, p. 1; Wim Voermans, 'Judicial 
Transparency Furthering Public Accountability for New Judiciaries', 3 (2007) Utrecht Law Review, p. 159; 
Alvaro Herrero and Gaspar Lopez (2010), supra note 2010, p. 10. 
108 Ronald D. Rotunda, 'Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector 
General for the Courts', 41 (2010) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, p. 325; Hon. T. S. Ellis (2008), 
supra note 104, pp. 939-940. 
109 Adam M. Samaha, 'Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction', 53 (2008) Villanova Law Review, 
pp. 829-854. 
110 %RUQDUJXHVWKDWWKHUHLVDGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQµSULYDWH¶DQGµFRQILGHQWLDO¶:KLOHµSULYDWH¶PDLQO\UHIHUV
to the situation that outsiders being blocked from arbitration proceedings by customary agreements, 
µFRQILGHQWLDO¶HPSKDVL]HVPRUHRQ the point that outsiders are legally prohibited from gaining access to 
arbitration proceedings. Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 89. 
111 For the merits of confidentiality in arbitration, see Edward Brunet (2006), supra note 37, pp. 3-7; Gary 
Born (2014), supra note 38, pp. 89-90. 
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challenges. Many jurisdictions do not explicitly recognize arbitral confidentiality as a 
compulsory requirement in law. Accordingly, only limited legal and judicial support can be 
expected for the protection of confidentiality. 112  Meanwhile, the absence of effective 
mechanisms against unauthorized information leakage renders it difficult to sanction the 
behaviour of improper leakage by arbitration participants. 113  Besides, information 
disclosure may also occur when arbitration cases are under judicial review. The publication 
of court decisions regarding arbitration cases will inevitably disclose some information that 
is originally confidential.114 Given that it is rather difficult to fully ensure the confidentiality 
of arbitration cases in practice, many scholars have paid attention to the tension between 
confidentiality and transparency in arbitration. Arguments arise that the confidentiality 
requirements in arbitration should be conditionally removed or at least limited.115 
However, although arbitral confidentiality raises some doubts and challenges, it is still 
widely followed by leading international arbitration institutions,116 which, as evident in 
empirical data and academic studies, is also an important concern for commercial disputants 
in forum shopping. 117  As a result, it seems necessary for arbitration legislators and 
arbitration institutions to at least make efforts to prevent the information of arbitration 
proceedings from being unduly disclosed. 
2.3.4 Efficiency and Enforcement: Timely and Substantial Remedies  
(1) Efficiency: The Importance of Expeditious Proceedings 
                                                 
112 Alexis C. Brown, 'Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in 
International Commercial Arbitration', 16 (2001) American University International Law Review, p. 974. 
Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 90. 
113 Alexis C. Brown (2001), supra note 112, pp. 1014-1016. 
114 Ibid., p. 974. 
115 One main argument of the proponents of reforming confidentiality rules in arbitration is that the 
arbitration awards should be conditionally published to enhance the case law effects of arbitration cases. 
See e.g. Cindy G. Buys, 'The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International 
Arbitration', 14 (2003) American Review of International Arbitration, pp. 121-138; Catherine A. Rogers, 
'Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration', 54 (2006) Kansas Law Review, pp. 1-44.  
116 For a summary of related articles in the institutional arbitration rules in leading international arbitration 
institutions, see Baker & McKenzie, 'Comparative Chart of Internaitional Arbitration Rules', in, September 
2014. Available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/ 
de9cf921-bd9c-4252-9364-8abc5e327d2c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/49a91f5b-30e6 
-492f-a8f8-8ba52c9c6de2/mm_disputeresolution_international_arbitration_rules_sep14.pdf. Last visited 
in June 2016. 
117 Queen Mary School of International Arbitration (2013), supra note 62, p. 8; Christopher R. Drahozal 
and Stephen J. Ware (2010), supra note 62, p. 15; Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. Keer (2002), 
supra note 82, p. 205. 
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Litigation and arbitration have a common pursuit in efficiency and the importance of 
efficiency is to some extent self-evident. An understandable demand of commercial 
disputants is to solve their disputes within a reasonable time period. They desire a just result 
and they also expect to obtain it in an expeditious way. After all, a just result may become 
valueless for commercial disputants, if it comes too late.  
The efficiency of litigation and arbitration is an interesting yet controversial topic. A 
traditional widespread perception is that arbitration is relatively quicker than litigation.118 
%XW DV WRGD\¶V DUELWUDWLRQ LV EHFRPLQJ LQFUHDVLQJO\ VRSKLVWLFDWHG DQG OLWLJDWLRQ-like, it 
seems incorrect to still insist on this perception.119 To a large extent, both mechanisms can 
become lengthy in practice and the length of these two proceedings largely depends on the 
specific conditions of individual cases. For example, arbitration cases regarding significant 
commercial interest may be as lengthy as those in litigation, while small-claim cases 
following summary proceedings in litigation can also be resolved as expeditiously as those 
LQDUELWUDWLRQ7KXVDVSRLQWHGRXWE\%RUQµLWLVXQZLVHWRPDNHVZHHSLQJJHQHUDOL]DWLRQV
DERXWZKLFKPHFKDQLVPLVQHFHVVDULO\TXLFNHU¶120 
The complexity in practice does not change the fact that efficiency is an impotent 
concern for commercial disputants when choosing between different dispute resolution 
mechanisms. For example, a study shows that whether courts in developing countries are 
µTXLFN¶LVDVLPSRUWDQWDVµIDLUKRQHVW¶DQGµDEOHWRHQIRUFHGHFLVLRQV¶IRUEXVLQHVVPHQ121 
Similar reflections can also be found in the surveys on arbitration.122 As a consequence, 
courts and arbitration institutions should make efforts to improve the efficiency of 
proceedings to ensure that the delivery of justice can be made in a timely manner. At least, 
                                                 
118 See e.g. Soia Mentschikoff, 'Commercial Arbitration', 61 (1961) Columbia Law Review, p. 847; Hayford 
Stephen and Ralph Peeples (1995), supra note 62, pp. 345-346. There are also empirical surveys that give 
support to this perception. See e.g. Herbert M. Kritzer and Jill K. Anderson, 'The Arbitration Alternative: 
A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration 
Association and the Courts', 8 (1983) Justice System Journal, pp. 6-19. 
119 Penny Brooker, 'The "Juridification" of Alternative Dispute Resolution', 28 (1999) Anglo-American 
Law Review, p. 4; Thomas J. Stipanowich, 'Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the "New Litigation"', 
7 (2009) DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, p. 1; Thomas J. Stipanowich (2010), supra note 
91, p. 402-403. 
120 Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 87. 
121 James H. Anderson, David S. Bernstein and Cheryl W. Gray, 'Judicial Systems in Transition Economies: 
Assessing the Past, Looking to the Future', (2005), p. 51. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/complete.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. 
122 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Von Kann Curtis E. and Deborah Rothman, 'Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-
Effective Commercial Arbitration', in James M. Gaitis, Carl F. Jr. Ingwalson and Vivien B. Shelanski (eds.), 
The College of Commercial Arbitrators Guide to Best Practices in Commercial Arbitration (Juris, 2010), 
p. 3; Queen Mary School of International Arbitration (2013), supra note 62, p. 5. 
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they should ensure that the cases are resolved within the time limits in laws and arbitration 
rules without undue delay. 
(2) Enforcement: The Assurance of Substantial Remedies 
In the end phase of litigation and arbitration, the enforcement of court judgements and 
arbitration awards is particularly crucial for commercial disputants. The substantial 
SURWHFWLRQRIEXVLQHVVPHQ¶VLQWHUHVWXOWLPDWHO\UHVWVZLWKZKHWKHUWKHRXWFRPHVRIOLWLJDWLRn 
and arbitration can be eventually enforced. A court judgement or an arbitration award that 
is not enforceable may become a substantially meaningless paper for commercial disputants.  
Litigation and arbitration differ from each other concerning the finality of court 
decisions and arbitration awards. Generally speaking, first instance court decisions can be 
appealed to higher level courts, so that necessary supervision can be conducted and 
erroneous decisions can be corrected accordingly. However, unlike litigation, once 
arbitration awards are issued, they are principally final and directly enforceable. Although 
arbitration awards may be reviewed by courts in the enforcement phase upon the application 
of the parties, the scope of such judicial review is normally limited to procedural issues.123 
As a result, the absence of appeal proceedings renders it difficult to rectify substantive errors 
in arbitration awards.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the omission of appeal proceedings in arbitration 
can, to some extent, reduce the length of arbitration proceedings. The disputes can come to 
an end when arbitration awards are issued, and the parties can save the extra time and 
expense that may be consumed in appeal proceedings. This is also why some businessmen 
choose to use arbitration proceedings in dispute resolution so as to find immediate finality 
and enforceability upon the issuance of arbitration awards, even though they may lose the 
chance to appeal.124 
With regard to the issue of enforcement, the wide acceptance of the 1958 New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law provides a solid legal basis for the recognition 
                                                 
123 Article V of the 1958 New York Convention sets up the general principles for the judicial review 
regarding the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards, which provides that the courts can only 
refuse to recognize and enforce foreign arbitration awards when certain important procedural requirements 
are not met in arbitration proceedings or the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards are 
against the public policy of the country concerned. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958), Article V. 
124 Gary Born (2014), supra note 38, p. 83. See also Christian Buhring-Uhle (2005), supra note 62, p. 25; 
Queen Mary School of International Arbitration (2013), supra note 62, p. 18. 
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and enforcement of arbitration awards at the international level,125 which enables arbitration 
awards to be more easily enforced in foreign jurisdictions. 126  But, since arbitration 
institutions, as private organizations, have no substantial coercive power to enforce 
arbitration awards, it is eventually the courts which provide support to the parties on 
compulsory enforcement. To a large extent, whether court decisions and arbitration awards 
can be eventually enforced is actually decided by the institutional capabilities of courts in 
enforcement. As a result, effective enforcement mechanisms should be established in 
judicial systems. Courts should also be supported by other state organs and be provided with 
sufficient power to ensure the enforcement of both court judgements and arbitration awards. 
2.4 Summary 
As evident in international legal documents and literature, the core principles of 
litigation and arbitration, at least in a general sense, follow a similar set of core principles. 
As adjudicative mechanisms, they have a common pursuit: decisions should be made by 
competent DGMXGLFDWRUVWKURXJKIDLUSURFHHGLQJVVRWKDWWKHDOORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶ULghts can 
be correct and appropriate, while the decisions should also be made in an accessible, timely 
and substantial manner, so that the legal services provided by these two mechanisms will 
not become meaningless for the parties due to inaccessibility, delay or non-enforcement. 
The common pursuit of these two mechanisms provides the basis for the establishment 
of a common analytical framework for evaluating litigation and arbitration systems. Under 
this framework, four sets of core principles that are commonly followed in litigation and 
arbitration systems can serve as the criteria for evaluation. First, litigation and arbitration 
proceedings should be accessible, which ensures that they can be readily and equally used 
by disputants. Second, judges and arbitrators should be competent, so that they can act as 
the neutral third and render correct decisions. Third, the proceedings should be fair, which 
ensures that the parties are provided with equal and sufficient opportunities to defend their 
claims. Fourth, the process should be efficient and the outcomes should be enforceable, so 
that the parties can find timely and substantial remedies in litigation and arbitration. 
                                                 
125 By now, there are 156 state parties that have signed the 1958 New York Convention and there are 73 
jurisdictions that have followed the model provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html. Last 
visited in December 2016.   
126 ,Q9DQGHQ%HUJ¶VHPSLULFDOVXUYH\PRVWIRUHLJQDUELWUDWLRQDZDUGVDURXQGUequested by the 
parties for cross-border enforcement have been recognized and enforced by the courts in different countries. 
Albert Jan Van den Berg, 'New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement', 18 (2007) ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, p. 35. 
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However, it should also be noted that although litigation and arbitration have many 
characteristics in common, they do have several differences in procedural designs. On the 
one hand, litigation, as a public mechanism, emphasizes more on the formality and 
rigorousness of litigation proceedings. Extensive discovery proceedings are established to 
ensure the facts can be properly ascertained. Judgements are appealable to enable potential 
errors to be corrected. Rules and procedures are transparent so that the public can scrutinize 
the work of courts. On the other hand, arbitration, as a private mechanism, pays more 
attention to the autonomy of the parties and their substantial needs. Arbitration proceedings 
are relatively simplified and subject to the modification of the parties. Arbitration awards 
are principally final to shorten the overall length of the proceedings. Confidentiality is 
ensured to protect the privacy of parties. 
As a consequence, the specific requirements for the fulfilment of the core principles 
are relatively different in litigation and arbitration. Nonetheless, the diverging emphases of 
litigation and arbitration on formality and flexibility, transparency and confidentiality, 
appealability and finality can actually respond to the diverse needs of disputants, and these 
diverging designs enable disputants to choose a more suitable forum according to their own 
specific needs. From this perspective, these two mechanisms are complementing each other 
rather than purely competing with each other. They jointly establish an adjudicative dispute 
resolution regime for those who need a binding and enforceable decision issued by an 
authoritative adjudicative body. 
These core principles and the corresponding specific requirements for their fulfilment 
in litigation and arbitration will be used as the main criteria for the examination and 
evaluation of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in subsequent chapters. 
After a brief introduction to the dual legal system and a systematic examination of the 
institutional and procedural settings of foreign-related litigation and arbitration, the law and 
practice of these two mechanisms will be analysed in the light of these core principles to 
find out whether and to what extent the core principles are fulfilled in these two mechanisms, 
and what the remaining deficiencies are at the current stage.
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Chapter 3 Dual Legal System and Foreign-Related Commercial 
Dispute Resolution 
3.1 Introduction 
Foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration are rooted LQ&KLQD¶VGXDOOHJDO
system which separates domestic and foreign-related issues in both law and practice. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive and systematic analysis of these two mechanisms should be 
based on a proper understating of the dual legal system. Why domestic and foreign-related 
cases are separately regulated in China? What is the role of foreign-related commercial 
dispute resolution in the dual legal system? What are the main options for foreign-related 
commercial disputants for resolving their disputes? What is the position of foreign-related 
litigation and arbitration in the general framework of foreign-related commercial dispute 
resolution? These questions, as important background information should be answered 
before the detailed examination and assessment of the two mechanisms. 
This chapter approaches these questions from two perspectives. First, the origin and 
evolution of the dual legal system are reviewed to illustrate its establishment in the 1980s 
and its development in the following three decades. The application of the dual system in 
the field of dispute resolution is then discussed to show the peculiarities of foreign-related 
commercial cases under the dual legal system and to review the changing definition of 
µIRUHLJQ-UHODWHGFDVHV¶LQODZDQGSUDFWLFH6HFRQGWKLVFKDSWHUSrovides a brief overview 
of main dispute resolution mechanisms that can be used by foreign-related commercial 
GLVSXWDQWV7KLVRYHUYLHZVKRZVWKHSRVLWLRQVRIGLIIHUHQWPHFKDQLVPVLQ&KLQD¶VGLVSXWH
resolution framework for foreign-related commercial disputes, illustrates why and when 
foreign-related commercial disputants should use these mechanisms and clarifies the 
relative strengths and drawbacks of these mechanisms in foreign-related commercial 
dispute resolution. 
3.2 Dual Legal System: A Separation of Domestic and Foreign-Related Issues 
3.2.1 Origin and Evolution of the Dual Legal System 
To pull back the partly-paralyzed society from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, 
the Chinese government set economic growth as its priority goal in the reform towards 
modernization in 1978. Recognizing the importance of foreign investment in the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VHFRQRP\µRSHQLQJXS¶ was raised as the basic policy in the reform, 
and the door which had been shut for decades was opened again for foreign investors and 
traders. However, as the products of the previous pODQQHG HFRQRP\ LQ0DR¶s era, most 
enterprises at that time were state-owned or collectively-owned (䳶փᡰᴹ). At that time, 
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many state-owned or collectively-owned enterprises still undertook special tasks in the 
production, circulation and allocation sectors as they did in the previous planned economy 
era. They also receive special support from the country, so that their pre-set functions could 
be fulfilled. These special tasks and support derived from the planned economy were not 
expected to be linked to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Accordingly, the laws and 
regulations designed for these public ownership enterprises with distinctive public 
characteristics were also not suitable for regulating FIEs with a more private nature.127  
Facing this challenge, the central authorities decided to separate the legislation on 
foreign-related and domestic enterprises. In 1979, the advent of the first FDI law, the Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, marked the initial establishment of the dual legal system. 
Another two types of FIEs were also introduced later with the promulgation of the Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law and the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law in 
1986 and 1988 respectively. The promulgation of these three basic FDI laws set up the 
keynote of the dual legal system: domestic enterprises and FIEs would receive different 
treatment in certain aspects, and domestic and foreign-related issues would be regulated 
separately when necessary. 128 
The experience of the dual-track legislation was soon spread into other legal fields and 
a number of special laws and regulations on foreign investment and trade were promulgated 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 1). Meanwhile, to attract foreign investment and promote 
international trade, several Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established on the 
southeast coast of China, in which foreign investors and traders were provided with 
preferential treatment in tax, tariff and land use.129 All these special laws, regulations and 
                                                 
127 &KRQJOL;X µᐲ൪㓿⍾оᡁഭ⎹ཆ㓿⍾・⌅ሬੁ (0DUNHW(FRQRP\DQG WKH'LUHFWLRQRI&KLQD¶V
Foreign-Related Economic Legislation)¶6 (1994) ⌅ᆖ⹄ウ (Legal Research)S&KRQJOL;Xµཆ䍴
㇑ࡦ৺ަ・⌅ਆੁ (Foreign Investment Control and Its Legislation Direction)¶  ⌅ᆖᵲᘇ 
(Legal Science Magazine), pp. 9-10. See also Xudong Zhao, '㶽ਸ䘈ᱟᒦ㹼: ཆ୶ᣅ䍴Աъ⌅оޜਨ⌅
Ⲵ・⌅䘹ᤙ (Fusion or Parallel: The Legislative Choices of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Laws and the 
Company Law)', 3 (2005) ⌅ᖻ䘲⭘ (Law Application), p. 15. 
128 Zhen Cao, 'Ӿᒦ㹼ࡠᒦ䖘: ᵚᶕй䍴Աъ⌅оޜਨ⌅᭩䶙䐟ᖴ᧒᷀ (From Parallel to Unification: 
Exploring the Future Reform Route of Three Foreign-Invested Enterprises Laws and Company Law)', 33 
(2015) 、ᆖǃ㓿⍾ǃ⽮Պ (Science, Economy and Society), pp. 151-152. 
129 The first four pilot SEZs, namely Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai in Guangdong Province and Xiamen 
in Fujian Province, were set up in 1979 and1980. Later in 1988 Hainan Province was included as the fifth 
SEZ in China. Meanwhile, as an extension of SEZs, fourteen coastal cities were listed as Open Coastal 
Cities (OCPs) in 1984. The scope was further expanded to include another six coastal areas as Coastal 
Economic Open Zones (CEOZs). Strictly speaking, SEZs, OCPs and CEOZs are not different from each 
other, as their autonomy in economic legislation are different from each other. However, in general, they 
are also rather similar to each other, as they are all open economic zones to promote foreign investment 
and trade, which provide foreign investors and traders with preferential treatment in tax, tariff and other 
economic sectors (e.g. relaxed and simplified administrative approval procedures, fewer restrictions in the 
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local rules created a relatively independent foreign-related sector which was parallel with 
the general sector. This foreign-related sector provided special legal rules for foreign-related 
issues that were different from domestic ones.130 
Table 1: Major laws and regulations on foreign investment and trade promulgated in 
the 1980s and 1990s 
Legal 
fields 
Special laws and regulations on 
foreign investment and trade 
Corresponding general laws and 
regulations 
Enterprise 
Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Law (1979) 
 
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise 
Law (1986) 
 
Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Venture Law (1988) 
Law on the Industrial Enterprises 
Owned by the Whole People 
(1988) 
 
Regulation on Rural Collective-
Owned Enterprises (1990) 
 
Regulation on Urban Collective-
Owned Enterprises (1991) 
 
Company Law (1993) 
Contract 
Foreign-Related Economic Contract 
Law (1985) 
Economic Contract Law  (1981) 
Tax 
Income Tax Law on Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures (1980) 
 
Income Tax Law on Foreign 
Enterprises (1981) 
 
Income Tax Law on Foreign-
Invested Enterprises and Foreign 
Enterprises (1991) 
Provisional Regulations on 
Enterprise Income Tax (1993) 
 
Foreign 
trade 
Foreign Trade Law (1994) -- 
                                                 
usage of foreign currencies and preferential land, labour or environment policies). See Y. Y. Kueh, 'Foreign 
Investment and Economic Change in China', 131 (1992) China Quarterly, pp. 641-643.  
130 Huiqin Jiang, 'ѝഭཆ୶ᣅ䍴・⌅Ⲵᵚᶕ䎠ੁ (The Future Trend of China's Foreign Investment 
Legislation)', 26 (2013) Ӂইབྷᆖᆖᣕ⌅ᆖ⡸ (Journal of Yunnan University Law Edition), pp. 141-148. 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
42 
To some extent, the establishment of the dual legal system or, more precisely, the 
separation of domestic and foreign-related issues in law was an inevitable choice for China 
at that time.131 The rapid development of foreign investment and trade provided a powerful 
LPSHWXV WR&KLQD¶V EXUJHRQLQJ HFRQRP\ZKLOH LW DOVR UDLVHG VLJQLILFDQW FKDOOHQJHV IRU
Chinese legislators in the meantime. Unprecedented amounts of foreign capital brought 
thousands of FIEs, millions of cross-border transactions, immeasurable foreign norms, as 
well as the diverse thinking, culture and ideology behind them.132 Accordingly, China 
needed to properly govern FIEs and cross-border transactions, adequately protect the 
interests of foreign investors and traders and carefully handle the relationship between 
foreigners and Chinese. More fundamentally, to realize its economic modernization, China 
chose to make the transition from the planned economy to the market economy. The tension 
between the central control requirements of the Party-State regime and the liberal needs of 
business activities in the field of foreign investment and trade is thus needed to be eased.133  
In this context, the adoption of the dual-track legislative approach had several 
advantages. To begin with, preferential treatment, such as tax privilege, preferential land 
policy and even relaxed labour and environmental requirements, could be set up for foreign 
business under the dual legal system to attract foreign investment and promote international 
trade.134 0HDQZKLOH IRUHLJQQRUPV WKDWZHUHQRW DGDSWDEOH WR&KLQD¶V ORFDO FRQWH[W EXW
suitable for external economies could be directly introduced into special laws and 
regulations regarding foreign-related issues without causing direct confrontation between 
foreign and domestic norms.135   Besides, the central authorities could provide foreign 
investors and traders with more freedom in business activities by relaxing the legal 
requirements for foreign-related business activities, while maintaining relatively rigid 
central control over domestic business. Likewise, the central authorities could also establish 
                                                 
131 Zhen Cao (2015), supra note 128, p. 151; Huiqin Jiang (2013), supra note 130, p. 141; Xudong Zhao 
(2005), supra note 127, p. 15. 
132  Bin Liang, The Changing Chinese Legal System, 1978-Present: Centralization of Power and 
Rationalization of the Legal System (Routledge, 2008), pp. 1223-125. 
133 For a useful analysLVRQWKHGLOHPPDRI&KLQD¶VOHJDOUHIRUPLQWKHVDQGVVHHPitman B. 
Potter, 'Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control', 141 (1995) 
China Quarterly, pp. 155-185; Pitman B. Potter, 'The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to 
the Primacy of State Power', 159 (1999) China Quarterly, pp. 673-683. 
134 Philip C. C. Huang, 'The Theoretical and Practical Implications of China's Development Experience: 
The Role of Informal Economic Practices', 37 (2011) Modern China, pp. 16-25. 
135 But, of course, there can be indirect interactions between foreign and domestic norms even when 
foreign-related and domestic legislation are separated. For an in-GHSWKDQDO\VLVRQ WKH LVVXHRI&KLQD¶V
selective adaptation of foreign norms, see Pitman B. Potter, 'Globalization and Economic Regulation in 
China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices', 2 (2003) Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review, pp. 119-150; Pitman B. Potter, 'Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and 
Selective Adaptation', 29 (2004) Law & Social Inquiry, pp. 465-495. 
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extra control on foreign capital through special admittance or supervision mechanisms 
without affecting the regulatory arrangements for domestic commerce.136 Simply put, by 
separating the governance of foreign-related and domestic issues, China took a middle path 
which could satisfy the needs of foreign investment and trade without directly affecting the 
governance of domestic commercial order. 
The establishment of the dual legal system also met challenges. The closed-door 
SROLF\ DQG SODQQHG HFRQRP\ LQ0DR¶V HUD SURYLGHG OLWWOH GLUHFW H[SHULHQFH WR &KLQHVH
legislators on how to systematically establish a modernized legal system that could be 
adapted to the increasing foreign-related business and the emerging market economy. At 
that time, Chinese legislators lacked the necessary skills and experience to accurately 
predict the outcomes of new laws and regulations. Nor did they develop the proficiency in 
using legal instruments to balance the diverse values in society.  
As a result, the designers of the dual legal system had no choice but to adopt a 
µSUDJPDWLF¶ RU µSDWK-dependenW¶ DSSURDFK LQ OHJLVODWLRQ 137  Following the strategy of 
‘crossing the river by feeling the way over stones’ (᪨⵰⸣ཤ䗷⋣), most foreign-related 
laws and regulations were promulgated on an issue-driven basis. Whenever there was a new 
issue that required urgent regulation, a new law or regulation would come out in a rush to 
respond to the emerging issue.138 Such a piecemeal legislative approach inevitably led to 
the drawbacks of fragmentation, repetition, contradiction and redundancy, which rendered 
it difficult for practitioners to use these foreign-related laws and regulations in practice.139 
                                                 
136 The extra central control can be found in many aspects, such as foreign exchange, market and industry 
admission, and the supervision of FIEs. For a brief introduction, see Y. Y. Kueh (1992), supra note 129, 
pp. 637-641. See also Shoushuang Li, The Legal Environment and Risks for Foreign Investment in China 
(Springer, 2007), pp. 29-47. 
137 For an in-depth analysis on the reasons and impacts of the pragmatic or path-dependent approach 
adopted by Chinese legal reformers, see Randall Peerenboom, 'What Have We Learned about Law and 
Development? Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China', 27 (2006) Michigan 
Journal of International Law, pp. 823-871; Randall Peerenboom, 'Globalization, Path Dependency and the 
Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China', 19 (2001) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, pp. 161-264. 
138 Qinglin Zhang and Zhongbo Peng, '䇪ᡁഭཆ䍴⌅ᖻփ㌫Ⲵ䟽ᶴ⁑ᔿ', 1 (2006) ⌅ᆖ䇴䇪, p. 123; Yi 
Cai, '䇪ᡁഭཆ䍴・⌅փ㌫Ⲵ䟽ᶴ: ެ䇞ཆഭᣅ䍴⌅ިⲴ㕆㒲䰞仈 (A Discussion on the Reconstruction 
of China's Foreign Investment Legislative System: A Focus on the Issue of Foreign Investment Code)', 5 
(2000) ⌅ᆖ (Law Science), p. 54. 
139 Since there was no systematic plan in the law-making practice, many repetitions and contradictions can 
be found between general and special laws, central and local laws and the laws at the same hierarchical 
level. For example, around half of articles in the aforementioned three FIE laws are basically the same. 
Moreover, by now, there are over 200 laws and regulations promulgated at the central level and thousands 
of legal rules produced by local governments. The massive number of fragmented laws and regulations 
also raises the cost of practitioners in finding, recognizing and applying them in practice. See Guoqiang 
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To overcome these deficiencies, continuous efforts have been made to develop the 
dual legal system in the past three decades. One representative example is the centralized 
legislDWLYHDFWLYLWLHVFRQGXFWHGEHIRUH&KLQD¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQL]DWLRQ
:72 LQ 7KH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG WKUHH ODZV RQ ),(VZHUH UHYLVHG WR IXOILO&KLQD¶V
promised commitments before entering WTO. A number of foreign-related laws and 
regulations were revised or abolished to reduce repetitions and contradictions. New laws 
and regulations were promulgated to further promote foreign investment and trade. These 
efforts at the legislative level have largely enhanced the quality of foreign-related laws and 
regulations under the dual legal system.140 
Another noticeable trend in the changing dual legal system was the gradual 
codification and unification of foreign-related and domestic laws and regulations, which 
was particularly evident in the fields of contract and tax (Table 2). More recently, the Draft 
Foreign Investment Law was published in 2015. It was drafted as a unified foreign 
investment code to replace the three laws on FIEs and unify other related piecemeal foreign 
investment laws and regulations.141 These unification and codification efforts reflected 
OHJLVODWRUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR UHGXFH XQQHFHVVDU\ GLVWLQFWLRQV EHWZHHQ IRUHLJQ-related and 
domestic issues in law.142 
Nonetheless, the trend of gradual unification should not be simply understood as a 
signal which indicates the abolishment of the dual legal system. In the unified Contract Law 
and the Enterprise Income Tax Law, there are still a few articles providing special legal 
rules on foreign-related issues. For example, Article 126 of the Contract Law confirms the 
SDUWLHV¶DXWRQRP\LQIRUHLJQ-related contracts to select foreign laws as the governing laws 
of the contracts instead of Chinese law. Article 57 of the Enterprise Income Tax law clarifies 
that preferential tax treatment can still be provided to foreign investors and traders in 
                                                 
Luo, '䇪ѝഭཆ䍴⌅Ⲵ⌅ިॆ䐟ᖴ (A Discussion on the Route of the Codification of China's Foreign 
Investment Law)', 6 (2015) 㓿⍾⌅䇪උ (Modern Economic Research), pp. 69-71; Qinglin Zhang and 
Zhongbo Peng (2006), supra note 138, pp. 121-127; Yi Cai (2000), supra note 138, pp. 53-55. 
140 Wenhua Shan, 'Towards a Level Playing Field of Foreign Investment in China', 3 (2002) Journal of 
World Investment, pp. 327-343; Jianming Cao, 'WTO and the Rule of Law in China', 16 (2002) Temple 
International Law and Comparative Law Journal, pp. 381-382. 
141 )RUDQLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKH'UDIW)RUHLJQ,QYHVWPHQW/DZVHH<XZHQ/LDQG0DDUWHQ.URH]Hµ7KH)LUVW
Uniform Foreign Investment Law in China is in the MDNLQJ¶Ondernemingsrecht, pp. 504-509. 
See also Yongmin Bian, 'A Revisit to China's Foreign Investment Law', 8 (2015) Journal of East Asia and 
International law, pp. 447-469.  
142 As shown in in Table 2, the unified approach of law-making is evident in many legislative fields, 
including contract, tax, bills, insurance and labour. See Guoping Zhang, '䇪ཆ䍴Աъ઼ᡁഭԱъ⌅ࡦⲴ
ॿ䈳 (A Discussion on the Coordination of the Legal Systems for Foreign Invested Enterprises and 
Domestic Enterprises)', 5 (2010) ইӜ⽮Պ、ᆖ (Nanjing Social Science), p. 86. 
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designated economic zones. More importantly, the advent of the Draft Foreign Investment 
Law in 2015 also demonstrated that foreign investment issues will still be a relatively 
independent sector, the governance of which will be different from domestic ones. Besides, 
as an experiment of new type special regional arrangements, the newly established Shanghai 
Pilot Free Trade Zone in 2013 is actually a continuation of the dual legal system.143  
Therefore, it seems that the dual legal system is unlikely coming to an end in the near 
future. The separation of foreign-related and domestic issues will still exist in law, either 
reflected in the special articles in unified laws and regulations or independent special 
foreign-related laws and regulations. To a large extent, the real change in the dual legal 
system is the gradual reduction of the piecemeal approach of law-making. New types of 
foreign-related laws and regulations will be promulgated in a more systematic manner and 
continue to play an important role in the field of foreign investment and trade. 
Table 2: Major revision and unification of laws and regulations under the dual legal 
system 
Legal 
fields 
Laws and regulations initially promulgated 
Revision and 
unification 
Enterprise 
Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (1979) 
Revised in 
1990 and 2001 
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law (1986) 
Revised in 
2000 
Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law (1988) 
Revised in 
2000 
Contract 
Foreign-Related Economic Contract Law (1985) Unified as: 
Contract Law 
(1999) 
 Economic Contract Law (1981) 
                                                 
143 Similar to previous special regional arrangements, special finance, tax and investment policies are 
followed in this new pilot free trade zone, which provide a favourable business environment for foreign 
investors and traders. For a useful introduction, see Xinkui Wang, 'Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone and the 
National Strategy of Opening-Up to Boost Reform', 10 (2015) Frontiers of Economics in China, pp. 591-
603. 
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Tax 
Income Tax Law for 
Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures (1980) 
Unified as: 
Income Tax Law for Foreign 
Invested Enterprises and 
Foreign Enterprises (1991) 
Unified as: 
Enterprise 
Income Tax 
Law (2007) 
 
Income Tax Law for 
Foreign Enterprises 
(1981) 
Provisional Regulation on Enterprise Income Tax 
(1993) 
 
3.2.2 Resolution of Foreign-Related Commercial Disputes under the Dual Legal 
System 
(1) Peculiarities of Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Similar to the separation of domestic and foreign-related issues in the aforementioned 
substantive laws, domestic and foreign-related commercial disputes are also distinguished 
in dispute resolution. Special, if not favourable, legal settings for foreign-related 
commercial disputes can be found in both litigation and arbitration. The introduction of the 
centralized jurisdiction in litigation, the prior reporting mechanism in arbitration, as well as 
other major or minor particular proceedings have brought many positive changes to the 
development of foreign-related commercial dispute resolution.144  
Meanwhile, the particular treatment for foreign-related commercial cases is also 
HYLGHQWLQSUDFWLFH$VUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKHGLSORPDWLFVORJDQRIµIRreign issues are always 
LPSRUWDQW¶ཆһᰐሿһ), the authorities generally adopt a prudent attitude towards foreign-
related issues.145 7KH LQFUHDVLQJ LPSRUWDQFH RI IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW DQG WUDGH LQ&KLQD¶V
economy also raises the attention of the authorities to treat foreign-related cases seriously. 
Thus, prudence naturally becomes an important principle in the practice of foreign-related 
dispute resolution. Judges and arbitrators are normally expected to treat foreign-related 
commercial cases carefully and cautiously to avoid mistakes and errors caused by 
negligence.  
                                                 
144  The major differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and 
arbitration are further discussed in a more detailed manner in the following Sections 4.4 and 5.4. 
145 This diplomatic slogan was initially proposed by Enlai Zhou, the Prime Minister of China in Mao era, 
to emphasize the importance of treating foreign issues carefully and prudently in diplomacy. Bing Zhang, 
'ઘᚙᶕⲴཆӔ⛩┤³ཆһᰐሿһˈ䙷һཊ䈧⽪´7KH6QDSVKRWVRI(QODL=KRX
V'LSORPDF\
)RUHLJQ
Issues Are Always Important, Ask for Instructions when Dealing with Foreign Issues')', 7 (2015) ⒈▞ 
(Xiang Chao), pp. 45-47. 
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More importantly, the parties in foreign-related commercial disputes have the freedom 
to designate foreign laws as the applicable laws of their contracts, while the parties in 
domestic disputes without foreign elements are prohibited from so doing.146 Specifically, 
according to Article 3 of the Law on Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations, 
only when the legal relations are foreign-related can the parties select foreign laws as the 
applicable laws of their contracts. The SPC further emphasizes that the designation of 
foreign laws is only possible when there are explicit permissions in laws and regulations.147 
Accordingly, domestic legal relations, lacking such explicit permissions in law, should be 
subject to the governance of Chinese laws. By contrast, the parties of foreign-related 
commercial contracts are permitted to choose the applicable laws for their contracts by 
express agreement, either before or after their disputes arise. Even when the parties do not 
specify their preferred applicable laws in their foreign-related contracts, Chinese law is not 
necessarily the default substitute. Instead, the laws which have the most significant 
connections with the contracts should be applied.148  
But, it should be noted that the selection of foreign laws should not go against 
mandatory legal rules and the public interest of China.149 Several examples are raised by 
the SPC to illustrate what kinds of legal rules can be deemed as mandatory, which include 
labour right protection, food and public health safety, environment safety, financial safety, 
as well as antitrust and anti-dumping.150 Particularly, pursuant to Article 126 of the Contract 
law, the applicable laws of Sino-foreign equity joint venture contracts, Sino-foreign 
                                                 
146 For a useful summary, see Feng Gao, Haidi Teng and Mingyan Wu, 'Dispute Resolution and Choice of 
Law in China-Related Contracts', in King & Wood Mallesons, 16 October 2015. Available at 
http://www.kwm.com/en/knowledge/insights/dispute-resolution-and-choice-of-law-in-china-related-
contracts-20151016. Last visited in June 2016. 
147 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations-I (2012) 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⎹ཆ≁һޣ㌫⌅ᖻ䘲⭘⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺 (а)), ⌅䟺
[2012]24ਧ (Fa Shi [2012] No.24), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 28 December 2012, Article 
6. 
148 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations 
(2010) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⎹ཆ≁һޣ㌫⌅ᖻ䘲⭘⌅), promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
National People's Congress on 28 October 2010, Article 41; Contract Law of the People's Republic of 
China (1999) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭਸ਼⌅), promulgated by the National People's Congress on 15 March 
1999, Article 126. 
149 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations 
(2010), Articles 4 and 5. 
150 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations-I (2012), 
Article 10. 
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contractual joint venture contracts and Sino-foreign cooperative exploration and 
development of natural resources contracts can only be Chinese laws. 
Furthermore, the autonomy of the parties to designate foreign laws as the applicable 
laws is also respected in legal rules regarding litigation and arbitration. In litigation, if both 
parties invoke the laws of the same country without objections, the court can then deem that 
the parties have made a selection on applicable laws. It is also possible for the parties to 
select or change the applicable laws before the end of court debate in first instance trials.151 
In arbitration, the parties are permitted to not only select the substantive laws applicable to 
their disputes, but also to designate the applicable laws for deciding the validity of 
arbitration agreements. If the parties fail to do so, the laws of the place of arbitration or the 
place of the selected arbitration institutions are the substitutes. Only when all the 
aforementioned designations do not exist will Chinese laws apply. 152 
Similar to the designation of foreign laws as the applicable laws, the parties in foreign-
related commercial disputes can also choose foreign courts or arbitration institutions to 
resolve their disputes, while the parties in domestic disputes have no such freedom. 
Specifically, the SPC confirms that foreign-related commercial disputes can be brought to 
IRUHLJQFRXUWVEDVHGRQWKHSDUWLHV¶ZULWWHQDJUHHPHQWVDVORQJDVWKHGHVLJQDWHGIRUHLJQ
courts have the actual connections with the disputes concerned.153 However, similar to the 
issue of the applicable laws, disputes arising from Sino-foreign equity or contractual joint 
ventures and Sino-foreign cooperative exploration and development of natural resources 
contracts fall into the exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Thus, these three kinds of 
foreign-related commercial disputes cannot be litigated in foreign courts.154  
                                                 
151 Ibid., Article 8. 
152 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ
㻱⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺), ⌅䟺[2006]7ਧ (Fa Shi [2006] No.7), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 
23 August 2006, Article 16; Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-
Related Civil Relations (2010), Article 10; Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to 
Foreign-Related Civil Relations-I (2012), Article 14. 
153 7KH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDOVRFODULILHVZKDWFRQQHFWLQJIDFWRUVFDQEHGHHPHGDVWKHµDFWXDO
FRQQHFWLRQ¶LQFOXGLQJWKHGRPLFLOHRIWKHGHIHQGant and plaintiff, the place of contract performance and 
signature, the place of the subject matter and the place of the infringement act. Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2015), 
Article 531. 
154 It should be noted that whether a case can be deemed as foreign-related is a rather complicated issue in 
China. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises, which are deemed as Chinese legal persons under Chinese law, 
are regarded as domestic parties in litigation and arbitration, though wholly foreign owned enterprises are 
not included in this exclusive jurisdiction article. In other words, cases involving wholly foreign owned 
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However, it should be noted that the exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese courts in 
litigation does not affect the jurisdiction of foreign arbitration institutions over these three 
kinds of foreign-related commercial disputes. Foreign-related commercial disputants are 
permitted to resolve all kinds of commercial disputes in foreign arbitration institutions based 
on valid arbitration agreements.155 
Nonetheless, unlike foreign-related commercial disputants, the parties in domestic 
disputes have no such freedom to select foreign courts or arbitration institutions in dispute 
resolution. Lacking actual connections with foreign courts, domestic contracts without 
foreign elements are prohibited from being litigated in foreign courts. Similarly, there are 
also no legal provisions which explicitly permit the parties to arbitrate their domestic 
disputes outside China.  
(2) Definition and Scope of Foreign-Related Commercial Cases in Law and Practice 
Given all these differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in 
litigation and arbitration, a clear and appropriate definition is needed to clarify the scope of 
foreign-related commercial cases. The 1982 Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation) 
provided a preliminary definition on foreign-related cases in civil litigation, which 
prescribed that foreigners, stateless persons and foreign enterprises and organizations who 
conduct civil litigation in China should follow the special provisions for foreign-related 
civil proceedings.156 This preliminary definition which distinguished domestic and foreign-
related cases based only on the nationality of the parties is obviously too narrow. In 1988, 
the SPC expanded the scope of in its judicial interpretation, which stated that a legal 
relationship which can fulfil one of the following conditions should be recognized as 
foreign-related: 
                                                 
enterprises also cannot be litigated in foreign courts, unless there are other foreign elements recognized in 
ODZLQWKHFDVHVFRQFHUQHG7KHLVVXHWKDWZKDWHOHPHQWVDUHUHFRJQL]HGDVµIRUHLJQHOHPHQWV¶LQODZDQG
what kinds of cases can be regarded as foreign-related is discussed in a more detailed and systematic 
manner in the following Section 3.2.2 (2). Besides, the exclusive jurisdiction also applies to disputes 
regarding real estate. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁
һ䇹䇬⌅), promulgated by the National People's Congress on 9 April 1991 and revised by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on 28 October 2007 and 31 August 2012, Articles 33 and 
266. 
155 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015), Article 531; Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 
(2012), Article 271; Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (1999), Article 182. 
156 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (Trial Implementation) (1982) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼
ഭ≁һ䇹䇬⌅ (䈅㹼)), promulgated by the Standing Committee of National People's Congress on 8 March 
1982 and replaced by the Civil Procedure law of People's Republic of China in 1991, Article 185. 
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(1) One or two parties are foreigners, stateless persons or foreign legal persons;  
(2) The subject matter (䇹䇬ḷⲴ) is located in foreign territories;  
(3) The establishment, modification or termination of the legal relationship occurs in 
foreign territories.157 
In 2012, two new conditions were added by the SPC to further expand the scope of 
foreign-related issues: 
2QHRUWZRSDUWLHV¶KDELWXDOUHVLGHQce is outside China;  
(5) Other conditions that can be recognized as foreign-related.158 
Compared with the initial definition in the 1982 Civil Procedure Law (Trial 
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ WKH63&¶VMXGLFLal interpretations issued in 1988 and 2012 added three 
new conditions (subject matter, legal relationship and habitual residence) to expand the 
scope. After the expansion in 1988 and 2012, the current definition of foreign-related 
commercial cases in ChineVODZLVJHQHUDOO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶
in the UNICTRAL Model Law, which consists of the aforementioned four basic elements, 
namely nationality, domicile, legal relationship and subject matter.159 Besides, the newly 
introduced fifth condition also provides courts with more discretionary power to interpret 
the definition of foreign-related commercial cases in practice. 
                                                 
157 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Implementation of the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (Trial Implementation) (1988) (ᴰ
儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䍟ᖫᢗ㹼ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁⌅䙊ࡉǊ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ᜿㿱 (䈅㹼)), ⌅(࣎)ਁ[1998]6
ਧ (Fa (Ban) Fa [1998] No. 6), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 26 January 1988, Article 178. 
7KHVHWKUHHFRQGLWLRQVDUHDOVRUHLWHUDWHGLQWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRWKH&LYLO3URFHGXUH/DZ
Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (1992) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁
һ䇹䇬⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ᜿㿱), ⌅ਁ[1992]22ਧ (Fa Fa [1992] No. 22), issued by the Supreme People's 
Court on 14 July 1992, Article 304. 
158 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations-I (2012), 
Articles 1 (3) and (5). 7KHH[SDQGHGVFRSHFRQVLVWLQJRIILYHFRQGLWLRQVLVDOVRUHLWHUDWHGLQWKH63&¶VQHZ
interpolation to the Civil Procedure Law in 2015. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2015), Article 522.  
159 %XWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKH81&,75$/0RGHO/DZXVHVµSODFHVRIEXVLQHVV¶WRFRYHUWKHHOHPHQWV
of both domicile and nationality. Besides, to show respect to party autonomy, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
also provides that a case is international, if the parties explicitly express that the subject matter is related 
to more than two countries. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), 
Article 1 (3). 
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However, it should be noted that cases involving with FIEs do not necessarily fall into 
the scope of foreign-related commercial cases under this definition, though the interest of 
FIEs is normally connected to the interest of foreign investors. Under Chinese law, FIEs are 
established within the territory of China and registered as Chinese legal persons and they 
do not fulfil the nationality and domicile conditions in the definition of foreign-related 
commercial cases.160 Therefore, a case between two FIEs or one FIE and one domestic-
invested enterprise should be regarded as a domestic case according to the definition of 
foreign-related cases in law, unless the case concerned has other foreign elements 
recognized in law such as the subject matter of the case is located outside China or the legal 
relationship of the case occurs outside China.  
This has been confirmed by the SPC in the Jiangsu Wanyuan case (⎉⊏зⓀṸ) in 
2012. The SPC explicitly stated that the Aiermu Company (one of the disputing parties) as 
a Sino-foreign equity joint venture (one type of FIE) should be regarded as a Chinese legal 
person. Accordingly, the dispute concerned had no foreign-related elements and should thus 
be regarded as a domestic dispute. The submission of a domestic dispute without foreign 
elements to a foreign arbitration institution had no legal grounds in Chinese law and such 
designation by the parties was thus invalid.161 Similar decisions can also be found in the 
Zhaolai Xinsheng case (ᵍᶕᯠ⭏Ṹ) which was decided in 2013. The Beijing Second 
                                                 
160 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic of China (2001) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭѝ
ཆਸ䍴㓿㩕Աъ⌅), promulgated by the National People's Congress on 8 July 1979 and revised on 4 
April 1990 and 15 March 2001, Articles 1 and 3; Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law 
of the People's Republic of China (2000) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭѝཆਸ֌㓿㩕Աъ⌅), promulgated by the 
National People's Congress on 13 April 1988 and revised by the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress on 31 October 2000, Articles 2 and 7; Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2000) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭཆ䍴Աъ⌅), promulgated by the National People's 
Congress on 12 April 1986 and revised by the Standing committee of the National People's Congress on 
31 October 2000, Articles 1 and 6. 
161 The Jiangsu Wanyuan company (Jiangsu Wanyuan, a domestic enterprise) and the Aiermu company 
(Aiermu, a Sino-foreign equity joint venture) reached an arbitration agreement prescribing that disputes 
between them should be arbitrated in ICC. A dispute regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement 
ZDVWKHQEURXJKWWRWKH-LDQJVX+LJK3HRSOH¶V&RXUW7KH-LDQJVX+LJK3HRSOH¶VFRXUWWKHQUHDFKHGDQ
opinion denying the validity of the arbitration clause. Following the prior reporting mechanism, the Jiangsu 
+LJK3HRSOH¶VFRXUW UHSRUWHG WKHFDVH WR WKH63&7KH63&WKHQFRQILUPHG WKH-LDQJVX+LJK3HRSOH¶V
&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQEHFDXVH$LHUPXDVDIRUHLJQ-invested enterprise, should be regarded as a Chinese legal 
person and the dispute concerned should be treated as a domestic dispute. Thus, the arbitration agreement 
that the dispute should be arbitrated in ICC had no legal grounds in Chinese law and the arbitration 
agreement was invalid accordingly. Reply Letter of the Supreme People's Court Concerning the Dispute 
between Jiangsu Aerospace Wanyuan Wind Electricity Equipment Production Ltd. and Aiermu Wind 
Energy Blade Production (Tianjin) Ltd. on the Application for Confirming the Validity of the Arbitration 
Agreement (2012) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⊏㣿㡚ཙзⓀ仾⭥䇮༷ࡦ䙐ᴹ䲀ޜਨо㢮ቄ࿶仾㜭ਦ⡷ࡦ૱ 
(ཙ⍕) ᴹ䲀ޜਨ⭣䈧⺞䇔Ԣ㻱ॿ䇞᭸࣋㓐㓧аṸⲴ䈧⽪Ⲵ༽࠭), [2012]≁ഋԆᆇㅜ 2ਧ ([2012] Min 
Si Ta Zi No.2), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 31 August 2012. 
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,QWHUPHGLDWH3HRSOH¶V&RXUWUXOHGWKDWWKH6XRZDQJ=KL[LQ&RPSDQ\RQHRIWKHGLVSXWLQJ
parties), as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, should be regarded as a Chinese legal person, 
and the dispute concerned should be treated as a domestic dispute which cannot be resolved 
in a foreign arbitration institution.162 
However, there are also different understandings on the interpretation of foreign-
related commercial cases in judicial practice. In the Siemens case, the Shanghai First 
,QWHUPHGLDWH3HRSOH¶V&RXUWDUJXHGWKDWDOWKRXJKERWKSDUWLHVLQWKH6LHPHQV case are FIEs 
and should be treated as Chinese legal persons, the capital resources, interest allocation and 
operational decisions of these two wholly foreign-owned enterprises, were all closely 
connected to their foreign investors outside China. Meanwhile, the circulation of the 
disputed goods in the Siemens case needed to go through the import process in customs. 
Thus, the performance of the contract and the subject matter of the case had the features of 
international trade. Based on these two reasons, the court ruled that the case should be 
recognized as foreign-related according to the aforePHQWLRQHGILIWKFRQGLWLRQLQWKH63&¶V
2012 judicial interpretation.163 
The Siemens case demonstrates that cases involving wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
that are completely controlled by foreign investors, can be conditionally recognized as 
foreign-related in judicial practice. However, it should be noted that the court in the Siemens 
case rendered its decision not only based on the reason that the parties are wholly foreign-
                                                 
162 In 2007, the Zhaolai Xinsheng company (Zhaolai Xinsheng, a domestic enterprise) and the Suowang 
Zhixin company (Suowang Zhixin, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise invested by a Korean natural person) 
reached a contract with an arbitration agreement prescribing that disputes between them should be 
arbitrated in the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB). In 2012, Suowang Zhixin brought a case 
against Zhaolai Xinsheng to KCAB. KCAB then reached a decision in favour of Suowang Zhixin, and 
Suowang Zhixin applied for the enforcement of the arbitration award before the Beijing Second 
,QWHUPHGLDWH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW7KHFRXUWWKen refused the application on the grounds that the dispute should 
be regarded as a domestic dispute, which should not be arbitrated in foreign arbitration institutions. Thus, 
the arbitration clause that the dispute should be arbitrated in KCAB violated Chinese law and the arbitration 
award should not be recognized and enforced. ेӜᵍᶕᯠ⭏փ㛢Ձ䰢ᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ेӜᡰᵋѻؑᣅ䍴
૘䈒ᴹ䲀ޜਨṸ (Beijing Zhaolaixinsheng Sports Leisure Ltd. v. Beijing Suowangzhixin Investment 
Consulting Ltd.), [2013]Ҽѝ≁⢩ᆇㅜ 10670ਧ ([2013] Er Zhong Min Te Zi No.10670). 
163 In the Siemens case, the Siemens Company and the Gold Land Company were all wholly-foreign owned 
FIES. They reached an arbitration agreement that the dispute between them should be arbitrated in the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). Later, SIAC reached a decision in favour of Siemens 
over a dispute between these two companies and Siemens applied before the Shanghai first Intermediate 
3HRSOH¶V&RXUWIRUHQIRUFLQJWKHDUELWUDWLRQDZDUG7KHFRXUWWKHQUXOHGWKDWWKHFDVHVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHG
as foreign-related. The arbitration agreement that the dispute between these two companies should be 
brought to SIAC was thus valid, and the arbitration award issued by SIAC should be recognized and 
enforced. 㾯䰘ᆀഭ䱵䍨᱃ (к⎧) ᴹ 䲀ޜਨ䇹к⎧哴䠁㖞ൠᴹ䲀ޜਨṸ  (Siemens Internaitional Trade 
(Shanghai) Ltd. v. Shanghai Gold Land Ltd.), [2013]⋚аѝ≁䇔[ཆԢ]ᆇㅜ 2ਧ ([2013] Hu Yi Zhong 
Min Ren [Waizhong] Zi No.2). 
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owned enterprises, but also on the fact that the performance of the contract and subject 
matter of the dispute have international features. Thus, it is still uncertain whether cases 
regarding wholly foreign-owned enterprises can be treated as foreign-related, if the cases 
concerned have no other international basis. More importantly, as the SPC has not officially 
supported or opposed this decision yet, it is still too early to argue that this decision will be 
followed by other courts in judicial practice. Nonetheless, the Siemens case does show that 
Chinese courts have begun to exercise WKHLUGLVFUHWLRQDU\SRZHUJUDQWHGE\WKH63&¶V
judicial interpretation to interpret the definition of foreign-related commercial cases with a 
more open and liberal attitude.  
3.3 Main Options of Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Brief 
Overview 
Negotiation, mediation, litigation and arbitration are the main mechanisms in the 
modern regime of commercial dispute resolution. 164  The resolution of foreign-related 
commercial disputes in China is not an exception. The following discussion provides a brief 
overview on the roles of these four mechanisms in foreign-related commercial dispute 
resolution. 
3.3.1 Informal Consensual Approaches: Negotiation and Mediation 
In China, amicable settlement approaches such as negotiation and mediation closely 
corUHVSRQGWR&KLQD¶s traditional philosophies of harmony (઼). Before the modern concept 
of law was introduced into China in the 19th century, the notion of law in ancient China 
was mainly connected with crime and punishment. Under the influence of Confucianism, 
propriety (⽬) was believed to be a more appropriate norm for ruling the society rather than 
law (⌅).165  Consequently, traditional Chinese were reluctant to publicly resolve their 
disputes before state organs and preferred to settle their disputes privately with compromise 
and comity. To some extent, the influence of traditional Chinese philosophies is still visible 
LQ WRGD\¶V&KLQD$VDUJXHGE\/XEPDQPDQ\&KLQHVHVWLOOKDYHµWKH WHQGHQF\ WR VHHN
justice elsewhere than in the courts.166  
                                                 
164 Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone (2005), supra note 21, pp. 16-18. 
165 Carlos De Vera, 'Arbitrating harmony: 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the 
Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China', 18 (2004) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, pp. 
162-165. Benedict Sheehy, 'Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West 
& Implications for Commercial Disputes', 26 (2006) Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, pp. 239-243. 
166 Stanley B. Lubman, 'Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping: "Mao and Mediation" Revisited', 
11 (1997) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, p. 397. See also Donald C. Clarke (1991), supra note 6, pp. 
294-295. 
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(1) Negotiation 
µ)ULHQGO\QHJRWLDWLRQ¶৻ྭॿ୶) is an important term which is frequently listed in 
the dispute resolution clauses of foreign-related commercial contracts.167 Negotiation is also 
a popular start in the initial period of foreign-related commercial dispute resolution.168 But, 
the success of negotiation relies heavily on whether the disputing parties are willing to 
actively compromise with each other and partially sacrifice their own interest in exchange 
for the amicable settlement of their disputes. Otherwise, the negotiation efforts may turn out 
to be futile. In extreme circumstances, some disputants may even use negotiation as a trick 
RI LQWHQWLRQDO GHOD\ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV D FRUUHFW MXGJHPHQW RI WKH FRXQWHUSDUW\¶V WUXH
LQWHQWLRQV D SURSHU HYDOXDWLRQ RI ERWK VLGHV¶ SRVLWLRQV DQG PRUe importantly, the 
substantial trust between the parties are important preconditions for successful 
negotiation.169 
These important conditions, however, seem relatively difficult to be fulfilled in 
foreign-related commercial dispute resolution. The common hardship of trust-building in 
cross-border transactions also exists in foreign-related commercial transactions. The 
cultural differences between Chinese and foreign parties inevitably lead to difficulties for 
them to understand and predict each other. This is especially the case when disputes arise 
between them, which may increase the distrust between the parties.170  Thus, although 
negotiation is a popular and important method in the initial period of foreign-related 
commercial dispute resolution, its substantial effects seem uncertain and unreliable for 
disputants. 
(2) Commercial Mediation 
Compared with negotiation, it seems to be easier for the parties to reach a compromise 
in mediation with the assistance of mediators. In modern commercial mediation, mediators 
can establish a channel to bridge the gaps between the parties and help them to find an 
                                                 
167 7KHFRPPRQSUDFWLFHRIXVLQJµIULHQGO\QHJRWLDWLRQ¶DVWKHILUVWVWHSRIGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQFDQGDWHEDFN
to the early days after the 1978 reform. See Sally Lord Ellis and Laura Shea (1981), supra note 6, p. 161. 
168 Richard Chalk and John Choong, 'Dispute Settlement Options: An Overview', in Michael J. Moser (ed.), 
Managing Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law International, 2007), 
p. 8. 
169 Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, Nancy H. Rogers and Sarah Rudolph Cole (2012), supra note 
36, pp. 89-93. 
170 As argued by Norton, if foreign businessmen expect a successful amicable settlement with Chinese 
partners, they need to do intensive work of information gathering and assessment. Meanwhile, both sides 
need to be aware of cultural differences between them. Otherwise, the negotiation efforts may turn out to 
be futile. Patrick M. Norton, 'Informal Dispute Settlement Approaches', in Michael J. Moser (ed.), 
Managing Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law International, 2007), 
pp. 19-36. 
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acceptable middle point. With legal knowledge and mediation experience, mediators can 
smooth the communication between the parties, show the parties their legal positions and 
comparative strengths and weaknesses, predict the possible outcomes if no agreement can 
be reached, and recommend feasible settlement plans to solve the dispute. These 
professional techniques can significantly increase the chances of success in commercial 
mediation.171 
Commercial mediation is not new to China. Early in 1987, the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a core trade association with a government 
EDFNJURXQGKDGDOUHDG\HVWDEOLVKHG&KLQD¶VILUVWPRGHUQFRPPHUFLDO mediation centre in 
Beijing.172 In the following years, the CCPIT Mediation Centre has gradually built up a 
nationwide network, which now consists of 46 sub-divisions covering different regions and 
industries in China. CCPIT also actively cooperates with foreign organizations and has 
established a series of Sino-foreign commercial mediation centres, including the Sino-US 
Commercial Mediation Centre in 2004, the Sino-Italy Commercial Mediation Centre in 
2004, the Sino-UK Commercial Mediation Centre in 2006 and the Sino-Arab Commercial 
Mediation Centre in 2015. Apart from numerous mediation centres established under the 
DXVSLFHVRI&&3,7WKH6KDQJKDL&RPPHUFLDO0HGLDWLRQ&HQWUH6&0&EHFRPH&KLQD¶V
first commercial mediation centre outside the CCPIT system in 2011, which signalled the 
emergence of new generation Chinese commercial mediation centres that are established by 
private organizations.173  
However, although the increasing number of commercial mediation centres seems to 
suggest that commercial mediation has gradually developed in the past two decades, it is 
still unclear whether commercial mediation indeed plays an important role in foreign-
related commercial dispute resolution. There are only limited and unsystematic statistics 
                                                 
171  Christian Buhring-Uhle, Lars Kirchhoff and Gabriele Scherer, Arbitration and Mediation in 
International Business (Kluwer Law International, 2006), pp. 177-180. 
172 CCPIT, also named as the China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC), is an important Chinese 
trade association for facilitating foreign investment and trade, the operation of which is under the indirect 
control of the central authorities. As a nationwide organization which consists of renowned scholars and 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV HQWHUSULVHV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQ LQ &KLQD¶V HFRQRPLF DQG WUDGH FLUFOH &&3,7 ZDV LQLWLDOO\
established with the approval of the Government Administration Council in 1952 (the central government 
organ in Mao era, the predecessor of the current State Council). According to its newest Articles of 
Association, CCPIT is an independent legal person, which is under the instruction of the Chinese 
government. Articles of Association for the China Council for the Promotion of International trade (2009) 
(ѝഭഭ䱵䍨᱃׳䘋ငઈՊㄐ〻), issued by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
on 5 January 2009, Articles 2-5. 
173 SCMC was established by the Shanghai Modern Service Association, a private civil organization in 
Shanghai. It can be regarded as CKLQD¶V ILUVWPRGHUQ-style commercial mediation centre which is truly 
independent from the government. 
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reflecting the usage of coPPHUFLDOPHGLDWLRQLQ&KLQD¶VSUDFWLFHWKHUHOLDELOLW\RIZKLFK
remains untested. CCPIT alleges that the annual caseload of its headquarters in Beijing can 
amount to 4,000 in recent years.174 But, it does not provide a list showing the exact number 
of each \HDU¶VFDVHORDG,WDOVRIDLOVWRVSHFLI\WKHSURSRUWLRQRIIRUHLJQ-related commercial 
FDVHVLQWKHRYHUDOOFDVHORDG6LPLODUO\UHOLDEOHGDWDRQ&&3,7¶VVXERUGLQDWHRUJDQVDQG
Sino-foreign commercial mediation centres is also not publicly available. 
(3) Government-Official-Involved Mediation 
Apart from modern-style commercial mediation, foreign-related commercial 
disputants can also resort to a more Chinese-style mediation. When foreign-related 
commercial disputes arise, the parties can turn to local government organs that are in charge 
of foreign investment and trade issues for help. Generally speaking, the disputes will be 
treated seriously and prudently by local government organs, and it is not rare to find that 
local government officials get involved and act as the middlemen to help the disputing 
parties to reach a settlement.175 Local government officials are motivated to prevent the 
disputes from affecting the local economy and their political achievements. Accordingly, 
they are normally willing to provide favourable or at least acceptable solutions to foreign 
businessmen, so that they can maintain an investment-friendly reputation.176 There is also a 
large possibility that the settlement plans provided by local government officials can be 
accepted by the dLVSXWLQJSDUWLHV,Q&KLQDJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV¶ZRUGVQRUPDOO\FDUU\D
weight, which can effectively convince the parties, especially the Chinese side, to 
compromise in dispute resolution. After all, businessmen tend to avoid friction with local 
government officials so that they will not face unnecessary obstacles posed by 
administrative organs in future business activities.  
However, this kind of government-official-involved mediation is not always workable. 
Unlike specialized mediators in commercial mediation centres, local government officials 
pay more attention to the needs of the local economy rather than the laws, the facts and the 
interests of the parties. Their personal likes and dislikes may also affect the settlement plans 
provided to the parties. This is also one of the reasons why Guanxi (informal relationship) 
                                                 
174  The data is obtained from the official website of CCPIT, available at 
http://en.ccpit.org/info/info_8a8080a94fd37680014fd3d050340009.html#a4. Last visited in March 2016. 
175 Patrick M. Norton (2007), supra note 170, p. 20. 
176 As argued by Peerenboom and He, local government officials have a strong incentive to employ all 
available methods to create a business-friendly environment to achieve local economic growth, because 
they can be rewarded in their political career for so doing. Randall Peerenboom and Xin He (2009), supra 
note 5, p. 4. 
Chapter 3 Dual Legal System and Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution 
 
57 
plays an important role in the practice of foreign-related business.177 Businessmen who are 
adept in developing Guanxi with local government organs and government officials may 
indeed benefit from this kind of government-official-involved mediation. But, for new 
comers and those who are not familiar with the Guanxi practice, there is no guarantee that 
this informal channel will deliver sound results for them.178 
At the same time, it is also difficult to draw a neat line between Guanxi practice and 
corruption.179 7KLV JUH\ DUHD LV LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH JHQHUDO GLUHFWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V OHJDO
UHIRUP WRZDUGV PRGHUQL]DWLRQ ,Q WKH V DQG V ZKHQ &KLQD¶V OLWLJDWLRQ DQG
arbitration mechanisms were still in their infant age, this informal channel of mediation with 
Chinese characteristics did have its positive side, which, to some extent, helped to resolve 
foreign-UHODWHGFRPPHUFLDOGLVSXWHVDQGSURWHFWIRUHLJQEXVLQHVVPHQ¶VLQWHUHVW180 It is also 
plausible that Guanxi practice may still exist and, to some extent, play a role today.181 But, 
DV &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ-related commercial litigation and arbitration systems become 
increasingly law-based, it can be predicted that the government-official-involved mediation 
will eventually lose its position in foreign-related commercial dispute resolution. 
Another noteworthy type of mediation in China is mediation conducted within the 
litigation and arbitration proceeding. As an important form of mediation which is closely 
connected to foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, this particular type of 
affiliated mediation in litigation and arbitration is discussed in the following Section 6.4.2. 
3.3.2 Formal Adjudicative Approaches: Litigation and Arbitration 
For foreign-related commercial disputants who find difficulties in reaching a 
settlement through informal consensual approaches or those who prefer the binding effects 
of decisions rendered through formal adjudicative approaches, litigation and arbitration are 
their main options.  
                                                 
177 For a useful introduction to the Guanxi practice in China, see Ying Fan, '"Guanxi", Government and 
Corporate Reputation in China: Lessons for International Companies', 25 (2007) Marketing Intelligence & 
Planning, pp. 499-510. 
178 Scott Wilson, 'Law Guanxi: MNCs, State Actors, and the Legal Reform in China', 17 (2007) Journal of 
Contemporary China, pp. 30-37. 
179 Ling Li, 'Performing Bribery in China: Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with a Human Face', 20 (2010) 
Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 19-20. 
180 Sally Lord Ellis and Laura Shea (1981), supra note 6, pp. 161-164; Jun Ge (1996), supra note 6, pp. 
123-125. 
181 Jane Nolan, 'Good Guanxi and Bad Guanxi: Western Bankers and the Role of Network Practices in 
Institutional Change in China', 22 (2011) International Journal of Human Resource Management, p. 3370; 
Ying Fan (2007), supra note 177, p. 508. 
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(1) Litigation and Arbitration outside China 
As previously discussed, foreign-related commercial disputants generally have the 
freedom to choose to litigate or arbitrate outside China.182 However, although the disputants 
may find quality legal services provided by courts and arbitration institutions in developed 
jurisdictions, they still need to face the risk that the court decisions and arbitration awards 
rendered by foreign courts and arbitration institutions may not be recognized and enforced 
in China.  
In terms of litigation, according to Article 281 of the 2012 Civil Procedure Law 
(CiPL),183 Chinese courts can decide whether to enforce foreign judgements at the request 
of the parties or foreign courts, which should be based on the judicial assistance treaties that 
China has signed and ratified or the principle of reciprocity. However, China has only 
signed 22 bilateral judicial assistance treaties regarding civil proceedings by now. Most 
major trading partners of China, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Korea and many European countries, are not on the list.184 The situation is similar with 
regard to the principle of reciprocity. As of now, there are no published cases where foreign 
court judgements regarding commercial disputes are successfully recognized and enforced 
by Chinese courts based on the principle of reciprocity.185  
As a consequence, the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgements 
regarding commercial issues generally cannot find a solid legal basis from judicial 
assistance treaties and the principle of reciprocity. Besides, even foreign court judgements 
can fulfil these legal requirements, Chinese courts can still decide not to recognize and 
enforce them based on the reason that the recognition and enforcement of foreign court 
judgements concerned are violating the basic principles in Chinese law or against state 
                                                 
182 See the previous discussion in Section 3.2.2 (1). 
183 ,IQRWVSHFLILHG&L3/UHIHUVWRWKH&LYLO3URFHGXUH/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDLQWKLV
thesis. 
184 The majority of the 22 judicial assistance treaties regarding civil issues were signed by China and 
developing countries in Asia and former Soviet Union area. There are only four major developed countries 
that have signed judicial assistance treaties regarding civil and commercial cases with China, namely 
France, Spain, Italy, Russia and Australia. The information is obtained froPWKHRIILFLDOZHEVLWHRI&KLQD¶V
Ministry of Justice. Available at http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzws/node_219.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
Meanwhile, it should be noted Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan have special regional arrangements with 
China which can be regarded as the legal basis for the recognition and enforcement of the court judgements 
from these three regions. 
185 In practice, the principle of reciprocity is rarely raised as the basis for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign commercial court judgements. See Friven Yeoh, 'Enforcement of Dispute Outcomes', in Michael 
J. Moser (ed.), Managing Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law 
International, 2007), pp. 284-285. 
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sovereignty, national security or the public interest of China.186 In general, although there 
is a possibility for the recognition and enforcement of foreign commercial judgements in 
law, its substantial realization in practice remains difficult.187 
Compared with foreign court judgements, foreign arbitration awards generally have a 
larger possibility of being enforced in China. The recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitration awards in China are legally supported by the 1958 New York Convention. As a 
member state of the 1958 New York Convention, Chinese legal provisions regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards are generally consistent with 
international standards.188 Meanwhile, to ensure that the cases regarding the enforcement of 
foreign arbitration awards can be properly handled by local courts, the SPC sets up a prior 
reporting mechanism to ensure the correcWQHVVRIORFDOFRXUWV¶GHFLVLRQVLQZKLFKDGHFLVLRQ
denying the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards must be reported 
level by level to the SPC and can only be rendered upon the approval of the SPC.189 Besides, 
recent studies also suggest that Chinese judges are increasingly competent to handle the 
issues regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards.190  
However, despite these encouraging developments in law and practice, there is still 
the possibility, though largely reduced, that foreign arbitration awards cannot be recognized 
and enforced in China. At the same time, the disputants who choose to arbitrate outside 
China also need to bear in mind that foreign arbitration institutions cannot directly request 
Chinese courts to conduct preservation measures to preserve the assets that are located in 
China. This disadvantage may lead to substantial difficulties in the enforcement phase, if 
the counterparties transfer away the assets before the end of the disputes. Besides, although 
WKH63&¶VSULRUUHSRUWLQJPHFKDQLVPFDQHIIHFWLYHO\UHFWLI\WKHLPSURSHUGHFLVLRQVPDGH
                                                 
186 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 282. 
187 Eu Jin Chua, 'Litigation and the People's Courts', in Michael J. Moser (ed.), Managing Business Disputes 
in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law International, 2007), pp. 140-141. 
188 This issue is further discussed in the following Section 5.5.3. 
189 The prior reporting mechanism is introduced in a more detailed manner in the following Section 5.4.2. 
190 As observed by Cheng and Liu, since Chinese judges handle more and more cases regarding the 
enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, they have gradually obtained the necessary skills and experience 
to decide such kind of cases properly. Teresa Cheng S.C. and Joe Liu, 'Enforcement of Foreign Awards in 
Mainland China: Current Practices and Future Trends', 31 (2014) Journal of International Arbitration, p. 
671. See also Qisheng He, 'Public Policy in Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the Supreme 
People's Court of China', 43 (2013) Hong Kong Law Journal, pp. 1037-1060. 
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by local courts, it may also cause considerable delay, as the cases need to go through a time-
consuming level by level reporting and reviewing process.191  
(2) Litigation and Arbitration inside China 
There are several advantages that foreign-related commercial disputants can benefit 
from, if they choose to litigate or arbitrate inside China. To begin with, when the assets and 
evidence are mainly located inside China, Chinese courts and arbitration institutions can 
more effectively ensure the preservation of these assets and evidence. By the same token, if 
ERWK SDUWLHV¶ PDLQ SODFHV RI EXVLQHVV DUH LQVLGH &KLQD FKRRVLQJ &KLQHVH FRXUWV DQG
arbitration institutions can enable the parties and arbitrators to meet each other more 
conveniently and frequently without worrying about the time, energy and money spent for 
covering the geographical distance. In practice, the principle of proximity is one important 
concern when the parties select arbitration institutions. Moreover, unlike foreign court 
judgements, court decisions made by Chinese courts can be directly enforced without the 
recognition process. Similarly, arbitration awards made by Chinese arbitration institutions 
are also immediately legally binding and effective once issued.192 Accordingly, the parties 
who choose litigation and arbitration inside China at least do not need to worry about the 
recognition of their dispute outcomes in China. 
More importantly, forum shopping choices cannot be unilaterally made by one party, 
but should be based on the mutual agreement of the parties. In reality, both sides of the 
parties tend to choose courts and arbitration institutions that they are more familiar with.193 
Just like foreign parties who prefer foreign courts and arbitration institutions, Chinese 
parties are also reluctant to litigate or arbitrate outside China. As a result, foreign parties 
may find difficulty in convincing Chinese parties to agree on their suggestions to litigate or 
arbitrate outside China, when they do not have the advantageous bargaining power. As 
Moser and Yuen noticed, it is not rare to find foreign parties compromise in negotiation and 
agree to choose Chinese arbitration institutions or courts to resolve their disputes.194  
                                                 
191 Friven Yeoh (2007), supra note 185, pp. 269-270. This issue is further discussed in a more detailed 
manner in the following Section 6.5.1 (3). 
192 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅), promulgated by 
the Standing Committee of National People's Congress on 31 August 1994, Article 57. 
193 Markus A. Petsche, 'International Commercial Arbitration and the Transformation of the Conflict of 
Laws Theory', 18 (2010) Michigan State Journal of International Law, pp. 474-476. Gary Born (2014), 
supra note 38, pp. 73-76. 
194 Michael J. Moser and Peter Yuen, 'Arbitration outside China', in Michael J. Moser (ed.), Managing 
Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law International, 2007), p. 89. 
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Regardless of what the reasons are, when foreign-related commercial disputants 
FKRRVHWRRUKDYHWROLWLJDWHDQGDUELWUDWHLQVLGH&KLQDWKHTXDOLW\RI&KLQD¶IRUHLJQ-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration will then be vital for the successful resolution of their 
disputes and the effective protection of their interests. 
3.4 Summary 
China adopted a dual legal system in which the governance of foreign-related and 
domestic issues is separated in law. Through the promulgation of special laws and 
regulations for foreign investment and trade issues, a relatively independent foreign-related 
sector which is parallel to the domestic one has been gradually established over the past 
three decades. Under the dual legal system, special legal settings for foreign-related issues 
can be designed to serve the particular needs of foreign investors and traders, while the 
domestic legal order needs not to be fundamentally changed. 
A satisfactory legal environment for foreign investment and trade not only needs a 
proper regulatory framework which explicitly confirms the rights of foreign investors and 
traders in law, but also effective legal mechanisms to enforce and protect their rights in 
SUDFWLFH :LWK WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI WKH WHUP µIRUHLJQ-related FRPPHUFLDO FDVHV¶ WKH
resolution of domestic and foreign-related commercial cases was separated in litigation and 
arbitration. Special legal settings were introduced into the litigation and arbitration systems 
to enhance the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. Over the past 
few decades, the definition of foreign-related commercial cases has experienced an 
expansion in law, which is now more consistent with the UNICTRAL Model Law. Some 
Chinese courts also show a more liberal attitude towards the interpretation of the scope of 
µIRUHLJQ-UHODWHGFRPPHUFLDOFDVHV¶LQMXGLFLDOSUDFWLFH 
China also provides a pluralistic dispute resolution framework for foreign-related 
commercial disputants. On one hand, they can commence their dispute resolution process 
with informal consensual approaches such as negotiation and mediation to reach an 
amicable settlement. Influenced by traditional Chinese philosophies, negotiation is a 
popular start in foreign-related commercial dispute resolution, though it does not always 
work in practice. Modern-style commercial mediation and Chinese-style government-
official-involved mediation reflect different kinds of mediation practice. However, they 
generally strike for one goal: the parties should be supported to find a middle path to resolve 
the disputes, regardless of the middleman is a modern-style commercial mediator or a 
Chinese-style government official. 
On the other hand, foreign-related commercial disputants can also resort to formal 
adjudicative approaches when initial amicable settlement efforts fail or when they prefer 
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the binding effects of litigation and arbitration. Chinese law permits foreign-related 
commercial disputants to choose litigation or arbitration outside China, though the parties 
may need to face the difficulties in enforcing the decisions rendered by foreign courts and 
arbitration institutions. Litigation and arbitration inside China, namely foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration, are also important options for disputants. Foreign-
related commercial disputants may choose to resolve their disputes in Chinese courts and 
arbitration institutions for the reasons of enforcement advantage and proximity. Foreign 
businessmen may also need to do so when Chinese parties insist on litigation or arbitration 
in China. No matter for what reasons, the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation 
and arbitration are crucial to the disputants, as the protection of their interest will then lie in 
the hands of Chinese courts and arbitration institutions.
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Chapter 4 Institutional and Procedural Settings for Foreign-
Related Commercial Litigation 
4.1 Introduction 
Under the dual legal system, the relationship between domestic and foreign-related 
commercial cases in litigation is two-fold. On the one hand, domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputes share many similarities in institutional settings and litigation 
proceedings. On the other hand, there are several special legal designs for foreign-related 
commercial disputes, which are different from domestic cases. To understand the 
differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial disputes in litigation, this 
chapter studies the special legal designs and their effects on foreign-related commercial 
litigation. At the same time, the structure of Chinese courts and the litigation proceedings 
from commencement to closure are also reviewed to provide a general understanding on 
how foreign-related commercial disputes are handled in litigation. 
This chapter consists of four sections. First, a historical review is conducted to 
illustrate how the foreign-related commercial litigation system has been gradually 
established and developed in the past three decades. Second, the structure of Chinese courts 
is briefly described to illustrate the organization of judges and courts, the role of the SPC 
and its judicial interpretations in the judicial system, and the evaluation mechanisms for 
judges and courts in China. Third, the statutory differences between domestic and foreign-
related commercial litigation, the centralized jurisdiction in particular, are discussed. Fourth, 
an overview on litigation proceedings is provided to show how foreign-related commercial 
disputes are handled in courts from submission to conclusion. 
4.2 Historical Development of Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation 
In the initial years after the 1978 reform, Chinese courts, which were mainly used as 
the tools for combating crime DQG FODVV VWUXJJOH LQ0DR¶V HUD had little experience in 
handling commercial disputes. Accordingly, foreign-related commercial disputes at that 
time were rarely resolved through litigation. Only a limited number of courts in Beijing, 
Tianjin and Guangzhou were authorized to handle commercial cases, the majority of which 
were domestic commercial cases.195 At that time, foreign-related commercial disputes were 
mainly resolved through informal approaches such as negotiation and mediation. If the 
                                                 
195 Sally Lord Ellis and Laura Shea (1981), supra note 6, p. 169. 
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amicable settlement did not work, the disputes were normally brought to arbitration 
institutions instead of courts.196 
The situation was gradually changed with the introduction of the CiPL (Trial 
Implementation) in 1982, which signalled the start of the modernization of Chinese 
litigation. The 1982 CiPL (Trial Implementation) was the first procedural law which 
separated domestic and foreign-related cases in the field of dispute resolution after the 1978 
reform. It had a separate part (Part Five) providing special provisions on the proceedings of 
foreign-related civil and commercial disputes, which covered five main procedural issues, 
QDPHO\ µ*HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV¶ µ$UELWUDWLRQ¶ µ6HUYLFH DQG 7LPH 3HULRGV¶ µ3UHVHUYDWLRQ
0HDVXUHV¶DQGµ-XGLFLDO$VVLVWDQFH¶$OWKRXJKWKHVHVSHFLDOSURYLVLRQVDWWKDWWLPHZHUH
rather preliminary and general, they clearly reflected the general strategy of legislators to 
separate the governance of domestic and foreign-related civil and commercial cases in 
litigation. 
If the promulgation of the 1982 CiPL (Trial Implementation) can be marked as the 
beginning of Chinese courts to handle foreign-related civil and commercial disputes, the 
1991 CiPL can be then deemed as the formal announcement of the establishment of a 
foreign-related civil and commercial litigation system.197 $IWHUWHQ\HDUV¶SUHSDUDWLRQWKH
1991 CiPL provided more systematic and detailed legal provisions on litigating foreign-
related civil and commercial cases. The number of related legal articles expanded from 
¶V  $UWLFOHV - WR ¶V  $UWLFOHV -270). Apart from the 
aforementioned five issues in the 1982 CiPL (Trial Implementation), a new issue 
µ-XULVGLFWLRQ¶ ZDV DGGHG WR FODULI\ WKH special jurisdictional rules for foreign-related 
commercial cases.198 Apart from the increase in the number of articles, the contents of 
articles also became more concrete, detailed and sophisticated. 199  These positive 
                                                 
196 Ibid. 
197 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (1991) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁һ䇹䇬⌅), 
promulgated by the National People's Congress on 9 April 1991 and revised by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress on 28 October 2007 and 31 August 2012. 
198 For a detailed introduction to jurisdictional rules on foreign-related commercial cases, see the following 
Section 4.4.1. 
199 For example, the articles on the service of documents in the 1982 version only provided general 
guidance on what kinds of methods can be used for the service of documents, while the articles on the 
service of documents in the 1991 version provided more detailed descriptions, such as the time limits of 
different methods and what requirements should be met for the service of documents. See Civil Procedure 
Law of the People's Republic of China (1991), Article 246; Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic 
of China (Trial Implementation) (1982), Article 196.  
For comments on the new characteristics of the 1991 CiPL, see e.g. Bing Tan, 'ޜ↓ǃ≁ѫǃ᭸⦷: 䇪ᡁ
ഭᯠ≁һ䇹䇬⌅Ⲵ⢩⛩ (Justice, Democracy and Efficiency: An Analysis on the Characteristics of the 
New Civil Procedure Law)', 5 (1991) ⧠ԓ⌅ᆖ (Modern Legal Science), pp. 10-14; Yanmin Cai, 'ㆰ᷀ᡁ
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developments led to a gradual increase in the number of foreign-related civil and 
commercial disputes that were brought to courts in the 1990s (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Annual number of foreign-related cases accepted by courts (1992-1999)200 
 
,QWKHVWKHERRPLQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWDQGWUDGHDIWHU&KLQD¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH
WTO resulted in a further increase in the number of foreign-related civil and commercial 
cases resolved via litigation (Figure 2). Anticipating the potential role of courts in foreign-
related commercial litigation, the SPC introduced the centralized jurisdiction (䳶ѝ㇑䗆) 
in 2002 to enhance the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and secure a 
consistent application of law in judicial practice.201 
                                                 
ഭᯠ≁һ䇹䇬⌅Ⲵ⢩⛩ (A Brief Analysis on the Characteristics of the New Civil Procedure Law)', 4 
(1992) ѝኡབྷᆖᆖᣕ⽮Պ、ᆖ⡸ (Journal of Sun Yatsen University Social Science Edition), pp. 46-58. 
200 7KHGDWDLVREWDLQHGIURPWKHDQQXDOµ6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW:RUN5HSRUW¶ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ
੺ ) to the NPC. The reports are downloaded from the data base set up by the Peking University 
(http://www.pkulaw.cn/). The annual number of foreign-related cases before 1992 is not available. But, the 
SPC stated in its 1993 work report to the NPC that the total number of foreign-related commercial cases 
accepted from1988 to 1992 was 6186. 
201 For comments on the centralized jurisdiction, see e.g. Wei Ding, 'ᡁഭ⎹ཆ≁୶һ䇹䇬㇑䗆ᵳࡦᓖⲴ
ᆼழ (The Perfection of China's Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation Jurisdictional Rules)', 24 (2006) 
᭯⌅䇪උ (Tribune of Political Science and Law), pp. 152-164; Zhanghui Li, '⎹ཆ≁୶һṸԦ䳶ѝ㇑䗆
㾱䇪 (Key Issues in the Centralized Jurisdiction for Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases)', 7 (2002) 
Ӫ≁ਨ⌅ (People's Judicature), pp. 17-19. A more detailed discussion on issue of the jurisdiction of 
foreign-related commercial cases is provided in the following Section 4.4.1. 
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Figure 2: Annual number of foreign-related civil and commercial cases handled by 
courts (2002-2007) 202 
 
In recent years, affected by the financial crisis, the caseload of foreign-related civil 
and commercial disputes has experienced a sharp jump from 6000-8000 in the 2000s to the 
recent 14000-16000 (Figures 2 and 3). Facing the challenge, the SPC introduced the 
µ([FHOOHQFH6WUDWHJ\¶㋮૱ᡈ⮕) into foreign-related commercial litigation in 2010. The 
µ([FHOOHQFH 6WUDWHJ\¶ HPSKDVL]HG WKDW IRUHLJQ-related commercial cases should be 
adjudicated by high quality judges and courts. The quality of litigation proceedings and 
court judgements should also be enhanced to ensure foreign-related commercial cases are 
adjudicated correctly and properly in litigation.203 
                                                 
202 The data is obtainHGIURPWKHDQQXDOµ6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW:RUN5HSRUW¶ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ
੺ ) to the NPC. The reports are downloaded from the data base set up by the Peking University 
(http://www.pkulaw.cn/). However, the data for the years 2000, 2001 and 2008 is not available in the work 
reports of the SPC in corresponding years. Meanwhile it should be noted that the description of the statistics 
LQWKHUHSRUWVFKDQJHGIURPµIRUHLJQ-UHODWHGFDVHVDFFHSWHGE\FRXUWV¶LQWKHVWRµIRUHLJQ-related civil 
and commercial cases handlHGE\FRXUWV¶LQWKHV7KHFKDQJHZDVSUREDEO\FRQGXFWHGWREHPRUH
precise in the description of statistics, because foreign-related cases involves not only civil and commercial 
issues, but also administrative and criminal issues. 
203 7KHµ([FHOOHQFH6WUDWHJ\¶ZDVILUVWDQQRXQFHGE\(U[LDQJ:DQWKHYLFHSUHVLGHQWRIWKH63&LQWKH
third Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Adjudication Working Conference. See Zhou Bin, '⎹ཆ
୶һ⎧һᇑࡔ㋮૱ᡈ⮕ᨀ䙏 (The Excellent Strategy for Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime 
Adjudication Accelerates)', in Ӫབྷ㖁 (The Official Website of the National People's Congress), 2 February 
2010. Available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/ 
fztd/sfgz/2010-02/02/content_1537330.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
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Figure 3: Annual number of foreign-related civil and commercial cases handled by 
courts (2009-2015)204 
 
The statistics above show that the number of foreign-related civil and commercial 
disputes resolved in Chinese courts has increased dramatically over the past three decades. 
The significant increase, on the one hand, reflects the rapid development of foreign 
investment and trade in China. As shown in Figure 4, around half of foreign-related civil 
and commercial disputes resolved by courts in recent years are contract disputes. By and 
large, the increasing foreign-related business activities and accompanying contract disputes 
are the major reason for the increase in the number of foreign-related civil and commercial 
cases. On the other hand, this increase also shows the increasing importance of foreign-
related commercial litigation. To a large extent, resolving foreign-related commercial 
disputes in Chinese courts is now an important and indispensable option for foreign-related 
commercial disputants. 
                                                 
204 The data is obtained froPWKHDQQXDOµ6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW:RUN5HSRUW¶ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ
੺ ) to the NPC. The reports are downloaded from the data base set up by the Peking University 
(http://www.pkulaw.cn/). It should be noted that the number of foreign-related civil cases and foreign-
related commercial cases are normally calculated together in the reports. By now, there is no clear 
FODULILFDWLRQRQWKHSURSRUWLRQRIFRPPHUFLDOFDVHVLQWKH63&¶VRIILFLDOGRFXPHQWV%XWWKH63&VWDUWHG
to separate the statistics on foreign-related civil cases and foreign-related commercial cases since 2015. In 
its 2015 work report, the SPC stated that the number of foreign-related commercial cases resolved in 2014 
was 5804. This is the first time that the SPC explicitly provided the number of foreign-related commercial 
cases in its official reports. Later in 2016, the SPC stated in its 2016 work report that the number of foreign-
related commercial cases resolved in 2015 was 6079.  
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Figure 4: Proportion of different kinds of civil and commercial cases resolved by 
Chinese courts (2013-2015)205 
 
4.3 Chinese Courts: A Brief Description 
4.3.1 Structure of Chinese Courts 
Courts follow a pyramid-style structure in China. As the highest judicial organ, the 
SPC supervises the trial work of local courts and special courts. Local courts consist of three 
OHYHOVQDPHO\KLJKSHRSOH¶VFRXUWV+3&VLQWHUPHGLDWHSHRSOH¶VFRXUWV,3&VDQGEDVLF
SHRSOH¶V FRXUWV %3&V 6SHFLDO FRXUWV FRQVLVW RI PLOLWDU\ FRXUWV PDULWLPH FRXUWV DQG
railway transportation courts, the main functions of which, as their names suggest, are 
handling cases regarding military, maritime and railway transportation issues.206  
                                                 
205 The data is obtained from the database set up by the Peking University (www.pkulaw.cn). All the first 
instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases resolved from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015 in 
the database are calculated. Available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/Case/. Last visited in May 2016. 
206 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (2006) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭӪ≁
⌅䲒㓴㓷⌅), promulgated on 1 July 1979 and revised on 2 September 1983, 2 December 1986 and 31 
October 2006, Articles 2 and 29. The maritime courts are established at the intermediate level for first 
instance maritime cases. The appeal for maritime cases should be brought to HPCs. The railway 
transportation courts consist of two levels: basic and intermediate. The intermediate railway transportation 
courts are under the supervision of corresponding HPCs. Similar to local courts, military courts also consist 
of three levels, the highest instance court of which is the SPC. See 'ޘഭ⌅䲒㓴㓷փ㌫ (The Organization 
Structure of Courts)', in ѝഭ㖁 (China.com.cn), 16 September 2002. Available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2002-09/16/content_5204990.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
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With regard to civil and commercial cases, the SPC and local courts form a four-level 
and two-instance system.207 Specifically, apart from the SPC at the national level, local 
courts are distributed on the basis of administrative divisions, including 32 HPCs at the 
provincial level, 409 IPCs at the city and prefecture level and 3117 BPCs at the county and 
district level.208 In principle, most first instance civil and commercial cases are handled by 
BPCs, while IPCs, HPCs and the SPC only hear first instance cases that are significant in 
their corresponding administrative divisions.209 The parties can appeal the decisions made 
by first instance courts to the corresponding courts at the next level for second instance trials. 
The decisions made by the second instance courts are final.210 But, it should be noted that 
cases having gone through two instance trials can still be conditionally retried through the 
trial supervision procedure.211 
The internal structure of Chinese courts normally consists of three parts.212 First, there 
are several administrative organs, including the general administrative office, the political 
department, the research office, the Party committee department (ފင) and other offices or 
departments responsible for administrative issues. Second, specialized functional divisions 
                                                 
207 This four-level two instance system is also applicable to administrative and criminal litigation. 
208 $FFRUGLQJWRWKHLQIRUPDWLRQSXEOLVKHGRQWKH63&¶VRIILFLDOZHEVLWHLQWKHUHDUH+3&V
IPCs and 3117 BPCs in China. See The Supreme People's Court, 'Ӫ≁⌅䲒ㆰӻ (A Brief Introduction to 
People's Courts)', in ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᇈᯩ㖁ㄉ (The Official Website of the Supreme People's Court), 21 
January. Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-5035.html. Last visited in June 2016. 
There is one HPC in each province level administrative region. HPCs are located in 4 municipalities 
directly under the central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), 5 autonomous regions 
(Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Guangxi and Inner Mongolia) and 23 provinces. IPCs are set up in the cities and 
prefectures under the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central 
government. BPCs are located in counties, autonomous counties and districts under the cities. Besides, 
ZKHQQHFHVVDU\%3&VFDQVHWXSGLVSDWFKHGSHRSOH¶V WULEXQDOV ⍮ࠪ⌅ᓝ) as their agencies to handle 
cases in distant rural areas. Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (2006), 
Articles 17, 22 and 25. 
209 In other words, IPCs handle cases that are significant at the city and prefecture level. HPCs handle cases 
that are significant at the province level. The SPC handles cases that are significant at the nation level. 
Meanwhile, the SPC can also handle cases that the SPC deems necessary to try. Besides, IPCs also try 
cases that are designated by the SPC and significant foreign-related cases. Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 17-20. 
However, as introduced in the following Section 4.4.1 (3), many first instance foreign-related commercial 
cases are handled by IPCs instead of BPCs due to the introduction of the centralized jurisdiction in 2002, 
regardless of whether it is significant or not. 
210 %XWRIFRXUVHLIILUVWLQVWDQFHFDVHVDUHKDQGOHGE\WKH63&WKH63&¶VMXGJHPHQWVDQGUXOLQJVDUHDOVR
final and cannot be appealed. 
211 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 164, 175 and 198.The appeal 
and retrial procedures are further discussed in the following Section 4.5.3. 
212 For a brief introduction, see Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, pp. 8-9. See also Stanley B. Lubman 
(1997), supra note 166, pp. 308-309. 
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are established for handling trial-related issues such as case-filing, enforcement and trial 
supervision. Third, for the trial work, there are normally three or four specialized trial 
divisions within the courts, namely criminal divisions, administrative divisions and civil 
divisions, while economic divisions and other special trial divisions can be established 
according to practical needs. For example, in many IPCs and BPCs that frequently handle 
foreign-related commercial cases, there are normally separate foreign-related commercial 
divisions.213  
Apart from ordinary judges, there are a division chief and one or more deputy division 
chief(s) who supervise the trial work of their corresponding divisions. Above them are one 
or more vice court president(s) and one court president who supervise the work of courts.214 
There are no explicit rules regulating the relationship between court officials and ordinary 
MXGJHV,QSUDFWLFHWKHVHFRXUWRIILFLDOVEDVLFDOO\IXQFWLRQDVWKHµOHDGHUV¶DWGLIIHUHQWOHYHOV
and the internal structure of the courts thus shows a hierarchal feature.215  
46XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUWDQG,WV-XGLFLDO,QWHUSUHWDWLRQV 
$WWKHWRSRI&KLQD¶VS\UDPLG-style court structure, the SPC plays multiple roles in 
&KLQD¶VMXGLFLDOV\VWHP216 As the highest adjudicative organ in the judiciary, it handles first 
instance cases that are highly influential on a national scale, functions as the second instance 
court for HPCs and supervises the trial work of local courts.217 As the chief administrator 
in the judicial system, it scrutinizes the work reports of local courts, organizes training 
sessions for judges, holds conferences to guide local courts and unify judicial practice.218 
                                                 
213 For details, see the following Section 4.4.1 (4). 
214 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (2006), Artiles 18, 23, 26 and 30. 
215 Bin Liang (2008), supra note 132, p. 146. Stanley B. Lubman (1997), supra note 166, pp. 308-309. The 
hierarchal feature in the structure of Chinese courts is further discussed in the following Section 6.3.2. 
216 For a useful introduction to the SPC, see Susan Finder, 'The Supreme People's Court of the People's 
Republic of China', 7 (1993) Journal of Chinese Law, pp. 145-224. See also Taisu Zhang, 'The Pragmatic 
Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People's Court of China', 25 (2012) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 
pp. 1- 5DQGDOO 3HHUHQERRP 
&RXUWV DV /HJLVODWRUV 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V &RXUW ,QWHUSUHWDtions and 
Procedural Reforms', (2007) FLJS (Foundation for Law, Justice and Society) 'Rule of Law in China: 
Chinese Law and Business' programme reports, pp. 1-8. Available at http://www.fljs.org/content/courts-
legislators-supreme-people%E2%80%99s-court-interpretations-and-procedural-reforms. Last visited in 
June 2016; Nanping Liu, '"Legal Precedents" with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette 
of the Supreme People's Court', 5 (1991) Journal of Chinese Law, pp. 107-140. 
217 The SPC is also the second instance court for military courts at the HPC level. The SPC supervises the 
trial work of both local and special courts. The trial supervision of the SPC over local and special courts is 
mainly conducted through identifying and correcting wrong decisions of lower level courts through appeal 
procedures and trial supervision procedures. Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic 
of China (2006), Articles 11-13. 
218 Susan Finder (1993), supra note 216, pp. 213-222. 
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As the major leader in judicial reform, it publishes policy statements, sets up reform plans 
and launches campaigns to tackle problematic issues in judicial practice.219 Since 1999, the 
SPC has issued a series of five-year outlines to promote judicial reforms and introduce new 
reform measures to improve the judicial work. For example, its recently published fourth 
five-year outline announced the start of the new round judicial reform from 2014 to 2018.220 
Apart from these important functions, the most distinctive yet controversial issue of 
WKH 63& LV LWV µMXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV¶ ਨ⌅䀓䟺), which produce de facto legislative 
effects in practice. 221  As explicitly stated in the Legislation Law, the power of legal 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ EHORQJV WR WKH 6WDQGLQJ &RPPLWWHH RI WKH 1DWLRQDO 3HRSOH¶V &RQJUHVV
(NPCSC),222 ZKLOHWKH63&DVDXWKRUL]HGE\WKH2UJDQLF/DZRI3HRSOH¶V&RXUWVFDQRQO\
make interpretations to the application of laws and regulations in judicial proceedings,.223 
However, in practice, the NPCSC rarely exercises its power of legal interpretation, while 
the SPC is a more active player who is actually playing the role of legal interpreter with its 
judicial interpretations.224  
,QLWLDOO\WKHPDLQJRDORIWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVZDVWRFODULI\WKHPHDQLQJ
of relatively vague articles in laws and regulations, so as to enhance the consistency of law 
application in local courts. But, with the increase in the number of laws and regulations, the 
                                                 
219 Judicial campaigns are normally launched to tackle significant problems in judicial work in a targeted 
and centralized manner. For example, the SPC periodically launches anti-corruption campaigns. For 
discussion on the role of the SPC in judicial reforms, see Taisu Zhang (2012), supra note 216, pp. 2-12. 
220 In 9 July 2014, the SPC published its Fourth Five-<HDU2XWOLQHIRU5HIRUPLQJ3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV-
2018), which consists of 45 measures. Later in 4 February 2015, the number of measures was further 
expanded to 63. See Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform 
of People's Courts: Fourth Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2014-2018 (2015) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁
⌅䲒ޣҾޘ䶒␡ॆӪ≁⌅䲒᭩䶙Ⲵ᜿㿱: Ӫ≁⌅䲒ㅜഋњӄᒤ᭩䶙㓢㾱 2014-2018 ), ⌅ਁ[2015]3ਧ 
(Fa Fa [2015] No.3), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 4 February 2015. 
221  )RU D XVHIXO GLVFXVVLRQ RQ WKH 63&¶V de facto UROH DV D µTXDVL-OHJLVODWRU¶ LQ &KLQD VHH Randall 
Peerenboom (2007), supra note 216, pp. 1-8. 
222 Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (2000) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ・⌅⌅), promulgated by 
the National People's Congress on 15 March 2000, Article 42. 
223 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (2006), Article 32. 
224 In practice, it is plausible that the NPCSC is too busy to handle the interpretation work of numerous 
laws and regulations in China, because the NPCSC is also responsible for revising and promulgating laws, 
as well as other important political and administrative work. But, the NPCSC has made several legal 
interpretations to basic laws, when the issues concerned are vital for the country. For example, it has made 
H[SODQDWLRQVRQWKH+RQJ.RQJ6$5%DVLF/DZLQUHJDUGLQJWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHµSHUPDQHQWUHVLGHQW¶
of Hong Kong SAR. See '䀓䟺⌅ᖻᱟޘഭӪབྷᑨငՊⲴ䟽㾱㙼䍓 (Legal Interpretation Is an Important 
Task for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress)', in ᯠॾ㖁 (Xinhuanet), 6 April 2004. 
Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/06/content_1404241.htm. Last visited in June 
2016. See also Susan Finder (1993), supra note 216, pp. 164-165. 
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63&¶VMXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVDOVREHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPPRQIRUPDODQGV\VWHPDWLF
which has gradually become an indispensable part in law application.225 
6SHFLILFDOO\DVFODULILHGLQWKH63&¶VRZQVWDWHPHQWRQLWVMXGLFLDOinterpretations, it 
PDNHVµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV¶DOVRIUHTXHQWO\WLWOHGDVµRSLQLRQV¶WRODZVUHJXODWLRQVDQGFHUWDLQ
OHJDOLVVXHVWRVSHFLI\WKHPHDQLQJRIVSHFLILFDUWLFOHV,WLVVXHVµSURYLVLRQV¶DOVRIUHTXHQWO\
WLWOHGDVµQRWLFHV¶ WRVSHFLI\WKHUXOHVand requirements for judges and courts in judicial 
ZRUN,WDOVRVHQGVµUHSOLHV¶WR+3&VWRFODULI\LWVDWWLWXGHVRQVSHFLILFLVVXHVRUFDVHV226 
Collectively, these different kinds of judicial interpretations constitute an authoritative 
source of rules for judicial activities and detailed clarifications on the articles in laws and 
regulations, which provide timely and concrete guidance for judges and practitioners on law 
application in practice.  
+RZHYHUWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQs also raise doubts and criticisms. The main 
DUJXPHQWLVWKDWWKHLVVXDQFHRIMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVH[FHHGVWKHVFRSHRIWKH63&¶SRZHU
endowed by law. 227  $OWKRXJK WKH 63&¶V MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV DUH PDLQO\ PDGH IRU
unifying the application of law in judicial work, its usage in practice is so wide that the 
63&¶V MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV DUH DFWXDOO\ UHVHPEOLQJ OHJDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH SRZHU RI
ZKLFKVKRXOGEHORQJWRWKH13&6&0HDQZKLOHDSDUWIURPWKH63&¶VRZQVWDWHPHQWRQLWV
judicial interpretation work, there are no explicit and authoritative rules regulating how the 
63& PDNHV WKH MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV 7KXV WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI WKH 63&¶ MXGLFLDO
interpretations lacks transparency and supervision, which are important and necessary in an 
ordinary legislative process.228  
Despite the questionable authority of the SPC in its quasi-legislation activities, its 
judicial interpretations indeed bridge the gap between the vagueness of laws and regulations 
in books and the needs of concrete application of laws and regulations in practice. This is 
                                                 
225 Susan Finder (1993), supra note 216, pp. 164-167. ,QSUDFWLFH WKHQXPEHURI DUWLFOHV LQ WKH63&¶V
judicial interpretations can be even larger than that in the laws and regulations the SPC interprets. For 
H[DPSOHWKHUHDUHDUWLFOHVLQWKH&L3/ZKLOHWKHQXPEHURIDUWLFOHVLQWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDO
interpretation to the 2012 CiPL amounts to 552 articles. 
226 %HVLGHV WKH 63& DOVR PDNHV µGHFLVLRQV¶ WR UHYLVH RU DEROLVK LWV SUHvious judicial interpretations. 
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work (2007) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ
ਨ⌅䀓䟺ᐕ֌Ⲵ㿴ᇊ), ⌅ਁ[2007]12ਧ (Fa Fa [2007] No.12), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 
9 march 2007, Article 6. 
227 Randall Peerenboom (2007), supra note 216, pp. 3-4; Susan Finder (1993), supra note 216, pp. 185-
190; Jerome A. Cohen, 'Reforming China's Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts', 45 (1997) American 
Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 794-795. 
228 Ibid. 
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DOVR ZK\ MXGJHV SUDFWLWLRQHUV DQG VFKRODUV IUHTXHQWO\ UHIHU WR WKH 63&¶V MXGLFLDO
interpretations when they cannot find clear and detailed answers in laws and regulations.  
In foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, the SPC and its judicial 
interpretations also play an indispensable role. On the one hand, the SPC issues 
interpretations to the CiPL, Arbitration Law and other important procedural laws and 
regulations, which clarify important issues in foreign-related commercial litigation and 
DUELWUDWLRQHJZKDWNLQGRIFDVHVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµIRUHLJQ-UHODWHG¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
WKH 63&¶V VSHFLDO legal designs for foreign-related commercial disputes, such as the 
centralized jurisdiction for first instance foreign-related commercial cases, and the prior 
reporting mechanism for the validity of foreign-related arbitration agreements and the 
enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards, also reflect the particular influence of the 
SPC on foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration.229  
4.3.3 Evaluation Mechanism for Judges and Courts 
Judges and courts in China are assessed annually by a series of numbers in an 
evaluation mechanism and the evaluation results are directly connected with their rewards 
and punishment.230 The emergence of the rudiments of the evaluation mechanism can date 
back to the 1980s. At that time, the statistical work was mainly conducted manually and the 
collection of data covering a wide range of issues was thus not feasible. Accordingly, the 
number of evaluation factors was rather limited. There were only several simple evaluation 
factors at that time, such as the rate of overruled judgements (᭩ࡔ⦷), the rate of cases 
remanded for retrial (ਁഎ䟽ᇑ⦷) and the rate of concluded cases (ᇑ㔃⦷).231  
With the introduction of the computer and information technology into the judicial 
system by the end of the 1990s, the scope of evaluation factors had been gradually 
enlarged.232 As a result, the SPC started research into how to establish a comprehensive 
evaluation mechanism to quantify the performance of judges and courts with objective 
numbers and formally announced the plan to establish an evaluation mechanism in its 
                                                 
229 These issues are discussed in a more detailed manner in the following Sections 4.4.1, 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
230 Song Jin, Meilai Wu, Lu Chen and Liang Xiang, 'ᇑࡔ䍘᭸㘳Ṩփ㌫Ⲵ㘳ሏо৽ᙍ (An Investigation 
and Reflection on the Adjudicative Quality and Effectiveness Evaluation Mechanism)', 2 (2011) ⌅ᖻ䘲
⭘ (Law Application), p. 74. 
231  Zengqin Sun and Yuefeng Xu, 'ѝഭ⌅䲒ᇑࡔ䍘䟿᭸⦷䇴ՠᤷḷփ㌫⹄ウ  (A Study on the 
Adjudicative Quality and Effectiveness Evaluation Mechanism for Chinese Courts)', 28 (2012) ѝഭ⸣⋩
བྷᆖᆖᣕ⽮Պ、ᆖ⡸ (Journal of China University of Petroleum Social Science Edition), p. 46. 
232 Ibid., p. 47.  
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Second Five-Year Outline for Reforming Chinese Courts. 233  The SPC then issued its 
µJXLGLQJRSLQLRQV¶IRUFRXUWHYDOXDWLRQ$ comprehensive evaluation mechanism consisting 
of three main categories (adjudicative justice, adjudicate efficiency and adjudicative 
effectiveness) and thirty-one evaluation factors was established.234  
The introduction of the evaluation mechanism by the SPC has brought many positive 
changes to the judicial system. On the one hand, the evaluation mechanism provides 
relatively objective criteria for assessing the performance of judges and courts. Accordingly, 
judges and courts are motivated to enhance their performance in the judicial work to obtain 
rewards and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the evaluation results show judges and 
                                                 
233 Second Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2004-2008 (2005) (Ӫ≁⌅䲒ㅜҼњӄᒤ᭩
䶙㓢㾱 2004-2008), ⌅ਁ[2005]18ਧ (Fa Fa (2005) No.18), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 26 
October 2005, Paragraph 42. 
234 Supreme People's Court, 'ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᔰኅṸԦ䍘䟿䇴ՠᐕ֌Ⲵᤷሬ᜿㿱 (䈅㹼) (Guiding 
Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Carrying Out the Case Quality Evaluation Work)', (2008) ⌅
ਁ[2008]6ਧ (Fa Fa [2008] No.6). Available at. Last visited in June 2016.  
Evaluation factors on adjudicative justice (ᇑࡔޜ↓) include: the rate of cases changed in the case-filing 
period (・Ṹਈᴤ⦷ WKH UDWH RI ILUVW LQVWDQFH FDVHV WULHG E\ FROOHJLDO SDQHOV FRQVLVWLQJ RI SHRSOH¶V
assessors (аᇑṸԦ䲚ᇑ⦷), the rate of first instance cases overruled and remanded for retrial (аᇑࡔߣ
ṸԦ᭩ࡔਁഎ䟽ᇑ⦷),  the rate of second instance cases overruled and remanded for retrial (Ҽᇑ᭩ࡔਁ
എ䟽ᇑ⦷), the rate of second instance cases tried in open court sessions (Ҽᇑᔰᓝᇑ⨶⦷),  the rate of 
cases concluded by lower level courts which are decided by the higher level courts to be retried (ሩл㓗
⌅䲒⭏᭸ṸԦᨀ䎧޽ᇑ⦷), the rate of concluded cases remanded for retrial (⭏᭸ṸԦ᭩ࡔਁഎ䟽ᇑ
⦷), the rate of cases concluded by lower level courts that are overruled in retrials and remanded for retrials 
(ሩл㓗⌅䲒⭏᭸ṸԦ᭩ࡔਁഎ䟽ᇑ⦷), the rate of investigations and examinations in retrials (޽ᇑᇑ
ḕ䈒䰞⦷), the rate of judicial compensation (ਨ⌅䎄گ⦷),  the grade of court decision documents (㻱ࡔ
᮷Җ䇴࠶). 
Evaluation factors on adjudicative efficiency (ᇑࡔ᭸⦷) include: the rate of cases filed within the legal 
time limit (⌅ᇊᵏ䲀޵・Ṹ⦷),  the rate of summary proceedings in first instance trials (аᇑㆰ᱃〻ᒿ
䘲⭘⦷), the rate of reaching decisions in court sessions (ᖃᓝ㻱ࡔ⦷), the rate of cases concluded within 
the legal time limit (⌅ᇊᇑ䲀޵㔃Ṹ⦷), the average length of adjudication (ᒣ൷ᇑ⨶ᰦ䰤), the average 
length of enforcement (ᒣ൷ᢗ㹼ᰦ䰤), the rate of cases not concluded after time limit extension (ᔦ䮯ᇑ
䲀ᵚ㔃∄),  the balance rate of concluded cases (㔃Ṹ൷㺑ᓖ), the average number of concluded cases per 
person per year (⌅䲒ᒤӪ൷㔃Ṹᮠ), the average number of concluded cases per judge per year (⌅ᇈᒤ
Ӫ൷㔃Ṹᮠ). 
Evaluation factors on adjudicative effectiveness (ᇑࡔ᭸᷌) include: the rate of cases in which the parties 
agree with the court decisions without resorting to further litigation proceedings after first instance trials 
(аᇑᴽࡔ᚟䇹⦷), the rate of mediation (䈳䀓⦷), the rate of cases withdrawn (᫔䇹⦷), the rate of actual 
enforcement (ᇎ䱵ᢗ㹼⦷), the rate of substantial recovery of the subject matter in enforcement (ᢗ㹼ḷ
Ⲵࡠս⦷), the rate of voluntary enforcement (㻱ࡔ㠚ࣘን㹼⦷), the rate of mediation cases in which the 
parties applying for compulsory enforcement (䈳䀓ṸԦ⭣䈧ᢗ㹼⦷), the rate of investigations in retrials 
(޽ᇑᇑḕ⦷), the rate of petitions (ؑ䇯ᣅ䇹⦷), the score of public satisfaction (ޜՇ┑᜿ᓖ). 
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courts what are their main deficiencies in the judicial work, so that they can more actively 
improve their performance in adjudication with clear targets.235 
However, the evaluation mechanism may also have negative effects in practice. As the 
HYDOXDWLRQ UHVXOWV GLUHFWO\ DIIHFW MXGJHV¶ SURPRWLRQ DQG ERQXVHV MXGJHV DUH LQHYLWDEO\
motivated to maximize the numbers that bring them rewards and minimize the numbers that 
cause punishment. Similarly, to achieve better results in evaluation, court officials also push 
WKHLU VXERUGLQDWHV WR GR VR DV WKH FRXUWV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH DOVR GLUHFWO\ DIIHFWV WKHLU IXWXUH
positions. As a consequence, judges may use all the methods that can be employed to 
improve their scores in the evaluation, be it on their own initiative or forced by court 
officials. Merely focusing on the numbers on the evaluation list, judges tend to neglect other 
off-list yet important factors in the judicial work. In extreme circumstances, they may even 
intentionally ignore or go against the requirements in law, as long as such actions can help 
them to obtain high scores in the evaluation.236  
In general, the evaluation mechanism seems to a double-edge sword. Whilst the 
objective numbers in the evaluation mechanism can motivate judges to enhance their 
performance in judicial work, these objective numbers may also push judges to abuse the 
evaluation mechanism to maximize their own profits. To some extent, adjudication is a 
complicated process which cannot be solely reflected by objective numbers. For example, 
the rate of first instance cases overruled and remanded for retrial (к䇹ਁ᭩⦷) is an 
important evaluation factor which is designed to show the general quality of first instance 
trials. But, the fact that a court decision made by the first instance court is overruled by the 
second instance court does not necessarily mean that the lower level court indeed made a 
mistake in the first instance trial. It can be caused by new evidence, new facts or simply two 
different opinions from judges within the discretionary scope. 237  Thus, it seems 
                                                 
235 Zengqin Sun and Yuefeng Xu (2012), supra note 231, pp. 47-48; Song Jin, Meilai Wu, Lu Chen and 
Liang Xiang (2011), supra note 230, p. 75. 
236 Donald C. Clarke (2003), supra note 19, pp. 23-24. For example, to maximize the rate of cases 
concluded within the time limits in law, judges may try to turn away disputants in the case-filing period 
and reduce the number of new accepted cases, so that they can find enough time to deal with cases that 
have already been accepted and ensures that they can solve the accepted cases within the time limits. 
However, such practice inevitably affected the accessibility of disputants to courts. For a more detailed 
discussion on this issue, see the following Section 6.2.1. 
237 Fei Yang and Junwen Zhang, 'ṸԦ䍘䟿䇴ՠ䈝ຳлⲴᇑࡔ㇑⨶᭩䶙: สҾк䇹ਁ᭩⦷ᤷḷ㇑⨶Ⲵ
ᇎ䇱࠶᷀  (The Adjudicative Management Reform in the Context of Case Quality Evaluation: An 
Empirical Analysis on the Management of the Rate of Cases Overruled and Remanded for Retrial)', 52 
(2012) ⋣ইབྷᆖᆖᣕ⽮Պ、ᆖ⡸ (Journal of Henan University Social Science Edition), p. 48. It is also 
interesting to notice that although the general performance of the judiciary, in terms of the evaluation 
factors, has been gradually enhanced in recent years, the public perception of justice in courts is not 
changing accordingly. Naixing Shi, 'ਨ⌅ޜ↓䇴ԧᵪࡦⲴᇑ㿶оڕޘ: ԕӪ≁⌅䲒ṸԦ䍘䟿䇴ՠᤷḷ
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inappropriate to blindly XVHWKLVNLQGRIµREMHFWLYHQXPEHUV¶WRDVVHVVWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI
judges and courts. The evaluation mechanism can play a positive role in enhancing the 
quality of judicial work. But, what evaluation factors should be included and how to design 
the evaluation mechanism seem necessary to be reconsidered carefully.238 
4.4 Statutory Differences between Domestic and Foreign-Related Commercial 
Litigation 
4.4.1 Jurisdictional Differences and the Centralized Jurisdiction 
(1) General Provisions for Both Domestic and Foreign-Related Commercial Cases 
There are several general jurisdiction rules in the CiPL that are applicable to both 
domestic and foreign-related cases, which need to be discussed before the introduction to 
the special provisions for foreign-related commercial cases, so that a full understanding of 
the differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in jurisdiction 
issues can be acquired. 
In general, there are mainly three kinds of jurisdiction rules in the CiPL, namely 
hierarchical jurisdiction rules (㓗࡛㇑䗆), territorial jurisdiction rules (ൠฏ㇑䗆), as well 
as transfer and designation jurisdiction rules (〫䘱઼ᤷᇊ㇑䗆 ). First, hierarchical 
jurisdiction rules prescribe which level of courts should be first instance courts. Most of 
first instance cases are handled by BPCs, while IPCs, HPCs and the SPC may also conduct 
first instance trials when the cases concerned are (economically) significant in their 
corresponding administrative divisions (Table 3).239  
Second, territorial jurisdiction rules decide which court at the corresponding level 
should exercise the jurisdiction. They consists of three parts. To begin with, the case should 
be principally handled by the court located in the place of the deIHQGDQW¶V GRPLFLOH240 
Meanwhile, there are also several special arrangements for disputes regarding contracts, 
                                                 
փ㌫Ѫ㿶䀂 (The Examination and Perfection of the Judicial Justice Evaluation Mechanism: A Perspective 
from the People's Courts Case Quality Evaluation Mechanism)', 5 (2014) Ӫ≁ਨ⌅ (People's Judicature), 
p. 51. 
238 Fei Yang and Junwen Zhang (2012), supra note 237, p. 48; Song Jin, Meilai Wu, Lu Chen and Liang 
Xiang (2011), supra note 230, p. 77. 
239 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 17-20. In China, the main 
criterion for the allocation of first instance civil and commercial cases among different levels of courts is 
the disputed amount. The following Table 3 shows the disputed amount standards in different provincial 
level administrative regions, which are decided according to their economic development status. 
240 7KHUHLVDQH[FHSWLRQWKDWWKHFRXUWLQWKHSODFHRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VGRUPLFHFDQH[HUFLVHWKHMXULVGLFWLRQ
iI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V GRPLFLOH FDQQRW EH DVFHUWDLQHG HJ ZKHQ WKH GHIHQGDQW LV XQGHU FRPSXOVRU\
imprisonment). Ibid., Article 22. 
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insurance contracts, bills, company issues, transportation contracts, tort and maritime 
issues.241 Besides, there is also exclusive jurisdiction which applies to disputes concerning 
real estate, harbour operation and inheritance.242 
Apart from general and special territorial jurisdiction rules, the CiPL also provides a 
particular type of territorial jurisdiction rule (consensual jurisdiction) to recognize the 
SDUWLHV¶DXWRQRP\LQVHOHFWLQJFRXUWVFRQGLWLRQDOO\)RUGLVSXWHVDULVLQJIURPFRQWUDFWRU
property rights, the parties can select a court that has an actual connection with the disputes. 
The actual connection can be the place where the subject matter is located, the place of 
contract performance/signature and the domicile of the plaintiff/defendant, as long as the 
SDUWLHV¶GHVLJQDWLRQLVQRWDJDLQVWthe hierarchical and exclusive jurisdiction rules.  
Another type of special territorial jurisdiction rule, submission jurisdiction, is also 
stated in the CiPL, which prescribes that if the defendant responds to the suit without 
objections, the court concerned should then be deemed to have the jurisdiction, unless it is 
against hierarchical jurisdiction rules.243 In addition, the CiPL also clarifies that when the 
parties simultaneously bring the dispute to two or more courts that have the jurisdiction, the 
court which first files the case should exercise the jurisdiction.244 
Third, the transfer jurisdiction rules allow the court that received the application to 
transfer the case to another court when it finds it does not have the jurisdiction. The 
designation jurisdiction rules provide that if a court cannot exercise its jurisdiction for 
special reasons, its superior courts should designate another court to take over the case. 
Meanwhile, the CiPL also rules that the conflict between the courts on jurisdiction issues 
should be solved through negotiation or decided by their mutual superior court if the 
negation between conflicting courts fails. Besides, a court can request its superior court to 
handle the case when necessary, while a court, upon the approval of its superior court, also 
has the right to take over the case accepted by its inferior court when necessary.245 
                                                 
241 )RUWKHVHNLQGVRIGLVSXWHVQRWRQO\WKHFRXUWLQWKHSODFHRIGHIHQGDQW¶VGRPLFLOHEXWDOVRWKHFRXUWLQ
the place of the subject matter (e.g. the place of contract performance) can exercise the jurisdiction. 
242 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 21-33. 
243 It should be noted that the consensual and submission jurisdiction were initially special rules only 
applicable to foreign-related civil and commercial cases in the Civil Procedure Law. In 2012, these two 
special rules were integrated into the general provisions applicable to both domestic and foreign-related 
civil and commercial cases in the 2012 Civil Procedure Law. 
244 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 34, 35, 127. 
245 Ibid., Articles 36-38. 
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Table 3: Disputed amount standards for first instance civil and commercial cases in 
different levels of courts246 
Provincial administrative region HPC IPC BPC 
When both parties are in the same provincial administrative region 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
and Guangdong 
more than 
500 million 
between 100 
and 500 
million  
less than 100 
million 
Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Liaoning, Anhui, Fujian, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, 
Hainan, Sichuan, Chongqing  
more than 
300 million 
between 30 
and 300 
million 
less than 30 
million 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Yunnan, 
Shanxi, Xinjiang 
more than 
200 million 
between 10 
and 200 
million 
less than 10 
million 
Guizhou, Xizang, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia 
more than 
100 million 
between 5 
and 100 
million 
less than 5 
million 
When the parties are not in the same provincial administrative region 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
and Guangdong 
more than 
300 million 
between 50 
and 500 
million  
less than 50 
million 
                                                 
246  Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Adjusting the Standards for High People's Courts and 
Intermediate People's Courts to Exercise Jurisdiction over First Instance Civil and Commercial Cases (2015) 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䈳ᮤ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒઼ѝ㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒㇑䗆ㅜаᇑ≁୶һṸԦḷ߶Ⲵ䙊⸕), ⌅ਁ 
[2015] 7ਧ (Fa Fa [2015] No.7), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 3 May 2015. 
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Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Liaoning, Anhui, Fujian, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, 
Hainan, Sichuan, Chongqing  
more than 
100 million 
between 20 
and 100 
million 
less than 20 
million 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Yunnan, 
Shanxi, Xinjiang 
more than 50 
million 
between 10 
and 50 
million 
less than 10 
million 
Guizhou, Xizang, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia 
more than 20 
million 
between 5 
and 20 
million 
less than 5 
million 
 
(Unit: RMB) 
(2) Special Exclusive and Territorial Jurisdiction Rules for Foreign-Related Commercial 
Cases 
There are two special jurisdiction rules for foreign-related civil and commercial cases 
LQ WKH &L3/ $UWLFOH  FRQILUPV &KLQHVH FRXUWV¶ H[FOXVLYH MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU GLVSXWHV
arising from Sino-foreign equity joint venture contracts, Sino-foreign contractual joint 
venture contracts and Sino-foreign cooperative exploration and development of natural 
resources contracts. 247  In other words, the parties cannot choose foreign courts by 
agreement to handle disputes arising from these three kinds of contracts. But, as confirmed 
by the SPC, these disputes can be resolved by Chinese or foreign arbitration institutions 
based on WKHSDUWLHV¶PXWXDODJUHHPHQWV248 
                                                 
247 More precisely, these three kinds of disputes refer to the disputes arising between cooperating partners 
in joint ventures and natural resource exploration/development project. For example, a Chinese party and 
an American party can reach a contract to establish a Sino-foreign joint venture. If a dispute arises from 
this contract, these two parties can only bring the dispute to a Chinese court or a Chinese/foreign arbitration 
institution. The choice of foreign courts is excluded by Article 266. 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that Article 266 only applies to foreign-related commercial disputes derived 
from these three kinds of cooperative contracts. For example, if two FIEs or one FIE and one domestic 
enterprise have a dispute, such a dispute is regarded as a domestic dispute under Chinese law, as both 
parties are Chinese legal persons. This issue is discussed in a more detailed manner in the previous section 
3.2.2. 
248 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015), Article 531. 
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Article 265 provides the plaintiffs with the possibility to sue defendants who have no 
domicile within China in Chinese courts. In principle, a plaintiff should bring the dispute to 
WKH FRXUW WKDW LV ORFDWHG LQ WKH SODFH RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V GRPLFLOH %XW LW ZLOO EHFRPH
problematic if the defendant has no domicile in China. The plaintiff should then try to reach 
an agreement with the defendant to select a court by agreement. Consensual jurisdiction, 
however, cannot always be guaranteed in practice. If this is the case, the plaintiff will face 
the condition that he/she cannot find a suitable Chinese court that has the lawful jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, to solve this potential problem, Article 265 prescribes that Chinese courts that 
DUHORFDWHGLQWKHSODFHVRIVXEMHFWPDWWHUFRQWUDFWSHUIRUPDQFHRUVLJQDWXUHGHIHQGDQWV¶
distrainable assets and representative offices can exercise the jurisdiction over the disputes 
in case that the defendants have no domicile in China. 
(3) Centralized Jurisdiction for Foreign-Related Commercial Cases 
The most significant difference between domestic and foreign-related commercial 
cases in litigation is the centralized jurisdiction. Before China joined the WTO, the 
competence of Chinese courts in resolving commercial disputes, foreign-related ones in 
particular, had been a common concern for commercial disputants.249 Anticipating the 
increasing demDQGVIRUTXDOLW\OLWLJDWLRQVHUYLFHVDIWHU&KLQD¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH:72WKH
SPC decided to introduce the centralized jurisdiction to enhance the quality of foreign-
related commercial litigation. Specifically, the SPC issued special provisions on the 
jurisdiction of foreign-related commercial cases in 2002, which prescribed that the first 
instance jurisdiction of the following cases: 
(1) Foreign-related contract and infringement disputes; 
(2) Letter of credit disputes; 
(3) Revocation, recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards; 
(4) Validity of foreign-related civil and commercial arbitration agreements; 
(5) Recognition and enforcement of foreign courts judgements and rulings; 
Should be exercised by the following courts: 
                                                 
249 Mo Zhang, 'International Civil Litigation in China: a Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System', 
25 (2002) Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, pp. 95-96; Jerome A. Cohen (1997), 
supra note 227, pp. 793-804; Minxin Pei, 'Does Legal Reform Protect Economic Transactions? 
Commercial Disputes in China', in Peter Murrell (ed.), Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies 
(University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 193-199; Roy F. Grow, 'Resolving Commercial Disputes in 
China: Foreign Firms and the Role of Contract Law', 14 (1993) Northwestern Journal of International Law 
& Business, p. 173. 
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(1) BPCs in the economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) approved 
by the State Council;  
(2) IPCs in the capital cities of provinces and autonomous regions and municipalities 
directly under the central government (ⴤ䗆ᐲ);  
(3) IPCs in special economic zones (SEZs) and cities specifically designated in the 
state plan (䇑ࡂঅࡇᐲ);  
(4) Other IPCs that are designated by the SPC;  
(5) HPCs.250 
In other words, the first instance jurisdiction of most foreign-related commercial cases 
was centralized from BPCs to several higher OHYHOFRXUWV7KH63&¶VGHFLVLRQWRUDLVHWKH
first instance jurisdiction of foreign-related commercial cases from the level of BPCs to the 
OHYHORI ,3&VDQG+3&V ZLWK WKHH[FHSWLRQRI WKH%3&V LQ(7'=V VKRZHG WKH63&¶V
determination to improve the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation by allocating 
foreign-related commercial cases to more competent higher level courts. 
(4) Centralized Jurisdiction in Transformation 
However, the scope of courts under the centralized jurisdiction established in 2002 
seemed to be too narrow, the number of courts having the jurisdiction over first instance 
foreign-related commercial cases was only around 110 in 2002, which was rather limited in 
comparison with the number of BPCs which was more than 3000 at that time.251 Such a 
limited number of courts could not manage the heavy caseload of foreign-related civil and 
commercial cases at that time (around 6000 per year).252 Moreover, given that there was 
                                                 
250  Generally, EPTZs are similar to SEZs, which enjoy special policies for promoting economic 
development, though county-size EPTZs are basically smaller than city-size SEZs. Provisions of the 
Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction over Foreign-Related Civil and 
Commercial Cases (2002) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⎹ཆ≁୶һṸԦ䇹䇬㇑䗆㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ㿴ᇊ), ⌅䟺
[2002]5ਧ (Fa Shi [2002] No.5), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 25 February 2002, Articles 1 
and 2. 
251 There are no official statistics on the number of courts that are within the scope defined in 2002. As 
estimated by the author, these courts consisted of around 30 BPCs in ETDZs, 32 HPCs, around 23 IPCs in 
provincial capitals, 15 IPCs in municipalities directly under the control of the central government, 5 IPCs 
in SEZs and 5 IPCs in special cities designated in the state plan.  
%\DFFRUGLQJWRWKH63&¶VUHSRUWWKHQXPEHURI%3&VZDV6HHSupreme People's Court, 'ᴰ
儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ࣐ᕪสቲ⌅䲒ᔪ䇮ᛵߥⲴᣕ੺ (The Supreme People's Court's Report on Strengthening 
WKH&RQVWUXFWLRQRI%DVLF3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV
 LQӪབྷ㖁 (The Official Website of the National People's 
Congress), 26 October 2004. Available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2004-
12/26/content_5337517.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
252 See the previous Figure 2. 
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only a small number of BPCs and IPCs which have the first instance jurisdiction, many 
foreign-related commercial cases would inevitably flow to HPCs and thus render the SPC 
to be the second instance court for these cases. This was inconsistent with the general 
principle that the main function of the SPC was not directly handling cases, but guiding, 
administering and supervising the judicial work of local courts.253  
Thus, to solve this dilemma, the SPC issued a further special notice in 2004 to adjust 
the scope set up in 2002.254 Specifically, the notice provided that IPCs, upon application, 
can be approved by the SPC to exercise jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related 
commercial cases.255 Besides, the SPC also authorized HPCs in Guangdong province and 
municipalities directly under the central government, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing, to designate BPCs in these areas as the first instance courts for foreign-related 
commercial cases when necessary.256  
But, these additionally designated BPCs and IPCs must fulfil rigid requirements: 
specialized foreign-related commercial trial divisions or collegial panels should be 
established inside these courts, which should be equipped with sufficient qualified judges 
for handling foreign-related commercial cases. Particularly, the SPC emphasized that the 
designation should be postponed, if these requirements could not be fulfilled. Otherwise, 
the applications would be rejected by the SPC.257 Following the issuance of the notice, the 
list of courts that have jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related commercial cases has 
been gradually enlarged in the past decade to respond to the increasing caseload of foreign-
related commercial cases. By the end of 2014, apart from 32 HPCs throughout the country, 
                                                 
253 Wei Ding (2006), supra note 201, pp. 157-158; Wei Ding, 'ᡁഭሩ⎹ཆ≁୶һṸԦᇎ㹼䳶ѝ㇑䗆Ⲵ
࡙ᔺ࠶᷀ : 䇴ǉᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⎹ཆ≁୶һ㇑䗆ᵳ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ㿴ᇊǊ (An Analysis on the 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Centralized Jurisdiction over Foreign-Related Commercial Cases in 
China: A Comment on the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the 
Jurisdiction over Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases)', 8 (2003) ਨ⌅ᇎ䐥 (Judicial Practice), 
pp. 120-121. 
254 Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Strengthening the Jurisdiction Work for Foreign-Related 
Commercial Cases (2004) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ࣐ᕪ⎹ཆ୶һṸԦ䇹䇬㇑䗆ᐕ֌Ⲵ䙊⸕), ⌅[2004]265
ਧ (Fa [2004] No.265), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 29 December 2004. 
255 Candidate courts should be selected by HPCs from the following IPCS: second instance courts handling 
border trade disputes, second instance courts in ETDZs or other IPCs which are deemed as qualified IPCS 
by HPCs. 
256 It should be noted that the designation of BPCs in these areas can be directly decided by corresponding 
HPCs, which do not need the approval of the SPC, but the designation should be reported to the SPC for 
record. 
257 See Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Strengthening the Jurisdiction Work for Foreign-Related 
Commercial Cases (2004). 
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there were 203 IPCs and 204 BPCs approved by the SPC to be listed courts that had the 
jurisdiction over foreign-related commercial cases.258 
(5) Particular Role of Courts Located in Economically-Developed Coastal Areas in 
Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation  
It should be noted that the five most economically-developed areas in China, namely 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, take a crucially important position in 
foreign-related commercial litigation. Around half of courts that have jurisdiction over first 
instance foreign-related commercial cases are located in these five areas (Figure 5) and over 
half of foreign-related civil and commercial cases are handled by the courts in these five 
areas (Figure 6). From this perspective, the performance of courts in these five areas, to a 
large extent, represents the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation in China. This 
is also consistent with the empirical findings that foreign investment activities are much 
PRUHDFWLYHLQ&KLQD¶VFRDVWDODUHDV259 
Figure 5: Proportion of courts which have jurisdiction over first instance foreign-
related commercial cases in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and 
other areas by 2014260 
                                                 
258 Dingbo Yuan, '407њѝสቲӪ≁⌅䲒ާᴹаᇑ⎹ཆ୶һṸԦ㇑䗆ᵳ (407 Basic People's Courts and 
Intermediate People's Courts Have the Jurisdiction over First Instance Foreign-Related Commercial Cases)', 
in ⌅ ࡦ ᰕ ᣕ   (Legal Daily), 18 November 2014. Available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2014-11/18/content_5849095.htm?node=20908. Last visited 
in June 2016. 
259 Joseph P. H. Fan, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung and Linxin Xu, 'Does 'Good Government' Draw 
Foreign Capital? Explaining China's Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow', (2007) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 4206 (WPS4206), pp. 19-21. Available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7062/wps4206.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y. Last visited in June 2016. 
260 For the number of courts that have jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related commercial cases, 
there are 1 HPC, 4 IPCs and 16 BPCs in Beijing; 1 HPC, 2 IPCs and 18 BPCs in Shanghai; 1 HPC, 16 IPCs 
and 57 BPCs in Guangdong; 1 HPC, 11 IPCs and 36 BPCs in Zhejiang; 1HPC, 13 IPCs and 8 BPCs in 
Jiangsu; 32 HPCs, 203 IPCs and 204 BPCs through the country. The data regarding the four areas is 
calculated based on the information published on the official websites of HPCs in these four areas. 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
84 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of foreign-related civil and commercial cases handled by courts 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and other areas in 2014261 
 
                                                 
261 Of all the 27999 foreign-related civil and commercial cases handled in Chinese courts in 2014 (13999 
cases regarding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and 15780 cases regarding other foreign jurisdictions), 
there are 1693 cases handled by courts in Beijing, 3222 in Shanghai, 7089 in Guangdong, 3934 in Zhejiang 
and 998 in Jiangsu. The data is calculated based on the annual work reports issued by the HPCs in these 
five areas. The data regarding the whole nation is obtained from the 2014 AQQXDO3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV:RUN
Report issued by the SPC. The reports are downloaded from the database set up by the Peking University 
(www.pkulaw.cn). The data for the year 2015 is not systematically published by the aforementioned HPCs. 
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,Q VKRUW WKH 63&¶V VSHFLDO MXULVGLFWLRQDO GHVLJQ FRQYH\V DQ LPSRUWDQWPHVVDJH WR
foreign-related commercial disputants that their disputes will be handled by the courts 
which are equipped with the most competent judges in China. Only HPCs, IPCs in 
importance cities and selected BPCs located in economically-developed coastal areas can 
have first instance jurisdiction over foreign-related commercial cases. Even after the 
expansion in 2004, there are now only about 7% of BPCs and 50% of IPCs that can fulfil 
the rigid requirements and be included in the list.262 These listed HPCs, IPCs and BPCs, to 
some extent, are the best courts in China. The objective of the centralized jurisdiction is 
rather clear. It is introduced by the SPC to maximally enhance the quality of foreign-related 
commercial litigation with available judicial resources.263 As discussed later, this main 
difference between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases in litigation brings about 
many positive effects to the development of foreign-related commercial litigation.264 
4.4.2 Other Procedural Differences 
There are several other procedural differences between domestic and foreign-related 
commercial cases, though their effects on the resolution of foreign-related commercial 
litigation may not be as significant as the centralized jurisdiction. 
(1) Agent Ad Item 
Since the judicature of a country is involved with the sovereignty, it is a common 
practice that a foreign lawyer is prohibited from representing the parties and commenting 
RQWKHODZDSSOLFDWLRQLQDQRWKHUFRXQWU\¶VFRXUWZLWKWKHLGHQWLW\RIDIRUHLJQODZ\HU265 
Article 263 of the CiPL follows such practice and prescribes that a foreign litigant who 
needs a lawyer to represent him/her cannot entrust a foreign lawyer as the agent ad item in 
litigation. The SPC further clarifies that it is possible for a foreign lawyer with the same 
                                                 
262 According to latest official statistics, China has 3117 BPCs and 409 IPCs. Among them there are 203 
BPCs and 204 IPCs that have the jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related commercial cases. The 
statistics is published by the SPC on its official website. Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
xiangqing-5035.html. Last visited in June 2016. 
263 This goal was explicitly stated by the SPC. The SPC stated in its judicial interpretation that the 
FHQWUDOL]HGMXULVGLFWLRQZDVLQWURGXFHGWRµHQKDQFHWKHTXDOLW\RIMXGJHVDQG adjudication in foreign-related 
FRPPHUFLDO OLWLJDWLRQ WR UHVSRQG WR WKHFKDOOHQJHVDIWHU&KLQD¶VDFFHVVLRQ WR:72¶6HHNotice of the 
Supreme People's Court on Strengthening the Jurisdiction Work for Foreign-Related Commercial Cases 
(2004).  
264 The positive effects brought by the centralized jurisdiction are further discussed in the following 
Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.2 and 6.4.1. 
265 Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, p. xv. See also Zhenzhong Huang, Ԣ㻱㩕䬰⹄ウ (Research 
on Arbitration Marketing) (⌅ᖻࠪ⡸⽮ (Law Press China), 2005), p. 71. 
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nationality as the foreign litigant to be appointed as the agent ad item. But, the foreign 
lawyer can only do so as a foreign person, not with the identity of a foreign lawyer.266 
(2) Language 
Pursuant to Article 262 of the CiPL, foreign-related cases should be tried with a spoken 
and written language that is commonly used in China (normally mandarin Chinese). 
Translation can be provided upon the request of foreign parties, while the translation fee is 
covered by the foreign parties themselves. This compulsory requirement in language is 
IXUWKHUFRQILUPHG LQ$UWLFOHRI WKH63&¶V MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WR WKH&L3/ZKLFK
prescribes that the materials submitted by the parties that are written in a foreign language 
should be accompanied with Chinese translations. As a result, foreign parties should bear 
in mind that the documents they submitted, the evidence they collected, as well as their oral 
presentation should be translated into Chinese if they are originally made in a foreign 
language. Meanwhile, they should also take the additional cost of translation into 
consideration when they prepare to solve their disputes in Chinese courts.  
(3) Service of Documents 
The CiPL provides that litigation documents in domestic civil proceedings should be 
principally handed to the parties directly. Only when there are substantial difficulties for 
direct service can documents be served via fax, email, post or public announcement.267 But, 
for foreign litigants who have no domicile within the territory of China, direct service is 
rather difficult. Accordingly, Article 267 of the CiPL provides several methods to replace 
direct service. Apart from the common ways of fax, email, post and diplomatic channels, 
litigation documents can also be served to IRUHLJQ OLWLJDQWV¶ DXWKRUL]HG DJHQWad items, 
representative/branch offices or business agents. In the case that all the methods above 
cannot be employed, public announcement can be the final choice for the service of 
documents.268 
(4) Time Periods 
For domestic cases, the general time limit (from acceptance to conclusion) for ordinary 
civil proceedings is six months for first instance trials and three months for second instance 
                                                 
266 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015), Article 528. 
267 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 85-92. 
268 When the documents are served via post or public announcement, the documents will be deemed as 
completed if the time period lasts for three months. 
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trials, which can only be extended with the approval of the court president.269 But, this 
general time limit does not apply to foreign-related civil and commercial cases.270 One 
possible reason for the removal of the general time limit is that the proceedings in foreign-
related civil and commercial litigation, such as service of documents, arrangement of 
hearings and collection of evidence, are probably more time-consuming than domestic cases. 
The removal of the general time limit may have two kinds of effects. On the one hand, 
there can be an increase in the length of foreign-related commercial litigation as there is no 
compulsory time limit in law. On the other hand, both judges and the parties can also avoid 
being pushed by the compulsory time limit and find sufficient time to conduct the 
proceedings more carefully. From this perspective, the removal of the time limit can be 
beneficial for ensuring the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation, though it may 
also potentially lead to court delay. But, it should be noted that although there is no 
compulsory time limit in the CiPL, some courts are actually trying to set their own time 
limits for foreign-related commercial litigation. For example, the Shanghai HPC issued a 
special rule in 2012 that the courts in Shanghai are required to follow the general time limit 
of six months when resolving foreign-related commercial cases.271  
Besides, compared with domestic cases, the time periods for foreign-related cases are 
normally longer. For example, the time limit for foreign litigants who have no domicile in 
China to submit a statement of complaint or raise an appeal is 30 days, while the time limit 
on these issues for domestic litigants is 15 days.272 Similarly, the length of service of 
documents by public announcement is 3 months for foreign litigants, instead of 60 days for 
domestic litigants.273 
4.5 Litigation Proceedings: A General Overview 
4.5.1 Submission and Pre-Trial 
(1) Submission 
                                                 
269 For first instance courts, if the case still cannot be concluded after the six months extension, the time 
limit can be further extended with the approval of the higher level court. Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 149 and 176. 
270 Ibid., Article 270. 
271 But, the time spent for cross-border litigation activities, such as service of documents and collection of 
evidence, is not calculated in the time limit of six months. See Management Methods of the Shanghai High 
People's Court on the Time Limits for Foreign-Related Commercial Cases (Trial Implementation) (2012) 
(к⎧ᐲ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⎹ཆ୶һṸԦᇑ䲀㇑⨶࣎⌅ (䈅㹼)), issued by the Shanghai High People's 
Court on 11 July 2012. 
272 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 125, 164, 268 and 269. 
273 Ibid., Articles 92 and 267. 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
88 
Litigation proceedings start from the submission of a claim by the plaintiff, which 
should fulfil the requirements that there should be an eligible plaintiff, a definite defendant, 
a specific claim with facts and reasons. In the meantime, the suit should also be within the 
scope of civil litigation and the jurisdiction of the court.274 Court staff in the case-filing 
division then examine whether the materials submitted by the plaintiff are in accordance 
with the aforementioned requirements and makes the decision to accept the case or not 
accordingly.275 In special circumstances, for example, where there is a valid arbitration 
agreement or the court has no jurisdiction over the case, the court then needs to inform the 
plaintiff to arbitrate the case or litigate the case in another court which has jurisdiction. 
Besides, the court can also made mediation efforts in the case-filing phase.276 
(2) Pre-trial 
If the case is accepted by the court, the pre-trial phase then commences. For a foreign-
related commercial case, the case will be forwarded from the case-filing division to the 
economic trial division or the foreign-related commercial trial division in the court. The 
division chief will then designate a judge for handling the pre-trial issues, including sending 
the documents to the defendant, informing both parties of their rights and duties, handling 
the objections to jurisdiction or the challenge of judges if any.277 Some studies suggest that 
the designation of a judge is not necessarily random or based on rotation. The division chief 
may consider the specific conditions of the case and assign suitable judges to handle the 
case.278 Particularly, a pre-WULDOPHHWLQJFDQEHKHOGE\WKHFRXUWIRUFODULI\LQJHDFKVLGH¶V
claims, exchanging the evidence, conducting mediation and summarizing the main 
disputing issues with the parties.279 
                                                 
274 Specifically, an eligible plaintiff refers to citizens, legal persons or other organizations with direct 
LQWHUHVW LQ WKH FDVH FRQFHUQHG 7KH GHIHQGDQW LV µGHILQLWH¶ ZKHQ WKH SODLQWLII FDQ SURYLGH QHFHVVDU\
LQIRUPDWLRQWRDVFHUWDLQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VQDPe and domicile. The scope of civil litigation covers disputes 
arise from property or personal relations. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application 
of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2015), Article 209; Civil Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 109. 
275 It should be noted that there has been a change from examination mechanism to registration mechanisms 
in the case-filing phase in recent years, which significantly affects the accessibility of litigation. This 
important issue is further discussed in the following Section 6.2.1. 
276 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 122 and 124. 
277 Ibid., Articles 125-127. 
278 Stanley B. Lubman (1997), supra note 166, pp. 316-317. 
279 Meanwhile, the court can also conduct its own investigation when necessary or requested by the parties 
in the pre-trial phase. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 124; 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2015), Articles 224-226. 
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4.5.2 Trial Sessions, Evidence Rules and Preservation Measures 
(1) Trial Sessions 
First instance trials are held by collegial panels in ordinary proceedings or sole judges 
in summary proceedings. Collegial panels consist RIMXGJHVDQGSHRSOH¶VDVVHVVRUVWKH
number of which should be singular.280 A collegial panel normally consist of three members, 
HLWKHU WKUHH MXGJHV RU RQH MXGJH DQG WZR SHRSOH¶V assessors.281 The presiding judge is 
normally the judge who was assigned to be in charge of pre-trial issues. 282 
In principle, trials are conducted publicly, unless the cases involve state secrets and 
personal privacy. Particularly, the parties in commercial disputes can apply for a closed 
hearing if the cases involve trade secrets, and the courts will then decide whether or not to 
approve the applications. The parties should be notified three days before the opening of 
court sessions, while the trial information should also be publicly announced. 
$WULDOQRUPDOO\VWDUWVZLWKWKHSUHVLGLQJMXGJH¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWZKLFKLQWURGXFHVWKH
case to be tried, the list of participants, and the rights and duties for the parties. Following 
WKH SUHVLGLQJ MXGJH¶V RSHQLQJ VWDWHPHQW LV WKH FRXUW LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK HYLGHQFH
submitted by the plaintiff and defendant are presented and examined. After court 
investigation, court debate starts with oral statements of the parties and then proceeds into 
FURVVGHEDWHZKLFKLVHYHQWXDOO\FRQFOXGHGE\WKHSDUWLHV¶ILQDOVWDWHPHQWV%HVLGHVDOOWKH
activities in trial sessions should be kept in a written trial record made by the court clerk, 
which should be signed by the collegial panel, the court clerk, as well as the parties and 
other litigation participants.283 
(2) Evidence Rules 
                                                 
280 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 39.  
281 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH13&6&¶VGHFLVLRQWKHFROOHJLDOSDQHOVKRXOGFRQVLVW RIMXGJHVDQGSHRSOH¶VDVVHVVRUV
when so requested by the parties or the case is socio-politically significant and sensitive. Decisions of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Perfection of the People's Assessor System 
(2004) (ޘഭӪ≁ԓ㺘བྷՊᑨ࣑ငઈՊޣҾᆼழӪ≁䲚ᇑઈࡦᓖⲴߣᇊ), issued by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on 28 August 2004, Article 1. For a detailed introduction to 
WKHSHRSOH¶VDVVHVVRUPHFKDQLVPVHHXiaolong Peng, 'Ӫ≁䲚ᇑઈࡦᓖⲴ༽㣿оᇎ䐥: 1998-2010 (The 
Revival and Practice of the People's Assessor Mechanism: 1998-2010)', 1 (2011) ⌅ᆖ⹄ウ  (Legal 
Research), pp. 15-32. Since foreign-related commercial cases normally do not fall into the scope mentioned 
DERYHSHRSOH¶VDVVHVVRUVDUHWKXVQRWIUHTXHQWO\IRXQGLQWKHDGMXGLFDWLRn of foreign-related commercial 
cases. 
282 Stanley B. Lubman (1997), supra note 166, p. 309. 
283 Recording errors in the trial records can be corrected at the request of the parties or other participants. 
Meanwhile, if there is anyone refusing to sign the trial records, the facts should then be recorded in the 
case files. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 141, 142, 146 and 147. 
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Article 64 of the CiPL prescribes that the burden of proof falls on the parties. The 
parties should provide evidence to support their own claims. Otherwise, they may face 
adverse consequences. But, if the parties cannot collect certain evidence for objective 
reasons or if the courts deem it necessary to collect certain evidence, the courts should 
conduct the investigation and evidence collection themselves. The SPC further specifies 
ZKDW FDQ EH UHJDUGHG DV µREMHFWLYH UHDVRQV¶ LQ $UWLFOH  ZKLFK PDLQO\ UHIHU WR WKH
conditions that the evidence is preserved by state organs and not entitled to be collected by 
the parties, or the evidence involves state secrets, trade secrets and personal privacy.  
+RZHYHULWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHFRXUWV¶LQYHVWLJDWLRQRQWKHLURZQLQLWLDWLYHVLV
limited. The courts can only collect evidence without the request of the parties when the 
evidence involves national or public interest, personal relations, public interest regarding 
environment and consumer rights, or when there is a possibility of malicious collaboration 
between the parties which may lead to thHYLRODWLRQRIRWKHUV¶OHJDOULJKWV284 It can be found 
WKDWWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVEDVLFDOO\FRQILUPWKDWWKHEXUGHQRISURRIVKRXOGEH
principally shouldered by the parties. The courts can only collect the evidence at the request 
of the parties or when the investigation is necessary for the protection of public interest. 
7KHIRUPVRIHYLGHQFHDUHVWDWHGLQ$UWLFOHRIWKH&L3/ZKLFKLQFOXGHWKHSDUWLHV¶
statements, documentary evidence, physical evidence, audio-visual materials, electronic 
daWDZLWQHVV¶WHVWLPRQ\H[SHUWRSLQLRQVDQGLQVSHFWLRQUHFRUGV7KH63&IXUWKHUFODULILHV
that all the evidence should be principally collected in the pre-trial phase within a time limit 
negotiated by the parties or decided by the courts, which is subject to extension upon the 
approval of the courts. The evidence then should be cross-examined in court investigation 
during the trial phase, which can only be taken as the basis for ascertaining facts after cross-
examination.285 Besides, it is also possible for the parties to present new evidence in the 
trial phase. But, the parties must give a justifiable reason why the evidence cannot be 
submitted within the prescribed time limit in the pre-trial phase. Otherwise, the new 
evidence may not be accepted by the courts.286 
Particularly, an emphasis on the authenticity and legitimacy of the evidence can be 
found in the CiPL. The documentary or physical evidence submitted should principally be 
original. The audio-visual materials and electronic data should be verified before acceptance. 
The witness is required to testify in person before the court. Only for reasons of health, long 
                                                 
284 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015), Articles 94-96. 
285 Normally, the time limit for evidence submission and exchange in the pre-trial phase should not be less 
than 15 days in first instance trial. Ibid., Articles 99-104. 
286 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 65 and 129. 
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geographical distance or natural disasters can the witness give the testimony in the form of 
written testimony, audio-visual materials or audio-visual live connection. Expert witness 
can also be questioned in the trial phase if the parties raise objections against expert opinions. 
Inspection records should also be principally made with the presence of the parties.287 
(3) Preservation Measures 
The CiPL recognizes the need of the disputants for preservation measures. The parties 
can apply to the courts for evidence or property preservation in litigation proceedings. The 
courts can also take preservation measures on their own initiatives when necessary. Besides, 
the interested parties can also apply for preservation measures before litigation proceedings 
in case of emergency.288 
The CiPL also provides necessary protection for the respondents to the preservation 
measures. First, if the applications are raised during the litigation proceedings, the courts 
can order the applicants to provide the guarantee, and the courts can reject the applications 
if the applicants fail to do so, whereas the guarantee provided by the applicants is 
compulsory when the applications are raised before the litigation proceedings. Second, the 
respondents can choose to provide the guarantee to the court to remove the preservation 
measures on their assets. Third, the respondent also has one chance to apply to the courts 
for reconsideration, though the preservation measures will not be suspended during the 
period of reconsideration. Last, when the applications are found to be incorrect, the losses 
of the respondent should be compensated by the applicants.289 
4.5.3 Judgment, Appeal and Trial Supervision Procedure 
(1) Judgment 
After the trial phase, collegial panels will deliberate the cases, and the decisions should 
be made based on the majority opinions. But, all the opinions should be put on the 
deliberation records and signed by the panel members, regardless of whether there are 
dissenting opinions or not. Court judgments should be announced publicly, be it made 
through open or closed trials, which become legally effective if the cases are not appealed 
                                                 
287 Ibid., Articles 70-80. 
288 Ibid., Articles 80, 100 and 101 
289 Ibid., Articles 104, 105 and 108. 
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within the time limit in law.290  Article 152 of the CiPL prescribes that the following 
information should be stated in court judgements: 
(1) Causes of suits, claims, disputed facts and reasons;  
(2) Facts ascertained, laws applied and the reasoning;  
(3) Results and the allocation of the litigation fees;  
(4) Time limits and courts for the appeal procedure. 
(2) Appeal 
Upon the receipt of first instance court judgements, the parties have the right to appeal 
the judgements to the courts at the next level for second instance trials within fifteen days.291 
The petitions for appeal should be first submitted to the first instance courts and then be 
forwarded to the second instance courts within five days. In the second instance trials, 
collegial panels must be established, which examine both the facts ascertained and the laws 
applied by the first instance courts. After the review of case files, the inquiry to the parties 
and investigation, the collegial panels can decide to adjudicate the cases with closed 
hearings if no new facts, evidence or reasons can be found.292  
Article 172 of the CiPL specifies that the second instance courts can make two kinds 
of decisions under different circumstances, either rendering second instance judgments by 
themselves or remanding the case to the first instance courts for retrial. On the one hand, 
the second instance courts can uphold the first instance judgments and reject the appeals, or 
amend, abrogate or change the first instance judgments if the facts ascertained or the laws 
applied are incorrect. On the other hand, second instance courts also have the right to revoke 
the first instance judgments and remand the cases to the first instance courts for retrial, if 
the basic facts are unclear or there is serious violation of procedural rules.293 
(3) Trial Supervision Procedure 
                                                 
290 But, of course, the first instance judgements made by the SPC immediately become legally effective 
once made. The second instance court decisions which cannot be appealed also become immediately 
effective once made. Ibid., Articles 42, 148 and 155 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid., Articles 165-169. 
293 :KDWNLQGVRIVLWXDWLRQVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµVHULRXVYLRODWLRQ¶RIOHJDOSURFHHGings is clarified by the 
63&7KH\DUHDWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHWULDORUJDQLVLOOHJDOEWKHMXGJHVRUSHRSOH¶VDVVHVVRUVWKDWVKRXOG
EHVXEMHFWWRUHFXVDOGRQRWIROORZWKHUXOHRIUHFXVDOFWKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWVRIGHEDWHLVGHSULYHGDQGG
the party without litigation capacity is not represented by a legal agent id item. Interpretation of the 
Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 
(2015), Article 325. 
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As mentioned, first instance judgments that are not appealed and second instance 
judgments are final and binding. However, if there are serious errors in these legally 
effective judgments, the cases concerned can still be re-tried through the trial supervision 
procedure. The trial supervision procedure, as its name implies, is designed to enable the 
courts and the procuratorates to supervise the trial work of courts and to correct the errors 
in effective court decisions through retrials.294 Particularly, within six months after the court 
decisions become effective, the parties can raise petitions for retrials if they find: (1) there 
is new decisive evidence that could reverse the original court decisions; (2) the original 
court decisions are supported by evidence that is insufficient, forged or not cross-examined; 
(3) the application of law is incorrect; (4) there is serious violation of procedural rules; (5) 
there is corruption, favouritism or perversion activities which lead to partial court 
decisions.295 
4.6 Summary 
The promulgation of the 1982 CiPL (Trial Implementation) introduced the dual-track 
approach into litigation, which separated the resolution of foreign-related commercial cases 
from domestic cases in courts. As marked by the advent of the 1991 CiPL and the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH 63&¶V VSHFLDO SURYLVLRQV RQ IRUHLJQ-related commercial cases, 
foreign-related commercial litigation has been further developed in the past two decades. 
As reflected by the increase in the number of foreign-related commercial cases in courts, 
litigation plays an increasingly important role in the resolution of foreign-related 
commercial disputes. 
China adopts a four-level and two instance system in civil proceedings. Initially, 
similar to domestic disputes, first instance foreign-related commercial disputes should be 
mainly handed by BPCs. The introduction of the centralized jurisdiction in 2002 changed 
the scenario and turned HPCs, selected IPCs and limited number of BPCs in economically-
developed coastal areas into the main forces in foreign-related commercial litigation. To a 
large extent, foreign-related commercial cases are resolved by the most competent judges 
LQWKHEHVW&KLQHVHFRXUWVZKLFKXQGHUOLQHVWKH63&¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRHQKDQFHWKHTXDOLW\
of foreign-related commercial litigation. 
                                                 
294 It should be noted that the trial supervision procedure applies to not only judgments, but also rulings 
and mediation statements made by courts. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), 
Articles 198 and 208.  
295 But, if the parties find that: (1) there is new evidence; (2) the original evidence is forged, (3) the legal 
documents used as evidence is revoked or revised, or (4) there are corruption, favouritism, previsions 
activities, the time limit is then calculated from the time that they start to know or should have known these 
new facts. Ibid., Articles 199, 200 and 205. 
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)URPVXEPLVVLRQWRFRQFOXVLRQWKH&L3/DQGWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVODLG
down the procedural rules for litigation proceedings. Basically, the parties can find 
necessary guidance in law on how to use their procedural rights, while relatively detailed 
procedural requirements are also set up for judges to follow. In general, the current 
procedural rules provide a relatively complete and modernized framework for the resolution 
of foreign-related commercial cases in courts.
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Chapter 5 Institutional and Procedural Settings for Foreign-
Related Commercial Arbitration 
5.1 Introduction 
Similar to litigation, domestic and foreign-related cases are subject to a series of 
common institutional and procedural rules, while there are also several special legal settings 
particularly designed for foreign-related commercial cases in arbitration. To understand 
how foreign-related commercial disputes are resolved in arbitration, this chapter examines 
both the main differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial arbitration and 
the common institutional and procedural framework for both domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputes in arbitration. 
Following the same structure as Chapter 4, this chapter first reviews the historical 
development of foreign-related commercial arbitration. It then briefly depicts the 
establishment and development of Chinese arbitration institutions, CIETAC and prominent 
local arbitration institutions in particular, as well as their relationship and roles in the current 
foreign-related commercial arbitration system. Following the introduction to arbitration 
institutions, the chapter continues by illustrating the main differences between domestic and 
foreign-related commercial arbitration, including the prior reporting mechanism, the 
judicial review standards and other minor procedural differences. The chapter then provides 
a general overview on the proceedings that a foreign-related commercial dispute needs to 
go through from submission of applications to the issuance of arbitration awards.  
5.2 Historical Development of Foreign-Related Commercial Arbitration 
%DFNLQ0DR¶VHUD&KLQHVHFRXUWVPDLQO\GHDOWZLWKGRPHVWLFLVVXHVZLWKDSDUWLFXODU
focus on class struggle and social control.  Accordingly, most foreign-related commercial 
disputes were resolved outside courts. 296  At that time, as literally the only available 
adjudicative mechanism which could be resorted to when amicable settlement efforts failed, 
arbitration played an indispensable role in foreign-related commercial dispute resolution.297 
In the initial years after the 1978 reform, the reliance on arbitration continued, as the courts 
at that time were still relatively incompetent to deal with foreign-related commercial 
                                                 
296 ,Q 0DR¶V HUD PRVW GLVSXWHV ZHUH UHVROYHG WKURXJK PHGLDWLRQ 7KH IXQFWLRQ RI FRXUWV ZDV UDWKHU
SROLWLFDOL]HG7KH\ZHUHPDLQO\XVHGDVWRROVDJDLQVWWKHµclass struggle enemies of thHSHRSOH¶䱦㓗ᯇҹ
᭼Ӫ). Adjudication in the modern sense was rarely conducted in courts at that time. See Stanley B. 
Lubman, 'Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China', 55 (1967) California 
Law Review, pp. 1353-1358. 
297 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 2. 
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cases.298 As exemplified by Article 14 of the 1979 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, 
Article 24 of the 1982 Regulations on the Sino-foreign Cooperative Exploration of Offshore 
Petroleum Resources and Article 37 of the 1985 Foreign-Related Economic Contract Law, 
many laws and regulations promulgated at that time referred to arbitration as the 
recommended resolution forum for foreign-related commercial disputes. 
Foreign-related commercial arbitration experienced further development in the 1980s. 
China became a member state of the 1958 New York Convention in 1986, which signalled 
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQ299 Both the 1982 CiPL (Trial 
Implementation) and its replacement (the 1991 CiPL) recognized the position of foreign-
related commercial arbitration and confirmed that if disputing parties have valid arbitration 
agreements, their disputes should be resolved in arbitration institutions instead of courts. 
Meanwhile, these two laws also contained basic provisions which guided the courts to 
provide necessary assistance to foreign-related commercial arbitration on the issues of 
preservation measures and enforcement.300 
However, the legal provisions on foreign-related commercial arbitration at that time 
were rather fragmented. The absence of a unified and comprehensive arbitration law 
SODJXHG WKH IXUWKHU GHYHORSPHQW RI &KLQD¶V DUELWUDWLRQ 5HFRJQL]LQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
arbitration as an indispensable alternative to litigation and responding to the increasing 
demands of foreign businessmen for a formal and complete foreign-related commercial 
arbitration system, the legislators promulgated the Arbitration Law in 1994. Although the 
Arbitration Law did not directly follow the model provisions in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, many important principles and standards of modern commercial arbitration were 
introduced into the Arbitration Law, including the principles of party autonomy, finality of 
                                                 
298 Sally Lord Ellis and Laura Shea (1981), supra note 6, p. 169. 
299 The 1958 New York Convention applies to both foreign and foreign-related arbitration awards. Article 
RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQSURYLGHVWKDWµWKLV&RQYHQWLRQVKDOO apply to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement 
of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It 
shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition 
DQGHQIRUFHPHQWDUHVRXJKW¶ 
%XWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW&KLQD¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH&RQYHQWLRQZDVZLWKWKHUHFLSURFDODQGFRPPHUFLDO
reservations. Specifically, China fulfils its obligations under the Convention only when the foreign 
arbitration awards are made in another contracting state of the Convention and the foreign arbitration 
awards are regarding commercial disputes. For related discussion, see e.g. Fiona D' Souza, 'The 
Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic of China', 30 (2007) 
Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 1123-1336; Randall Peerenboom, 'The Evolving Regulatory 
Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC', 1 (2000) Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, 
pp. 11-13. 
300 These provisions are in Chapter 20 of the 1982 Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation) and Chapter 
28 of 1991 Civil Procedure Law. 
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arbitration awards and independence of arbitration institutions. 301  The advent of the 
$UELWUDWLRQ /DZ ZDV UHJDUGHG DV D PLOHVWRQH LQ &KLQD¶V DUELWUDWion reform towards 
modernization.302 
However, the development of arbitration legislation seemed to slow down after 1994. 
Over the following two decades, apart from several new legal rules provided by the SPC 
through its judicial interpretations, there were hardly any other legal instruments which 
brought changes to the arbitration legislation. Although scholars have constantly pointed 
out the drawbacks of the Arbitration Law and made a number of proposals to revise it,303 
there has been no amendment made to the Arbitration Law in the past 22 years.304 The 
unchanged Arbitration Law has shown increasing difficulties in adapting to the rapid 
development of arbitration in China. Its relatively out-dated rules were regarded as the main 
obstacles to the further developmHQWRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQ305  
                                                 
301 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 4, 9 and 14. See also Weixia Gu 
(2013), supra note 5, pp. 80-31. 
302 See e.g. Frederick Brown and Catherine A. Rogers, 'The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational 
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of China', 15 (1997) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, pp. 338-339; Liu Ge and Alexander Lourie, 'International Commercial Arbitration in 
China: History, New Developments and Current Practice', 28 (1995) John Marshall Law Review, pp. 550-
553. 
303 See e.g. Lianbin Song and Jin Huang, 'ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅ᔪ䇞؞᭩は (Proposed Draft for 
Revising the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China)', 4 (2003) ⌅ᆖ䇴䇪 (Law Review), pp. 
91-98; Zhanjun Ma, '1994 ᒤѝഭԢ㻱⌅؞᭩৺䇪䇱 (The Revision and Argumentation of the 1994 
Arbitration Law)', 8 (2006) Ԣ㻱⹄ウ (Arbitration Study), pp. 60-89. 
304 It should be noted that the Office of Legislative Affairs of the State Council once led a project for the 
revision of the 1994 Arbitration Law in 2006. However, it turned out that the Arbitration Law was not 
revised in the end, though the SPC issued a specialized judicial interpretation to the 1994 Arbitration Law 
in 2006. As for the reasons why the Arbitration Law was not revised, Yunhua Lu, the Head of the Office 
of Legislative Affairs of the StaWH&RXQFLOPHQWLRQHG LQKLVDUWLFOH WKDW WKH µSUHSDUDWLRQZRUN¶ IRU WKH
revision was still not sufficient at that time. Although many scholars and practitioners raised many 
suggestions from different perspectives, it seemed that there was still no clear direction that can be followed 
in the revision work. Yunhua Lu, 'ޣҾ؞᭩ǉԢ㻱⌅ǊⲴࠐњสᵜ䰞仈  (Several Basic Issues 
Concerning the Revision of the Arbitration Law)', 8 (2006) Ԣ㻱⹄ウ (Arbitration Study), pp. 1-5. 
305 For critical comments, see Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 77-131; Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra 
note 12, pp. 1-45. See also Kun Fan, 'Arbitration in China: Practice, Legal Obstacles and Reforms', 19 
(2008) ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, pp. 25-40; Xiuwen Zhao and Lisa A. Kloppenberg, 
'Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the Global Economy', 31 (2006) University of Dayton 
Law Review, pp. 450-452; Jerome A. Cohen, 'Time to Fix China's Arbitration' (2005) Far Eastern 
Economic Review, pp. 31-37; Russel Thirgood, 'A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China', 17 (2000) 
journal of International Arbitration, pp. 97-100; Charles Kenworthey Harer, 'Arbitration Fails to Reduce 
Foreign Investors' Risk in China', 8 (1999) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, pp. 402-420; Jingzhou Tao, 
'Salient Issues in Arbitration in China', 27 (2012) American University International Law Review, pp. 828-
830. 
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Facing competition at both the domestic and international level, Chinese arbitration 
institutions have no choice but to actively revise their arbitration rules to bridge the gaps 
between the unchanged legal rules in the Arbitration Law and the new developments in 
DUELWUDWLRQ SUDFWLFH $V UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI &KLQD¶V IODJVKLS DUELWUDWLRQ
institution, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
&,(7$&&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQUHIRUPDIWHUZDV, to a large extent, brought about by 
the continuous institutional development of Chinese arbitration institutions.306 
5.3 Chinese Arbitration Institutions: A Brief Description 
5.3.1 Origin and Evolution of CIETAC  
(1) CIETAC before 1994 
The history of CIETAC can date back to the 1950s. In 1956, the Foreign Trade 
Arbitration Commission (FTAC), the predecessor of CIETAC, was established as an 
arbitral body within the CCPIT, the main function of which was to resolve Sino-foreign 
trade disputes.307 Later in 1980, responding to the emergence of new types of disputes 
regarding foreign investment after the 1978 reform, FTAC was renamed as the Foreign 
(FRQRPLFDQG7UDGH$UELWUDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ)(7$&$V WKHDGGHGZRUGµHFRQRPLF¶
implied, the jurisdiction of FETAC was also broadened to cover not only foreign-related 
                                                 
306 See the following discussion in Section 5.3. 
307 The official decision of establishing FTAC was made by the Government Administration Council (the 
predecessor of the State Council, the central administrative organ from 1949 to 1954) in 1954. The 
*RYHUQPHQW$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ&RXQFLOVWDWHGWKDWµWKHUHVKDOOEHZLWKLQWKH&KLQD&RXQFLOIRUWKH3URPRWLRQ
of International Trade, a Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission to settle disputes that may arise in 
contracts and transactions in foreign trade, particularly those between foreign firms, companies or other 
economic organizations on the one hand and Chinese firms, companies or other economic organizations 
on the otKHU¶ See Decision of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government 
Concerning the Establishment of a Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission Within the China Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade (1954) (ѝཞӪ≁᭯ᓌ࣑᭯䲒ޣҾ൘ѝഭഭ䱵䍨᱃׳䘋ငઈՊ޵
䇮・ሩཆ䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊⲴߣᇊ), issued by the Government Administration Council on 6 May 1954, 
Article 1. Later in 1956, based on this official decision, CCPIT formally established FTAC in 31 March 
1956. CCPIT, which is also known as China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC), is a nationwide 
civil organization for promoting international trade, which is composed of renowned scholars and 
SUDFWLWLRQHUVHQWHUSULVHVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQ&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFDQGWUDGHFLUFOH,WZDVLQLWLDOO\HVWDEOLVKHG
in 1952 as a government-instructed organization for coordinating international trade, the legal status of 
which was approved by the Government Administration Council. According to its newest Articles of 
Association, the CCPIT is now an independent legal person, which is under the instruction of the Chinese 
government. See Articles of Association for the China Council for the Promotion of International trade 
(2009), Articles 2-5. 
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trade disputes in WKH)7$&¶VHUDEXWDOVRdisputes regarding Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
foreign-invested factories and Sino-foreign bank loans.308 
In 1988, FETAC was renamed as CIETAC upon the State Council¶V DSSURYDO
Meanwhile, the State Council also clarified that the right of issuance and modification of 
&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVFRXOGEHDSSURYHGE\&&3,7LWVHOIZKLFKQRORQJHUQHHGHG
further confirmation from the central authorities. 309  Upon the permission of the State 
Council, CIETAC soon organized a drafting group in 1988 to revise its arbitration rules 
which had remained unchanged for 30 years since its initial establishment in 1956.310 The 
1988 CIETAC Arbitration Rules stated that its jurisdiction, in accordance with the change 
LQLWVQDPHZDVIXUWKHUH[SDQGHGWRFRYHUµGLVSXWHVDULVLQJIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLF
DQGWUDGHWUDQVDFWLRQV¶311 Moreover, for the first time, foreign arbitrators were allowed to 
be appointed by the parties, and the first group of 13 foreign arbitrators were invited by 
CIETAC in 1988.312  
(2) Revision of CIETAC Arbitration Rules: 1994-2012 
In 1994, in parallel with the promulgation of the Arbitration Law, CIETAC issued the 
1994 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, which was literally its first version of modernized 
arbitration rules. The drafters of the 1994 CIETAC Arbitration Rules studied many 
arbitration rules from renowned international organizations such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and UNCITRAL for reference and brought many 
LPSURYHPHQWVWR&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHV)RUH[DPSOHWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHVHSDUDELOLW\
                                                 
308 Notice of the State Council on Renaming the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission as the Foreign 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (1980) (ഭ࣑䲒ޣҾሶሩཆ䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊ᭩〠Ѫሩཆ
㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊⲴ䙊⸕), issued by the State Council on 26 February 1980. 
309 Reply of the State Council on Renaming the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission as 
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the Revision of the Arbitration 
Rules (1988) (ഭ࣑䲒ޣҾሶሩཆ㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊ᭩਽Ѫѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊ઼؞䇒
Ԣ㻱㿴ࡉⲴᢩ༽), Issued by the State Council on 21 June 1988. 
310 7DRDUJXHVWKDWµLWLVQRWFRUUHFWWRVD\WKDW&,($&«LVFRQWUROOHGE\&&3,7¶,WLVPRUHSUHFLVHWRVD\ 
that their relationship is close but mutually independent. Thus, although CIETAC still needs the approval 
of CCPIT for conducting major changes, CIETAC actually enjoys substantial autonomy in revising its own 
arbitral rules. CCPIT rarely exercises its power to interfere the revision of CIETAC arbitration rules. 
Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 24. 
311 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1988) (ѝഭഭ䱵
㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 1988), approved by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade on 12 September 1988, Article 2. 
312 Michael J. Moser, 'China's New International Arbitration Rules', 11 (1994) Journal of International 
Arbitration, p. 9; Benjamin P. Fishburne and Chuncheng Lian, 'Commercial Arbitration in Hong Kong and 
China: A Comparative Analysis', 18 (1997) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law, pp. 303-305. 
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of arbitration clauses from other contractual clauses was confirmed. The disclosure 
obligation of arbitrators and the possibility to challenge arbitrators were added. Several 
articles regarding the combination of mediation and arbitration were included to formalize 
the Med-Arb procedure.313 It is noteworthy that CIETAC also significantly increased the 
number of foreign arbitrators in its list of arbitrators. Of all the 296 listed arbitrators in 
CIETAC, 80 came from foreign jurisdictions at that time.314 Besides, to be consistent with 
the Arbitration Law, CIETAC also started to use the term µIRUHLJQ-UHODWHG¶DQGUH-defined 
LWVMXULVGLFWLRQDVµGLVSXWHVDULVLQJIURP international or foreign-related, contractual or non-
FRQWUDFWXDOHFRQRPLFDQGWUDGHWUDQVDFWLRQV¶315 
Although the 1994 CIETAC Arbitration Rules were an important step towards 
modernization and internationalization, they were still distant from the arbitration rules of 
other leading international commercial arbitration institutions with regard to autonomy, 
flexibility and neutrality.316 Thus, to enhance its position in the circle of international 
commercial arbitration, CIETAC has constantly revised its arbitration rules for a total of six 
times since 1994, among which the 2005 amendment and 2012 amendment were the most 
remarkable ones.317 
7KH &,(7$&$UELWUDWLRQ5XOHVZHUH DQRWKHU µOHDS IRUZDUG¶ UHYLVLRQZKLFK
introduced a number of changes to enhance party autonomy and procedural flexibility in 
arbitration proceedings. First, the parties were no longer forced to follow CIETAC 
arbitration rules, but permitted to select other arbitration rules or make modifications to 
&,(7$&¶V DUELWUDWLRQ UXOHV DFFRUGLQJ WR their needs. Second, upon the approval of the 
&KDLUPDQRI&,(7$&WKHSDUWLHVZHUHSHUPLWWHGWRVHOHFWDUELWUDWRUVRXWVLGH&,(7$&¶V
list of arbitrators. Third, the place of arbitration (arbitration seat) and the place of oral 
hearings were clearly distinguished, while both of them can be designated by the parties to 
                                                 
313 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1994) (ѝഭഭ䱵
㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 1994), approved by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade on 17 March 1994, Articles 5, 26, 28, 29 and 46-51. Other minor changes involved evidence, time 
limit, summary procedure and language. For a useful comment on these changes, see Michael J. Moser 
(1994), supra note 312, pp. 5-14. 
314 Benjamin P. Fishburne and Chuncheng Lian (1997), supra note 312, p. 305. 
315 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1994), Article 2. 
316  Michael J. Moser, 'CIETAC Arbitration: A Success Story?', 15 (1998) Journal of International 
Arbitration, pp. 27-36. 
317 These revisions are conducted in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2005, 2012 and 2014 respectively. 
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be a place outside the territories of China. Fourth, the parties can also select between 
inquisitional and adversarial modes of hearings based on their preference.318  
CIETAC further amended its arbitration rules in 2012 to provide the parties with more 
freedom to tailor their own arbitration proceedings. First, it was explicitly stated that the 
parties can designate both the applicable laws to arbitration agreements and the governing 
laws on substantive issues. Second, evidence rules became more flexible, the cross-
examination of evidence, both in oral and written hearings, was no longer compulsory but 
subject to the choices of the parties. Third, with regard to the arbitration language, although 
tKH&,(7$&$UELWUDWLRQ5XOHVUHFRJQL]HGWKHSDUWLHV¶IUHHGRPWRVHOHFWWKHDUELWUDWLRQ
language, it provided that Chinese would be the arbitration language if the parties did not 
make the selection. But, the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules were more internationalized 
on the language issue, which enabled the arbitration tribunal to decide which language, be 
it Chinese or foreign, is more suitable for the case when the parties fail to designate one.319   
(3) Split of CIETAC in 2012 
A noticeable issue which affected the development of CIETAC was the split of 
&,(7$&LQ%HIRUH&,(7$&¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVZHUHORFDWHGLQ%HLMLQJZKLOHLW
also had several sub-commissions established in Shenzhen, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing 
and Hong Kong. Among them, the one ORFDWHGLQ6KHQ]KHQZKLFKZDVQDPHGDVµ&,(7$&
Southeast Sub-&RPPLVVLRQ¶ DQG WKH RQH ORFDWHG LQ 6KDQJKDL ZKLFK ZDV QDPHG DV
µ&,(7$&6KDQJKDL6XE-&RPPLVVLRQ¶ZHUHUDWKHUGLIIHUHQWIURPRWKHUVXE-commissions. 
It is reported that these two sub-commissions were de facto independent from CIETAC in 
personnel, finance and case administration, though they used the same arbitration rules as 
CIETAC and were connected with CIETAC in a nominal sense. The nominal cooperation 
                                                 
318 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2000) (ѝഭഭ䱵
㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 2000), approved by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade on 5 September 2000, Articles 4, 21, 29, 31 and 32. Other minor changes involved evidence 
exchange time limit, expert witness, hearing Med-Arb and summary procedure. For detailed comments, 
see Michael J. Moser, 'The New CIETAC Arbitration Rules', 21 (2005) Arbitration International, pp. 391-
403. 
319 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2012) (ѝഭഭ䱵
㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 2012), approved by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade on 3 February 2012, Articles 4, 40, 47 and 71. Other minor changes involved consolidated arbitration, 
interim measures and the appointment of the sole/presiding arbitrator. 
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was initially designed to form a union under WKHIODJRIµ&,(7$&¶DQGHQKDQFHWKHRYHUDOO
LQIOXHQFHRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQLQWKHV320 
In 2012, CIETAC revised its arbitration rules to limit the independence of its sub-
commissions, which explicitly stated that the sub-commissions were local branches of 
CIETAC, and the mandate of the sub-commissions to handle arbitration case came from 
CIETAC. The 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules also emphasized that the sub-commissions 
could only administer the cases in which the parties expressly wrote down the names of the 
sub-commissions in their arbitration agreements. Otherwise, the cases should be handled by 
CIETAC and any disagreement regarding the acceptance of the cases should be decided by 
CIETAC.321   
These revised provisions in the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules were strongly 
opposed by the aforementioned two sub-commissions in Shenzhen and Shanghai, as these 
added limitations significantly undermined their substantial independence and affected their 
actual influence and revenue. 322  With the support of Shanghai and Shenzhen local 
governments, the two sub-commissions announced their complete independence and 
FKDQJHG WKHLU QDPHV WR µ6RXWK &KLQD ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (FRQRPLF DQG 7UDGH $UELWUDWLRQ
&RPPLVVLRQ6KHQ]KHQ&RXUWRI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UELWUDWLRQV¶ 6&,$RQ'HFHPEHU2012 
DQG µ6KDQJKDL ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (FRQRPLF DQG 7UDGH $UELWUDWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQ6KDQJKDL
,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UELWUDWLRQ&HQWUH¶6+,$&RQ0D\UHVSHFWLYHO\ 
&,(7$&¶VFRQIOLFWVZLWKWKHIRUPHU6KDQJKDLDQG6KHQ]KHQVXE-commissions (i.e. 
current SHAIC and SCIA) led to uncertainty in arbitration practice. Both sides claimed they 
KDG WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU WKH FDVHV LQ ZKLFK WKH SDUWLHV GHVLJQDWH µ&,(7$&
Shenzhen/Shanghai sub-FRPPLVVLRQ¶DVWKHVHOHFWHGDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQZKLFKFDXVHG
unexpected risk in the issues regarding the validity of arbitration agreements and the 
                                                 
320 Xiao Yao, Lu Litao and Guo Liqin, '⎹ཆԢ㻱䰩࠶⋫: ҹ䇞㛼ਾ䓛ԭᡀ䉌 (Division Occurs in 
Foreign-Related Arbitration: Mystery Identifies behind the Disputes)', in ᯠ⎚䍒㓿 (Sina Finance), 4 May 
2012. Available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20120504/011011981271. 
shtml. Last visited in June 2016. 
321 Before the promulgation of the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, when the parties simply referred to 
µ&,(7$&¶LQWKHLUDUELWUDWion agreements, the two sub-commissions could still exercise their jurisdiction 
over the cases concerned which were directly submitted to them. But, the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 
denied such implied jurisdiction of the two sub-commissions. Simply put, the jurisdiction of the two sub-
commissions would be subject to the control of CIETAC according to the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules. 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2012), Article 2. 
322 Lear Liu and Clarisse Von Wunschheim, 'Judicial Side Effects of the CIETAC Split: A Confusing Maze 
with Happy End?', (2014) WunschArb online publications, p. 3. Available at 
http://issuu.com/wunscharb/docs/j189_wunsch_arb_cietac_vp4. Last visited in June 2016. 
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enforcement of arbitration awards.323 To resolve the uncertainty caused by the split of 
CIETAC, the SPC first issued a judicial interpretation which prescribed that all the cases 
regarding the jurisdiction issues of CIETAC and the two sub-commissions in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai should be reported to the SPC, and local courts should not make formal court 
GHFLVLRQVEHIRUHWKH63&¶VIRUPDOUHSOLHV324 The SPC then set up a dividing line based on 
the time of the name change of the two sub-commissions in a following judicial 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQ  6SHFLILFDOO\ LI DQ DUELWUDWLRQ DJUHHPHQW LQ ZKLFK WKH µ&,(7$&
Shenzhen/Shanghai sub-FRPPLVVLRQ¶LVGHVLJQDWHGDVWKHVHOHFWHGDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQLV
signed before the name change, the jurisdiction over the case then should be exercised by 
the current SCIA and SHIAC. Otherwise, the case should be administered by CIETAC.325 
7KH63&¶VFODULILFDWLRQVHHPVWRSXWDQHQGWRWKHMXULVGLFWLRQFRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQWKH
two sides. Both sides have revised their arbitration rules recently, the focus of which was to 
further their regulatory development towards modernization and internationalization.326 It 
seems that both sides have changed their focuses from the split conflicts in 2012 to the 
upcoming competition in the future. 
(4) Increasing Caseload of CIETAC 
%HQHILWLQJIURP&,($&¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWDVZHOODVWKHLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHU
of foreign-related commercial disputes brought by the booming foreign investment and 
trade &,(7$&¶V FDVHORDG KDV H[SHULHQFHG D FRQWLQXRXV LQFUHDVH LQ WKH SDVW  \HDUV
Although there was a sharp drop which was probably caused by the split in 2012, CIETAC 
managed to retain and even further increase its caseload in the following years (Figure 7). 
Meanwhile, as China is increasingly integrating with the world economy, CIETAC is also 
undergoing the transition from merely a leading arbitration institution in China to an 
                                                 
323 For example, when the cases are handled by the two sub-commissions, the court may refuse to recognize 
the validity of arbitration agreements or enforce arbitration awards if they consider the jurisdiction over 
the cases should be exercised by CIETAC, and vice versa. Ibid. 
324 Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Related Issues Concerning Correctly Handling Arbitration 
Cases under Judicial Review (2013) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ↓⺞ᇑ⨶Ԣ㻱ਨ⌅ᇑḕṸԦᴹޣ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕), 
⌅ [2013] 194ਧ (Fa [2013] No.194), issued by Supreme People's Court on 4 September 2013. 
325 Reply of the Supreme People's Court to the Shanghai High People's Court and Other Courts on the 
Issues Concerning the Cases Relating to Judicial Review over Arbitration Awards Rendered by the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and Its Former Sub-Commissions (2015) (ᴰ
儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾሩк⎧ᐲ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ㅹቡ⎹৺ѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊ৺ަ৏࠶ՊㅹԢ㻱
ᵪᶴᡰ֌Ԣ㻱㻱ߣਨ⌅ᇑḕṸԦ䈧⽪䰞仈Ⲵᢩ༽), ⌅䟺[2015]15ਧ (Fa Shi [2015] No.15), issued by 
the Supreme People's Court on 15 July 2015, Article 1. 
326 CIETAC revised its arbitration rules on 4 November 2014, which came into effect on 1 January 2015. 
SHIAC revised its arbitration rules on 1 January 2015, which came into effect on the same day. SCIA 
revised its rules on 1 December 2012, which came into the effect on the same day. 
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important player in the international commercial arbitration circuit. As shown in Figure 8, 
the increasing caseload of CIETAC has already turned CIETAC to the busiest international 
arbitration centre in the world.327 Although this does not necessarily mean that CIETAC has 
already become a world-class international commercial arbitration centre, the significant 
amount of caseload still can reflect the increasing importance of CIETAC in the 
international commercial arbitration circuit. 
Figure 7: Annual number of arbitration cases accepted by CIETAC (1985-2015)328 
 
Figure 8: Caseloads of major international commercial arbitration centres (2012-
2015)329 
                                                 
327 But, of course, the caseload statistics are significantly affected by geographical and jurisdictional factors, 
which cannot fully reflect the competiveness of an international arbitration institution. The considerable 
TXDQWLW\ RI &,(7$&¶V FDVHORDG SDUWO\ EHQHILWV IURP WKH YDVW YROXme of foreign investment and 
international trade and the accompanying considerable number of foreign-related commercial disputes in 
China. 
328  The statistics are obtained from the official website of CIETAC. Available at 
http://cn.cietac.org/AboutUS/AboutUS4Read.asp. Last visited in December 2016. 
329 Markus Altenkirch and Nicolas Gremminger, 'Global Arbitration Cases Still Rise: Arbitral Institutions' 
Caseload Statistics for 2015', in Global Arbitration News, 25 August 2016. Available at 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/global-arbitration-cases-still-rise-arbitral-institutions-caseload-
statistics-2015/. Last visited in June 2016. 
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5.3.2 Local Arbitration Institutions and Their Roles in Foreign-Related Commercial 
Arbitration 
Unlike CIETAC which has a long history of handling foreign-related commercial 
disputes, most local arbitration institutions were not established until the 1980s. They were 
initially established as government-affiliated bodies at the local level to handle domestic 
arbitration cases. 330  But, the nature and legal status of local arbitration institutions 
experienced a fundamental change in the arbitration reform around 1994. The Arbitration 
Law announced the independence of all the Chinese arbitration institutions from 
administrative organs in 1994 and requested existing government-affiliated local arbitration 
institutions to reorganize themselves as independent local arbitration institutions. 331 
Accordingly, local arbitration institutions were re-established by local chambers of 
                                                 
International arbitration institutions listed in this figure are: CIETAC (the China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission), ICDR (the International Centre for Dispute Resolution under the 
American Arbitration Association), ICC (the International Court of Arbitration under the International 
Chamber of Commerce), HIKAC (the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre), LCIA (London Court 
of International Arbitration), SIAC (the Singapore International Arbitration Centre) and SCC (the 
Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce). 
330 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, pp. 2-4. 
331 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 14 and 97. But, it should be noted 
that many Chinese arbitration institutions are not fully independent due to indirect administrative and 
financial control from government organs in practice, though their independence was announced in law. 
Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, pp. 6-7. 
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commerce and local government organs at the city level, and registered in the judicial and 
administrative departments at the provincial level.332  
Another reform measure that significantly affected the development of local 
arbitration institutions was that the monopoly of CIETAC in handling foreign-related 
commercial cases in China was ended by the State Council in 1996.333 Before that, local 
DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV FRXOG RQO\ DGPLQLVWHU GRPHVWLF FDVHV 5HFRJQL]LQJ WKH SDUWLHV¶
freedom in designating their own preferred arbitration institutions, the State Council issued 
a special notice which prescribed that local arbitration institutions can accept foreign-related 
arbitration cases in which the parties voluntarily select them as the desired arbitration 
intrusions, though the state council emphasized that the main responsibilities of local 
arbitration institutions should still be handling domestic arbitration cases.334 Responding to 
WKHH[SDQVLRQRIORFDODUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶MXULVGLFWLRQ&,(7$&DOVRH[WHQGHGLWVVFRSH
of case acceptance to cover domestic disputes in 1998. 335  Thus, with regard to the 
jurisdiction issue, CIETAC and local arbitration institutions are now generally the same. 
Both of them can accept domestic or foreign-related commercial cases, though there is an 
insignificant nominal difference regarding their main functions. 
                                                 
332 Principally, local arbitration institutions should be located in municipalities directly under the central 
government and the capital cities of provinces or autonomous regions. Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China (1994), Article 10. 
333 It is necessary to point out that CIETAC, at that time, only had the monopoly over foreign-related 
commercial cases. Another kind of foreign-related cases, namely foreign-related maritime cases, were 
mainly handled by China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC). Similar to FTAC, the predecessor 
of CIETAC, the predecessor of CMAC, Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC) was established in 1958, 
which was later renamed as CMAC with the same procedure as &,(7$&¶VQDPHFKDQJHLQ)RUD
useful introduction of the CMAC and its arbitration rules, see Hongda Cai, 'Impartiality, High Efficiency 
and Being Fit for Demand of the Market Economy: Introduction to the Fifth Revision of the Arbitration 
Rules of CMAC', 2 (2005) US-China Law Review, pp. 71-76. 
334 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Several Issues to be Clarified Concerning the 
Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1996) (ഭ࣑䲒࣎ޜ঵ޣҾ䍟
ᖫᇎᯭǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅Ǌ䴰㾱᰾⺞Ⲵࠐњ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕), ഭ࣎ਁ[1996]22 ਧ (Guo Ban Fa 
[1996] No. 22), issued by the General Office of the State Council on 8 June 1996, Article 3. 
335 More specifically, CIETAC expanded its jurisdiction in 1998 to cover disputes between FIEs and 
disputes related to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. In 2005, CIETAC further clarified its jurisdiction scope, 
which included (1) international or foreign-related disputes, (2) domestic disputes and (3) disputes related 
to the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
Arbitration Rules (1998) (ѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ  1998), approved by the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade on 6 May 1998, Article 2; China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2005) (ѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 
2005), approved by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade on 11 January 2005, Article 
2. 
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Benefiting from the economic growth and the development of arbitration in China, 
local arbitration institutions have experienced rapid development in recent years. As Figure 
9 shows, the total number of accepted cases in prominent local arbitration institutions, such 
as the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) and the Shanghai Arbitration Commission 
(SAC), are generally equal to CIETAC. 
Figure 9: Annual number of arbitration cases accepted by CIETAC and major local 
arbitration institutions in China (2010-2015) 336 
 
+RZHYHUDODUJHSRUWLRQRIORFDODUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶FDVHORDGLVDFWXDOO\WDNHQXS
by domestic cases in practice. As exemplified by the caseload statistics of BAC, the 
percentage of foreign-related commercial cases in the overall caseload of BAC is far less 
than CIETAC (Table 4). In other words, the influence of local arbitration institutions in the 
field of foreign-related commercial arbitration is to a large extent still rather limited in 
comparison with CIETAC. As commented by many scholars &,(7$& LV VWLOO &KLQD¶V
flagship arbitration institution which is normally first considered by foreign investors and 
                                                 
336 The caseload statistics are obtained from the official websites of these arbitration institutions. Available 
at CIETAC http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=24, BAC (Beijing) 
http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/introduce_report.html and SAC (Shanghai) 
http://www.accsh.org/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=42&menu=6-42-. Last visited in 
January 2016. 
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traders.337 As the traditionally preferred foreign-related arbitration institution in China, 
CIETAC still plays a central role in handling foreign-related commercial arbitration cases. 
The changes in its arbitration rules and arbitral practice are still important indicators which 
UHSUHVHQWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQ-related commercial arbitration.338  
Table 4: Proportion of foreign-related arbitration cases in CIETAC and BAC (2010-
2015) 339  
Year CIEAC BAC 
2010 30.9%  (418/1352) 2.0%  (32/1566) 
2011 32.7%  (470/1435) 2.6%  (38/1471) 
2012 31.2%  (331/1060) 1.7%  (26/1473) 
2013 29.8%  (375/1256) 2.7%  (44/1627) 
2014 24.0%  (387/1610) 2.0%  (41/2041) 
2015 22.0%  (437/1968) 1.8%  (52/2944) 
 
5.4 Statutory Differences between Domestic and Foreign-Related Commercial 
Arbitration 
There are several special legal provisions in the CiPL, the Arbitration Law and the 
63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVwhich provide foreign-related arbitration cases with special 
legal settings that are different from domestic cases. These special legal settings are mainly 
                                                 
337 Lear Liu and Clarisse Von Wunschheim (2014), supra note 322, p. 1; Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 
12, p. 22; Nadia Darwazeh and Michael J. Moser, 'Arbitration inside China', in Michael J. Moser (ed.), 
Managing Business Disputes in Today's China: Duelling with Dragons (Kluwer Law International, 2007), 
p. 54. 
338 )RUWKLVUHDVRQ&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVDUHWKHPDLQLQVWLWXWLRQDOUXOHVWKDWDUHUHIHUUHGWRLQWKH
IROORZLQJ WH[W ZKLOH RWKHU ORFDO DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ DUELWUDWLRQ UXOHV DUH RQO\ PHQWLRQHG ZKHn 
necessary. Besides, the influence of CIETAC in China is also evident in the regulatory dimension. The 
DUELWUDWLRQ UXOHV RI PRVW UHQRZQHG &KLQHVH DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH EDVLFDOO\ VLPLODU WR &,(7$&¶V
arbitration rules. See Yuan Wang, 'Introduction and Comparison of Chinese Arbitration Institutions', (2013) 
Beitrage zum Transnnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Heft 126. Available at http://tietje.jura.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/BeitraegeTWR/Abstract_Heft126.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. 
339  The statistiFV LV REWDLQHG IURP &,(7$& DQG %$&¶V RIILFLDO ZHEVLWHV $YDLODEOH DW
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=24 and 
http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/introduce_report.html. Last visited in December 2016. Systematic 
statistics of foreign-related commercial cases accepted by other local arbitration institutions are not 
available.  
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reflected in the prior reporting mechanism, the judicial review standards for arbitration 
awards and several other procedural differences. 
5.4.1 Prior Reporting Mechanism in the Judicial Review of Foreign-Related 
Arbitration Cases 
The validity of arbitration agreements and the enforcement of arbitration awards are 
two key issues in arbitration proceedings. In the beginning phase, the validity of an 
arbitration agreement decides whether the arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over the 
dispute concerned, while the enforcement of an arbitration award determines whether the 
losses of the parties can be substantially recovered in the end phase. Considering the 
importance of these two issues, the SPC prescribes that these two issues, be they domestic 
or foreign-related, should be handled by the courts at the intermediate level.340 Similar to 
the centralized jurisdiction in foreign-related commercial litigation, the SPC raises the 
jurisdictional level to ensure that these two important issues can be handled by more 
competent courts. 
Considering the particular importance and possible complexity of foreign-related 
arbitration cases, the SPC introduced a special prior reporting mechanism to further enhance 
the quality of court decisions on foreign-related arbitration cases with regard to the 
aforementioned two issues in 1995. Specifically, if an IPC considers a foreign-related 
arbitration agreement invalid, it must first report to the corresponding HPC for review. If 
the HPC shares the same opinion with the IPC, it should further report the case to the SPC. 
Before the SPC replies, the IPC may not make the formal decision. Similarly, if an IPC 
decides not to enforce a foreign-related arbitration award, it should also follow the same 
procedure to report the case to the SPC level by level. 341 
Under this prior reporting mechanism, any court decisions that potentially deny the 
validity of foreign-related arbitration agreements and the enforceability of foreign-related 
arbitration awards will be reviewed by the SPC. This particular design of case-by-case 
supervision has several positive effects. 342  First, it can reduce the influence of local 
                                                 
340 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), Articles 12 and 29. 
341 This prior reporting mechanism is also applicable to foreign arbitration awards. Notice of the Supreme 
People's Court on People's Courts Handling Related Issues Concerning Foreign-Related Arbitration and 
Foreign Arbitration (1995) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒༴⨶о⎹ཆԢ㻱৺ཆഭԢ㻱һ亩ᴹޣ䰞仈Ⲵ
䙊⸕), ⌅ਁ[1995]18ਧ (Fa Fa [1995] No.18), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 20 August 1995, 
Articles 1 and 2. 
342 For literature discussing the prior reporting mechanisms, see Teresa Cheng S.C. and Joe Liu (2014), 
supra note 190, pp. 651-674; Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 116-118; Clarisse Von Wunschheim, 
'Recent Developments Regarding Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in China', 7 (2010) Transnational 
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protectionism. If local courts are forced to render decisions in favour of local enterprises 
due to the pressure from local governments, the SPC can remove the interference by 
ordering local courts to revise their manipulated decisions. Second, through the case-by-
case supervision, the SPC can enhance the consistency of court decisions on these two issues. 
7KH63&¶VGHFLVLRQVFDQIXQFWLRQDVH[DPSOHVIRUORFDOFRXUWVZKLFKJUDGXDOO\XQLI\WKH
SDWWHUQVRIORFDOFRXUWV¶GHFLVLRQ-making on these two issues. Third, this mechanism can 
remind local courts that foreign-related arbitration cases, those regarding these two issues 
in particular, should be handled with extra caution. Otherwise, ill-founded decisions which 
are not based on careful study of the facts and laws may face the risk of being overturned 
by the SPC. To some extent, the introduction of this mechanism also sends a signal to 
foreign-related commercial disputants that their arbitration cases will receive due support 
from Chinese courts and be treated with a prudent attitude.  
5.4.2 Legal Grounds for the Non-Enforcement of Arbitration Awards 
Another major difference between domestic and foreign-related arbitration cases is the 
legal grounds for the non-enforcement of arbitration awards. As a member state of the 1958 
1HZ <RUN &RQYHQWLRQ &KLQD¶V OHJDO SURYLVLRQV UHJXODWLQJ IRUHLJQ-related arbitration 
awards are generally the same as Article V of the 1958 New York Convention, which 
mainly focus on procedural issues. Article 274 of the CiPL prescribes that a foreign-related 
arbitration award that fulfils one of the following conditions should not be enforced: 
(1) There is no arbitration clause in the contract or no written arbitration agreement 
reached; 
(2) The defendant was not informed about their rights in the selection of arbitrators, 
and the arbitration proceedings or the defendant did not present his/her 
statements for other reasons that he/she is not responsible for; 
(3) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure is not in 
accordance with the arbitration rules; 
(4) The disputing issues decided are outside the scope specified by the arbitration 
agreement, or the arbitration tribunal has no right to decide such issues; 
(5) The enforcement of the arbitration award is against public interest. 
                                                 
Dispute Management, pp. 14-20; Weixia Gu, 'Judicial Review over Arbitration in China: Assessing the 
Extent of the Latest Pro-Arbitration Move by the Supreme People's Court in the People's Republic of China', 
27 (2009) Wisconsin International Law Journal, pp. 232-234; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 33; Fiona 
D' Souza (2007), supra note 299, pp. 1331-1334; Ellen Reinstein, 'Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign 
Investors: The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the People's Republic of China', 16 (2005) Indiana 
International Law & Comparative Law Review, p. 64. 
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Unlike foreign-related arbitration awards the enforceability of which can only be 
denied for procedural issues, the courts can review both procedural and substantive issues 
in domestic arbitration awards. Whilst the procedural reasons for denying the enforceability 
of domestic and foreign-related arbitration awards are basically the same, Article 237 of the 
CiPL further lists three substantive reasons which can be invoked for the non-enforcement 
of a domestic arbitration award: 
(1) The decision is based on forged evidence;  
(2) A party conceals evidence that is important enough to affect the correctness of 
the decision;  
(3) Arbitrators were involved in activities of corruption, favouritism and perversion 
when deciding the case.343 
Under the obligation of the 1958 New York Convention, the judicial review of foreign-
related arbitration awards have to be consistent with international standards, which limit the 
legal grounds for non-enforcement to procedural issues. But, when it comes to domestic 
arbitration cases, Chinese legislators laid down more emphasis on the correctness of results. 
While this approach may contribute to the reduction of substantive errors in domestic 
arbitration awards, its adoption does undermine the finality of domestic arbitration awards. 
Whether this exchange is worthy seems to be debatable. This is also one important reason 
why the different judicial review standards on domestic and foreign-related arbitration 
awards are questioned by many scholars.344 
5.4.3 Other Procedural Differences 
(1) Arbitration Institutions and Foreign Arbitrators 
In a strict sense, there is a difference between domestic and foreign-related arbitration 
LQVWLWXWLRQV :KLOH &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ-related commercial arbitration institution, namely 
CITEAC, was established by CCPIT at the central level and designed to mainly handle 
foreign-related commercial cases, domestic arbitration institutions, namely local arbitration 
                                                 
343 The previous procedural reasons (2) and (3) in Article 274 for foreign-related arbitration awards are 
combined into one sentence in Article 237 for domestic arbitration awards. But the substantial meaning of 
these two legal articles regarding this point is basically the same, since they both provide that the violation 
of arbitration proceedings can lead to a decision which denies the enforceability of arbitration awards. 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the violation of public interest is not a legal ground for denying the 
enforceability of domestic arbitration awards. 
344  Many scholars argue that China should provide equal treatment to domestic and foreign-related 
commercial arbitration awards regarding the issue of legal grounds for non-enforcement in judicial review. 
See e.g. Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 129-131; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, pp. 31-32; Fiona 
D' Souza (2007), supra note 299, pp. 1351-1352. 
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institutions, are set up by local chambers of commerce and government organs at the local 
level and designed to mainly serve the needs of domestic arbitration.345 Meanwhile, Article 
67 of the Arbitration Law explicitly provides that foreign arbitrators can be included in the 
lists of arbitrators of foreign-related arbitration institutions, while the Arbitration Law is 
silent on whether foreign arbitrators can be included in the lists of arbitrators in domestic 
arbitration institutions. 
However, the dichotomy on arbitration institutions does not produce substantial 
differences in practLFH6LQFHWKHSURPXOJDWLRQRIWKH6WDWH&RXQFLO¶VQRWLFHLQLWKDV
been increasingly difficult to draw a neat line between domestic and foreign-related 
arbitration institutions, as both of them are authorized to handle domestic and foreign-
related commercial cases. It is also interesting to note that some so-FDOOHG µGRPHVWLF¶
DUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQVKDYHDGGHGWKHWHUPµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶LQWRWKHLURIILFLDOQDPHVLQUHFHQW
\HDUV)RUH[DPSOH%$&EHJDQWRXVHLWVVHFRQGQDPHµ%HLMLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UELtration 
&HQWUH¶LQ7KHWZRIRUPHUVXE-commissions of CIETAC, namely current SCIA and 
6+,$ DOVR QDPHG WKHPVHOYHV DV µFRXUW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUELWUDWLRQ¶ RU µLQWHUQDWLRQDO
DUELWUDWLRQFHQWUH¶DIWHUWKHVSOLWLQ 
As for the issue of foreign arbitrators, many Chinese arbitration institutions used to 
prepare two different lists of arbitrators for domestic and foreign-related arbitration cases, 
and the parties in domestic cases were prohibited from appointing foreign arbitrators.346 
This practice, however, has gradually been abolished in recent years. Today, most 
arbitration institutions in China, be it CIETAC or local arbitration intrusions, have only one 
list of arbitrators consisting of both Chinese and foreign arbitrators, and the parties in both 
domestic and foreign-related commercial cases can freely choose their preferred Chinese or 
foreign arbitrators in the list. Thus, as local arbitration institutions become increasingly 
internationalized, the nominal difference between foreign-related and domestic arbitration 
institutions seems to be unnecessary any more, and it should be removed from the 
Arbitration Law in future amendments. 
(2) Preservation Measures 
During the arbitration proceedings in China, the parties can submit their applications 
for property or evidence perseveration to the arbitration tribunal, which should then be 
forwarded by the arbitration tribunal to the arbitration commission and the corresponding 
                                                 
345 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 10 and 66. 
346 Nadia Darwazeh and Michael J. Moser (2007), supra note 337, p. 62. 
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court.347 The main difference in preservation measures between domestic and foreign-
related arbitration is the jurisdiction level of courts. The applications for preservation 
measures raised in foreign-related arbitration should be processed by the courts at the 
intermediate level, while those raised in domestic arbitration are subject to the jurisdiction 
of BPCs.348 Similar to the usage of the raised jurisdiction level in other aspects, more 
competent IPCs are selected to be the courts for handling preservation measures issues in 
foreign-related arbitration. 
(3) Hearing Records 
Article 48 of the Arbitration Law prescribes that a hearing record must be made in 
domestic arbitration and the parties, arbitrators, recorders and other arbitration participants 
need to sign the hearing record. The compulsory requirements of keeping hearing records 
provide domestic arbitration proceedings with a more litigation-like look. By contrast, 
foreign-related arbitration proceedings are more flexible on the issue of hearing records. As 
prescribed by Article 69 of the Arbitration Law, a written record for the hearing in foreign-
related arbitration is optional, and it is also not compulsory for the parties and other 
participants to sign the hearing record.  
5.5 Arbitration Proceedings: A General Overview 
5.5.1 Application, Pre-Hearing and the Selection, Challenge and Replacement of 
Arbitrators 
(1) Application and Pre-Hearing 
Arbitration proceedings commence from the submission of arbitration agreements and 
written applications. Written applications should contain the necessary information about 
the parties and the disputes, including the names, domicile and contact details of the parties, 
WKHDSSOLFDQW¶V arbitral claims, and the facts and reasons to support the claims.349 Upon the 
                                                 
347 Similar to litigation proceedings, the interested parties can also apply for preservation measures before 
the commencement of arbitration proceedings in case of emergency. Civil Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2012), Articles 81 and 101.  
348 The legal provisions regulating preservation measures in foreign-related arbitration are Article 272 of 
the Civil Procedure Law and Article 68 of the Arbitration Law. The legal provisions regulating on 
preservation measures in domestic arbitration are Article 46 of the Arbitration Law and Article 2 of the 
Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Arbitration 
Law of the People's Republic of China (1997) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᇎᯭǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅Ǌࠐ
њ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕), ⌅ਁ[1997]4ਧ (Fa Fa [1997] No. 4), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 26 March 
1997. 
349 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 22 and 23. &,(7$&¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV
are generally similar to the Arbitration Law. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
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receipt of the application documents, arbitration commissions examine whether the 
arbitration agreements and the written applications fulfil the aforementioned requirements, 
and decide whether or not to accept the applications accordingly. Following positive 
decisions, the arbitration commissions should send arbitration rules and list of arbitrators to 
both sides, while negative decisions should be sent to the applicants in writing with reasons. 
The respondents, upon receiving the copies of applications, should submit written defence 
statements. But, arbitration proceedings should continue regardless of whether the 
respondents submit the written defence statements. Meanwhile, the respondents also enjoy 
the right to raise counterclaims, and both sides have the right to amend the claims or 
counterclaims before the hearings.350 
(2) Selection of Arbitrators 
According to the Arbitration Law, an arbitration tribunal consists of one or three 
arbitrators. For a three-arbitrator tribunal, each party can select one arbitrator or entrust the 
arbitration commission to designate one arbitrator, while the presiding arbitrator (the third 
arbitrator) should be mutually selected by the parties or appointed by the chairman of the 
arbitration commission. The rule of selecting the presiding arbitrator also applies to the one-
arbitrator tribunal. In the case where the parties fail to select the arbitrator within the time 
limit set up in the arbitration rules, the chairman of the arbitration commission will then 
designate the arbitrator.351 
(3) Challenge of Arbitrators 
According to Article 34 of the Arbitration Law, an arbitrator can be challenged for the 
following grounds: 
(1) The arbitrator is one of the parties in the case or a near relative of the parties or 
their agents;  
                                                 
Commission Arbitration Rules (2014) (ѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ 2015), approved by the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade on 4 November 2014, Article 12. 
350 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 24-27. With regard to the pre-hearing 
proceedings, CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2014 are generally in accordance with the Arbitration Law. 
Besides, to respond to the new development in international commercial arbitration, CIETAC also adds 
new provisions to provide detailed guidance on the consolidation of the arbitration proceedings and joinder 
of additional parties. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules 
(2014), Articles 18 and 19. 
351 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 30-32. But, it should be noted that 
based on the general rules in the Arbitration Law, CIETAC further adds several rules for arbitrator selection, 
which cover the match-up system, the criteria for the designation of the sole/presiding arbitrator and the 
possibility to select off-list arbitrators. These issues are discussed in the following Sections 6.3.4 and 6.4.1. 
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(2) The arbitrator has a personal interest in the case;  
(3) The arbitrator has other relations with the parties or their agents, which may 
affect the impartiality of the arbitration proceedings;  
(4) The arbitrator privately meets with the parties or their agents, or accept the 
favour of dining or gifts provided by the parties or their agents. 
An arbitrator who fulfils one of the conditions above must withdraw himself on his/her 
own initiative. The parties also have the right to challenge the arbitrator based on these 
reasons before the first hearing or before the end of the last hearing if the parties find the 
conditions during the hearing phase. The chairman of the arbitration commission then 
decides whether or not to withdraw the arbitrator.352 
Instead of listing specific reasons for the challenge of arbitrators, CIETAC adopts a 
more generalized approach, which is in accordance with the provisions in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. 353  Specifically, any selected or designated arbitrator should sign a 
declaration statement which specifies any fact that may lead to reasonable doubts on his/her 
impartiality and independence. This obligation of disclosure persists throughout the whole 
proceedings. The parties can request to withdraw the arbitrator based on the facts disclosed 
in the declaration statement. They can also directly raise such requests if they find the facts 
or reasons which may cause reasonable doubts by themselves. Particularly, the withdrawal 
decision is not necessarily made by the chairman of CIETAC. If the arbitrator concerned 
withdraws him/herself, or the other party agrees with the withdrawal request, the arbitrator 
concerned is then directly withdrawn from the arbitration tribunal, though the withdrawal 
in these circumstances does not necessarily mean that the facts or reasons raised by the 
parties are confirmed by the arbitration commission.354 
(4) Replacement of Arbitrators 
If an arbitrator is withdrawn or cannot perform his/her duties for other reasons, he/she 
should then be replaced by another arbitrator, who is re-selected or re-designated following 
the same procedure in the selection of arbitrators.355 Whether the arbitration proceedings 
                                                 
352 Ibid., Articles 35 and 36. 
353 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Articles 11-13. 
354 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Articles 31 
and 32. But, it should be noted that CIETAC also provides detailed rules on what can be regarded as the 
specific grounds for challenging arbitrators. See Provisions for the Conduct of Arbitrators (2009) (Ԣ㻱ઈ
㹼Ѫ㘳ሏ㿴ᇊ), issued by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission on 1 
March 2009, Article 7. 
355 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Article 37. 
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should be continued or re-started is decided by the new arbitration tribunal. CIETAC further 
emphasizes that any selected or designated arbitrator should be substantially competent to 
arbitrate the case concerned. Otherwise, if an arbitrator cannot perform his/her duties for 
legal or practical reasons (e.g. insufficient time, poor health or lacking the necessary 
knowledge and experience for the case concerned), or the arbitrator does not perform his/her 
duties in accordance with the arbitration rules and time limit, the arbitrator concerned then 
can be replaced on his/her own initiative or according to the decision of the chairman of 
CIETAC.356  
5.5.2 Hearing, Evidence and Interim Measures 
(1) Hearing 
The Arbitration Law lays down the basic rules on the proceedings in the hearing phase. 
Oral hearings are the default option, whereas written hearings are also possible if so agreed 
by the parties.357 Compared with the Arbitration Law, the 2014 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 
provide more detailed guidance on the hearing proceedings. It is noteworthy that while due 
respect is paid to the autonomy of the parties, the position of the arbitration tribunal in the 
hearing phase is also enhanced. First, the arbitration tribunal, unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, can hear the case in a manner it considers appropriate, as long as the arbitration 
tribunal conducts the hearings independently and impartially and provides reasonable 
opportunities to both parties for presentation and debate. Second, in contrast to the 
Arbitration Law, the replacement of oral hearings by written hearings not only needs the 
mutual agreement of the parties, but also the consent of the arbitration tribunal. Third, 
considering that the parties may come from both civil law and common law jurisdictions, 
the arbitration tribunal is authorized, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, to adopt 
inquisitional or adversarial approaches in the hearings based on the specific conditions of 
the case.358 Last, the arbitration tribunal is also authorized to use several procedural tools to 
more effectively hold the hearings, including issuing procedural orders, making question 
lists, setting terms of references for arbitration and organizing pre-hearing conferences.359 
(2) Evidence 
                                                 
356 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 33. 
Provisions for the Conduct of Arbitrators (2009), Articles 6 and 9. 
357 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 39 and 40. 
358 Lijun Cao, 'CIETAC as a Forum for Resolving Business Disputes', (2008) FLJS (Foundation for Law, 
Justice and Society) 'Rule of Law in China: Chinese Law and Business' programme reports, p. 3. Available 
at http://www.fljs.org/content/cietac-forum-resolving-business-disputes. Last visited in June 2016. 
359 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 35. 
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Similar to the CiPL, the Arbitration Law also provides that the parties should provide 
evidence to support their claims, while the arbitration tribunal can also collect evidence on 
its own initiative when necessary. Particularly, to enhance the flexibility of arbitration 
proceedings, the cross-examination on evidence is not set as compulsory.360 The 2014 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules add several supplementary provisions to the Arbitration Law. 
For the evidence in written hearings or the evidence agreed by the parties to be cross-
examined in written form, the cross-examination of evidence can be conducted based on 
ZULWWHQ RSLQLRQV VXEPLWWHG E\ WKH SDUWLHV 0HDQZKLOH WR SURWHFW WKH SDUWLHV¶ ULJKW RI
information, the arbitration tribunal can inform the parties to be present when it collects the 
evidence, though the absence of the parties does not affect the evidence collection, as long 
as the parties are given proper notice. Besides, the evidence collected by the arbitration 
tribunal, expert opinions or appraisal reports should also be forwarded to the parties, so that 
they have the opportunities to comment on this evidence.361 
(3) Interim Measures 
In CIETAC, preservation measures (؍ޘ) and interim measures (Ѥᰦ᧚ᯭ) are 
different procedural tools for securing evidence and assets in arbitration proceedings. One 
the one hand, the parties can apply for preservation measures implemented by courts 
according to the Arbitration Law. On the other hand, at the request of one party, the 
arbitration tribunal can also decide whether to adopt interim measures and whether the 
applicant should provide the guarantee for interim measures.362  But, it should be noted that 
unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Arbitration Law only formally confirms the rights 
of parties to preservation measures and does not explicitly recognize the power of the 
arbitration tribunal to take interim measures.363 Thus, although CIETAC include interim 
measures in its arbitration rules, the usage of interim measures does not have a solid legal 
basis in Chinese Law. Instead, the mandate of the arbitration tribunal to adopt interim 
measures can only come from the mutual agreement of the parties on the usage of interim 
measures or the explicit permission in the applicable foreign laws for the case concerned.  
5.5.3 Issuance, Revocation and Non-Enforcement of Arbitration Awards 
(1) Issuance of Arbitration Awards 
                                                 
360 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 43-45. 
361 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Articles 42 
and 43. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the power of the arbitration tribunal to adopt interim measures is 
generally recognized. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), Article 17. 
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According to the Arbitration Law, an arbitration award should be rendered based on 
the majority opinion of the arbitration tribunal, while the minority opinion can be recorded 
in the hearing record. The opinion of the presiding arbitrators will prevail if a majority 
opinion cannot be formed in the arbitration tribunal, and the arbitrators who hold different 
opinions can choose to sign the arbitration awards or not. An arbitration award should 
specify the claims, facts, reasons, results, fee allocation and date of the decision. Particularly, 
if agreed by the parties, the disputing facts and the reasoning can be omitted. Besides, a 
partial award can be rendered if part of facts has already been ascertained.364 
With regard to the issuance of arbitration awards, the 2014 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 
are basically consistent with the Arbitration Law, while some differences can be found. First, 
the minority opinions are required to be recorded in case files instead of hearing records. 
This rule responds to the circumstances when hearing records are not made as agreed by the 
parties.365 Second, minority opinions can also be attached at the end of arbitration awards. 
A guess about this provision is that CIETAC is willing to increase the persuasion of its 
DUELWUDWLRQ DZDUGV E\ DGGLQJPLQRULW\ RSLQLRQV 7KH ORVLQJ SDUWLHV¶ discontent may be 
reduced when they find the minority opinions which may be in favour of their sides.366 But, 
it is necessary to point out that the attached minority opinions should not be deemed as 
formal parts of the arbitration awards, and the inclusion of the minority opinions in 
arbitration awards is also not compulsory.367 
(2) Revocation and Non-Enforcement of Arbitration Awards 
In a strict sense, setting aside arbitration awards (᫔䬰 ) is different from non-
enforcement (нҸᢗ㹼) of arbitration awards, which responds to two different kinds of 
requests from the parties.368 Under the Arbitration Law, on the one hand, one party can 
apply to the court for setting aside the arbitration award within six months after the receipt 
of the arbitration award. On the other hand, if one party has already initiated the enforcement 
procedure, the respondent to the enforcement can apply to the court for not enforcing the 
arbitration award. Particularly, if one party applies for the enforcement of the arbitration 
award and the other party requests the court to set aside the arbitration award, the court 
                                                 
364 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 53-55. 
365 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2012), Article 47. 
366 Zhengrui Han and Xiaoyu Li, 'Discourse of International Commercial Arbitration: the Case of Mainland 
China', 43 (2011) Journal of Pragmatics, p. 1390. 
367 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 49. 
368 Xianming Shi, 'Judicial Review of Foreign-Related Arbitral Awards in China: Statutory Provisions, 
Perceived Defects and Suggested Innovations', 10 (2013) Transnational Dispute Management, p. 3. 
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should first suspend the enforcement procedure and then render a decision on whether the 
arbitration award should be set aside or not.369  
But, the legal grounds for setting aside and non-enforcement of arbitration awards are 
entirely the same in the Arbitration Law and the CiPL. For foreign-related arbitration 
awards, the courts mainly examine procedural issues, while the courts also scrutinize 
substantive issues in domestic arbitration awards.370 For the parties, the substantial effects 
of these two procedures, to some extent, are rather similar to each other, which render the 
arbitration awards unenforceable. 
The main difference between setting aside and non-enforcement of arbitration awards 
is the possibility for arbitration tribunals to rectify their errors in arbitration awards. 
Specifically, in case of non-enforcement, Articles 237 and 275 of the CiPL prescribe that if 
the court decides not to enforce arbitration awards, the parties can apply for arbitration again 
based on their arbitration agreements or bring their disputes to the courts for litigation.  
Unlike non-enforcement of arbitration awards, Article 61 of the Arbitration Law 
provides a re-arbitration option when arbitration awards are set aside by the courts. The 
court can inform the arbitration tribunal to re-arbitrate the case within a certain time limit 
and suspend the setting-aside procedure. If the arbitration tribunal refuses to re-arbitrate the 
case, the setting-aside procedure should then be resumed by the court. 
Similar to Article 34 (4) of the UNICTRAL Model Law, Article 61 of the Arbitration 
Law adopts a relatively flexible approach in treating arbitration awards that are potentially 
being revoked. Instead of directly rendering negative decisions, the courts give arbitration 
tribunals the opportunities to rectify the errors in arbitration awards, which, to some extent, 
can avoid disputes being re-arbitrated or re-litigated from the very beginning and save the 
time and energy of the parties.371 
5.6 Summary 
For a long time, arbitration was the only available adjudicative mechanism for 
resolving foreign-related commercial disputes in China, the history of which can be traced 
back to the 1950s. After the 1978 reform, marked E\&KLQD¶V accession to the 1958 New 
York Convention in 1986 and the promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994, important 
steps have been taken to promote the modernization and internationalization of the 
                                                 
369 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 59, 63 and 64. 
370 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 237 and 274; Arbitration Law 
of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 58, 63, 70 and 71. 
371 Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 124-125. 
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arbitration system. Advancements can be witnessed in the development of Chinese 
arbitration institutions. With the advent of the Arbitration Law, Chinese arbitration 
institutions obtained their independence from government organs and the necessary 
freedom to amend their arbitration rules. Accordingly, as represented by CIETAC, 
considerable progress has been achieved by Chinese arbitration institutions in both the 
regulatory and institutional dimensions. This progress enables Chinese arbitration 
institutions to provide high quality arbitration services to foreign-related commercial 
disputants. 
Recognizing the importance of foreign-related commercial arbitration, the SPC 
introduced the prior reporting mechanism to guarantee the correctness of court decisions on 
the validity of foreign-related arbitration agreements and the enforcement of foreign-related 
arbitration awards, the two most important issues in the beginning and end phases of 
arbitration proceedings. Meanwhile, to fulfil convention obligations, China follows the 
provisions of the 1958 New York Convention and limits the legal grounds for the non-
enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards to procedural issues. Besides, the legal 
design of the raised jurisdictional level can also be witnessed in the preservation measures, 
while the parties are provided with the freedom to decide whether or not to keep the hearing 
records in foreign-related arbitration cases. In short, compared with domestic disputants, 
foreign-related commercial disputants can generally receive a more internationalized, 
flexible and quality services in arbitration. 
Although China does not directly copy the model provisions of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, many important principles and basic rules of modern commercial arbitration are 
recognized in the Arbitration Law. More importantly, as exemplified by CIETAC, the 
institutional rules provided by Chinese arbitration institutions have become increasingly 
modernized and internationalized over the past two decades. From application to closure, 
WKHSDUWLHV¶DXWRQRP\UHFHLYHVGXHUHVSHFWLQPRst sectors of arbitration proceedings, while 
the position of arbitration tribunals in the hearings is also enhanced. In general, the 
Arbitration Law and institutional arbitration rules of Chinese arbitration institutions jointly 
create a regulatory framework for arbitration proceedings, which provides necessary 
procedural guidance for the parties and arbitrators in foreign-related commercial arbitration.
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Chapter 6 Status Quo of Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation 
and Arbitration: Assessment and Comparison 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters studied the core principles of litigation and arbitration at the 
theoretical level and examined the institutional and procedural legal settings for foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration under the dual legal system. This chapter 
continues to assess and compare these two mechanisms by connecting the core principles 
in theory and the law and practice of these two mechanisms, based on which the remaining 
deficiencies in these two mechanisms and the underlying reasons behind can be identified. 
Corresponding to the four sets of core principles of litigation and arbitration identified in 
Chapter 2, the assessment of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration is divided 
into four sections in this chapter, namely accessibility, competence of adjudicators, fairness 
of proceedings, and efficiency and enforcement.  
Each section starts with an introductory paragraph. The introductory paragraph has 
three functions: (1) reviewing what are the specific requirements that need to be met for 
fulfilling the core principles concerned; (2) illustrating whether the core principles 
concerned are fulfilled in a general sense; (3) pointing out the contentious issues in law and 
practice which affect the realization of the core principles concerned.  
Then, the contentious issues mentioned in the introductory paragraph are discussed in 
a more detailed manner by showing how these issues arise, what the underlying reasons 
behind them are, what measures have been taken to tackle them, and how they affect the 
quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. Each section then ends with 
a summarizing paragraph which provides a short review of the issues discussed in the 
corresponding section. 
After the evaluation analysis, foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration are 
further compared with each other to show their relative advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of accessibility, competence of adjudicators, fairness of proceedings, and efficiency 
and enforcement. 
6.2 Accessibility 
6.2.1 Transforming Case-Filing Mechanism in Litigation: From Examination to 
Registration 
The accessibility of litigation is mainly decided by two issues: jurisdiction rules and 
the case-filing mechanism.  Generally speaking, Chinese law provides a relatively complete 
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set of jurisdiction rules to ensure that foreign-related commercial disputants can find 
sufficient legal support in terms of jurisdiction issues.372 The parties can reach jurisdictional 
agreements and use consensual jurisdiction rules to choose the courts that have actual 
connections with the disputes concerned, while they can also directly sue in the courts based 
on territorial jurisdiction rules in the case that no jurisdiction agreements are reached. As 
previously discussed, the centralized jurisdiction specially designed for foreign-related 
commercial cases further increased the possibility of foreign-related commercial disputants 
to find quality litigation services in courts.373  
A more controversial issue that merits attention is the case-filing mechanism and its 
effects on the accessibility of litigation. The case-filing proceedings are the pre-condition 
for following litigation proceedings, and the quality of the case-filing work directly decides 
whether the cases submitted by the parties can be properly filed and accepted by the courts. 
Early in 1997, the SPC had already recognized the importance of the case-filing work and 
issued a specialized judicial interpretation to regulate the case-filing work.374 To enhance 
the quality of the case-filing work, the 63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVHWXSWKHSULQFLSOH
of separating the case-filing work from the adjudicative work (・ᇑ࠶⿫). Since then, the 
case-filing work has been officially allocated to specialized case-filing divisions that are 
independent from adjudicative divisions.375 Meanwhile, the SPC also introduced an internal 
examination process. A decision denying the acceptance of cases should be reviewed by the 
corresponding division chief or the court president, and the denying decision could only be 
rendered with the approval of these court officials.376 Besides, the parties are also entitled 
                                                 
372 In practice, the parties may raise objections to the jurisdiction, which is a common litigation technique 
to prolong the litigation proceedings. But, this does not necessarily mean that the courts will approve the 
objections. Even if the courts find that they have no jurisdiction over the cases concerned, they should 
transfer the cases to the courts that have jurisdiction under Chinese law. Generally speaking, Chinese law 
provides multiple kinds of jurisdictional rules to ensure that Chinese courts have the jurisdiction over 
foreign-related commercial cases. At least, foreign-related commercial disputants will not be blocked from 
the courts for the reason that there is no applicable jurisdictional rule in Chinese law to enable Chinese 
courts to handle the cases concerned. 
373 See the previous Section 4.4.1. 
374 Provisional Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Case-Filing Work in People's Courts (1997) 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒・Ṹᐕ֌ⲴᲲ㹼㿴ᇊ), ⌅ਁ[1997]7ਧ (Fa Fa [1997] No.7), issued by the 
Supreme People's Court on 21 April 1997. 
375 Margaret Y.K. Woo and Yaxin Wang, 'Civil Justice in China: An Empirical Study of Courts in Three 
Provinces', 53 (2005) American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 15. 
376 Provisional Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Case-Filing Work in People's Courts (1997), 
Articles 5 and 12. 
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to a remedy procedure in which they can appeal the court decisions to the higher level courts 
for review if their applications are rejected in the case-filing phase.377 
However, the implementation of legal rules regarding the case-filing work seems to 
be problematic in practice. It is reported that many courts in China deliberately set obstacles 
for the parties to file lawsuits. For example, court staff in case-filing divisions may persuade 
the parties to withdraw their lawsuits based on the reasons that the evidence was insufficient 
or there were no solid legal grounds. They may also conduct mediation so that the cases 
could be ended at the case-filing stage if the mediation efforts succeed. Particularly, to 
prevent the parties from appealing to the higher level courts, the court staff normally only 
inform the parties about the negative results orally or intentionally delay the process without 
issuing any written decisions. Without the written decisions, the parties could not exercise 
their rights of appeal and find substantial legal remedies through the appeal procedure.378  
One important reason for the reluctance of courts to file the cases is connected to the 
aforementioned evaluation mechanism in which the rate of concluded cases (㔃Ṹ⦷) is an 
important evaluation factor.379 The rate of concluded cases directly decides the scores of 
judges and courts in annual evaluation and in turn affects the assessment of courts and 
MXGJHV¶promotion and bonuses. Accordingly, to maximize the rate of concluded cases, the 
courts tend turn away the disputants, so that they can ensure the number of accepted cases 
is controlled within a manageable range. This is also why the applications of disputants are 
more frequently rejected in the last few months of the year, because the rate of concluded 
cases is normally calculated in that period. In practice, some courts even directly inform the 
disputants that the lawsuits brought to the courts after October would not be accepted in 
                                                 
377 Article 123 of the Civil Procedure Law clearly states that the decision of accepting or not accepting the 
case must be rendered by the court within seven days. If the court decides not to accept the case, the plaintiff 
can then appeal the court decision to the higher level court. 
378 Jin Ran and He Mu, '⌅䲒Ѫօᒤᓅ䳮・Ṹ (Why It Is Difficult to File a Case in Courts at the End of 
Year)', in ইᯩઘᵛ (Southern Weekly), 16 December 2011. Available at 
http://www.infzm.com/content/66240. Last visited in June 2016; Dawei Jiang, 'ഠຳо䘋䐟: ᒤ㓸⌅䲒・
Ṹ䳮⧠䊑ѻ৽ᙍ (Dilemma and Route Forward: Rethinking the Phenomenon of the Difficulties in Filing 
Cases at the End of the Year)', 6 (2013) 㾯䜘⌅ᆖ䇴䇪 (Western Law Review), pp. 87-89. In a 2012 survey 
to local courts in Guilin, 69% of court staff in case-filing divisions admitted that the case-filing examination 
of many cases were actually beyond the time limits in law. Jining Yang and Qiang Wang, 'ᖃࡽ≁һṸԦ
・Ṹ䳮Ⲵ৏ഐ䈳ḕ৺ᙍ㘳 (An Investigation and Analysis on the Reasons for the Difficulties in Filing 
Civil Cases)', 3 (2012) ⌅ࡦо⽮Պ (Legality and Society), pp. 135-137. 
379 The court evaluation mechanisms is discussed in the previous Section 4.3.3. 
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principle.380 As commented by Liu, the case-filing divisions in courts, to some extent, act 
DVWKHµJDWHNHHSHUV¶ZKREORFNWKHFDVHVWKDWWKHFRXUWVDUHQRWZLOOLQJWRKDQGOH381  
Another reason for the improper practice in the case-filing phase is the existence of 
loopholes in law.382 Although the law offers basic procedural guidance on the case-filing 
work, it fails to provide effective supervision and punishment measures to secure its 
implementation in practice. The practice that courts tend to provide oral case-filing 
decisions and intentionally delay the case-filing proceedings obviously violates the law, but 
there seems to be no substantial supervision and punishment against such deviant behaviour. 
More importantly, although the law emphasizes the separation of case-filing and 
adjudicative work, it does not explicitly define the separation of power between case-filing 
and adjudicative divisions. In practice, the court staff in case-filing divisions not only check 
whether the submissions fulfil the procedural requirements, but also examine substantive 
issues such as the facts and the reasons provided by the disputants. They even comment on 
the evidence and legal grounds of the cases, which should be ascertained by judges in 
adjudicative divisions. In other words, court staff in case-filing divisions not only decide 
whether to file the case, but also de facto make decisions on whether to accept the case in 
the case-filing phase. To some extent, the case-filing examination mechanism provides too 
much power to case-filing divisions, and such power may be abused by the courts to 
improperly block the access of disputants to litigation.383 
7R WDFNOH WKHREVWDFOHV WRGLVSXWDQWV¶DFFHVV WRFRXUWVDVHULHVRI UHIRUPPHDVXUHV
were introduced recently. In January 2015, the Political and Legal Commission under the 
Central Committee of CPC announced the removal of the rate of concluded cases from the 
evaluation criteria for judges and courts.384 At the same time, the SPC also introduced the 
registration mechanism in 2015 to replace the previous examination mechanism.385 The 
                                                 
380 Jin Ran and He Mu (2011), supra note 378. 
381 Nanping Liu and Michelle Liu, 'Justice without Judges: The Case Filing Division in the People's 
Republic of China', 17 (2011) University of California, Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, p. 
342. 
382 Ibid., pp. 300-315. 
383 Jining Yang and Qiang Wang (2012), supra note 378, pp. 135-137. 
384 Fei Chen and Wei Zou, '᭯⌅ᵪޣӺᒤޘ䶒␵⨶ᢗ⌅ਨ⌅㘳Ṩᤷḷ˖ᴹ㖚ࡔߣ⦷ǃ㔃Ṹ⦷ㅹሶਆ
⎸ (The Political-Legal Organs Will Comprehensively Adjust Judicial Evaluation Criteria: the Rate of 
Guilty Conviction and the Rate of Concluded Cases Will Be Cancelled)', in ᯠॾ㖁 (Xinhuanet), 21 
January 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-01/21/c_1114079201.htm. Last visited in June 
2016. 
385 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Case-Filing Registration in 
People's Courts (2015) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒ⲫ䇠・Ṹ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ㿴ᇊ), ⌅䟺[2015]8 ਧ (Fa 
Shi [2015] No.8), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 15 April 2015; Opinions on Promoting the 
Chapter 6 Status Quo of Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
 
125 
power of case-filing divisions is limited, and they are only authorized to check procedural 
issues and file the cases accordingly. Specifically, case-filing divisions are required to 
receive the documents submitted by the parties without exception and issue written 
certificates with the record of the date of receipt. Case-filing divisions should also 
immediately conduct the prima facie check on the spot. After the prima facie check, they 
should register qualified cases or explain to the parties why the cases cannot be filed 
according to law. If the case-filing decisions in complicated cases are indeed difficult to 
make on the spot, the courts should then decide whether to accept the cases within seven 
days.386  
More importantly, the requirements for the parties to start the remedy procedure are 
relaxed. The parties are now entitled to directly raise complaints to the higher level courts, 
even if they receive no written decisions from the lower level courts. Besides, supervision 
and punishment mechanisms are now established. It is emphasized that the case-filing work 
RI WKH FRXUWV VKRXOG EH VXEMHFW WR WKH VXSHUYLVLRQ RI FRXUWV SURFXUDWRUDWHV SHRSOH¶V
congresses, and the media and the public. Responsible court staff and the leaders in charge 
will be held responsible for their improper behaviour.387  
From examination mechanism to registration mechanism, the line between the case-
filing and adjudicative work now becomes clearer. The previously ambiguous role of case-
filing divisions is now explicitly defined to focus on a prima facie check, which is more 
consistent with the functional and procedural nature of case-filing divisions. The relaxation 
of the requirements in the remedy procedure for disputants and the establishment of 
supervision and punishment mechanisms also help to ensure that the newly introduced 
proceedings can be effectively followed in practice.  
Equally important is the cancellation of the rate of concluded cases in the court 
evaOXDWLRQ7RDODUJHH[WHQWWKHUHPRYDORIWKLVXQGHUO\LQJLQFHQWLYHIRUFRXUWV¶LPSURSHU
behaviour is the key in the judicial reform of the case-filing work. The transformation from 
examination to registration in the case-filing work has already brought changes in practice. 
In tKH63&¶Vofficial statistics published recently, a significant increase in the number of 
                                                 
Reform of Case-Filing Registration Mechanism in People's Courts (2015) (ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒᧘㹼・Ṹⲫ䇠
ࡦ᭩䶙Ⲵ᜿㿱), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 15 April 2015. 
386 Particularly, if whether the case fulfils the legal requirements cannot be ascertained within seven days, 
the case should be filed without delay, and if the case is found to be inconsistent with the legal requirements 
in the following proceedings, the court can decide to reject the lawsuit. Provisions of the Supreme People's 
Court on Several Issues Concerning the Case-Filing Registration in People's Courts (2015), Article 8. 
387 Opinions on Promoting the Reform of Case-Filing Registration Mechanism in People's Courts (2015), 
Article 6; Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Case-Filing 
Registration in People's Courts (2015), Articles 1, 2, 8 and 13. 
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filed cases can be found. From the start of the overall implementation of the registration 
mechanism in May 2015 to October, the number of registered first instance cases in all 
SHRSOH¶VFRXUWVDPRXQWHGWRPLOOLRQZKLFKZDVKLJKHUWKDQthe number in the 
same period of 2014.388 
Compared with domestic cases, foreign-related commercial cases may have some 
advantages on the issue of accessibility in practice. On the one hand, it might be true that 
&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQV\VWHPLQDJHQHUDOVHQVHLVVWLOOUHODWLYHO\GLVWDQWIURPDVRXQGVWDWXVLQ
terms of ensuring access to justice. However, it does not necessarily mean the problematic 
situation is visible in all kinds of cases. Actually, the majority of critical views on access to 
justice in China mainly focus on administrative and socio-politically sensitive cases, 
whereas criticism is less heard in commercial cases.389 The courts are found to be reluctant 
to accept administrative and socio-politically sensitive cases, as these cases are normally 
connected with disputes between local governments and mass victims. The courts are easily 
stuck in the middle of these two groups and thus need to face pressure from both sides.390 
However, the adjudication of commercial cases, in comparison with administrative and 
socio-politically sensitive cases, brings less pressure to courts.391 On the other hand, the 
courts may also have additional incentives to treat foreign-related commercial cases more 
seriously in the case-filing phase. As mentioned, foreign-related issues are generally treated 
with extra caution in China.392 The prudent attitude encourages the courts to more strictly 
follow the legal rules when dealing with foreign-related commercial disputes. Overall, 
                                                 
388 Qian Ge, 'ᴰ儈⌅・Ṹᓝ঵䮯: ・Ṹ䳮ᐢᡀѪশਢ (The Chief of the Case-Filing Division in the 
Supreme People's Court: The Difficulties in Filing Cases Has Become Part of History)', in ᯠ⎚ᯠ䰫 (Sina 
News), 6 November 2015. Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2015-11-06/doc-
ifxkniur2915765.shtml. Last visited in June 2016. 
389 See Nanping Liu and Michelle Liu (2011), supra note 381, pp. 283-344; Jonathan Kinkel and William 
Hurst, 'Access to Justice in Post-Mao China: Assessing the Politics of Criminal and Administrative Law', 
11 (2011) Journal of East Asian Studies, pp. 467-499; Hualing Fu, 'Access to Justice in China: Potentials, 
Limits, and Alternatives', in John Gillespie and Albert H. Y. Chen (eds.), Legal Reforms in China and 
Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes (Routledge, 2010), pp. 163-187. 
390 Yuwen Li and Yun Ma, 'The Hurdle is High: The Administrative Litigation System in the People's 
Republic of China', in Yuwen Li (ed.), Administrative Litigation Systems in Greater China and Europe 
(Ashgate, 2014), pp. 32-40. Randall Peerenboom and Xin He (2009), supra note 5, pp. 10-20.  
391  As suggested by Peerenboom, considering that different kinds of case are treated with different 
strategies in China, the discussion on different kinds of cases should also be separated. Randall Peerenboom 
and Yulin Fu, 'A New Analytical Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in 
China', in Randall P. Peerenboom (ed.), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 95-134.  
392 Xianglin Zhao and Yong Geng, 'WTOоѝഭ⎹ཆ≁୶һᇑࡔ (WTO and China's Foreign-Related 
Civil and Commercial Adjudication)', 20 (2002) ᭯⌅䇪උ (Tribune of Political Science and Law); Bosi 
Lan, 'ѝഭ⎹ཆ୶һǃ⎧һᇑࡔⲴ⧠⣦৺ኅᵋ (The Status Quo and Outlook of China's Foreign-Related 
Commercial and Maritime Adjudication)', 3 (2002) Ӫ≁ਨ⌅ (People's Judicature). 
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foreign-related commercial disputants, in comparison with domestic disputants, especially 
those who are involved with socio-politically sensitive cases, may find less barriers in their 
paths to courts. 
6.2.2 Potential Obstacles to Arbitral Accessibility: The Demanding Requirement in 
Arbitration Agreements and the Partial Recognition of the Competence-Competence 
Principle in Arbitral Jurisdiction 
Two important issues, namely arbitration agreements and arbitral jurisdiction, are the 
key factors which significantly affect the accessibility to arbitration proceedings. Article II 
of the 1958 New York Convention and Articles 7 and 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
provide model provisions on these two issues.393 As discXVVHGLQWKLVVHFWLRQ&KLQD¶VOHJDO
rules on these two issues are basically consistent with the model provisions at the 
international level. However, some particular law and practice with Chinese characteristics 
such as the demanding requirement of the clear designation of the arbitration commission 
and the partial recognition of the principle of competence-competence still pose obstacles 
to arbitral accessibility.394 
(1) Arbitration Agreements and the Demanding Requirement of the Clear Designation of 
the Arbitration Commission 
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Arbitration Law, an arbitration agreement can be reached 
either before or after the rise of disputes, provided it is concluded in written form. The SPC 
IXUWKHUFODULILHVWKHVFRSHRIµZULWWHQIRUP¶LQLWV2006 judicial interpretation, which includes 
written contracts, letters or electronic text such as telegram, telex, facsimile, electronic data 
exchange and email. Meanwhile, the SPC also specifies that an arbitration agreement can 
be concluded in different ways, which can be an arbitration clause within the contract, a 
separate arbitration agreement outside the contract or an agreement referring to an 
arbitration clause in other written contracts or documents.395 In addition, CIETAC takes a 
further step to recognize the arbitration agreement based on implied consent. If one party 
GRHVQRWGHQ\WKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VFODLPDERXWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHDUELWUDWLRQDJUHHPHQWLQWKH
process of documents exchange during the pre-hearing phase, a written arbitration 
agreement will be deemed to be existent. 396  In general, the legal provisions in the 
$UELWUDWLRQ /DZ WKH 63&¶V MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG &,(7$&$UELWUDWLRQ5XOHV
                                                 
393 For the analysis on the importance of these two issues, see the previous Section 2.3.1. 
394 In China, DQDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQLVQRUPDOO\QDPHGDVµDUELWUDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQ¶Ԣ㻱ငઈՊ). For 
most of the time, these two words are interchangeable in China. 
395 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), Articles 1 and 11. 
396 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 5. 
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jointly form a relatively complete regulatory framework on the form requirements for 
arbitration agreements, which are generally consistent with Article 7 (Option I) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Apart from the form requirements above, Article 16 of the Arbitration Law also lists 
three substantive requirements for a valid arbitration agreement. First, the expression of the 
intention should be true. For example, an arbitration agreement is invalid when one party is 
forced by the other party to conclude the arbitration agreement.397 Second, the disputes 
should be within the arbitral scope defined by law, which includes contract or property 
disputes and excludes administrative disputes and disputes regarding personal relations such 
as marriage, adoption and inheritance. 398  These two requirements correspond to the 
provisions on arbitration agreements in Article II of the 1958 New York Convention, which 
VSHFLI\WKDWWKHGLVSXWHVVKRXOGEHGHULYHGIURPµGHILQHGOHJDO UHODWLRQVKLS¶and the subject 
PDWWHUVKRXOGEHµFDSDEOHRIVHWWOHPHQWE\DUELWUDWLRQ¶ 
The third and the most controversial requirement in the Arbitration Law is that an 
arbitration commission must be clearly designated in the arbitration agreement. 399 
Otherwise, an arbitration agreement without the clear designation of the arbitration 
commission will be deemed as invalid.400 However, foreign investors and traders are not 
necessarily experts in Chinese arbitration laws and regulations. They may leave defects in 
the arbitration agreements if they fail to notice the third requirement or understand its 
correct meaning. In practice, they may (1) inaccurately write the name of the arbitration 
commission, (2) only designate the arbitration rules of the arbitration commission without 
                                                 
397 Besides, the intention to arbitrate should also be clear. For example, if the parties specify in the 
arbitration agreement that their disputes can be resolved by either arbitration institutions or courts, the 
arbitration agreement then should be deemed invalid. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on 
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), 
Article 7. 
398 Meanwhile, labour disputes and agricultural contracts reached within agricultural collective economy 
organizations are also excluded from commercial arbitration. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of 
China (1994), Articles 2, 3, 17 and 77. But, the issues to be arbitrated need not to be specific. The parties 
can generally state that any disputable issue regarding the establishment, validity, modification, assignment, 
performance, default, interpretation and termination of the contract should be resolved via arbitration in 
the arbitration agreement. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), Article 2. 
399 See Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 88-90; Jingzhou Tao and Clarisse Von Wunschheim, 'Articles 
16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law: The Great Wall of China for Foreign Arbitration Institutions', 23 
(2007) Arbitration International, pp. 311-318. This reqXLUHPHQWDOVROLPLWVSDUWLHV¶DXWRQRP\WRFKRRVH
ad hoc arbitration and foreign arbitration institutions to resolve their dispute if the cases concerned are 
seated in China. For a more detailed discussion, see the following Section 6.4.1 (3). 
400 But, the parties can reach a supplementary agreement to designate one arbitration commission to ensure 
their arbitration agreement is valid. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Article 18. 
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clearly mentioning the name of the arbitration commission, (3) designate two arbitration 
institutions (each party designates one to show equality), or (4) only designate the place 
where the arbitration commission is located.401 
Responding to the various circumstances in practice, the SPC issued a systematic 
explanation in 2006 on what kinds of statements in arbitration agreements can be accepted 
DV WKH µFOHDU GHVLJQDWLRQ RI WKH DUELWUDWLRQ FRPPLVVLRQ¶ 402  First, simple omission or 
misspelling of words in the name of the arbitration commission does not affect the validity 
of the arbitration agreement, as long as the arbitration commission can be ascertained based 
on the inaccurate name. For example, the SPC confirmed in the Lianyugang Yunqing case 
(䘎Ӂ⑟ӁযṸ) that the omission of WKHZRUGµ(FRQRPLF¶IURP&,(7$&¶s full name was 
DFFHSWDEOHIRU&,(7$&FRXOGVWLOOEHLGHQWLILHGZLWKWKHUHPDLQLQJILYHZRUGVµ&,7$&¶403  
Second, the arbitration agreement is invalid if the parties only designate the arbitration 
rules, unless the arbitration commission can be ascertained by the designated arbitration 
rules. Responding to this situation, CIETAC explicitly states that if the parties designate 
&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVLQWKHDUELWUDWLRQDJUHHPHQWLWLVWKHQGHHPed that parties agree 
to arbitrate the dispute in CIETAC.  
Third, the selection of two or more arbitration institutions renders the arbitration 
agreement invalid, unless the parties can reach a supplementary agreement to select one 
from them.  
Fourth, if there is only one arbitration institution in the designated place, this 
arbitration institution is then deemed as the designated arbitration institution. But, if there 
                                                 
401 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, pp. 71-76; Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 98. 
402 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), Articles 3-7. 
403 In this case, two Chinese companies (Guanyun Jianyin Real Estate and Guanyun Coal Industry) and 
one American company (Seattle Yafan Investment) reached an equity joint venture contract. In the contract, 
there was an arbitration agreement which stated that any dispute regarding the contract should be arbitrated 
LQWKHµ&KLQD,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH$UELWUDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶/DWHUDGLVSXWHDURVHEHWZHHQWKHFRQWUDFWLQJ
parties, and the case was brought to the Jiangsu HPC. The Jiangsu HPC then decided that the arbitration 
agreement was invalid, because the officiDOQDPHRI&,(7$&VKRXOGEHµ&KLQD,QWHUQDWLRQDO(FRQRPLF
DQG7UDGH$UELWUDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶DQGWKHRPLVVLRQRIWKHZRUGµ(FRQRPLF¶OHGWRDQXQFOHDUGHVLJQDWLRQ
of the arbitration commission. The case was then reported to the SPC for final approval. The SPC rejected 
WKH-LDQJVX+3&¶VGHFLVLRQDQGVWDWHGLQLWVUHSO\WKDWWKHRPLVVLRQRIWKHZRUGVLQWKHQDPHRIDUELWUDWLRQ
institutions should not be a reason for denying the validity of the arbitration agreement, as long as the 
arbitration institution can be ascertained. See Reply Opinion of the Supreme People's Court on a Case in 
which the Omission of the Words in the Name of the Arbitration Institution Should Not Affect the Validity 
of the Arbitration Agreement (1998) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ሩԢ㻱ᶑⅮѝᡰ䘹Ԣ㻱ᵪᶴⲴ਽〠┿ᆇ, նнᖡ
૽Ԣ㻱ᶑⅮ᭸࣋ⲴањṸֻⲴᢩ༽᜿㿱), ⌅㓿 [1998]159 ਧ (Fajing [1998] No.159), issued by the 
Supreme People's Court on 2 April 1998. 
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are two or more arbitration institutions in the designated place, the arbitration agreement is 
then invalid unless the parties can reach a supplementary agreement to select one from them. 
,W LVQRWHZRUWK\ WKDW VRPHSURYLVLRQV LQ WKH63&¶V MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDUH
actually different from its previous judicial replies on the same issues. For example, in the 
Qilu Pharmacy case (喀励㦟ъṸ), the parties wrote both CIETAC and SCC as the 
designated arbitration institutions in the arbitration agreement. In 1996, the SPC confirmed 
that the simultaneous selection of two arbitration institutions in this case should be deemed 
DVµFOHDU¶and the arbitration agreement was thus valid.404 %XWLQWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDO
interpretation, such designation is no longer valid, unless the parties can reach a 
VXSSOHPHQWDU\DJUHHPHQW7KHFKDQJHRIWKH63&¶VDWWLWXGHRQWKLVLVVXHLVWDNHQDVDµVWHS
EDFN¶E\VRPHVFKRODUV405 
Similarly, some local courts once took a more liberalized attitude towards the 
circumstance that the parties only designate the place where two or more arbitration 
institutions are located. In 2001, the Shanghai HPC issued an opinion on the implementation 
RIWKH$UELWUDWLRQ/DZZKLFKVSHFLILHGWKDWGHVFULSWLRQVVXFKDVµDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ
6KDQJKDL¶DQGµUHOHYDQWRUJDQL]DWLRQVIRUDUELWUDWLRQ LQ6KDQJKDL¶FRXOGEHGHHPHGDVD
simultaneous designation of SAC and CIETAC Shanghai sub-commission, and the 
arbitration agreement should be deemed a valid.406  +RZHYHU WKH 63&¶V  MXGLFLDO
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQGLGQRWDGRSWWKH6KDQJKDL+3&¶VOLEHUDODSSURDFK,QVWHDGLWHPSKDVL]HG
the necessity of a supplementary agreement by the parties. 
Commercial disputants, foreign investors and traders in particular, are not necessarily 
IDPLOLDUZLWKWKHODZDQGSUDFWLFHRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQ)RUHLJQSDUWLHVPD\QRWQRWLFHWKH
                                                 
404 In this case, a Chinese company (Qilu Pharmacy Factory) and an American company (United States 
Antai International Trade) reached a contract in which the two parties agreed that any dispute regarding 
the contract should be arbitrated in CIETAC or SCC. Later, a dispute arose between the parties, and the 
case was brought to the Shandong HPC. The Shandong HPC then asked the SPC for instructions on how 
to decide the validity of the arbitration agreement in this case. The SPC then replied to the Shandong HPC 
that the simultaneous selection of two arbitration institutions should not be a reason for denying the validity 
of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement in the contract was valid, and the courts should not 
have the jurisdiction over the case. The parties can select either of these two arbitration institutions 
(CIETAC or SCC) for arbitrating the case. See Letter of the Supreme People's Court to Shandong High 
People's Court on the Validity of Arbitration Agreements when Two Arbitration Institutions Are Selected 
Simultaneously (1996) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ਼ᰦ䘹ᤙєњԢ㻱ᵪᶴⲴԢ㻱ᶑⅮ᭸࣋䰞仈㔉ኡьⴱ儈
㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒Ⲵ࠭), ⌅࠭[1996]176ਧ (Fahan [1996] No.176), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 
12 December 1996. 
405 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 172. 
406 Opinions of Shanghai High People's Court on the Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2001) (к⎧ᐲ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᢗ㹼ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ༴
⨶᜿㿱), issued by the Shanghai High People's Court on 3 January 2001, Article 2. 
Chapter 6 Status Quo of Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
 
131 
H[WUD UHTXLUHPHQW RI WKH µFOHDU GHVLJQDWLRQ RI WKH DUELWUDWLRQ FRPPLVVLRQ¶ ZKLFK JRHV
beyond the basic requirements stated in the 1958 New York Convention and the 
UNICTRAL Model Law. Even if they are careful enough to find this particular requirement 
in the Arbitration Law before they draft the arbitration agreement, they may still 
unconsciously make defective statements, as they may get puzzled with the names of 
Chinese arbitration institutions and the relationship between them.  
These issues became even more complicated for foreign businessmen after the split of 
CIETAC. For example, it is difficult for the parties to clearly recognize that the former 
CIETAC sub commissions in Shenzhen and Shanghai have changed their names to SHIAC 
and SCIA in 2012, and there are two new sub commissions re-established by CIETAC in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai in 2015. Meanwhile, there are now a total of six arbitration 
institutions which can handle foreign-related commercial disputes in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai (three for each). They are SAC, SHIAC and CIETAC Shanghai sub-commission 
in Shanghai, and SZAC, SCIA and CIETAC Shenzhen sub-commission in Shenzhen. These 
confusing names and abbreviations may lead to difficulties for businessmen in the 
designation of arbitration institutions. To ensure the clear designation of the arbitration 
commission and the validity of the arbitration agreement, the advice from Chinese lawyers 
specializing in Chinese arbitration seems necessary for foreign-related commercial 
disputants. 
$OWKRXJK WKH 63&¶V  MXGLFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WR VRPH extent, relaxed the strict 
requirements of the clear designation of the arbitration commission in arbitration 
agreements, its approach was still relatively conservative.407 Based on the interpretation, a 
defective arbitration agreement which does not clearly designate the arbitration commission 
can only be remedied when one arbitration commission can be ascertained based on the 
statements in the arbitration agreement. However, if there are two or more arbitration 
institutions, the arbitration agreement is then deemed as invalid, unless a supplementary 
agreement can be reached by the parties. But, as commented by Moses, the parties tend to 
DJUHHZLWKµQRWKLQJ¶DIWHUWKHULVHRIGLVSXWHVLQSUDFWLFH$VXSSOHPHQWDU\DJUHHPHQWLVQRW
easy to be reached when the SDUWLHV¶ LQWHUHVWV GLYHUJH IURPHDFKRWKHU408 Under certain 
circumstances, one party may abuse this rule to delay the dispute resolution process or even 
GHQ\WKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VULJKWWRDUELWUDWHWKHGLVSXWH 
In general, the particular requirement of the clear designation of the arbitration 
commission is actually rather demanding for foreign-related commercial disputants. Their 
                                                 
407 Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 99; Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 76. 
408 Margaret L. Moses (2008), supra note 52, p. 17. 
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arbitration agreements may turn out to be invalid, even though they have the true intention 
to arbitrate the disputes. Their accessibility to foreign-related commercial arbitration faces 
the risk of being denied if they cannot thoroughly study Chinese legal rules regarding this 
particular requirement and fully recognize their meanings.  
(2) Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Partial Recognition of the Competence-Competence 
Principle 
As prescribed in Article II (3) of the 1958 New York Convention, a valid arbitration 
agreement provides the arbitration tribunal with the mandate to arbitrate the dispute, which 
takes precedence over the jurisdiction of courts. This basic principle is reiterated in Articles 
124 and 271 of the CiPL and Article 5 of the Arbitration Law.409 Meanwhile, the principle 
of separability which recognizes the independence of arbitration clauses from other parts of 
contracts is also confirmed by Article 19 of the Arbitration Law, which specifies that the 
arbitration agreement exists independently and the amendment, recession, termination or 
invalidity of the contract does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. The SPC 
further clarifies that even when the contract is not yet effective or concluded, the arbitration 
agreement which has been reached in the contracting period is still valid.410 
However, another important principle with regard to arbitral jurisdiction, namely the 
principle of competence-competence, is not fully recognized in Chinese Law. The principle 
of competence-competence requires that the arbitration tribunal should have the power to 
decide whether it has the jurisdiction over the dispute concerned and whether the objection 
to the validity of the arbitration agreement is valid. 411  However, instead of directly 
empowering the arbitration tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, Article 20 of the 
Arbitration Law grants the power to arbitration commissions and courts, which provides 
that the parties should request arbitration commissions or courts to decide the validity of 
arbitration agreements.  
                                                 
409 But, there is an exception that the court may exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute even when there 
is a valid arbitration agreement. Specifically, if a party brings a law suit to the court and the other party 
does not raise jurisdiction objection before the first hearing, this implied consent should be deemed as the 
renouncement of the arbitration agreement, and the court should continue the civil proceedings. Arbitration 
Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Article 26. 
410 The transfer of the contract also does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Interpretation 
of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2006), Articles 9 and 10. Similarly, CIETAC further emphasizes that the 
amendment, recession, termination, transfer, expiration, invalidity, effectiveness, cancellation and 
consolidation (or not) of the contract does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 5 (4). 
411 This rule is clearly stated in Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law for International Commercial 
Arbitration. For more discussion on the principle of competence-competence, see the previous Section 2.3.1. 
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Moreover, courts also have a conditional priority over arbitration commissions. 
Specifically, if one party submits the request to the arbitration commission and the other 
party submits the request to the court, the court will have the priority over the arbitration 
commission to rule on this issue. But, if the arbitration commission has already made a 
decision on the vDOLGLW\RIWKHDUELWUDWLRQDJUHHPHQWWKHFRXUWVKRXOGQRWDFFHSWWKHSDUW\¶V
UHTXHVWDJDLQ,QRWKHUZRUGV WKHFRXUW¶VSULRULW\RYHU the arbitration commission exists 
when two requests are simultaneously submitted by the parties. Meanwhile, the objection 
to the validity of the arbitration agreement, be it submitted to the court or the arbitration 
commission, should be raised before the first hearing. Failing to do so will be deemed as an 
implied consent on the validity of the arbitration agreement, and the court then should not 
accept the request any more.412 
Such legal design weakens the position of the arbitration tribunal, which, to some 
extent, place the arbitration tribunal under the shadow of the arbitration commission and the 
court in terms of the decision-making power on arbitral jurisdiction. Whenever an objection 
to the validity of the arbitration agreement is raised, the arbitration tribunal needs to wait 
for the decision of the arbitration commission or the court before resuming the proceedings, 
which may lead to unnecessary delay.413 More importantly, under such legal design, the 
important issue of arbitral jurisdiction is not directly decided by the arbitration tribunals 
entrusted by the parties, but by the arbitration commissions and the courts which are 
generally less competent than the arbitration tribunals to rule on this issue. Their decisions, 
LIHUURQHRXVZLOOGHQ\ WKHSDUWLHV¶DFFHVV WRDUELWUDWLRQSURFHHGLQJV%HVLGHV WKHFRXUWV
even have precedence over the arbitration commissions when there are two simultaneous 
objections raised to both courts and arbitration institutions, which enables the courts to more 
easily exert their influence over arbitration cases.414 
Efforts have been made by the SPC and CIETAC to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
partial recognition of the competence-competence principle. CIETAC adopts an eclectic 
approach to avoid direct opposition to Chinese law on the one hand and to be as consistent 
as possible with international standards on the other hand. Specifically, CIETAC reiterates 
that the power to decide arbitral jurisdiction principally belongs to the arbitration 
commission. But, this power can be delegated to the arbitration tribunal by the arbitration 
commission when necessary. Meanwhile, to avoid unnecessary delay and to be in 
accordance with Article 16 of the UNITRAL Model Law, CIETAC also emphasizes that 
                                                 
412 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (2006), Article 13. 
413 Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 102. 
414 Manjiao Chi, 'Is the Chinese Arbitration Act Truly Arbitration-Friendly: Determining the Validity of 
Arbitration Agreement under Chinese Law', 4 (2008) Asian International Arbitration Journal, pp. 117-119. 
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the objection to the arbitral jurisdiction or to the validity of the arbitration agreement does 
not affect the continuation of arbitration proceedings, and the decision of the arbitration 
tribunal on the objection can be either rendered in a separate decision or incorporated in the 
arbitration award.415 However, CIETAC is silent on the details with regard to when and how 
can this power be delegated to the arbitration tribunal by the arbitration commission.416  
6LPLODUO\WKH63&LQWURGXFHGWKHSULRUUHSRUWLQJPHFKDQLVPXQGHUZKLFKORFDOFRXUWV¶
decisions denying the validity of arbitration agreements must be reported level-by-level to 
the SPC for final approval, which can reduce erroneous decisions made by courts and help 
to enhance the arbitral accessibility in foreign-related arbitration cases.417  
+RZHYHULWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWDOWKRXJKWKH63&DQG&,(7$&µVVSHFLDOUXOHVPD\
help to enhance arbitral accessibility in the practice of foreign-related commercial 
arbitration, the obstacles to the full recognition of the principle of competence-competence 
is still not removed from the law. Overall, foreign-related commercial disputants still need 
to consider the possibility that their access to arbitration may be denied by the courts or the 
arbitration commissions, since the power to decide the validity of arbitration agreements 
and to rule the arbitral jurisdiction ultimately lies in the hands of courts and arbitration 
commissions instead of with the arbitration tribunals.418  
6.3 Competence of Adjudicators 
6.3.1 Professional Quality of Judges and Arbitrators 
The professional quality of judges and arbitrators plays a key role in the performance 
of courts and arbitration institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, judges need to have 
sufficient legal knowledge and adjudicative experience to correctly ascertain the facts and 
apply the laws, while arbitrators are expected to be both experts in law and specialists in 
commercial disputes. As shown in this section, due to the developments in the field of legal 
education, Chinese judges are generally more educated than before. But, the emerging 
                                                 
415 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Articles 6 
(1), (3) and (5). 
416 Intentional or not, CIETAC, as commented by some writers, seems to be reluctant to go further on this 
issue, as further steps may lead to the risk of challenging the legislative authority 
Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 104. 
417 For details of the prior reporting mechanism, see previous Section 5.4.1. 
418 Yang Fan, 'Applicable Laws to Arbitration Agreements under Current Arbitration Law and Practice in 
Mainland China', 63 (2016) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 753-754; Clarisse Von 
Wunschheim and Kun Fan, 'Arbitrating in China: The Rules of the Game - Practical Recommendations 
Concerning Arbitration in China', 26 (2008) ASA Bulletin, p. 37; Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 101-
104. 
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problem of outflow of judges from the judicial system seems to be affecting the overall 
professional quality of Chinese judges. In arbitration, facing the pressure of competition at 
both domestic and international level, Chinese arbitration institutions have hastened their 
steps to enhance the professionalization of arbitrators. However, the relatively small 
proportion of foreign arbitrators still seems to be the bottleneck for the further 
internationalization of Chinese arbitration institutions. 
(1) Education Level of Judges 
The education level of Chinese judges is a thorny problem in China.419 In the initial 
years after the 1978 reform, due to the lack of legal professionals and the unattractiveness 
of court positions, the courts faced difficulties in recruiting judges with a sound legal 
education background.420 Many judges at that time were actually transferred from Party and 
military posts. This defective practice inevitably raised criticism and concerns on the 
professionalization of Chinese judges.421 To improve judges¶OHJDOHGXFDWLRQOHYHO, the 1995 
Judges Law and its subsequent 2001 amendment set up the minimum standards on the 
professional quality of judges. Apart from the basic requirements in nationality, age, health, 
political quality and moral level, the Judges Law requires candidate judges to at least have 
%DFKHORU GHJUHHV DQG WZR \HDUV¶ZRUking experience in the legal field (three years for 
judges in HPCs and the SPC), RUWRKDYHD0DVWHURU'RFWRUGHJUHHDQGRQH\HDU¶VZRUNLQJ
experience in the legal field (two years for judges in HPCs and the SPC).422 
In 2001, the National Judicial Examination was introduced into the Judges Law, which 
requires that the candidates who are to be appointed as judges for the first time must pass 
the National Judicial Examination. This new requirement ensures that newly recruited 
                                                 
419  For literature on the education level of Chinese judges, see Jingwen Zhu, 'Data Analysis of 
Professionalization of Legal Workers in China', 9 (2014) Frontiers of Law in China, pp. 277-293; Haicong 
Zuo, 'Legal Education in China: Present and Future', 34 (2009) Oklahoma City University Law Review, pp. 
51-58; Pamela N. Phan, 'Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a Mission 
of Social Justice', 8 (2005) Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, pp.117-152; Weidong Ji, 
'Legal Education in China: A Great Leap Forward of Professionalism', 39 (2005) Kobe University Law 
Review, pp. 1-21; Xianyi Zeng, 'Legal Education in China', 43 (2002) South Texas Law Review, pp. 707-
716. 
420 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 68. 
421 See e.g. Stanley B. Lubman (1997), supra note 166, p. 311; Jerome A. Cohen (1997), supra note 227, 
pp. 795-796; Donald C. Clarke (1991), supra note 6, pp. 257-259. 
422 Preferably, the degrees should be in law. However, considering the limited number of law schools at 
that time, the criteria were lessened to include non-law degrees. But, candidate judges with non-law degrees 
must have the required legal knowledge. Besides, candidates who have been subject to criminal punishment 
for committing a crime or discharged from public employment cannot be judges. Judges Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2001) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⌅ᇈ⌅), promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
National People's Congress on 28 Feburary 1995 and revised on 30 June 2001, Articles 9 and 10. 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
 
136 
judges can at least have the necessary legal knowledge in adjudication. Moreover, there has 
been a significant increase in the number of law schools in recent years, and legal 
undergraduates have become an important source of potential judges.423 In practice, young 
talents who want to become judges need to first pass the National Judicial Examination. 
They will then be selected based on their performance in the National Civil Servant 
Examination and the specialized oral and written tests in courts. After first round selection, 
recruited legal undergraduates will be assigned to supplement posts (e.g., court clerks) to 
gain experience and then be appointed as assistant judges after a period of probation and 
training. Newly appointed assistant judges need to face further practice, training and 
competition to obtain level by level promotion and become formal judges, superior judges 
and court officials.  
The introduction of the compulsory professional quality requirements in law and the 
establishment of the new mechanism for recruiting legal undergraduates had significantly 
raised the overall education level of Chinese judges. Although there are no systematic 
SXEOLVKHG VWDWLVWLFV VRPH QXPEHUV FRXOG VWLOO GHPRQVWUDWH WKH LPSURYHPHQWV LQ MXGJHV¶
education level. It is reported that the proportion of judges holding university degrees had 
ULVHQ IURP¶V WR¶V424 In 2011, the SPC issued an outline for the 
professionalization of court staff and judges, in which the SPC set up the target that the 
proportion of court staff and judges holding bachelor or higher degrees should reach 80% 
in 2015 and 85% in 2020.425  
However, legal education and training is a relatively lengthy and resource-consuming 
process, which is difficult to be substantially improved within a short time. Whether law 
schools in fast expansion can really cultivate high quality legal undergraduates is questioned 
by some scholars.426 0RUHRYHUFRQVWUDLQHGE\&KLQD¶VXQEDODQFHGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
the development of many courts in economically-underdeveloped inland areas is still 
plagued by the shortage of qualified legal professionals, as high quality talents prefer to stay 
in economically-developed coastal areas which can provide them with better treatment and 
career prospects.427 Consequently, although the overall education level of Chinese judges 
                                                 
423 According to Zuo, the number of law schools in China has increased from about 100 in the early years 
of 1990s to over 600 in 2007. Haicong Zuo (2009), supra note 419, p. 57. 
424 Jingwen Zhu (2014), supra note 419, p. 280. 
425 Outline for the Construction of Talent Groups in People's Courts 2010-2020 (2011) (ޘഭ⌅䲒Ӫ᡽䱏
Խᔪ䇮㿴ࡂ㓢㾱 2010²2020), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 22 June 2011. By now, there is 
no official statement clarifying whether the goal set in this documents has been reached. 
426 See e.g. Weifang He, 'China's Legal Profession: The Nascence and Growing Pains of a Professionalized 
Legal Class', 19 (2005) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, pp. 148-149. 
427 Jingwen Zhu (2014), supra note 419, pp. 287-288. 
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has experienced an increase since the promulgation of the Judges Law in 1995, the regional 
GLVSDULW\VHHPVWRSRVHDQHZFKDOOHQJHWR&KLQD¶VMXGLFLDU\428  
In comparison with domestic cases, foreign-related commercial cases which may 
involve international issues and foreign laws can be more complicated and thus need more 
professional and specialized judges to handle them. Recognizing the regional imbalance in 
the legal profession and the urgent needs for high quality judges in foreign-related 
commercial cases, the SPC introduced the centralized jurisdiction and allocated most first 
instance foreign-related commercial cases to more competent courts in economically-
developed coastal areas. These courts are normally equipped with well-educated judges. 
For example, according to the work report of the Shanghai HPC in 2008, 93% of judges in 
Shanghai held university or higher level degrees, and 17.1% judges held Master or higher 
degrees.429 In more recently published statistics, judges in Beijing who held university or 
higher level degrees amounted to 99.7% and 54.1% of Beijing judges held Master or higher 
level degrees.430  
The general strategy that foreign-related commercial cases should be handled by more 
professional judges can also be reflected by the establishment of pilot courts (䈅⛩⌅䲒) in 
economically-GHYHORSHGDUHDV$VDQµH[DPSOHFRXUWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHIRUP¶㔬ਸᙗ᭩
䶙⽪㤳⌅䲒), the Shenzhen Qianhai Court (␡ൣࡽ⎧⌅䲒) was established in 2015 as a 
pilot court to test the reform measures introduced in the SP&¶V)RXUWK)LYH-Year Outline 
IRU5HIRUPLQJ3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV431 Meanwhile, it should be noted that the Shenzhen Qianhai 
Court was also designated by the Guangdong HPC to handle all the first instance foreign-
related commercial cases that should be handled by BPCs in Shenzhen.432  From this 
perspective, the Shenzhen Qianhai Court, to some extent, is also a pilot court under 
                                                 
428 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 69. 
429 Work Report of the Shanghai High People's Court (2008) (к⎧儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ੺ 2008), issued 
by the Shanghai High People's Court on 26 January 2008. 
430 Bin Wang and Xiaolei Pu, '⹄ウ⭏ԕкᆖশ⌅ᇈ㛼ᲟेӜት俆ս (The Proportion of Judges Holding 
Master or Higher Level Degrees in Courts: Beijing Heads the List)', in ⌅ࡦᰕᣕ (Legal Daily), 29 
September 2012. Available at 
http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20120929/Articel05011GN.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
431 Reply of the Supreme People's Court on the Approval on the Establishment of the Shenzhen Qianhai 
Cooperation Zone People's Court (2014) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ਼᜿䇮・␡ൣࡽ⎧ਸ֌४Ӫ≁⌅䲒Ⲵᢩ
༽), ⌅ [204] 303ਧ (Fa [2014] No.303), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 2 December 2014. 
432 Reply of the Guangdong High People's Court on Designating the Shenzhen Qianhai Cooperation Zone 
People's Court to Exercise Centralized Jurisdiction over First Instance Foreign-Related and Hong 
Kong/Macao/Taiwan-Related Commercial Cases within the Administrative Region of the Shenzhen City 
(2015) (ᒯьⴱ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᤷᇊ␡ൣࡽ⎧ਸ֌४Ӫ≁⌅䲒䳶ѝ㇑䗆␡ൣᐲ䗆४аᇑ⎹ཆǃ⎹
⑟◣ਠ୶һṸԦⲴᢩ༽), issued by Guangdong High People's Court on 14 January 2015. 
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centralized jurisdiction, which is designed to be a specialized court to handle foreign-related 
commercial cases in a city-scale area. It is reported that 60% of cases in the Shenzhen 
Qianhai Court are foreign-related civil and commercial cases. 433  To ensure the 
professionalism, judges in the Shenzhen Qianhai Court are carefully selected from other 
Shenzhen courts. All its 15 presiding judges have a civil and commercial law education 
background and practical experience in adjudicating foreign-related commercial cases, and 
13 of them hold Master or higher level degrees.434  
(2) Increasing Caseload and the Emerging Problem of the Outflow of Judges 
Another issue which may affect the performance of judges in litigation is the caseload. 
Unlike the education level which directly determines the professional quality of judges, the 
caseload as an external factor decides how much time and energy a judge can spend on 
individual cases and thus indirectly affects the actual quality of litigation in practice. 
As shown in Figure 10, the caseload of Chinese judges has experienced a rapid 
increase in the past few years. The enhanced accessibility brought by the changes in the 
case-filing phase further increases the caseload of courts.435 Moreover, as shown in Figure 
11, while the number of cases has steadily risen, the number of judges has basically stayed 
the same and even experienced a slight drop in 2013. Moreover, compared to inland districts, 
MXGJHV¶FDVHORDGVDUHHYHQKHDYLHULQHFRQRPLFDOO\-developed coastal areas. For example, 
the average number of cases handled annually by Shanghai judges in 2013 was 131, which 
was well above the average number (67.66) at the national level.436 Other courts in coastal 
areas also witnessed heavy caseload, and the top three in 2014 were Zhejiang (160.42), 
Shanghai (158) and Beijing (138.26).437 
                                                 
433 '␡ൣࡽ⎧⌅䲒↓ᔿᤲ⡼ 15 ਽ѫᇑ⌅ᇈᆖশቲ⅑儈 (The Shenzhen Qianhai Court is Officially 
Launched: All the 15 Presiding Judges Have High Education Degrees)', in 㖺෾ᲊᣕ (Yangcheng Evening 
News), 28 January 2015. Available at http://news.ycwb.com/2015-01/28/content_8770749.htm. Last 
visited in June 2016. 
434 Ibid. 
435 For the surge in the caseload of courts after the legal reform in the case-filing period, see the previous 
Section 6.2.1. 
436 Work Report of Shanghai High People's Court (2014) (к⎧儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ੺ 2014), issued by 
the Shanghai High People's Court on 21 January 2014. 
437 Xi Yu, '৫ᒤ⋚ṸԦᙫᮠ໎ 13.2% ॱᒤᴰ儈 Ӫ൷࣎Ṹ 158Ԧ (The Number of Cases Handled by 
Courts in Shanghai Increased 13.2% in Last Year, Highest in the Last 10 Years: The Average Number of 
Cases Handled Each Judge Reached 158)', in ѝഭᰕᣕ (China Daily), 13 March 2015. Available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/sh/2015-03/13/content_19801755.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
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Figure 10: Average number of cases handled by each judge annually (2007-2013)438 
 
Figure 11: NuPEHURIMXGJHVLQSHRSOHV¶FRXUWVDQGQXPEHURIFDVHVKDQGOHGE\WKH
courts annually (2007-2013) 439 
 
                                                 
438 7KHQXPEHULVFDOFXODWHGEDVHGRQWKHGDWDREWDLQHGIURP$QQXDO3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV:RUN5HSorts. The 
reports are downloaded from the data base set up by the Peking University (www.pkulaw.cn). However, 
the caseload information for each judge was not systematically provided in the reports for years 2014 and 
2015. 
439 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the outflow of judges from courts even worsens the situation. In the past 
five years, more than 500 judges left the courts in Beijing. Similarly, from 2008 to 2013, an 
average of 67 judges left the courts in Shanghai each year. In 2014, the number even 
amounted to 104.440 In Guangdong, more than 1600 judges had left their court positions 
from 2008 to 2012.441 The increasing caseload and the outflow of judges have already been 
officially listed by the SPC as the two main obstacles in the judicial work.442 
Several reasons may explain the ongoing outflow of judges from courts. First, as the 
treatment of judges is relatively uncompetitive, the courts find it more difficult to retain 
young talents than recruiting them. It has become common in recent years that young talents 
first work in courts for a few years to accumulate practical experience and establish their 
network in the legal circle and then move on to other high-income legal positions in law 
firms, arbitration institutions and enterprises.443 Second, since young judges who are not 
DGDSWLYHWRWKHFRXUWV¶EXUHDXFUDWLFDWPRVSKHUHPD\ILQGGLIILFXOWLHV LQFOLPELQJWRKLJK
positions, their career prospects are more or less blighted.444 Third, the public also has a 
JHQHUDO GLVWUXVW LQ &KLQHVH FRXUWV ZKLFK UHGXFHV WKH SXEOLF¶V UHVSHFW IRU MXGJHV 7KH
increasing number of judicial corruption scandals also damages the reputation of judges and 
lowers their social status.445 Last, the increasing caseload naturally results in extra working 
time and pressure for judges. This may push judges to resign from courts and further 
increase the caseload of rest judges in courts.446 
To tackle the emerging problem of increasing caseload and outflow of judges, a quota 
system for judges (ઈ仍ࡦ) was introduced in 2015 which is now being tested in Shanghai 
                                                 
440 Jiahui Han, 'ेӜ⌅䲒 5ᒤ 500։Ӫ䗎㙼 ঻࣋བྷᖵ䙷վ㌫ѫഐ (Over 500 Judges Have Resigned 
from Courts in Beijing in the Past 5 Years: High Pressure and Low Treatment Are the Main Reasons)', in 
ᯠ ॾ 㖁  (Xinhuanet), 26 May 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
05/26/c_127841430.htm. Last visited in June 2016.  
441 Zhen Han and Yizhu Mao, 'ᒯь 08ᒤ㠣 12ᒤ䈳⿫ᡆ䗎㙼⌅ᇈӪᮠ䎵 1600Ӫ (From 2008 to 2012, 
More than 1600 Judges in the Guangdong Province Have Resigned or Been Transferred)', in ࠔࠠ㖁 
(ifeng.com), 9 May 2014. Available at http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140509/40223988_0.shtml. Last visited 
in June 2016. 
442 See Supreme People's Court Work Report 2015 (2015) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ੺ 2015), issued by the 
Supreme People's Court on 12 March 2015. See also Shanghai High People's Court Work Report 2014 
(2014) (к⎧ᐲ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᐕ֌ᣕ੺ 2014), issued by the Shanghai High People's Court on 21 January 
2014. 
443 Bin Huang, 'ᖃࡽᡁഭ⌅ᇈ⍱ཡ⧠䊑࠶᷀оሩㆆᔪ䇞 (An Analysis on the Contemporary Outflow of 
Judges in China's Courts and Several Suggestions)', 3 (2014) ѝഭᇑࡔ (China Trial), p. 71. 
444 This issue is discussed in a more detailed manner in the following Section 6.3.2. 
445 This issue is discussed in a more detailed manner in the following Section 6.3.3. 
446 Bin Huang (2014), supra note 443, pp. 70-72.  
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and other pilot zones.447 Learning from the experience of western countries, the quota 
system approaches the issue of caseload through refinement of the internal personnel 
management instead of simply increasing the number of judges. Specifically, the number 
of judges who are in charge of frontline adjudication will be reduced, whereas the number 
of various kinds of court staff on supplementary and administrative posts will be largely 
increased. Meanwhile, the workload is re-split among court staff at supplement and 
administration posts and judges at adjudication posts. Since the administrative and 
supplementary work is undertaken by corresponding court staff, judges can concentrate on 
the adjudicative work, and their actual workload can be substantially reduced under the 
quota system. Besides, to retain high quality talents in courts, the basic salary for judges is 
also planned to be increased by 40%.448 
However, there is criticism that the quota system reform is not well-supported by other 
DFFRPSDQ\LQJUHIRUPVLQMXGJHV¶WUHDWPHQWSURPRtion and protection. The reform in these 
fields seems to be lagging behind, which affects the implementation of the quota system in 
practice.449 Doubts are also raised by scholars on the transparency of reform. For example, 
from the initial announcement of the quota system to the publication of detailed reform 
plans, most frontline judges received little information on how judges are selected under the 
new quota system. As the main subjects of the quota system, judges also had no effective 
channels to voice their opinions on the reform.450 As a new reform measure which is now 
still being tested, there seems to still be room and necessity for the quota system to improve 
itself in the coming years.451 
To sum up, foreign-related commercial cases are mainly handled by judges in 
economically-developed coastal areas. The majority of these judges have received 
systematic leJDO HGXFDWLRQ DQG DUH SUREDEO\ WKH EHVW SHUVRQQHO UHVRXUFHV WKDW &KLQD¶V
                                                 
447 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People's Courts: 
Fourth Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2014-2018 (2015), Measure 49. 
448 Yejie Wang and Kai zhou, 'к⎧ਨ᭩Ѫ⮉տ䶂ᒤ⌅ᇈᔰࠪ³㦟ᯩ´6KDQJKDL-XGLFLDO5HIRUP0DNHV
'Prescription' for Retaining Young Judges)', in ѝഭ䶂ᒤᣕ (China Youth Daily), 20 April 2015. Available 
at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-04/20/nw.D110000zgqnb_20150420 
_5-01.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
449 Zhaoran Huang, '⌅ᇈઈ仍ࡦⲴ䘁ߥ࠶᷀ (An Analysis on the Recent Development of the Quota 
System for Judges)', 9 (2015) ⌅ࡦо⽮Պ (Legality and Society), pp. 111-112. 
450 Bin Liu, 'Ӿ⌅ᇈ³⿫㙼´⧠䊑ⴻ⌅ᇈઈ仍ࡦ᭩䶙Ⲵࡦᓖ䙫䗁 (A Analysis on the Institutional Logic in 
Reform of the Quota System for Judges from the Perspective of the Phenomenon of "Outflow" of Judges)', 
10 (2015) ⌅ᆖ (Law Science), p. 52. 
451 Zhiqiao Zhao, '⌅ᇈઈ仍ࡦ⨶䇪оᇎ䐥ᙍ㘳 (A Thought on the Theory and Practice of the Quota 
System for Judges)', 2 (2015) ⌅⋫о⽮Պ (Legality and Society), pp. 248-249. 
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current judicial system can offer. However, at the same time, they are also probably the 
busiest judges. Under the pressure of the increasing caseload, it is difficult for them to 
guarantee that sufficient time and energy can be invested in each case.  
Moreover, these judges are also facing difficult choices. The economic development 
of coastal areas provides them with more choices to design their career routes within the 
legal circle. Other legal positions such as attorneys, arbitrators, legal consultants tend to be 
more attractive than judges with regard to treatment and career prospects. In this context, 
the problem of the outflow of judges emerges and poses a new challenge to the courts. The 
new quota system has been introduced to respond to the changing practice. But, whether 
this new reform measure can substantially enhance the professional quality of judges and 
solve the problems of heavy caseload and outflow of judges is yet to be seen. 
(3) Chinese and Foreign Arbitrators in Chinese Arbitration Institutions 
Article 13 of the Arbitration Law sets up relatively strict requirements for the 
professional quality of Chinese arbitrators, in order to ensure that they have the necessary 
expertise for handling arbitration cases. Qualified arbitrators need to either have at least 
eigKW\HDUV¶ZRUNLQJH[SHULHQFHas attorneys/judges/practitioners in arbitration work or hold 
senior titles (or an equal level of profession) in the fields of legal research/legal 
education/economy and trade. It can be found that particular emphasis is laid in law on the 
legal experience of Chinese arbitrators, which requires them to be at least experienced 
SUDFWLWLRQHUVRUVFKRODUVZLWK\HDUV¶SUDFWLFHLQWKHOHJDOFircle.  
CIETAC is also quite rigid in the recruitment of Chinese arbitrators. According to 
&,(7$&¶VUHFUXLWPHQWDQQRXQFHPHQWIRU&KLQHVHDUELWUDWRUVwhich was published in 2014, 
qualified Chinese arbitrators need to not only reach the Master level in education or hold a 
senior professional title, but also take senior positions in their working fields, including 
(associate) professors in universities, partners in law firms, managers in legal departments 
of corporations or former judges in IPCs or higher level courts.452 Chinese arbitrators in 
CIETAC also need to at least master one other language apart from Chinese. 453  In 
international arbitration institutions which frequently handle foreign-related commercial 
cases, this language requirement seems to be indispensable. 
                                                 
452 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission's Announcement on the Recruitment 
of Arbitrators (2014) (ѝഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊޣҾޜᔰ䘹㚈Ԣ㻱ઈⲴޜ੺), issued by the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission on 10 January 2014. 
453  Provisions for the Recruitment of Arbitrators (2005) (Ԣ㻱ઈ㚈ԫ㿴ᇊ ), issued by the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission on 1 March 2005. 
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Other leading Chinese local arbitration institutions also adopt a similar attitude 
towards the recruitment of Chinese arbitrators. For example, BAC requires its arbitrators 
with Chinese nationality to be (associate) professors in civil and commercial law with 
Doctor degrees, attorneys practising in the field of litigation or arbitration with Master or 
higher level degrees, former judges taking positions of court officials with Bachelor or 
higher level degrees or economic and trade workers with senior titles and Master or higher 
level degrees.454 
With regard to foreign arbitrators, driven by the increasing demands of foreign 
expertise from foreign-related commercial disputants, both CIETAC and local arbitration 
institutions have paid special attention to the internationalization of their arbitrator pools.455 
For example, CIETAC has constantly enlarged its pool of foreign arbitrators, which has 
JURZQIURP¶VWR¶V456 By now, 27.2% of listed arbitrators in CIETAC are 
from jurisdictions outside mainland China. Similarly, a considerable proportion of foreign 
arbitrators can also be found in renowned ORFDODUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ%$&¶V
6+,$&¶VDQG6&,$¶V457  
However, it is interesting to notice that although the number of foreign arbitrators in 
&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWRUOLVWKDVH[SHULHQFHGDUHPDUNDEOHLQFUHDVHLWVSURSRUWLRQKDVDFWXDOO\
not changed much from 1994 to 2015 (Table 5). Moreover, by studying the distribution of 
IRUHLJQDUELWUDWRUV¶QDWLRQDOLWLHVLQ&,(7$&¶VDUELWrator list, it can be found that the number 
of foreign arbitrators from several European countries and Asian countries is actually still 
rather small (Table 6).  
7DEOH3URSRUWLRQRIIRUHLJQDUELWUDWRUVLQ&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWRUOLVW458 
                                                 
454 Management Methods for the Recruitment of Arbitrators (2012) (Ԣ㻱ઈ㚈⭘㇑⨶࣎⌅), issued by the 
Beijing Arbitration Commission on 4 September 2012. 
455 µ)RUHLJQ DUELWUDWRUV¶ KHUH UHIHU WR DUELWUDWRUV FRPLQJ IURP IRUHLJn jurisdictions other than mainland 
China, including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and other foreign jurisdictions. 
456 For the number of foreign arbitrators in CIETAC in 1989 and 1994, see Michael J. Moser (1994), supra 
note 312, p. 9. The current number of foreign arbitrators in CIETAC is calculated based on the arbitrator 
list provided by CIETAC, available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?g=User&m=Arbitrator&a=index. Last visited in June 2016. 
457 The number is calculated based on the data on official websites of BAC, SHIAC and SCIA. Available 
at BAC (Beijing): http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/introduce_index.html; SHAIC (Shanghai): 
http://www.shiac.org/SHIAC/aboutus.aspx?page=4; SZIC (Shenzhen): 
http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_guide/26.html. Last visited in June 2016. 
458 The statistics on the number of arbitrators are not systematically stated in the annual work reports of 
&,(7$&$YDLODEOHGDWDIURP&,(7$&¶VDQQXDOZRUNUHSRUWVDUHUHSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOH7KHUHSRUWV
are downloaded from the official website of CIETAC: 
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=index&id=23. Last visited in June 2016. 
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Year 
Number of foreign arbitrators/ 
total number of arbitrators 
Proportion of foreign arbitrators in 
&,(7$¶VDUELWUDWRUOLVW 
1994 80/296 27.0% 
2001 174/518 33.5% 
2008 276/970 28.4% 
2015 330/1214 27.2% 
 
Table 6: Proportion of arbitrators with different nationalities in C,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWRU
list459  
Area Nationality Number Proportion 
China 
Mainland China 884 72.8% 
Hong Kong China 51 4.2% 
Taiwan China 18 1.4% 
Macao China 4 0.3% 
North America 
United States 46 3.7% 
Canada 15 1.2% 
Europe 
United Kingdom 48 3.9% 
Germany 16 1.3% 
Sweden 10 0.8% 
Switzerland 9 0.7% 
France 7 0.6% 
Spain 6 0.5% 
Austria 6 0.5% 
Netherlands 5 0.4% 
Italy 4 0.3% 
Belgium 3 0.2% 
Asia 
Singapore 19 1.6% 
Korea 9 0.7% 
Japan 6 0.5% 
                                                 
459 Countries with less than three arbitrators are not listed in the table. The number is calculated based on 
&,(7$&¶VOLVWRIDUELWUDWRUVDYDLODEOHDW
http://www.cietac.org/module/cms/arbitrators/listArbitratorsInfoForCN.do, last visited in June 2016.  
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Iran 3 0.2% 
Oceania 
Australia 19 1.6% 
New Zealand 3 0.2% 
South America Brazil 3 0.2% 
Africa Egypt 3 0.2% 
Other 17 1.4% 
Total 1214 
 
Some observers notice that one important reason for the standstill in the proportion of 
foreign arbitrators in CIETAC is that the remuneration provided by CIETAC is not that 
attractive to foreign arbitrators, especially those renowned ones in the circle of international 
commercial arbitration. 460  Unlike other leading international arbitration institutions, 
CIETAC adopts a one-off arbitration fee collection approach, which does not separate the 
IHHV IRU DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DQG WKH IHHV IRU DUELWUDWRUV$FFRUGLQJO\
foreign arbitrators generally gain less remuneration from CIETAC than from other leading 
international arbitration institutions. Therefore, it is understandable that foreign arbitrators 
are not keen to be listed arbitrators in CIETAC. 
To sum up, CIETAC and other major arbitration institutions in China have achieved 
considerable improvements in enhancing the professional quality of arbitrators. However, 
DVUHSUHVHQWHGE\&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWRUOLVWWKHODFNRIforeign expertise still seems to be the 
bottleneck for the further enhancement of foreign expertise in Chinese arbitration institution. 
With the development of foreign investment and trade in China, the increasing demands of 
foreign businessmen for foreign arbitrators from different countries can be expected. To 
respond to these needs, as well as maintaining the competitive edge in the circle of 
international commercial arbitration, CIETAC and other Chinese arbitration institutions 
seem to have no choice but to hasten their steps towards modernization and 
internationalization. To a large extent, they are required to not only set up strict 
requirements for the recruitment of Chinese arbitrators, but also pay more attention to 
finding a way to attract more high quality foreign arbitrators. 
6.3.2 Judicial Independence: Advancing under the Shadow of Bureaucracy 
-XGLFLDO LQGHSHQGHQFH SOD\V D NH\ UROH LQ WKHPDLQWHQDQFH RI MXGJHV¶ LPSDUWLDOLW\
which HQVXUHV WKDW MXGJHVFDQDFWDV WKHµQHXWUDO WKLUG¶ WR LQGHSHQGHQWO\DQG LPSDUWLDOO\
decide cases and enables them to restrict the power of the government. To realize judicial 
independence, a fundamental requirement is that judges should be able to make decisions 
                                                 
460 Lijun Cao (2008), supra note 358, p. 4; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 38; Jingzhou Tao (2012), 
supra note 12, p. 134.  
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by themselves without any undue interference, be it internally from the judicial system or 
externally from extra-judicial bodies.461 In China, judicial independence is a complicated 
and controversial issue, which has been heatedly debated by scholars for years.462 As 
discussed in this section, Chinese judges may be subject to interference from multiple 
VRXUFHV,QWHUQDOO\WKHµLQVWUXFWLRQ¶SUDFWLFHEHWZHHQMXGJHVDQGDGMXGLFDWLRQFRPPLWWHHV
(ᇑࡔငઈՊ), higher and lower level courts may affect the independence of judges in 
decision-making. Externally, judges and courts may EHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKH3DUW\SHRSOH¶V
FRQJUHVVHVJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQVSHRSOH¶VSURFXUDWRUDWHVWKHPHGLDDQGWKHSXEOLF 
(1) Interference from Adjudication Committees 
A special characteristic of Chinese courts is the adjudication committee mechanism. 
From the SPC to BPCs, there is an adjudication committee in each court without exception, 
which is composed of the court president, vice president(s), division chiefs and several 
senior judges. As the highest adjudicative organs in the courts, the main function of the 
DGMXGLFDWLRQFRPPLWWHHVLVWRGLVFXVVµVLJQLILFDQWFRPSOLFDWHGDQGGLIILFXOW¶FDVHV(䟽བྷǃ
༽ᵲǃ⯁䳮), while in the meantime it also supervises, administers and instructs the trial 
work of courts.463 
The adjudication committees play a particular role in the decision-making process. 
After the trial phase, if the case concerned can be regarded as significant, complicated and 
difficult,464 the collegial panel can apply to corresponding court officials for submitting the 
                                                 
461 The theoretical discussion on the issue of judicial independence is provided in the previous Section 
2.5.2. 
462 For discussion on the topic of judicial independence in China, see Randall Peerenboom, Judicial 
Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp. 21-27, 32-36 and 39-64. See also Li Li, Judicial Discretion within Adjudicative Committee Proceedings 
in China (Springer, 2014), pp. 145-164; Nicolas C. Howson, 'Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's 
Courts, 1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State', 5 (2010) East Asia Law 
Review, pp. 327-409. 
463 Specifically, the main functions of adjudication committees are: (1) discussing difficult, complicated 
and significant cases; (2) summarizing adjudicative work experieQFH¶UHYLHZLQJWKHZRUNUHSRUWVRI
adjudicative divisions; (4) discussing example cases that have the referential meaning; (5) discussing other 
important issues in trial work. Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Printing and Distributing the 
'Implementation Opinions on Reforming and Improving the Adjudication Committee Mechanism in 
People's Courts' (2010) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾঠਁǉޣҾ᭩䶙઼ᆼழӪ≁⌅䲒ᇑࡔငઈՊࡦᓖⲴᇎᯭ
᜿㿱ǊⲴ䙊⸕), ⌅ਁ[2010]3ਧ (Fa Fa [2010] No.3), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 11 January 
2010, Articles 2-6. 
464 6SHFLILFDOO\WKHIROORZLQJFDVHVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµVLJQLILFDQWFRPSOLFDWHGDQGGLIILFXOW¶WKHUH
are major disagreements within the collegial panel which render it difficult to make a decision; (2) The 
legal provisions are not clear and definite, and there are difficulties in law application; (3) The result of the 
case may cause significant social effects; (4) The case is a new type case which has instructing effects for 
future trial work; (5) Other difficult, complicated and significant cases that are necessary to be discussed 
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case to the adjudication committee for discussion. Particularly, even if the collegial panel 
does not submit the case to the adjudication committee, the court president, responsible vice 
president or the division chief can also do so on their own initiative, as long as they find it 
necessary. The case will then be discussed in the adjudication committee meeting based on 
the written materials prepared by the collegial panel. The decision will then be made based 
on the majority opinions of the adjudication committee, and the decision of the adjudication 
committee must be followed by the collegial panel.465 
As a consequence, whenever a case is decided to be submitted to the adjudication 
committee, regardless of the submission is initiated by the collegial panel itself or by the 
court officials that are in charge, the decision upon the case will actually be made by the 
adjudication committee which considers the case based only on written materials instead of 
the collegial panel which conducts the trial in person. This kind of legal design provides 
adjudication committees with the convenience to get involved in individual cases, as long 
DVWKH\ODEHOWKHPDVµVLJQLILFDQWFRPSOLFDWHGDQGGLIILFXOW¶&RPSRVHGRIFRXUWRIILFLDOV
and senior judges, the authority of adjudication committees is also hardly challenged by 
ordinary judges. To a large extent, whether the power of adjudication committees can be 
properly exercised mainly relies on their own collective wisdom and self-discipline.466 
Some practical concerns may justify the necessity of adjudication committees in 
Chinese courts. On the one hand, many Chinese judges at the current stage still lack the 
competence to correctly and properly handle those complex cases, and the help of senior 
judges in adjudication committees is thus necessary to reduce the possibility that these kinds 
of cases are wrongly decided. On the other hand, as collective entities consisting of senior 
judges and court officials, adjudication committees may also play a role in resisting external 
pressure outside the courts. However, whether these advantages can outweigh the 
aforementioned disadvantages of affecting judicial independence remains debatable.467 
For now, there is no clear sign that the adjudication committee mechanism can be 
abolished in the near future. However, efforts to refine the mechanism can already be 
                                                 
by the adjudication committee. But, the court president, responsible vice president or the division chief can 
also decide not to forward the case to the adjudication committee, which is submitted by the collegial panel, 
if they find it unnecessary to do so. Ibid., Article 10. 
465  Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Printing and Distributing the 'Working Rules of the 
Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People's Court' (1999) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾঠਁǉᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅
䲒ᇑࡔငઈՊᐕ֌㿴ࡉǊⲴ䙊⸕), ⌅ਁ[1999]2ਧ (Fa Fa [1999] No.2), issued by the Supreme People's 
Court on 2 March 1999, Articles 4, 7 and 9. 
466 Li Li (2014), supra note 462, pp. 157-160. 
467 For a useful summary of the supporting and opposing opinions regarding adjudication committees, see 
Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, pp. 32-34; Randall Peerenboom (2008), supra note 71, pp. 12-14. 
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witnessed in recent legal reforms. In the previous three five-year reform outlines issued by 
the SPC, several measures have been introduced to reduce the negative effects of 
adjudication committees on judicial independence, including standardizing the working 
process of adjudication committees, enhancing the participation of experienced judges in 
the committees, appointing committee members as judges in the collegial panel to directly 
hear important cases instead of making decisions purely on written materials and increasing 
the presence of procurators in the adjudication committee meetings to conduct necessary 
supervision. In the recent fourth five-year reform outline, the SPC further emphasized that 
adjudication committees should limit their involvement in ordinary cases and mainly 
discuss the application of laws, unless the cases concerned are related to national diplomacy, 
security and social stability.468  
Nonetheless, these reform efforts fail to address the key problem of the adjudication 
committee mechanism.  Adjudication committees can still interfere and affect the results of 
FDVHVZKHQ QHFHVVDU\ 7KHLU SRZHU LQ WKLV DVSHFW LV RQO\ VOLJKWO\ OLPLWHG E\ WKH 63&¶V
reform outlines, the substantial effects of which in practice remain questionable. No 
substantial measures have been introduced to effectively supervise the work of adjudication 
committees, whereas self-restraint seems to still be the main method to be relied on. 
Moreover, even though adjudication committees can limit themselves and function properly 
as expected, their involvement still undermines the decisional independence of frontline 
judges. As long as adjudication committees can review, discuss and decide the results of 
individual cases, the interference from them may still create an inherent risk to the 
independence of judges in decision-making. 
(2) Interference from Higher Level Courts 
Under Chinese law, courts should independently exercise their adjudicative power, 
while higher level courts can supervise the trial work of lower level courts through the 
appeal procedure and the trial supervision procedure. 469  However, as reflected in the 
practice of the remand for retrial mechanism (ਁഎ䟽ᇑ) in the appeal procedure, the retrial 
mechanism (޽ᇑ ) in the trial supervision procedure and the request for instruction 
mechanism (䈧⽪ᣕ੺) in judicial work, the relationship between higher and lower level 
FRXUWVWHQGVWRJREH\RQGPHUHµVXSHUYLVLRQ¶DQGPRUHFORVHO\UHVHPEOHVµLQVWUXFWLRQ¶Rr 
HYHQµOHDGHUVKLS¶ 
                                                 
468 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People's Courts: 
Fourth Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2014-2018 (2015), Measure 32. 
469 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (2006), Articles 4 and 16. 
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The first contentious issue is the remand for retrial mechanism in the appeal procedure. 
As mentioned, the second instance court can decide to remand the case to the first instance 
court if there are fundamental errors in fact-finding RU VHULRXV YLRODWLRQ RI SDUWLHV¶
procedural rights.470 Under this mechanism, the parties whose basic litigation rights are 
violated are provided with a remedy that their cases can be re-tried in renewed first instance 
trials. This mechanism, however, can be abused in practice. To maximize the rate of 
concluded cases, second instance courts frequently use this mechanism to send back cases 
WRILUVWLQVWDQFHFRXUWVWRUHGXFHWKHLURZQZRUNORDG7KLVµWHFKQLTXH¶LVDOVRXVHGE\VHFRQG
instance courts to avoid facing sensitive cases that are difficult to deal with. 
More importantly, as required by the SPC, second instance courts must explain the 
reasons and legal grounds in a detailed manner when sending back cases to first instance 
courts.471 Although this rule may originally aim to prevent second instance courts from 
abusing the remanding rights, the detailed explanations of second instance courts in practice 
QRUPDOO\WXUQRXWWREHµLQVWUXFWLRQV¶RQKRZWRGHFLGHWKHFDVHVUDWKHUWKDQWKHGHWDLOHG
reasoning for sending back the cases. To avoid further tension with higher level courts, the 
first instance courts tend to follow such de facto instructions, which render the potential 
appeal procedure meaningless, as both courts actually already share similar opinions on the 
cases.472  
Second, through the trial supervision procedure, higher level courts can require lower 
level courts to retry the cases if serious errors are found in legally effective court 
decisions.473 Similar to the remand for retrial mechanism, this retrial mechanism in the trial 
supervision procedure also causes tension between higher and lower level courts. 
Accordingly, this mechanism indirectly increases the incentives of lower level courts to 
keep consistent with higher level courts, so that they can avoid the embarrassment of being 
asked by the higher level courts to retry the cases. Besides, the more retried cases a court 
has, the lower their performance scores will be in the annual evaluation. Under such 
                                                 
470 See the previous Section 4.5.3. 
471 Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Standardizing the Relationship between Higher and 
Lower Level Courts in Adjudicative Work (2010) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ㿴㤳кл㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒ᇑࡔъ࣑ޣ
㌫Ⲵ㤕ᒢ᜿㿱), ⌅ਁ[2010]61 ਧ (Fa Fa [2010] No.61), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 28 
December 2010, Article 6. 
472 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 21. 
473 It should be noted that not only the higher level courts can initiate the trial supervision procedure, the 
SDUWLHVWKHSUHVLGHQWVRIWKHFRXUWVFRQFHUQHGWKHSHRSOH¶VSURFXUDWRUDWHDWWKHVDPHRUKLJKHUOHYHODV
well as the SPC and SPP can also do so. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), 
Articles 198, 199 and 208. 
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pressure, the courts are motivated to reduce the number of retried cases by following higher 
OHYHOFRXUWV¶LQVWUXFWLRQVEHLWIURPWKHDSSHDOSURFHGXUHRUWKHWULDOVXSHUYLVLRQSURFHGXUH 
The third and most debatable issue regarding the relationship between higher and 
lower level courts is the widespread practice of the request for instruction mechanism. 
Unlike the remand for retrial mechanism and the trial supervision procedure, the request for 
instruction mechanism has no explicit legal basis in law. But, it is not rare to find lower 
level courts asking higher level courts for instructions when deciding cases in practice, 
which is particularly true when the cases concerned are significant, complicated and 
difficult.474  
It is not difficult to understand why there seems to be a tacit agreement on the 
µLQVWUXFWLRQ¶SUDFWLFHEHWZHHQORZHUOHYHOFRXUWVDQGKLJKHUOHYHOFRXUWV2QWKHRQHKDQG
following the instructions of higher level courts is a relatively safe option for lower level 
courts, which can reduce the possibility of retrials. The rate of retrials can be maintained at 
a relatively low level, so that this negative factor will not affect the overall assessment of 
courts in the annual evaluation. On the other hand, by sharing their opinions, higher and 
lower level courts can avoid the potential tensions caused by retrials. Simply put, following 
WKLVNLQGRILQIRUPDOµLQVWUXFWLRQ¶SUDFWLFHLVWRVRPHH[WHQWPXWXDOO\EHQHILFLDOIRUERWK
higher and lower level courts.  
1RQHWKHOHVV VXFK µLQVWUXFWLRQ¶ SUDFWLFH LV REYLRXVO\ D GLUHFW WKUHDW WR MXGLFLDO
indHSHQGHQFHDQGDVHULRXVYLRODWLRQRIOLWLJDQWV¶DSSHDOULJKWV7KHH[FKDQJHRIRSLQLRQV
between higher and lower level courts renders the appeal procedure meaningless, and the 
parties probably find similar results in first and second instance trials. Moreover, just like 
the negative impacts of adjudication committees, such results is not independently made by 
the first instance courts which substantially hear the cases, but the courts at the next level 
which handle the cases based on mere written materials. 
Efforts have been made to tackle these practical problems regarding the relationship 
EHWZHHQKLJKHUDQGORZHUOHYHOFRXUWV$FFRUGLQJWRWKH63&¶VMXGLFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
higher level courts should guide lower level courts by adjudicating cases, summarizing 
adjudicative experience, issuing guiding documents and sample cases, holding adjudicative 
FRQIHUHQFHV DQG RUJDQL]LQJ MXGJHV¶ WUDLQLQJ LQVWHDG RI GLUHFWO\ SURYLGLQJ VSHFLILF
instructions on individual cases. Meanwhile, when lower level courts encounter significant, 
complicated and difficult cases, they should not directly ask higher level courts for 
instructions. Instead, they can apply to transfer the cases concerned to higher level courts, 
                                                 
474 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, pp. 26-27. 
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while higher level courts can also do so on their own initiative when necessary.475 Besides, 
similar to the rate of concluded cases, the use of the rate of retrials, as one improper 
evaluation criteria in court assessment, is also planned to be removed by the central 
authorities.476 Free from the pressure of minimizing the rate of retrials, lower level courts 
can more independently exercise their discretionary power without worrying that the cases 
may be sent back by higher level courts which would lead to an increase in the rate of retrials. 
Similarly, it is less necHVVDU\ IRU ORZHU OHYHO FRXUWV WR DVN IRU KLJKHU OHYHO FRXUWV¶
instructions to avoid retrials. If these measures can be effectively implemented in practice, 
the reduction of improper instruction practice between higher and lower level courts can be 
expected. However, whether these reform measures can be substantially implemented in 
practice remains to be seen in the next few years.  
(3) Interference outside the Judicial System 
8QGHUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDOOSRZHUEHORQJVWR&KLQHVHSHRSOH3HRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVDre 
created (by election), beholden and supervised by people, and government organs, courts 
DQGSURFXUDWRUDWHVDUHFUHDWHGEHKROGHQDQGVXSHUYLVHGE\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVDWYDULRXV
levels. Although this constitutional design is relatively different from thHW\SLFDOµVHSDUDWLRQ
RIWKUHHSRZHUV¶LQZHVWHUQPRGHOVWKHOHJLVODWLYHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGMXGLFLDOSRZHUVDUH
IXQFWLRQDOO\VHSDUDWHGDPRQJSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQVDQGFRXUWVZKLOH
procuratorates are responsible for public prosecution and legal supervision. Fundamentally, 
the operation of all these state organs is under the leadership of CPC.477 Under such a power 
structure, connections between courts and other state organs exist in various forms, which 
may affect the independence of courts. 
First, the power to appoint and remove judges, including both court officials and 
RUGLQDU\MXGJHVEHORQJVWRSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVDWFRUUHVSRQGLQJOHYHOV478 7KXVSHRSOH¶V
congresses can exert their influence over courts through this channel when necessary. 
Although the power of decision-PDNLQJ XOWLPDWHO\ IDOOV LQWR WKH KDQGV RI SHRSOH¶V
                                                 
475 Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Standardizing the Relationship between Higher and 
Lower Level Courts in Adjudicative Work (2010), Articles 3-5 and 9-10. 
476 Fei Chen and Wei Zou (2015), supra note 384. 
477 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2004) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᇚ⌅), promulgated by the 
National People's Congress on 4 December 1982 and amended on 12 April 1988, 29 March 1993, 15 March 
1999 and 14 March 2004, Article 3. For a useful introduction to the power structure of China, see Bin 
Liang (2008), supra note 132, pp. 42-81. 
478 6SHFLILFDOO\FRXUWSUHVLGHQWVDUHDSSRLQWHGDQGUHPRYHGE\FRUUHVSRQGLQJSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHV2WKHU
judges, including vice president, (deputy) division chiefs, members of adjudication committees and 
RUGLQDU\MXGJHVDUHDSSRLQWHGDQGUHPRYHGE\FRUUHVSRQGLQJVWDQGLQJFRPPLWWHHVRISHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHV
based on the recommendations of court presidents. Assistant judges are directly appointed by court 
presidents. Judges Law of the People's Republic of China (2001), Article 5. 
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congresses, they rarely reject the nominations of courts in practice. However, the situation 
may change in the selection of court officials. The higher the rank of the court official is, 
WKHPRUHWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIWKH3DUW\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQVFDQEH
witnessed.479  
0HDQZKLOHSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVFDQDOVRVXSHUYLVH WKHZRUNRIFRXUWV2Q WKHRQH
KDQG SHRSOH¶V FRQJUHVVHV FDQ UHYLHZ WKH ZRUN UHSRUWV RI courts, make comments 
accordingly and address inquires to court officials that are in charge when necessary.480 On 
WKHRWKHUKDQGSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVPD\DOVRVXSHUYLVHWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOFDVHV
though such supervision lacks an explicit and solid legal basis. This controversial practice 
inevitably raises both supporting and opposing voices. While supporters deem such 
supervision necessary to combat corruption and secure justice, opponents argue that the 
supervision of individual cases is unacceptable, and such practice may seriously undermine 
judicial independence. 481  But, as shown in some empirical studies, individual case 
VXSHUYLVLRQFRQGXFWHGE\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVLVDFWXDOO\UDWKHUUDUHLQSUDFWLFH7KHUHIRUH
it seems that the worries on indivLGXDOFDVHVXSHUYLVLRQFRQGXFWHGE\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHV
can be eased to some extent.482 
Second, the dependence of courts on local government organs is mainly reflected in 
financial issues. China adopts a financial mechanism which separates the revenue and 
expenditure of the police, procuratorates and courts. Accordingly, local courts are required 
to submit all its revenue to local financial departments, and the funds for courts are 
separately allocated by local governments from their budgets.483 In practice, some local 
JRYHUQPHQWV PD\ XVH ILQDQFLDO SUHVVXUH WR IRUFH ORFDO FRXUWV WR µFRRSHUDWH¶ ZLWK ORFDO
interests. Meanwhile, local government officials are also normally leaders of local Party 
committees. They can indirectly exert their influence iQORFDOSHRSOH¶s congresses, and their 
words carry a weight in the selection of court officials. Simply put, the financial and 
                                                 
479 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 68. 
480 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision of the Standing Committees of the People's 
Congresses at Various Levels (2006) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ਴㓗Ӫ≁ԓ㺘བྷՊᑨ࣑ငઈՊⴁⶓ⌅ ), 
promulgated by the Standing Committee of National People's Congress on 27 August 2006, Articles 8, 14 
and 34. 
481 For a summary of the supporting and opposing opinions, see Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 41. 
482  Randall Peerenboom, 'Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: An Empirical Study of 
Individual Case Supervision', 55 (2006) China Journal, p. 81. 
483 Methods for the Litigation Fee Payment (2006) (䇹䇬䍩⭘Ӕ㓣࣎⌅), ഭ࣑䲒Ԕㅜ 481ਧ (Decree of 
the State Council No.481), issued by the State Council on 19 December 2006, Article 52. 
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personnel dependence of courts on local government creates room for local protectionism, 
which would threaten the judicial independence of local courts.484  
,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW LQ WKH UHFHQWO\ SXEOLVKHG 63&¶V )RXUWK )LYH-Year Reform 
Outline, the SPC announced a new reform measure to establish a unified system at the 
province level to manage the finance and personnel issues for local courts in a centralized 
manner.485 The nomination, appointment and removal of judges in local courts (BPCs at the 
county and district level, and IPCs at the city and prefecture level) will be subject to the 
unified management at the province level. Similarly, the revenue and expenditure of local 
courts are also planned to be managed by corresponding financial departments at the 
provincial level. Following the new reform measure, local courts will no longer be subject 
to the financial and personnel control of local government at the same level, which can in 
turn reduce their dependence on local governments. But, the SPC has not yet provided 
detailed plans on how this reform measure will be implemented. The actual impacts of this 
new reform measure remain unclear.  
Third, the procuratorates are authorized by the Constitution to supervise the 
implementation of law in courts. In terms of civil litigation, the supervision is mainly 
conducted via the trial supervision procedure, through which the procuratorates can lodge 
a protest to the courts for retrials if serious errors are found in effective court decisions.486 
Besides, the supervision can also be witnessed in the routine work of courts. For example, 
(vice) presidents of the procuratorates can attend the meetings of adjudication committees 
for case discussion.487  
Last, similar to other state organs, courts are also subject to the direct or indirect 
influence of the Party. In a general sense, the Party sets up basic judicial policies and general 
directions for judicial reforms. It also plays a role in the selection of high-level court 
officials. In a more specific sense, it may get involved in the adjudication of individual cases, 
especially when the cases concerned seriously affect social stability or challenge the 
authority of the Party. 488  While the general issue may, to some extent, affect the 
independence of the judiciary as a whole, the more specific issue seems to be a more 
                                                 
484 Randall Peerenboom (2008), supra note 71, p. 17. 
485 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People's Courts: 
Fourth Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2014-2018 (2015), Measures 54 and 63. 
486 See the previous discussion in Section 5.5.3. 
487 Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Printing and Distributing the 'Implementation Opinions on 
Reforming and Improving the Adjudication Committee Mechanism in People's Courts' (2010), Article 13. 
488 Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March towards Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 10-12. 
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substantial risk to the decisional independence of judges in individual cases.489 The latest 
judicial reform also paid attention to this issue ,Q WKH63&¶V )RXUWK )LYH-Year Reform 
Outline, a recording mechanism is planned to be established in the judicial system.490 The 
recording mechanism is designed to enable judges and courts to write down any undue 
interference from Party or government officials, based on which improper behaviour can be 
detected and responsible officials can be punished. 
Besides, external interference outside courts may also come from the media and the 
public. With the development of information technology, the media and the public are 
SOD\LQJDQLQFUHDVLQJO\LPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VMXGLFLDOV\VWHP7KH
PHGLDLQFUHDVHVWKHSXEOLF¶VFRYHUDJHRYHUWKHMXGLFLDOZRUNHVSHFLDOO\WKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRI
cases with significant social impacts. Meanwhile, the rise of social media in recent years 
has strengthened the spread of information, which provides the public with an effective 
channel to directly voice their opinions. However, despite the positive role the media and 
the public may play in scrutinizing the judicial work, the voices of the media and the public 
may also become an undue interference to the judiciary. Under the pressure of the media 
and the public, it is difficult for courts to uphold their original decisions in sensitive cases. 
They may defer to popular views to avoid criticism from the media and the public. In 
H[WUHPH FLUFXPVWDQFHV WKLV NLQG RI XQGXH SUHVVXUH HYHQ OHDGV WR WKH µW\UDQQ\ RI WKH
PDMRULW\¶491 As a consequence, it seems that the media and the public can be a double edged 
sword to judicial independence if judges cannot be effectively protected from undue 
pressure.  
(4) Judicial Independence in Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation 
The discussion above shows that judges and courts are vulnerable to both internal and 
external interference in the judicial work.492 Individuals in the judicial system tend to follow 
                                                 
489 Randall Peerenboom (2008), supra note 71, pp. 12-15. 
490 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People's Courts: 
Fourth Five-Year Outline for Reforming People's Courts 2014-2018 (2015), Measure 55. 
491 Benjamin L. Liebman, 'Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System', 105 (2005) 
Columbia Law Review, p. 69. 
492 Strictly speaking, not all the interference is inappropriate and illegal. &KLQD¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQHPSKDVL]HV
WKH LQGHSHQGHQFH RI FRXUWV LQ H[HUFLVLQJ WKH DGMXGLFDWLYH SRZHU ZKLOH LW DOVR HPSRZHUV SHRSOH¶V
congresses and procuratorates to supervise the adjudicative work of courts. As the traditional debates on 
the balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability indicate, judges should be 
independent to make their own decisions, while they should also be accountable for their decisions. Thus, 
XQGHU&KLQD¶VVWUXFWXUHRIVWDWHRUJDQV WKH LQWHUQDOVXSHUYLVLRQE\DGMXGLFDWLRQFRPPLWWHHVDQGKLJKHU
OHYHOFRXUWVDQGWKHH[WHUQDOVXSHUYLVLRQE\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVSURFXUDWRUDWHVWKHPHGLDDQGWKHSXEOLF
seem to be necessary and justified, as long as the supervision is conducted legally and properly. As a matter 
of fact, the supervision from the aforementioned groups does play a role in tackling the problems of judicial 
corruption, local protectionism and injustice.  However, it is difficult to draw a neat line between 
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orders from their superiors, as obedience and hierarchy are, to some extent, more valued 
than independent thinking under the bureaucratic environment.493  However, the actual 
effects of the bureaucracy on judicial independence should not be overstated. More than 10 
million cases are handled by Chinese courts every year.494 For most of the time, interference 
does not exist in ordinary cases.495  
More importantly, as pointed out by Fu and Peerenboom, more attention should be 
paid to the differences between various types of cases in the analysis of judicial 
independence, as the incentives of potential actors to interfere vary in different kinds of 
cases. Court officials and adjudication committees care more about the cases which may 
affect the assessment of courts, or those which can cause the tensions between higher and 
lower level courts/between courts and other state organs. Local government organs and 
SHRSOH¶VFRngresses pay more attention to the cases regarding local political and economic 
interest. The Party may only become involved in individual cases that directly cause 
political and social instability. In general, socio-politically sensitive cases seem to be more 
vulnerable to potential undue interference than ordinary cases.496 
As a result, there seems to be more reasons for foreign-related commercial disputants 
to expect their disputes can be handled by Chinese courts in an independent manner. To 
begin with, falling into the scope of commercial cases, foreign-related commercial cases are 
                                                 
appropriate and legal interference and improper and illegitimate interference in practice. Overall, the 
supervision power is potentially subject to abuse by various kinds of actors to serve their own interest, 
which threatens judicial independence in practice. 
493 To illustrate, following the soviet model, the structure of Chinese courts follows a pyramid style. Within 
the judicial system, ordinary judges are supervised and de facto led by (deputy) division chiefs. Above 
them are adjudication committees, (vice) court presidents. Lower level courts are supervised and de facto 
instructed by higher level courts. Outside the judicial system, courts also needs to interact with other state 
RUJDQVVXFKDVSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVJRvernment organs and procuratorates, and are sometimes forced to 
µFRRSHUDWH¶ZLWKWKHP8OWLPDWHO\DQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWO\FRXUWVDVZHOODVRWKHUVWDWHRUJDQVDUHVXEMHFW
to the overall leadership of the Party.  
Under such a hierarchical structure, the power is centralized level by level to the top of the pyramid. As a 
consequence, being bureaucratic or, more precisely, following the instructions of higher level authorities 
becomes a safer option for judges and courts, while insisting on their own decisions seems to be relatively 
risky. Although disobedience may not directly and immediately bring adverse consequences, the career 
SURVSHFWVRIMXGJHVZKRDUHODEHOOHGDVµQRQ-FRRSHUDWRUV¶LVSUREDEO\EOLJKWHGLQWKHORQJUXQ7KXVLWLV
not difficult to understand why judges and courts tend to turn to higher level authorities for instructions 
ZKHQWKH\HQFRXQWHUWKRUQ\SUREOHPVZKHQGHFLGLQJµVLJQLILFDQWFRPSOLFDWHGDQGGLIILFXOW¶FDVHV7KH\
tend to do so even when such practice is not explicitly permitted or prohibited by law. After all, it is much 
safer for judges and courts to actively communicate with higher level authorities or at least to be self-
constraint. 
494 See Figure 10. 
495 Randall Peerenboom (2010), Supra note 462, p. 4. 
496 Randall Peerenboom and Yulin Fu (2010), supra note 391, pp. 95-134. 
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normally not socio-politically sensitive, and they are thus less likely to draw the attention 
RIWKH3DUW\DQGSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHV0RUHRYHUIRUHLJQ-related commercial disputants also 
seldom directly face local government organs as the victims do in administrative cases. 
%HVLGHV&KLQD¶SROLF\HPSKDVLVRQHFRQRPLFJURZWKDIWHUWKHUHIRUPWRVRPHH[WHQW
encourages the courts to independently decide commercial cases, so that the courts can 
better serve their roles in maintaining commercial order through dispute resolution and law 
enforcement in the commercial field.497 
More importantly, the special design of centralized jurisdiction also enables more 
independent judges and courts to handle foreign-related commercial cases. Under the 
centralized jurisdiction, foreign-related commercial cases are mainly handled by the courts 
in economically-developed coastal areas. Judges in these areas are normally more 
professional, while they also generally have a stronger sense of independence than those in 
inland areas. Major threats to judicial independence, local protectionism for example, are 
also less frequently found in these areas.498 The developed economic order in these areas 
creates a more liberalized and legalized atmosphere, which encourages various kinds of 
state organs to more strictly behave in accordance with the law.499 Empirical evidence also 
shows that courts in economically-developed areas are generally more independent than 
courts in inland areas.500 Howson finds that the courts in Shanghai are willing and also able 
to rule against government organs, state-owned enterprises and other parties with a direct 
or indirect government background when necessary.501  
In short, although judicial independence, in a general sense, is threatened by the 
bureaucratic feature of the judicial system, foreign-related commercial cases do not 
necessarily suffer from this problematic issue. As indicated in various studies, benefiting 
from the relatively liberalized legal environment and rapid judicial development, judges and 
courts in economically-developed coastal areas are generally more independent than those 
in underdeveloped areas. Commercial cases, as a whole, are also less socio-politically 
                                                 
497 Roger P. Alford, Julian G. Ku and Bei Xiao, 'Perceptions and Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards in China', 33 (2016) Pacific Basin Law Journal, pp. 25-26; Randall Peerenboom (2010), 
supra note 462, p. 4. 
498 Mei Ying Gechlik, 'Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai', 19 (2005) Columbia Journal of 
Asian Law, pp. 100-121. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Minxin Pei, Guoyan Zhang, Fei Pei and Lixin Chen, 'A Survey of Commercial Litigation in Shanghai 
Courts', in Randall P. Peerenboom (ed.), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 221-233. 
501 Nicolas C. Howson, 'Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts', in Randall 
P. Peerenboom (ed.), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 152-153. 
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sensitive than administrative cases or cases involving mass victims. From this perspective, 
it seems that foreign-related commercial disputants can be less worried on the issue of 
judicial independence than domestic disputants who are involved with administrative or 
socio-politically sensitive cases.  
 -XGLFLDO &RUUXSWLRQ $ 7KUHDW WR -XGJHV¶ ,QWHJULW\ ,QGHSHQGHQFH DQG
Impartiality 
Judges may become partial or biased if they do not strictly follow judicial ethics, which 
is particularly true when judges are corrupted. Corrupt judges take sides with the parties 
who offer the bribe and infringe the rights of the parties on the other side.502 As explicitly 
stated in Article 7 of the Judges Law, following judicial ethics is a basic requirement for 
Chinese judges, the SPC also issues special provisions to provide judges with detailed 
guidance on judicial ethics.503 However, lacking a strong sense of honour and morality, 
some judges are still found to be involved in judicial corruption scandals. Judicial corruption 
has been identified by many scholars as the major threat to the integrity and impartiality of 
Chinese judges.504  
(1) Judicial Corruption and Its Underlying Reasons 
,QWKHSXEOLF¶SHUFHSWLRQMXGLFLDOFRUUXSWLRQLVRQHRIWKHPRVWVHULRXVSUREOHPVLQ
&KLQD¶VMXGiciary. According to the 2014 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (WJP 
,QGH[&KLQDRQO\VFRUHVDQGUDQNVRXWRIVXUYH\HGFRXQWULHVLQWKHIDFWRUµ1R
&RUUXSWLRQ LQ WKH -XGLFLDU\¶&KLQDDOVR UHFHLYHVDSRRU VFRUHRI LQ WKH IDFWRU µ1R
cRUUXSWLRQ¶LQµ&LYLO-XVWLFH¶+RZHYHULWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRQRWLFHWKDWWKHSXEOLFVHHPVWR
have more confidence in other state organs than courts with regard to the issue of corruption. 
&KLQD¶V VFRUHV LQ WKH VHFWRUV RI µ([HFXWLYH%UDQFK¶  µ3ROLFH0LOLWDU\¶  DQG
                                                 
502 See the previous discussion in Section 2.3.2. 
503 See Basic Standards of the People's Republic of China on Professional Ethics of Judges (2010) (ѝॾ
Ӫ≁ޡ઼ഭ⌅ᇈ㙼ъ䚃ᗧสᵜ߶ࡉ), ⌅ਁ[2010]53 ਧ (Fa Fa [2010] No.53), issued by the Supreme 
People's Court on 12 June 2010; Codes of Conduct for Judges (2010) (⌅ᇈ㹼Ѫ㿴㤳), ⌅ਁ[2010]54ਧ 
(Fa Fa [2010] No.54), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 6 December 2010. 
504 See Ling Li, 'The "Production" of Corruption in China's Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making 
in a One-Party State', 37 (2012) Law & Social Inquiry, pp. 848-887; Ling Li, 'Corruption in China's Courts', 
in Randall P. Peerenboom (ed.), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 196-220; Ling Li (2010), supra note179, pp. 1-20; 
Eric Chi-yeung Ip, 'Judicial Corruption and its Threats to National Governance in China', 3 (2008) Journal 
of Administration & Governance, pp. 80-89; Ting Gong, 'Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: 
Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China', 4 (2004) China Review, pp. 33-54. See also Yuwen Li (2014), 
supra note 12, pp. 75-85; Keith Henderson, 'Corruption in China: Half-Way over the Great Wall', in 
Transparency International (ed.), Global Corruption Report 2007 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 
151-159; Randall Peerenboom (2002), supra note 488, pp. 13-15. 
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µOHJLVODWXUH¶DUHJHQHUDOO\KLJKHUWKDQWKHMXGLFLDU\505 The statistics in the 2014 WJP 
Index indicate that the public still retains a deep distrust of the judicial integrity of Chinese 
courts. 
Due to the elusive character of corruption, it is difficult to obtain solid empirical data 
to describe the exact status of judicial corruption in China. However, the available data from 
RIILFLDO UHSRUWV DQG SXEOLVKHG FDVHV FDQ VWLOO GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW WKHSXEOLF¶ GRXEWV RQ WKH
integrity of thHMXGLFLDU\LVQRWDELDVHGSHUFHSWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHDVUHFRUGHGLQWKH63&¶V
annual work reports, hundreds of judicial officers receive internal punishment for violating 
law and discipline every year. Some of them are even under criminal investigation for their 
misbehaviour (Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Judicial officers investigated and punished for violating law and discipline 
(2003-2015) 506 
 
                                                 
505 The WJP Index is made by WKH:RUOG -XVWLFH3URMHFWZKLFK LV µDQ LQGHSHQGHQWPXOWL-disciplinary 
RUJDQL]DWLRQZRUNLQJ WRDGYDQFH WKH UXOHRI ODZDURXQG WKHZRUOG¶DQG µWKH ,QGH[ LV WKHZRUOG¶VPRVW
comprehensive data set of its kind and the only to rely solely on primary data, meaVXULQJ D QDWLRQ¶V
DGKHUHQFHWRWKHUXOHRIODZIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIKRZRUGLQDU\SHRSOHH[SHULHQFHLW¶. The introduction 
to the WJP Index is available on its official website http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index. Last 
visited in June 2016. 
506 The data is obtained from the annual work reports of the SPC. The reports are downloaded from the 
database set up by the Peking University (www.pkulaw.cn). The data for 2007 and 2012 is not available in 
WKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ\HDUV¶ZRUNUHSRUWV0HDQZKLOHMXdicial officers do not only refer to judges, which also 
include other judicial workers in the judicial system. 
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A particular pattern can be found in the official statistics. As shown in Figure 12, the 
number of judicial officers violating law and discipline reached high levels in 2003, 2009 
and 2014 respectively, which was probably caused by the intensive internal investigation in 
the anti-corruption campaigns in these years.507 But, the numbers soon experienced a sharp 
drop when the pressure of internal investigation became less intensive in the following years. 
It is also interesting to notice that the number of judges who are suspected of committing 
corruption crime has not changed much in the past decade. Similarly, according to ZhX¶V
data analysis, the proportion of judges who violate law and discipline generally stayed the 
same, which fluctuated around 2%.508 Thus, to a large extent, these regular anti-corruption 
campaigns seem unable to touch the core of judicial corruption, which contributed little to 
the substantial reduction of corruption activities.  
Judicial corruption is also reflected in published cases regarding corruption crime. 
According to a report based on published corruption cases, court officials seem to be more 
vulnerable to judicial corruption than junior level judges. 47% (84 of 200) corrupted judges 
in the report are presidents or vice presidents in courts. Given the aforementioned 
bureaucratic feature of the judicial system, the vulnerability of court officials to corruption 
activities is not difficult to understand,509 Under the hierarchical structure of courts, the 
power is centralized level by level to court officials, especially those in IPCs and HPCs. 
(Deputy) division chiefs and (vice) court presidents are in charge of supervising and 
instructing the work of ordinary judges. As members of adjudication committees, these 
court officials can also interfere with the adjudication of individual cases.510 Simply put, 
these court officials can find access to the decision-making process of cases and manipulate 
the results according to their wishes. More importantly, the words of court officials 
normally carry a weight in courts, and their opinions directly decide the promotion of 
ordinary judges. Although disobeying court oIILFLDOV¶ µLQVWUXFWLRQV¶ GRHVQRW QHFHVVDULO\
directly lead to adverse results, judges who act against court officials may receive 
unfavourable treatment in the long run.511 As a consequence, when court officials are 
willing to get involved in the decision-making process, ordinary judges normally have no 
FKRLFHEXWWRµFRRSHUDWH¶ZLWKWKHP 
                                                 
507 The anti-FRUUXSWLRQ FDPSDLJQV FRQGXFWHG LQ WKHVH \HDUV DUHPHQWLRQHG LQ WKH 63&¶V FRUUHVSRQGLQJ
annual work reports in 2004, 2010 and 2015. 
508 Jingwen Zhu (2014), supra note 419, p. 290. 
509 Similar arguments can be found in Ling Li (2012), supra note 504, pp. 870-873; Eric Chi-yeung Ip 
(2008), supra note 504, p. 87; Ting Gong (2004), supra note 504, p. 30. 
510 See the previous discussion in Section 6.3.2 (1). 
511 Ling Li (2012), supra note 504, p. 871. 
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The centralized power in the hands of court officials renders them the main targets for 
bribery. In an extreme sense, major court officials in the same court may even act in 
collusion with each other to conduct group corruption. The group corruption scandals in 
Wuhan IPC, Anhui Fuyang IPC, Shenzhen IPC and Hunan HPC reflect the seriousness of 
group corruption in practice.512 If such kind of corruption chains are formed between court 
officials in courts, their power within the courts will become even less restrained, as there 
is hardly any equal power within the courts that can challenge their authority. To some 
extent, their corruption activities can only be stopped when their misbehaviour is exposed.  
Furthermore, what is detrimental is not only the direct results caused by corruption 
activities (injustice in manipulated cases), but also the indirect impacts that judges may 
abandon their insistence on integrity, independence and impartiality. Constant manipulation 
by court officials may shake RUGLQDU\MXGJHV¶ faith in judicial honour and ethics. They may 
even build a sense that they are merely tools for manipulation and care less about the values 
of integrity, independence and impartiality. Consequently, judges do not really feel guilty 
when they receive bribes and render biased decisions.513 To some extent, the negative 
atmosphere created by the manipulation and corruption is a more fundamental threat to the 
integrity, independence and impartiality of judges. 
(2) Judicial Corruption in Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation 
So far, there is no direct evidence suggesting that judicial corruption in foreign-related 
commercial litigation is more severe or less severe than that in domestic litigation. But, 
there are some facts which suggest that judicial corruption is at least a potential risk in 
foreign-related commercial litigation.  
Firstly, empirical studies show that Chinese-style Guanxi practice is also evident in 
the circle of foreign investment and trade. Many foreign businessmen have recognized the 
important role of informal relationship with government officials in promoting their 
business in China. To ensure their commercial interest in China, some may even cross the 
legal boundary and resort to bribery. 514  For example, several famous transnational 
corporations such as IBM, Carrefour and Siemens are reported to be involved in the scandals 
                                                 
512  Xiaolou Zheng, '⌅ᇈ㞀䍕ᣕ੺  (Judges' Corruption Report)', in 䍒㓿  (Caijing), 27 May 2013. 
Available at http://misc.caijing.com.cn/chargeFullNews.jsp?id=112826999&time=2013-05-26&cl=106. 
Last visited in June 2016. 
513 Ting Gong (2004), supra note 504, p. 33. 
514 See Jane Nolan (2011), supra note 181, pp. 3357-3372; Scott Wilson (2007), supra note 178, pp. 25-
51. 
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of offering bribery to government officials.515 In the famous Guo Jingyi case, the former 
deputy head of the Department of Treaty and Law in the Ministry of Commerce was 
sentenced to death (with probation) for receiving bribery and abusing his power in foreign 
investment licensing.516 As these examples show, government officials that are in charge of 
foreign investment and trade are vulnerable to the threat of corruption.  
Secondly, some court officials that are responsible for foreign-related commercial 
cases are also found to be involved in corruption. For example, Cai Xiaoling, the former 
chief of the foreign-related division in Shenzhen IPC, was put into jail for corruption in 
2006.517 Corruption even reaches the highest judicial organ. Huang Songyou, the former 
vice president of the SPC was condemned to life imprisonment in 2010.Another former vice 
president of the SPC, Xi Xiaoming was also put under investigation for serious discipline 
violation in 2015.518 It should be noticed that these two vice presidents of the SPC who 
committed corruption crime were mainly in charge of civil and commercial cases when they 
were at the post. Actually, many scholars notice that judges who handle commercial cases 
are generally more vulnerable to corruption than judges handling other kinds of cases. Since 
commercial cases may involve significant commercial interest, commercial disputants have 
a strong incentive to employ all the methods available to ensure their interest in litigation.519 
Some disputants may even resort to bribery to secure favourable results in litigation.520 
From this perspective, it seems that foreign-related commercial cases with significant 
commercial interest are also possible to be affected by corruption activities. 
Thirdly, under the centralized jurisdiction, many foreign-related commercial cases are 
adjudicated by IPCs and HPCs. But, statistics shows that these high level courts seem to be 
more vulnerable to the threat of judicial corruption than BPCs. It is reported that 17.5% 
corrupted judges are from HPCs and 34.5% are from IPCs. Considering that the number of 
                                                 
515 Ning Kang, '▌㿴ࡉ≷ᡀ࡙⳺സ ཆ䍴ᐘཤ䳮䘳䍯䍲䰘 (Hidden Rules Create Interest Groups, Foreign 
Capital Giants are Involved with "Corruption Scandals")', in ᯠॾ㖁  (Xinhuanet), 11 October 2007. 
Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-10/11/content_6861252.htm. Last visited in June 
2016.  
516 Xiaoqiao Wang, 'ཆ䍴ᇑᢩ㞀䍕ネṸ䈳ḕ  (An Investigation on Corruption Cases regarding the 
Examination and Approval of Foreign Investment)', in ইᯩઘᵛ (Southern Weekly), 30 October 2008. 
Available at http://www.infzm.com/content/19231. Last visited in June 2016. 
517 Hua Zhou, '␡ൣѝ䲒⌅ᇈ㞀䍕Ṹࠨᱮ⧠㹼⹤ӗ⌅ࡦᓖ㕪䲧  (Judges' Corruption Cases in the 
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court Indicate the Existence of Loopholes in the Current Bankruptcy Law)', 
in ᯠ⎚ᯠ䰫  (Sina News), 15 November 2006. Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-11-
15/164711525745.shtml. Last visited in June 2016. 
518 Xiaolou Zheng (2013), supra note 512. 
519 Ling Li (2010), supra note 504, pp. 218-220. 
520 Randall Peerenboom and Yulin Fu (2010), supra note 462, pp. 100-101. 
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judges from IPCs and HPCs only amount to 20% of the total number of judges in China, 
judicial corruption seems much more severe in IPCs and HPCs than BPCs.521 IPCs and 
HPCs, which are positioned in the upper-middle level of the judicial system, not only decide 
the results of the cases handled by themselves, but also exert their influence over BPCs 
WKURXJK WKH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG µLQVWUXFWLRQV¶ SUDFWLFH522 Accordingly, judges in IPCs and 
+3&VHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHFRXUWRIILFLDOVDUHPRUHµYDOXDEOH¶WDUJHWVIRUEULEHUVDVWKH\FDQ
find more benefit by brLELQJ WKHVH µLPSRUWDQW¶ judges in high level courts. Since most 
foreign-related commercial cases are handled by IPCs and HPCs, it seems necessary to be 
cautious about the potential risk of corruption in foreign-related commercial litigation.  
6.3.4 Independence, Impartiality and Neutrality in Arbitration 
Similar to judges, arbitrators are also expected to be independent and impartial. 
Moreover, as an important feature of international commercial arbitration, the overall 
neutrality of the arbitration tribunal is also particularly cherished by disputants.523 The 
emphasis on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators is evident in Chinese 
institutional arbitration rules. For example, CIETAC specifies that any reasonable doubts 
on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators can be legal grounds for challenging 
arbitrators, which provide the parties with the procedural tools to ensure the independence 
and impartiality of arbitrators.524 CIETAC also issues special internal rules which provide 
detailed guidance on the independent, impartial and ethical requirements for its arbitrators. 
'HVSLWHWKHHPSKDVLVLQDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVVHYHUDOLVVXHVPD\VWLOOUDLVHGLVSXWDQWV¶FRQFHUQV
on the independence, impartiality and neutrality of arbitrators, including the independence 
of Chinese arbitration institutions, the scrutiny mechanism and the neutrality of the 
arbitration tribunal.   
(1) Doubtful Independence Status of Chinese Arbitration Institutions 
,WLVQRWUDUHWRILQGIRUHLJQSDUWLHV¶GRXEWVRQWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHof Chinese arbitration 
institutions. 525  Although the Arbitration Law announced the independence of Chinese 
                                                 
521 Xiaolou Zheng (2013), supra note 512. 
522 See the previous discussion in Section 6.3.2 (1). 
523 See the previous discussion in Section 2.3.2. 
524 Meanwhile, it is also emphasized that the arbitration tribunal must adhere to the basic principle of 
independence and impartiality when hearing and deciding cases. See the previous discussion in Section 
5.5.1 (3). 
525 See e.g. Michael I. Kaplan, 'Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality when Arbitrating in China: How the 
Lessons of the Soviet Union and Iran can Provide Solutions to Western Parties Arbitrating in China', 110 
(2006) Penn State Law Review, p. 806; Lijun Cao (2008), supra note 358, p. 2; Jingzhou Tao, 'Chinese 
Legal Environment for International Arbitration', 2 (2008) Dispute Resolution International, p. 298.  
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arbitration institutions from government organs in 1994,526 their substantial independence 
in practice seems questionable. For example, CIETAC did not gain the financial 
independence to manage its own revenue and expenditure until 2010. Before that, 
&,(7$&¶VUHYHQXHDQGH[SHQGLWXUHVLPLODUWRWKHFRXUWVZHUHVHSDUDWHGDQGVXEMHFWWRWKH
control of the Ministry of Finance.527  
&,(7$&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLQSHUVRQQHOLVVXHVLVDOVRXQFOHDU$FFRUGLQJWR&,(7$&¶V
Articles of Association, its high-level officials should be appointed by CCPIT.528 But, there 
are no clear legal rules explaining how they are selected. In practice, the chairman of 
CIETAC and CCPIT is usually the same person. They are normally former government 
officials who are actually appointed by the central authorities. For example, the current 
chairman of CIETAC and CCPIT, Jiang Zengwei, was the former deputy minister of 
commerce. He was appointed as the secretary of the Party committee of CCPIT and the 
chairman of CIETAC and CCPIT in 2014.529  
Similar to CIETAC, other Chinese arbitration institutions are also more or less subject 
to the influence of local government organs in finance and personnel issues.530 Considering 
the historical government background of Chinese arbitration institutions and their current 
unclear independent status in practice, it seems reasonable for the parties to worry about 
potential administrative or political interference outside arbitration institutions.531 
(2) CIETAC’s Scrutiny Mechanism and Its Effects on the Independence of Arbitration 
Tribunals in Decision-Making 
Another noteworthy issue which may affect the independence of arbitrators in 
decision-PDNLQJLV&,(7$&¶VVFUXWLQ\PHFhanism. The scrutiny mechanism is designed to 
ensure the quality and correctness of arbitration awards. Specifically, when a draft 
arbitration award is made by the arbitration tribunal, it needs to be first reviewed by the 
                                                 
526 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Article 8. 
527 Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission on Adjusting 
the Management Policies for the Collection of Arbitration Fees (2010) (䍒᭯䜘, ഭᇦਁኅ᭩䶙ငޣҾ䈳
ᮤԢ㻱᭦䍩㇑⨶᭯ㆆᴹޣ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕), 䍒㔬[2010]19 ਧ (Cai Zong [2010[ No.19), issued by the 
Ministry of Finance and National Development and Reform Commission on 01 April 2010, Article 1. 
528 Articles of Association of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (2014) (ѝ
ഭഭ䱵㓿⍾䍨᱃Ԣ㻱ငઈՊㄐ〻), 5 September 2014, Article 5. 
529 Chenlu Huang, 'ဌ໎Տࠪԫѝഭ䍨׳Պފ㓴Җ䇠, Պ䮯 (Zengwei Jiang Is the New Chairman and 
Secretary of the Party Committee of the China Commission of the Promotion of the International Trade)', 
in ᯠ ॾ 㖁  (Xinhuanet), 12 March 2014. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/expo/2014-
03/12/c_126256645.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
530 Jingzhou Tao (2008), supra note 525, pp. 298-299; Donald C. Clarke (2003), supra note 19, p, 175. 
531 Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 35. p. 35. 
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arbitration commission to examine whether there are errors in the draft arbitration award. 
The arbitration commission can then give its scrutiny opinion on the draft arbitration award 
and draw the attention of the arbitration tribunal to the issues which may need to be carefully 
considered.532  
Actually, the scrutiny mechanism is not a unique creation of CIETAC. ICC provides 
a similar scrutiny procedure for draft arbitration awards. Through the scrutiny, ICC ensures 
that its arbitration awards are consistent with the mandatory legal rules in corresponding 
jurisdictions and thus reduces the possibility that its arbitration awards become 
unenforceable for violating mandatory legal rules.533 
+RZHYHU VXFK D VFUXWLQ\ PHFKDQLVP PD\ UDLVH GRXEWV WKDW ZKHWKHU DUELWUDWRUV¶
independence in decision-making will be negatively affected by the scrutiny opinion. 
Recognizing the potential negative effects of the scrutiny mechanism, CIETAC emphasizes 
in its arbitration rules that the scrutiny opinion given by the arbitration commission should 
not affect the independence of the arbitration tribunal in decision-making.534 Cao notices 
that although arbitrators in CIETAC do weigh the scrutiny opinions in practice, they are 
generally free to decide whether to modify their original arbitration awards based on the 
suggestions in scrutiny opinions. Thus, he argues that the advantages of the scrutiny 
mechanism can outweigh its disadvantages, as long as arbitrators are not forced to abide by 
the scrutiny opinions.535  
To a large extent, whether the scrutiny mechanism can play a positive role in 
arbitration proceedings depends on whether a balance exists between the institutional 
incentive of producing quality and enforceable arbitration awards and the independence of 
arbitrators in rendering their own decisions. Thus, whether CIETAC can, as stated in its 
arbitration rules, limit its own power to avoid affecting the independence of the arbitration 
tribunal is the key to the success of the scrutiny mechanism. 
(3) Questionable Neutrality of Arbitration Tribunals 
                                                 
532 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 51. 
Article 51. 
533  For ICC¶V LQWURGXFWLRQ WR WKH VFUXWLQ\ SURFHGXUH VHH KWWSZZZLFFZERRUJSURGXFWV-and-
services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-arbitration-process/award-and-award-scrutiny/. Last visited in 
January 2016. 
534 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 51. 
Article 51. 
535 Lijun Cao (2008), supra note 358, p. 7. 
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Generally speaking, in a three-arbitrator tribunal, each party designates one arbitrator, 
while the third, namely the presiding arbitrator, can be selected by the parties based on 
mutual agreement. But, the parties may find it difficult to reach such agreement in practice 
when their interests are diverging from each other. Thus, who and how to designate the 
presiding arbitrator becomes particularly important when the parties fail to reach a mutual 
agreement on the selection of the presiding arbitrator. So is the cases for the sole arbitrator 
in the one-arbitrator tribunal. 
Before 2005, the presiding or sole arbitrator was appointed by the chairman of 
CIETAC when the parties failed to reach an agreement on the mutual selection. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that, for most of the time, a Chinese arbitrator would be appointed by the 
chairman of CIETAC.536 This practice inevitably affected the neutrality of the arbitration 
WULEXQDO DQG OHG WR IRUHLJQ SDUWLHV¶ GLVFRQWHQW537 For example, in the frequently-quoted 
&RKHQ¶VWHVWLPRQ\WRWKHU.S.-China Security Review Commission in 2001, he stated: 
“At a minimum, I would surely no longer advise clients to accept CIETAC 
jurisdiction unless the contract’s arbitration clause requires the appointment of a 
third country national as presiding arbitrator.”538 
&,(7$& UHVSRQGHG WR IRUHLJQ SDUWLHV¶ FRQFHUQV E\ LQWURGXFLQJ D PDWFK-up 
mechanism in 2005. Under the match-up mechanism, each party can nominate one to five 
arbitrator(s) to be the candidate(s) for the presiding or sole arbitrator, and the candidate who 
is mutually nominated by the parties will be the presiding or sole arbitrator.539 This match-
XSPHFKDQLVPEXLOGVXSDSODWIRUPIRUWKHSDUWLHVZKLFKHQKDQFHVWKHSDUWLHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
in the selection of the chief arbitrator and increases the possibility of a mutually agreed 
selection by the parties. Moreover, to formalize the designation of the sole or presiding 
arbitrator, CIETAC also introduces a special provision which requires the chairman to 
consider the applicable law, arbitration seat, arbitration language and the nationalities of 
parties when designating the sole or presiding arbitrator.540 
                                                 
536 Michael I. Kaplan (2006), supra note 525, p. 785; Weixia Gu, 'The China-Style Closed Panel System 
in Arbitral Tribunal Formation: Analysis of Chinese Adaptation to Globalization', 25 (2008) Journal of 
International Arbitration, p. 128; Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 305, p. 816. 
537 For related comments, see Jerome A. Cohen (2005), supra note 305, pp. 32-34. 
538 U.S.-China Security Review Commission, 'U.S.-China Current Trade and Investment Policies and Their 
Impact on the U.S. Economy', (2001) USCC transcripts of hearings, p. 134. Available at 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/6.14.01HT.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. 
539 If there is more than one match, the chairman of CIETAC will select one from the matched candidates 
to be the presiding or sole arbitrator. 
540 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 30. 
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However, although it is encouraging to see the increasing respect to party autonomy 
and additional limitations on the discretionary power of the chairman of CIETAC on the 
issue of the selection of the presiding or sole arbitrator, CIETAC still fails to include the 
restriction rule for the nationality of the designated sole or presiding arbitrator. In most 
leading international arbitration instructions, such as LCIA, ICC, SCC and HKIAC, there 
is normally a restrictive rule which requires the presiding or sole arbitrator to be a third 
country arbitrator whose nationality is different from both sides.541 This kind of provision 
is important because they can at least guarantee the neutrality of the arbitration tribunal in 
nationality, and the parties may feel more comfortable and confident to accept a presiding 
or sole arbitrator from a third country.542  
6HYHUDOUHDVRQVPD\H[SODLQ&,(7$&¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRLQWURGXFHWKHUHstriction rule on 
the nationality of the sole or presiding arbitrator. First, some observers notice that 
&,(7$&¶VUHODWLYHO\ORZUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUDUELWUDWRUVWRVRPHH[WHQWFDQQRWPDWFKIRUHLJQ
DUELWUDWRUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQV543 This practical concern may even render foreign arbitrators to 
µGHFOLQH¶ WKH DSSRLQWPHQW RI &,(7$&¶V FKDLUPDQ $FFRUGLQJO\ WR DYRLG VXFK
embarrassment, the chairman prefers to appoint a Chinese arbitrator when possible.544 
Second, the relatively small proportion of foreign arbitrators in C,(7$&¶VOLVWRIDUELWUDWRUV
may create practical difficulties for appointing a suitable and available third country 
arbitrator in foreign-related commercial cases. Third, it is plausible, though less convincing, 
that CIETAC is still willing to preserve the ULJKW WR GHVLJQDWH D µGHVLUHG¶ DUELWUDWRU LQ
µLPSRUWDQW¶FDVHVZKHQQHFHVVDU\1RPDWWHUIRUZKDWUHDVRQVWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHUHVWULFWLRQ
rule on the nationality of the sole or presiding arbitrator may still be an obstacle to the 
IXOILOPHQWRISDUWLHV¶H[pectations on the neutrality of the arbitration tribunal. 
6.4 Fairness of Proceedings 
6.4.1 Due Process in Dynamics: Formality, Flexibility and Party Autonomy 
$VWKHEDVLVRIIDLUSURFHGXUHGXHSURFHVVUHTXLUHPHQWVSURWHFWWKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWVLQ
adjudication and provide them with the necessary procedural tools to defend their claims. 
In this basic sense, litigation and arbitration are similar to each other. However, serving 
different ends of disputants, litigation and arbitration also diverge from each other in 
detailed procedural designs. While litigation emphasizes the formality of the procedure and 
                                                 
541 Baker & McKenzie (2014), supra note 116. 
542 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 135; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 38; Weixia Gu (2008), 
supra note 536, p. 125. 
543 Lijun Cao (2008), supra note 358, p. 4; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 38. 
544 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 12, p. 134. 
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adopts a relatively rigorous approach, arbitration pays more attention to the flexibility of 
the procedure and the autonomy of the parties in tailoring arbitration proceedings. With 
regard to litigation and arbitration in China, due process requirements are generally fulfilled 
LQWKHUHJXODWRU\GLPHQVLRQZKLFKSURYLGHWKHEDVLFSURWHFWLRQIRUWKHSDUWLHV¶SURFHGXUDO
rights, while some deficiencies can still be found in practice, which affect the formality in 
litigation proceedings and the flexibility and autonomy in arbitration proceedings. 
(1) Formality of Litigation Proceedings in Law and Practice 
In the past three decades, procedural rules on litigation proceedings have become 
increasingly complete. From the 1982 CiPL (Trial Implementation) to the 2012 CiPL, the 
QXPEHURIDUWLFOHVKDVULVHQIURPWR6LPLODUO\WKHQXPEHURIDUWLFOHVLQWKH63&¶V
judicial interpretation to the CiPL has increased from 1¶V  WR ¶V 
Accompanying the increase in the number of articles, the legal provisions are also 
increasingly detailed, which provide the judges, disputants and other participants with more 
concrete guidance. The currently effective 2012 CiPL, tKH 63&¶V  MXGLFLDO
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWR&L3/DQGWKH63&¶VVSHFLDOSURYLVLRQVRQLPSRUWDQWVHFWRUVRIOLWLJDWLRQ
proceedings (e.g. case-filing and evidence rules) jointly form a relatively complete and 
modernized regulatory framework for litigation proceeGLQJV LQZKLFKWKHSDUWLHV¶PDMRU
procedural rights, such as the pre-notice, the statement and challenge of claims, the 
collection, presentation and cross-examination of evidence, and the appeal, are generally 
recognized and protected in law.545 
Although the legislative development provides a sounder basis for the formalization 
of litigation proceedings, the implementation of the procedural rules in some specific 
sectors seems to be still lagging behind. First, to enhance the role and participation of the 
parties in litigation proceedings, common law style pre-trial meetings are introduced into 
&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQVRWKDWMXGJHVDQGGLVSXWDQWVFDQH[FKDQJHHYLGHQFHDQGDVFHUWDLQWKH
focuses of the disputes together before the formal hearing. However, in Woo aQG:DQJ¶V
empirical studies, they find that the practice of such pre-hearing meetings varies from court 
to court. Judges also hold different attitudes towards the necessity of the pre-trial meetings. 
While some judges tend to follow the guidance in law and actively hold pre-trial meetings, 
others prefer to simplify or even skip pre-trial meetings, especially when the cases are not 
perceived to be complicated.546  
Second, it is also found that some judges may hold informal court sessions to obtain 
information from the parties, and some basic due process requirements are not fulfilled in 
                                                 
545 This issue is discussed in a more detailed manner in the previous Section 4.5. 
546 Margaret Y.K. Woo and Yaxin Wang (2005), supra note 375, pp. 15-17. 
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these informal court sessions. For example, judges may ask one party about the case without 
the presence of the other party.547 It is understandable that such informal court sessions may 
be useful, as the information obtained from formal court hearings may be insufficient for 
judges to reach decisions on the cases. However, if the basic due process requirements 
cannot be guaranteed in these informal court sessions, they will then affect the procedural 
fairness of litigation proceedings. It is interesting to notice that pre-hearing meetings are 
specifically designed for judges to obtain necessary information before formal hearings. 
However, it seems that some judges are still used to holding Chinese-style informal court 
sessions to obtain necessary information rather than the newly introduced more 
standardized pre-hearing meetings. 
The third issue is related to the testimony of witnesses before courts. In principle, 
witnesses should testify in person before courts, so that the parties and judges can question 
the witnesses to obtain the necessary information and evaluate the credibility of the 
testimony. This is also so required by Article 72 of the CiPL. However, this requirement is 
noW VWULFWO\ IROORZHG LQ SUDFWLFH (PSLULFDO VWXGLHV VKRZ WKDW WKH UDWH RI ZLWQHVVHV¶
appearance before courts is very low, and the role of witness testimony is thus rather limited 
in the trials, as judges cannot ascertain the credibility of the testimony without the presence 
of the witnesses.548  
One important reason for the limited rate of the presence of witnesses before courts is 
that requesting a witness to come to the court is rather costly for the parties, and the 
witnesses are also reluctant to testify before the court as this can be troublesome for them. 
As a result, the parties and their attorneys normally only ask the witnesses to give the 
testimony in the form of written statements or oral recordings. To tackle this problem, the 
CiPL emphasizes the obligations of the witnesses to testify before courts, unless the absence 
of witnesses can be justified for health, geographical and disaster reasons. Meanwhile, to 
ensure that the cost of the witnesses for attending court hearings can be covered, it is 
claULILHGWKDWWKHZLWQHVVHV¶FRVWVIRUWUDYHODFFRPPRGDWLRQIRRGDQGORVVRIZRUNKRXUV
should be covered by the losing party. To some extent, this rule can encourage the parties 
who are confident in the results of cases to request the witnesses to testify before courts, for 
the cost will eventually be covered by the losing parties.549  
In general, although due process requirements have been basically laid down in 
Chinese law, their implementation in practice still needs further improvement. But, it should 
                                                 
547 Ibid. pp. 18-21. 
548 ,Q:RRDQG:DQJ¶VHPSLULFDOVWXG\RQO\RXWRIVDPSOHFDVHVKDV a clear record of oral testimony 
given by the witness at the court. Ibid. 
549 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 72-74. 
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be noted that judges in economically-developed urban areas generally have a stronger sense 
of procedural fairness than those in less developed rural areas. Judges in these areas are 
normally well educated and trained. They can better understand the importance of due 
process in litigation proceedings and are also more willing to follow due process 
requirements.550 7KLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVRQWKHSXEOLF¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIFRXUWV
Michelson finds that the public generally have more confidence in the courts in Beijing and 
other relatively prosperous areas about their capacity to secure procedural justice than those 
in rural areas. Procedural requirements are normally duly followed by judges in these 
areas.551 From this perspective, it seems that foreign-related commercial disputants can be 
less worried about the fulfilment of due process requirements, because their cases are 
mainly handled by the courts in economically-developed coastal areas. 
(2) Autonomy and Flexibility of Arbitration Proceedings in Law  
Party autonomy is generally recognized in Chinese law. Most legal provisions 
regarding party autonomy are basically consistent with those in the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(Table 7). These legal provisions provide the parties with the freedom to tailor their own 
arbitration proceedings and thus increase the flexibility of arbitration proceedings. For 
example, both the Arbitration Law and the 2014 CIETAC Arbitration Rules confirm the 
autonomy of parties in the selection of arbitrators.552 The parties are also entitled to select 
the laws governing substantive matters and the laws applicable to arbitration agreements, 
provided the designated laws are not against mandatory legal rules and the public interest 
of China.  
With regard to specific procedural rules, the Arbitration Law does not provide detailed 
guidance on the issue of party autonomy, while the gaps are filled by institutional arbitration 
rules such as CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2014. First, CIETAC permits the parties to modify 
&,(7$&¶DUELWUDWLRQUXOHVRUGLUHFWO\ GHVLJQDWHRWKHUDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVWRUHSODFH&,(7$&¶V
arbitration rules, as long as the modified or designated rules are feasible and not against 
mandatory legal rules (Article 4 (3)). Second, the arbitration language is subject to the 
choices of the parties. When the parties fail to reach an agreement, Chinese can be the 
substitute. But, the arbitration commission can also choose a foreign language which is 
                                                 
550 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 144. 
551 Ethan Michelson, 'Popular Attitudes towards Dispute Processing in Urban and Rural China', (2008) 
FLJS (Foundation for Law, Justice and Society) 'Rule of Law in China: Chinese Law and Business' 
programme reports, p. 6. Available at http://www.fljs.org/content/popular-attitudes-towards-dispute-
processing-urban-and-rural-china. Last visited in June 2016. 
552 However, it should be noted that the autonomy of parties in the appointment of arbitrators is partly 
OLPLWHGE\&KLQD¶VSDUWLFXODUSDQHOOLVWDUELWUDWRUV\VWHPLQSUDFWLFH7KLVLVVXHLVIXUWKHUGLVFXVVHGLQWKH
following Section 6.4.4 (1). 
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deemed to be more appropriate for the case concerned (Article 81). Third, the parties can 
select the arbitration seat and the place of hearings by agreement, while they are not 
necessarily places within the territories of China (Articles 7 and 36). Fourth, the parties 
enjoy the freedom of deciding the mode of hearings, be it oral or written (Article 35 (2)), 
inquisitional or adversarial (Article 35 (3)), summary or ordinary (Article 56). Last, the 
parties are free to decide whether to keep a hearing record in foreign-related commercial 
arbitration (Article 40). 
Table 7: List of key articles regarding party autonomy in Chinese laws, CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules 2014 and UNCITRAL Model Law 
Issues 
Articles in 
Chinese laws 
Articles in 
CIETAC 
Arbitration 
Rules 2014 
Article in the 
UNICTRAL 
Model Law 
Consistency of 
Chinese legal 
rules with the 
UNICTRAL 
Model Law 
Choice 
between sole-
arbitrator or 
three-arbitrator 
tribunal 
Article 30, 
Arbitration Law 
Article 25 Article 10 Consistent 
Appointment 
of arbitrators 
Article 31, 
Arbitration Law 
Article 26 Article 11 
Partly consistent 
(limited by the 
panel list 
arbitrator 
system) 
Designation of 
the arbitration 
seat 
Article 16, 
WKH63&¶V
judicial 
interpretation to 
the Arbitration 
Law 
Article 7 Article 20 (1) Consistent 
Designation of 
the place of 
oral hearings 
N/A Article 36 Article 20 (2) Consistent 
Selection of the 
arbitration 
language 
N/A Article 81 Article 22 Consistent 
Chapter 6 Status Quo of Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
 
171 
Choice 
between oral 
and written 
hearings 
N/A Article 35 (2) Article 24 Consistent 
Designation of 
the law 
governing 
substantive 
matters 
Article 3, 4, 5 
and 41, 
Law on 
Application of 
Laws to 
Foreign-Related 
Civil Relations 
Article 49 (2) Article 28 (1) 
Partly consistent 
(limited by 
mandatory rules 
and public 
interest) 
 
(3) Restrictions to Select Ad Hoc Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration Institutions for 
Resolving Arbitration Cases Seated in China 
Although most arbitration proceedings in China are free to be tailored by the parties, 
their freedom is restricted by several obstacles in practice. One such obstacle is the 
limitation in selecting ad hoc arbitration. Although there is no legal provision explicitly 
stating that ad hoc arbitration is prohibited in China, it is generally agreed the requirement 
that an arbitration commission must be expressly designated in the arbitration agreement in 
Article 16 of the Arbitration Law actually wipes out the possibility of ad hoc arbitration for 
arbitration cases seated in China.553 In other words, the parties can only select institutional 
arbitration when Chinese law is the applicable law to the arbitration agreement.554 This 
implied rule was also confirmed by the SPC in the Guangzhou People’s Insurance Company 
case (ᒯᐎӪ≁؍䲙ޜਨṸ), in which the validity of an arbitration agreement was denied 
by the SPC for the reason that the parties selected ad hoc arbitration and failed to fulfil the 
legal requirement that an arbitration commission must be designated in the arbitration 
agreement.555     
                                                 
553 See e.g. Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 88; Clarisse Von Wunschheim and Kun Fan (2008), supra 
note 418, p. 36; Jingzhou Tao and Clarisse Von Wunschheim (2007), supra note 399, p. 312; Jian Zhou, 
'Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc Arbitration', 
23 (2006) Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 162-167. 
554 It should be noted that Article 16 of the Arbitration Law does not specify that the arbitration agreement 
must be reached before the rise of the dispute. It is also possible for the parties to reach a valid arbitration 
agreement after the rise of the dispute. However, regardless of whether the arbitration agreement is reached 
ex ante or ex post, the parties can only choose institutional arbitration by clearly designating one arbitration 
commission in the arbitration agreement, while ad hoc arbitration is not allowed if the disputes are seated 
in China. 
555 ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH 3HRSOH¶V ,QVXUDQFH &RPSDQ\ *XDQJGRQJ %UDQFK Dnd the Guangdong Guanghe 
Electric Power Company reached a contract. In the contract, the parties agreed that any dispute regarding 
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Furthermore, the requirement of the clear designation of the arbitration commission in 
Article 16 also limits the possibility of foreign arbitration institutions to administer 
arbitration cDVHVVHDWHGLQ&KLQD6SHFLILFDOO\$UWLFOHH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHVWKDWDQµDUELWUDWLRQ
FRPPLVVLRQ¶VKRXOGEHGHVLJQDWHGLQWKHDUELWUDWLRQDJUHHPHQW, and the Arbitration Law 
IXUWKHUVSHFLILHVWKDWWKHµDUELWUDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQ¶FDQRQO\EHHVWDEOLVKHd by CCPIT at the 
central level, or local governments and chambers of commerce at the local level. In other 
ZRUGVWKHWHUPµDUELWUDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQ¶LQDVWULFWVHQVHUHIHUVWRD&KLQHVHDUELWUDWLRQ
institution, be it CIETAC or a local arbitration institution.556 Thus, this requirement is 
commonly deemed as an implied ban which prevents foreign arbitration institutions from 
administering arbitration cases seated in China, though, similar to the issue of ad hoc 
arbitration, there is no explicit prohibition in law.557 
This institution-only approach which only allows institutional arbitration and creates 
the de facto monopoly of Chinese arbitration institutions over arbitration cases seated in 
China has been widely criticized. It is argued that this approach is inconsisteQWZLWK&KLQD¶V
general arbitration reform towards openness and internationalization.558 The reason for this 
relatively conservative approach which blocks the entrance of ad hoc arbitration and foreign 
arbitration institutions to the Chinese arbitration market is attributed by some scholars to 
WKHUHOXFWDQFHRIWKHDXWKRULWLHVWRUHOLQTXLVKWKHLUFRQWURORYHU&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQ$IWHU
all, ad hoc arbitration directly conducted by arbitrators and foreign arbitration institutions 
is generally out of the reach of Chinese authorities. By contrast, it is much easier for the 
                                                 
the contract should be arbitrated by an arbitrator mutually selected by the parties. Later, a dispute arose 
between the parties and the case was brought to the Guangdong HPC. The Guangdong HPC decided that 
the arbitration agreement was invalid, because the parties chose ad hoc arbitration which is not allowed 
under Chinese law. The case was then appealed to the SPC. The SPC confLUPHGWKDWWKH*XDQJGRQJ+3&¶V
GHFLVLRQ ZDV FRUUHFW 7KLV ODQGPDUN FDVH VKRZHG WKH 63&¶V DWWLWXGH WKDW DQ DUELWUDWLRQ DJUHHPHQW
designating ad hoc arbitration would be deemed as invalid for arbitration cases seated in China. See ѝഭ
Ӫ≁؍䲙ޜਨᒯьⴱ࠶ޜਨоᒯьᒯਸ⭥࣋ᴹ䲀ޜਨㅹ؍䲙ਸ਼㓐㓧Ṹ  (People's Insurance 
Company (Guangdong Branch) v. Guangdong Guanghe Electric Power Company), [2002]≁ഋ㓸ᆇㅜ 29
ਧ ([2002] Min SI Zhong Zi No. 29). 
556 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 10, 16 and 66. 
557 See Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 89; Clarisse Von Wunschheim and Kun Fan (2008), supra note 
418, p. 37; Jingzhou Tao and Clarisse Von Wunschheim (2007), supra note 399, pp. 323-324. 
558 See Wei Sun, 'SPC Instruction Provides New Opportunities for International Arbitral Institutions to 
Expand into China', 31 (2014) Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 683-700; Kun Fan, 'Prospects of 
Foreign Arbitration Institutions Administering Arbitration in China', 28 (2011) Journal of International 
Arbitration, pp. 343-353; Jingzhou Tao and Clarisse Von Wunschheim (2007), supra note 399, pp. 324-
325. 
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authorities to exert their influence over the cases through their indirect connections with 
Chinese arbitration institutions.559  
+RZHYHU WKH 63&¶V UHSO\ LQ WKH /RQJOLGH FDVH 嗉࡙ᗇṸ) in 2013 brought new 
changes to practice.  In this case, the Longlide Packaging Co. Ltd. (a Chinese company 
located in Anhui Province) and the BP Agnati S.R.L. (a Italian company) reached an 
arbitration agreement which provided that disputes between them should be submitted to 
ICC for arbitration, and the place of arbitration (arbitration seat) should be Shanghai China. 
Later a dispute arose between them, and Longlide raised an objection to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement before the Hefei IPC. The Hefei IPC then ruled that the arbitration 
DJUHHPHQWZDVLQYDOLGDV,&&LVQRWDQµDUELWUDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQ¶XQGHUWKH$UELWUDWLRQODZ 
According to the requirement of the prior reporting mechanism, the case was reported 
to the Anhui HPC for review. The opinions of judges in Anhui HPC were divided. The 
majority opinion deemed the arbitration agreement valid, as the designation of ICC should 
be recognized as a clear designation of the arbitration institution in the agreement, while the 
minority opinion agreed with the decision of the Hefei IPC. The case was then further 
reported to the SPC for instruction. The SPC confirmed the majority opinion of the Anhui 
HPC and replied that the arbitration agreement should be deemed as valid.  
7KH 63&¶V UHSO\ LQ WKH /onglide case indicates that a foreign-related arbitration 
agreement in which a foreign arbitration institution is selected by the parties can be deemed 
DVYDOLG+RZHYHU LW VKRXOGEHQRWHG WKDW WKH63&RQO\UHVSRQGHG WR WKH$QKXL+3&¶V
inquiry regarding tKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHDUELWUDWLRQDJUHHPHQW$VDUHVXOWWKH63&¶VUHSO\LQ
this case cannot be directly understood as an explicit confirmation that foreign arbitration 
institutions can administer arbitration cases seated in China,560  
Another noteworthy development regarding foreign arbitration institutions in China is 
WKHRSHQLQJRIWKUHHIRUHLJQDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIILFHVLQWKH6KDQJKDL
Pilot Free Trade Zone. In November 2015, HKIAC opened its representative office in the 
Free Trade Zone, and it was the first foreign arbitration institution which has a presence 
                                                 
559 As mentioned, Chinese arbitration institutions are more or less subject to the influence of government 
organs in personnel and financial issues, which enables the authorities to establish indirect control over 
them. See Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 89-90; Jian Zhou (2006), supra note 553, pp. 168-170. 
560 Reply Letter of the Supreme People's Court on the Case between Anhui Longlide Packaging Co. Ltd. 
(Applicant) v. BP Agnati S.R.L. (Respondent) Concerning the Application for the Confirmation of the 
Validity of the Arbitration Agreement (2013) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⭣䈧Ӫᆹᗭⴱ嗉࡙ᗇव㻵ঠࡧᴹ䲀
ޜਨо㻛⭣䈧Ӫ BP Agnati S.R.L.⭣䈧⺞䇔Ԣ㻱ॿ䇞᭸࣋ṸⲴ༽࠭), [2013]≁ഋԆᆇㅜ 13ਧ ([2013] 
Min Si Ta Zi No.13), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 23 March 2013. For a detailed analysis of 
this case, see Wei Sun (2014), supra note 558, pp. 683-700. 
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inside mainland &KLQD)ROORZLQJ+.,$&¶VVWHSV6,$&DOVRHVWDEOLVKHGLWVUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
office in January 2016. Later in March 2016, ICC became the first non-Asian international 
arbitration institution which obtained a licence to open its representative office in mainland 
China. At the current stage, the main functions of these new representative offices are to 
foster cooperation between foreign and Chinese arbitration institutions, while the 
connections between these three international arbitration institutions and Chinese 
authorities and disputants can also be enhanced. Their presence in China is also expected to 
be an important step for these three arbitration institutions to increase their influence in 
China and Asia. Besides, these representative offices will also contribute to the development 
of arbitration in China through training projects and networking conferences.561  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that since these three representative offices are still 
not authorized to accept and handle arbitration cases seated in China, this new development 
can hardly be regarded as a direct permission that foreign arbitration institutions can handle 
foreign-related commercial cases seated in China. However, the recent opening of the three 
IRUHLJQ DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIILFHV LQ6KDQJKDLDQG WKH63&¶SRVLWLYH
UHSO\LQWKH/RQJOLGHFDVHVDWOHDVWUHIOHFWVWKDW&KLQD¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVIRUHLJQDUELWUDWLRQ
institutions is changing, and the Chinese arbitration market is increasingly opening. 
(4) Restrictions in Arbitrator Selection and the Panel List Arbitrator System 
Another contentious issue is the particular panel list arbitrator system in arbitrator 
selection, which only permits the parties to select the arbitrators on the arbitrator lists 
prepared by Chinese arbitration institutions.562 The panel list arbitrator system used to be 
DQLPSRUWDQWPHFKDQLVPDWWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQUHIRUPLQWKHPLG-1990s. 
At that time, Chinese parties were relatively unfamiliar with modern commercial arbitration, 
and they normally lacked the necessary information and experience to ascertain whether an 
arbitrator was competent to handle their cases. As a result, Chinese arbitration institutions 
assessed the quality of candidate arbitrators and only included qualified ones in their lists 
                                                 
561  5HODWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ FDQ EH IRXQG RQ WKH ZHEVLWH RI µ$VLDQ /HJDO %XVLQHVV¶ $YDLODEOH DW
http://www.legalbusinessonline.com/news/hkiac-opens-office-shanghai/71058; 
http://www.legalbusinessonline.com/news/siac-sets-office-shanghai/71508; 
http://www.legalbusinessonline.com/news/icc-wins-approval-open-shanghai/71789. 
Last visited in December 2016. 
562 There is no explicit statement in law that the panel list arbitrator system is compulsory, but Articles 11 
and 13 of the Arbitration Law require arbitration commissions to establish their own lists of arbitrators. 
These articles are argued to be the legal basis for the panel list arbitrator system. See Weixia Gu (2008), 
supra note 536, pp. 124-125. 
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of arbitrators. The parties were also required to select arbitrators from these lists, so that 
competent arbitrators could be selected for handling arbitration cases.563  
+RZHYHUZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQLQWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHV&KLQD¶V
arbitration institutions have become increasingly modernized and internationalized. More 
and more professional arbitrators have joined in ChinD¶VDUELWUDWLRQFLUFOH564 Meanwhile, 
WRGD\¶GLVSXWDQWVIRUHLJQSDUWLHVLQSDUWLFXODUPD\KDYHWKHLURZQVRXUFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQ
on the appropriate choices of arbitrators. Many off-list Chinese and foreign arbitrators that 
are trusted by the parties can be as professional as those listed arbitrators in the arbitrator 
lists of Chinese arbitration institutions. As a consequence, the compulsory requirement that 
arbitrators can only be selected from the arbitrator lists of Chinese arbitration institutions 
seems to be increasingly outdated. 
Furthermore, the panel list arbitrator system is also inconsistent with the common 
practice of arbitrator selection at the international level. The UNCITRAL Model Law does 
not place any substantial restrictions upon the autonomy of parties in arbitrator selection. 
The parties are generally free to select any arbitrator they trust, regardless of their 
nationalities.565 Meanwhile, many leading international arbitration institutions, such as ICC, 
LCIA, SCC and ICDR, do not have arbitrator lists. Other renowned international arbitration 
institutions, such as HKIAC and SIAC, do provide lists of arbitrators. But, their lists only 
function as the recommendations for the parties, which are different from the lists in Chinese 
arbitration institutions that are used as the arbitrator pools for compulsory selection.566 In 
other words, it is widely accepted at the international level that the parties should be 
provided with sufficient freedom to select their preferred arbitrators regardless of whether 
they are on the lists or not. 
Not surprisingly, the panel list arbitrator system, which is regarded as one of the main 
obstacles to party autonomy in foreign-related commercial arbitration, has received 
                                                 
563 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
564 This can be partly reflected by the significant increase in the number of listed arbitrators. For example, 
WKHQXPEHURIDUELWUDWRUVLQ&,(7$&¶VOLVWKDVLQFUHDVHGIURPLQWRLQ2015.   
565 Particularly, the UNCITRAL Model Law also provides that if the court or other responsible authority 
needs to designate the arbitrator when the parties fail to select one, it should also take into consideration 
the impartiality, independence and nationality of the arbitrators. See UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (2006), Article 11. 
566 For abbreviations, ICC refers to the International Chamber of Commerce; LCIA refers to the London 
Court of International Arbitration; SCC refers to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce; ICDR refers to the International Centre for Dispute Resolution under the American Arbitration 
Association; HKIAC refers to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Commission; SIAC refers to the 
Singapore International Arbitration Commissions. 
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increasing critical comments in recent years.567 Responding to these concerns, CIETAC 
revised its arbitration rules in 2005 and permitted the parties to select arbitrators outside 
&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWRUOLVW7KHVHOHFWLRQRIRIf-list arbitrators, however, is not completely 
free but subject to additional institutional control: tKHSDUWLHV¶VHOHFWLRQRIRII-list arbitrators 
must be first approved by the chairman of CIETAC.568 In practice, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the selection of off-list arbitrators may end in rejection by CIETAC.569  
Besides, CIETAC also does not clearly and explicitly specify how and based on what 
criteria the chairman decides whether to approve the selection of off-list arbitrators, which 
may lead to doubts on the transparency of the approval procedure.570 In general, although 
CIETAC has made efforts to change the panel list arbitrator system, it is still reluctant to go 
further and to FRPSOHWHO\DEROLVKWKHV\VWHP,WVHHPVWKDWWKHSDUWLHV¶IUHHGRPLQDUELWUDWRU
selection may still be restricted by the panel list arbitrator system for a while. 
6.4.2 Court Mediation and the Med-Arb Procedure: Potential Risks to Procedural 
Fairness 
Court mediation (the combination of litigation and mediation) and the Med-Arb 
procedure (the combination of arbitration and mediation) are two important procedures in 
&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQ7KHVHWZRSURFHGXUHVVKDUHPDQ\VLPLODULWLHVLQODZDQG
practice. On the one hand, they are supposed to bring the merits of both mediation and 
litigation/arbitration to the parties, which can help to ease the tension between the parties 
and to enhance the efficiency of litigation/arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, 
improper regulatory design and legal practice in court mediation and the Med-Arb 
procedure may also pose potential risks to procedural fairness.  
(1) Combination of Litigation and Mediation Proceedings in Chinese Courts 
Mediation has long been placed at the centre of dispute resolution by the authorities 
in China, the history of which can be traced back to the Mao era. As a mechanism which 
                                                 
567 For a detailed analysis on the panel list arbitrator system, see Weixia Gu (2008), supra note 536, pp. 
121-149. See also Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 105-109; Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 305, p. 
815; Kun Fan (2008), supra note 305, p. 38; Yuqing Zhang, 'Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes 
in China', in Albert Jan Van den Berg (ed.), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and 
Beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2005), p. 175; Russel Thirgood (2000), supra note 305, p. 98; Charles 
Kenworthey Harer (1999), supra note 305, pp. 404-405. 
568 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2005), Article 21 
(2). 
569 Jingzhou Tao (2012), supra note 305, p. 815. 
570 The vice chairman of CIETAC, Yu Jianlong once stated in a conference held in New York that the 
criteria for the approval of off-list arbitrators was the same as that for the recruitment of the listed arbitrators. 
But, this statement was not \HWRIILFLDOO\FRQILUPHGE\&,(7$&RUUHIOHFWHGLQ&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHV
See Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, p. 107. 
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was consistent with both the traditional philosophies of the &RQIXFLDQLVPYDOXLQJµKDUPRQ\¶
and the socialist ideology of CPC emphasizing political uniformity, mediation took 
precedence over litigation in the resolution of civil disputes at that time.571 After the 1978 
UHIRUP WKH PRGHUQL]DWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ PHFKDQLVPV DQG WKH
accompanying recognition of the importance of adjudicative mechanisms once led to the 
retreat of mediation in the 1990s. 572  However, the usage of mediation has been re-
emphasized since the mid-2000s. The central authorities attributed the increasing petitions 
from the public WRWKHµIDLOXUH¶RIDGMXGLFDWLYHPHFKDQLVPV in reducing social discontent, 
and the adversarial essence of adjudicative mechanisms was blamed as one of the main 
causes. As a result, uQGHU WKH VORJDQ RI µFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI VRFLDOLVW KDUPRQLRXV VRFLHW\¶
mediation has experienced a revival in the past ten years.573  
The particular focus on mediation is inevitably channelled to the judicial system. In 
courts, mediation proceedings are integrated into the litigation process, which follows the 
prinFLSOHRIµPHGLDWLRQLQSULRULW\DQGFRPELQDWLRQRIPHGLDWLRQDQGOLWLJDWLRQ¶䈳䀓Ոݸ, 
䈳ࡔ㔃ਸ).574 The CiPL repeatedly states that mediation can be conducted throughout the 
entire process of litigation, including the case-filling and pre-hearing phases, first and 
second instance trials and retrials.575 Courts are encouraged by the SPC to increase the rate 
RIFDVHVFRQFOXGHGYLDPHGLDWLRQ-XGJHV¶PHGLDWLRQVNLOOVDUHHPSKDVL]HGWREHHTXDOO\
important to, if not more important than, adjudicative skills.576 The SPC even issues special 
notices to praise the courts that have outstanding performance in court mediation.577 
                                                 
571 )RUDXVHIXOLQWURGXFWLRQRIPHGLDWLRQLQ0DR¶VHUDVHHStanley B. Lubman (1967), supra note 296, pp. 
1284-1359. 
572 Stanley B. Lubman (1997), supra note 166, pp. 272-274. 
573 Hualing Fu and Richard Cullen, 'From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice 
Reform in China', in Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher (eds.), Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute 
Resolution in Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 25-27. 
574 Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Further Implementing the Principle of 'Mediation 
First and Combination of Mediation and Adjudication' (2010) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘋а↕䍟ᖫ³䈳䀓Ո
ݸǃ䈳ࡔ㔃ਸ´ᐕ֌৏ࡉⲴ㤕ᒢ᜿㿱), ⌅ਁ[2010]16ਧ (Fa Fa [2010] No. 16), issued by the Supreme 
People's Court on 7 June 2010. 
575 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 122, 133, 142 and 172. 
576 Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Further Strengthening the Positive Effects of Court 
Mediation on the Construction of Socialist Harmonious Society (2007) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘋а↕ਁᥕ
䇹䇬䈳䀓൘ᶴᔪ⽮Պѫѹ઼䉀⽮Պѝ〟ᶱ֌⭘Ⲵ㤕ᒢ᜿㿱), ⌅ਁ[2007]9 ਧ (Fa Fa [2007] No. 9), 
issued by the Supreme People's Court on 1 March 2007, Paragraphs 4 and 24-26. 
577 Notification of the Supreme People's Court on Praising People's Courts Which Reach Outstanding 
Achievements in Mediation Work (2009) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾሩ൘䈳䀓ᐕ֌ѝڊࠪケࠪᡀ㔙ⲴӪ≁⌅
䲒Ҹԕ㺘ᢜⲴ䙊ᣕ), ⌅[2009]229ਧ (Fa (2009) No.229), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 23 
July 2009. 
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It should be noted that such emphasis on mediation results in several side effects and 
pose potential risks to procedural fairness in litigation. First, court mediation in China has 
a distinctive adjudicative nature. The CiPL provides that court mediation should be based 
RQµFOHDUO\DVFHUWDLQHGIDFWV¶DQGµDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQULJKWDQGZURQJ¶578 Following this 
principle, what judges do in mediation proceedings is basically the same as those in 
litigation proceedings. They investigate the cases, examine facts and evidence, and question 
the parties and witnesses when necessary. It is a common practice that judges first develop 
settlement plans in their minds based on the information they find in both mediation and 
litigation proceedings, and then turn to the parties for their consent. But, no matter the 
parties accept the plans or not, it normally does not really change the facts that the plans 
offered by judges are probably the final results of the cases. The plans will either be 
confirmed in mediation statements if the parties agree with the judges, or turn into 
judgements if the parties do not accept the plans and request the judges to render 
judgements. 579  To a large extent, judges are actually adjudicating cases rather than 
mediating cases. As a consequence, court mediation in China loses its consensual features, 
and judges become the ones who dominate the procedure instead of the parties.580 Court 
mediation in China is more likely to be a combined procedure with an adjudicative core and 
a mediatory shell. Procedural fairness is also undermined, as judges reach their decisions 
with the information obtained from mediation proceedings, which is not adequately 
presented and examined in formal adjudication proceedings. 
Second, although it is clearly stated in law that court mediation can only be conducted 
on a voluntary basis, judges, under the pressure of increasing the mediation rate, still tend 
to use all available techniques to convince or even force the parties to accept court mediation 
proposals. For example, judges may constantly raise mediation proposals throughout the 
entire litigation process. In an extreme sense, the cases will not be concluded unless the 
parties agree to settle the case with mediation statements. Judges may also use the 
DIRUHPHQWLRQHGµVHWWOHPHQWSODQV¶DVWKHEDUJDLQLQJFKLSVWRH[HUWSUHVVXUHRQWKHSDUWLHV
It is not rare to find judges informing the parties that the results are basically certain, as they 
have already made clear the facts and distinguished right from wrong. The parties are thus 
persuaded by judges that the acceptance of mediation agreements can be mutually beneficial 
for them, while insistence on formal court judgements may lead to the outcomes that are 
                                                 
578 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 93 and 94. 
579 F. Peter Philips, 'Commercial Mediation in China: the Challenge of Shifting Paradigms', in Arthur W. 
Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: the Fordham Papers 2008 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p. 320; Philip C. C. Huang, 'Court Mediation in China, Past and 
Present', 32 (2006) Modern China, p. 304. 
580 Vicki Waye and Ping Xiong, 'The Relationship between Mediation and Judicial Proceedings in China', 
6 (2011) Asian Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 21-22. 
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actually negative for both sides. 581   7KXV LW VHHPV WKDW WKH HVVHQFH RI &KLQD¶V FRXUW
mediation is substantially coercive, although it is decorated with a nominal emphasis on 
voluntariness. Such de facto infringement to the principle of voluntariness in mediation 
obviously violates the procedural rights of the parties. 
Third, the legal effects of mediation statements issued in court mediation and court 
judgements rendered after formal adjudication are rather similar to each other. Once the 
parties reach an agreement in court mediation, the court should issue a mediation statement, 
which states the claims of parties, the facts of cases and the results of court mediation. The 
mediation statement should be first signed by the judges and court clerks and then sent to 
the parties. It becomes immediately effective, legally binding and directly enforceable upon 
the receipt and signature of the parties.582 It is plausible that such design which provides 
mediation agreements with equal legal status as court judgements aims to remove the 
worries of the parties on the legal effects of mediation agreements and encourage them to 
settle the cases with court mediation.  
However, it should be noted that mediation statements cannot be appealed. 
Theoretically, mediation agreements, which are deemed to be the result of the amicable 
settlement between the parties, have a consensual nature. Accordingly, it is reasonable that 
mediation agreements which are essentially contracts between the parties are non-
appealable.583 But, mediation agreements in court mediation are issued in the form of 
mediation statements in China, which are equally binding and enforceable as court 
judgements. Considering the de facto coercive and adjudicative nature of court mediation 
in China, mediation statements and court judgements are not that different in essence, as 
they are essentially made based on the opinions of judges after investigation and actually 
µFRPSXOVRU\¶ WR EH DFFHSWHG E\ WKH SDUWLHV LQ WKH HQG 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ ZLWKRXW WKH
                                                 
581 3KLOLSVRQFHTXRWHGDMXGJH¶VVWDWHPHQWZKLFKZHOOLOOXVWUDWHVWKHFRHUFLYHQDWXUHRIFRXUWPHGLDWLRQ
µ,DPDMXGJHLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW,KDYHEHHQDMXGJHIRUWKLUW\-five years. I have conciliated 10,000 
FDVHV$QG\RX¶UH WU\LQJ WR WHOOPHKRZ WRGRDQRSHQLQJVWDWHPHQW"7KHUH LVQRQHHG IRUDQRSHQLQJ
statement by the judge. Our civil procedure law provides that I am obligated to offer my services as a 
conciliator in any case before me. I always do. The CIETAC Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator 
LVREOLJDWHGWRRIIHUKLVVHUYLFHVDVDFRQFLOLDWRUDQGWKH\DOZD\VGR$QGZKDW,GRLVWRVD\,¶PJRLQJWR
now conciliate this case. Stop lying, all of you stop lying. Tell me what really happened. And they tell me 
what really happened, because I am a very respected judge. Then I go back to my office. I look up the law 
WRILQGRXWZKDWWKHULJKWDQVZHULV7KHQ,FRPHEDFNDQG,VD\³$FFRUGLQJWRWKHODZ\RXRZH him 
10,000 RMB. Now, you will either pay him the 10,000 RMB or we will go back to the trial. And if we go 
back to the trial, then in front of your children and in front of your mother and in front of your business 
partners I will point to you and say, you RZHKLP50%´7KH\DOOVHWWOHF. Peter Philips (2009), 
supra note 579, p. 320. 
582 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 97. 
583 Frank E. A. Sander, 'Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to 
A Mediation-Centred Approach', 11 (2006) Harvard Negotiation Law Review, p. 2. 
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supervision of second LQVWDQFHFRXUWV WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIGHWHFWLQJ MXGJHV¶ misbehaviour, 
such as the violation of procedural rules, is also reduced.584 Given all these peculiarities of 
FRXUWPHGLDWLRQLQ&KLQDLWVHHPVQRORQJHUMXVWLILDEOHWRFRPSOHWHO\UHPRYHWKHSDUWLHV¶
rights to appeal in court mediation. 
)RXUWK WKH HPSKDVLV RQ PHGLDWLRQ LQ MXGLFLDO SUDFWLFH PD\ DOVR PLVOHDG MXGJHV¶
priorities in judicial work. Although mediation techniques can be helpful for judges in 
handling cases, they should be principally supplementary skills for judges. However, under 
WKH SULQFLSOH RI µPHGLDWLRQ LQ SULRULW\¶ MXGJHV VHHP WR EHPRUH H[SHFWHG WR EH VNLOIXO
mediators rather than impartial adjudicators. Judges receive mediation training and are 
encouraged to conduct court mediation. They are even formally and openly praised by the 
SPC for their good performance in court mediation. In such an environment, judges are 
motivated to try formal or informal methods to reach desired mediation results, while the 
requirements of procedural fairness are more or less neglected. It should be noted that judges 
are even permitted by law to separately meet the parties in court mediation. They can 
directly provide settlement plans to the parties, which, to some extent, is the same as sharing 
opinions with the parties. They can also allow the parties to reach agreements on issues that 
are outside the litigation claims.585 Such direct violation of procedural justice cannot be 
justified by the needs of mediation, especially when the judges and mediators are the same 
persons who will render court judgements in case of the failure of mediation efforts.  
To sum up, the combination of mediation and litigation proceedings do have some 
positive effects. Generally, court mediation provides the parties with an opportunity to 
reconsider the possibility of more efficient and amicable ways of settlement rather than 
costly and adversarial formal adjudication proceedings. Successful court mediation can ease 
the tension between the parties, relieve their grievances and thus help the parties to find a 
peaceful end for their disputes. It can also increase the possibility of voluntary enforcement 
and reduce the time, money and energy spent on the cases.586 However, the substantial 
realization of these merits of court mediation must be based on a voluntary basis and proper 
legal designs. Otherwise, if the mediation and adjudication proceedings cannot be carefully 
separated from each other, court mediation may then entail potential risks to procedural 
fairness. Influenced by the particular policy emphasis on mediation, the law and practice of 
court mediation in China fails to pay due respect to procedural justice. It is also questionable 
                                                 
584 Vicki Waye and Ping Xiong (2011), supra note 580, pp. 20-21. 
585 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues regarding the Civil Mediation Work in 
People's Courts (2004) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒≁һ䈳䀓ᐕ֌㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ㿴ᇊ), ⌅䟺[2004]12ਧ 
(Fa Shi [2004] No.12), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 16 September 2004, Articles 7-9. 
586 See Ellen E. Deason, 'Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-
Worldwide', 80 (2005) Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 557-562. 
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whether such de facto coercive and adjudicative court mediation can realize the assumed 
goals of amicable settlement, peaceful end and voluntary enforcement. 
It should be noted that the SPC introduced several new rules to enhance procedural 
justice in court mediation.  In its 2015 judicial interpretation to the CiPL, the SPC 
emphasizes that the facts recognized by the parties in court mediation should not be used as 
adverse evidence in following litigation proceedings, unless so agreed by the parties. The 
SPC also requires that the courts should resume adjudication proceedings and render 
judgements promptly when one or both parties refuse to mediate. The confidentiality of 
mediation proceedings is also confirmed. 587  But, whether these articles emphasizing 
procedural justice may bring substantial changes to the judicial practice of court mediation 
still needs to be tested in the future. 
In terms of foreign-related commercial cases, the issue of court mediation seems to be 
more controversial. Chinese-style court mediation which focuses on right and wrong is 
different from western-style mediation which starts from and ends in the interest of the 
parties. In comparison with western mediators, Chinese judges tend to be more proactive 
and even arbitrary. The substantial coercion is also not welcomed by the parties from 
western cultures who pay particular attention to the voluntary nature of mediation 
proceedings.588 These discrepancies between Chinese court mediation and western-style 
mediation inevitably lead to the reluctance of foreign parties to accept mediation proposals 
in foreign-related commercial litigation. Moreover, experienced disputants normally first 
try amicable ways of settlement such as negotiation and mediation to solve the disputes. 
This is particularly true in foreign-UHODWHG FRPPHUFLDO FRQWUDFWV LQ ZKLFK µIULHQGO\
QHJRWLDWLRQ¶LVIUHTXHQWO\PHQWLRQHd as the first choice in dispute resolution.589 As a result, 
when they turn to adjudicative mechanisms, the possibility of amicable settlement may be 
already rather small. Thus, whether the reconsideration of mediation in courts is still 
necessary seems to be questionable. 
(2) Combination of Arbitration and Mediation Proceedings in Chinese Arbitration 
Institutions 
Similar to litigation proceedings, the influence of Confucianism and the emphasis of 
social harmony and stability in the CPC policy are also evident in arbitration proceedings.590 
                                                 
587 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2015), Articles 107, 145 and 146. 
588 Philip C. C. Huang (2006), supra note 579, pp. 310-314. 
589 See the previous discussion in Section 3.3.1 (1). 
590 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan, 'Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: Why It Works 
in China', 25 (2008) Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 479-492; Sally A. Harpole, 'The Combination 
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Early in 1988, the Med-$UE SURFHGXUH KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ LQWURGXFHG LQWR &,(7$&¶V
arbitration rules. 591  It was then formally confirmed in the 1994 Arbitration Law, the 
provisions of which are basically similar to those in the CiPL. Specifically, the Med-Arb 
procedure should be conducted on a voluntary basis, while the arbitration tribunal should 
timely resume the arbitration proceedings and render arbitration awards in case of the failure 
of mediation efforts. The results of successful Med-Arb procedure can be confirmed in 
mediation statements or arbitration awards. These two kinds of outcomes have equal legal 
effects, which are effective and enforceable upon the receipt and signature of the parties.592  
The general legal atmosphere which emphasizes the usage of mediation also 
influences the practice of the Med-Arb procedure. Similar to Chinese judges, Chinese 
arbitrators are also relatively proactive in proposing the Med-Arb procedure to the parties, 
though in a less coercive manner. To avoid an image of non-cooperation, the parties are 
normally reluctant to directly refuse the proposals.593 Similar to court mediation, proposals 
can be raised by the parties or arbitrators at any stage before the issuance of arbitration 
awards. Upon the consent of both parties, mediation proceedings can be immediately 
commenced with the suspension of arbitration proceedings. If the mediation efforts fail, the 
arbitration proceedings can also be immediately resumed. Particularly, with the deepening 
of the arbitration procedure, the facts of the cases and the relative positions of the parties 
may become increasingly clear. Proposals can then be raised again at a later stage whenever 
the arbitrators or the parties find it appropriate.594 
Similar to court mediation, arbitrators and mediators in the Med-Arb procedure are 
normally the same. But, unlike judges who tend to use their authority to pressure the parties, 
arbitrators in the Med-$UESURFHGXUHDUHPRUHOLNHWKHPLGGOHPHQLQWKHSDUWLHV¶bargaining. 
As Harpole indicates, they clarify the facts and laws for the parties and help them to 
recognize their comparative advantages and disadvantages during the process of both 
                                                 
of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People's Republic of China', 24 (2007) Journal of International 
Arbitration, pp. 623-633; Houzhi Tang, 'Combination of Arbitration with Conciliation - Arb-Med', in 
Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond (Kluwer 
Law International, 2005), pp. 547-555; Ariel Ye, 'Commentary on Integrated Dispute Resolution Systems 
in the PRC', in Albert Jan Van den Berg (ed.), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and 
Beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2005), pp. 478-483; Carlos De Vera, 'Arbitrating Harmony: 'Med-Arb' 
and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in 
China', 18 (2004) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, pp. 149-194. 
591 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1988), Article 37. 
592 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (1994), Articles 51 and 52. 
593 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan (2008), supra note 590, p. 487; Sally A. Harpole (2007), 
supra note 590, p. 625. 
594 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan (2008), supra note 590, p. 487; Sally A. Harpole (2007), 
supra note 590, p. 626. 
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mediation and arbitration proceedings. From this perspective, the mediation and arbitration 
proceedings are not that different from each other, since they both provide information for 
WKH SDUWLHV¶ EDUJDLQLQJ 7KLV FORVH LQWHJUDWLRQ RI PHGLDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ KDV FOHDU
advantages. The possibility of plural mediation proposals and the seamless switches 
between mediation and arbitration can significantly increase the success rate of the Med-
Arb procedure. 595  Successful amicable settlement can help to reserve the relationship 
between the parties, save their time and expenses, and increase the possibility of voluntary 
enforcement. 
However, the Chinese-style Med-Arb procedure also has its disadvantages. The 
credibility of the facts found in arbitration proceedings is guaranteed by the requirements 
of procedural fairness, through which the parties gain equal opportunities to present the 
claims and cross-examine the evidence. But, the information acquired in mediation 
proceedings is normally not adequately presented and contested by the parties. For example, 
µSULYDWHFDXFXVLQJ¶ অ⤜Պ䈸) is not rare in the practice of the Chinese-style Med-Arb 
procedure, in which the arbitrators contact the parties separately. In private caucusing, one 
party may disclose confidential information that they do not want to disclose when both 
parties are present. Accordingly, the infRUPDWLRQ GLVFORVHG E\ RQH SDUW\ LQ µSULYDWH
FDXFXVLQJ¶PD\EHQHLWKHUUHDOL]HGQRUFRQWHVWHGE\WKHRWKHUSDUW\ ,IVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ
affects the decisions of the arbitrators when mediation efforts fail, the procedural rights of 
the other party to contest such information is then actually violated.596  
Recognizing the importance of separating the information gained from mediation and 
arbitration proceedings, Article 47 (9) of the 2014 CIETAC Arbitration Rules explicitly 
state that any statements made by the parties or the arbitration tribunal in mediation 
proceedings cannot be quoted or used as evidence in following arbitral, judicial or any other 
proceedings. In other words, information acquired from mediation proceedings should stay 
in the mediation phase without further affecting arbitration proceedings. This rule not only 
helps to avoid the abuse of mediation information, but also encourages the parties to disclose 
necessary information to achieve the success of mediation without worrying about the 
potential negative effects of the disclosure in following proceedings. 
However, since the role of mediators and arbitrators in the Med-Arb procedure is 
normally played by the same persons in China, their opinions are more or less affected by 
                                                 
595 Support can be found in the empirical statistics. For example, in 2006, of all the 483 cases concluded 
by CIETAC, 158 cases were ended with an amicable settlement. Sally A. Harpole (2007), supra note 590, 
p. 632.   
596 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan (2008), supra note 590, p. 488; Sally A. Harpole (2007), 
supra note 590, p. 627. 
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the information acquired in the mediation proceedings, even though they can consciously 
remind themselves that the information obtained in mediation cannot be used for decision-
making in arbitration proceedings. This is especially the case in the Chinese-style Med-Arb 
procedure, in which mediation and arbitration proceedings are so closely connected. Given 
WKDWDUELWUDWRUVPD\KDYHWRIUHTXHQWO\µFKDQJHWKHLUKDWV¶LQWKHVHDPOHVVVZLWFKHVEHWZHHQ
mediation and arbitration, it seems to be an excessive demand to request the arbitrators to 
clearly distinguish the information obtained in arbitration and mediation. Actually, such a 
potential threat to procedural fairness is one important reason for scholars and practitioners 
to question the usage of the Med-Arb procedure.597  
The Med-Arb procedure is not a unique procedural technique in China. It can also be 
found in many other jurisdictions in the world. Many scholars have already noticed the 
emergence and development of the Med-Arb procedure in international commercial 
arbitration in recent years.598 Leading international arbitration institutions, such as ICC, 
LCIA, HKIAC and SIAC also provide legal services that combines mediation and 
arbitration. However, unlike the Chinese-style Med-Arb procedure, in which mediation and 
arbitration are so closely connected, a line between mediation and arbitration is normally 
carefully drawn in these international arbitration institutions. For example, while CIETAC 
directly places the provisions regarding the Med-Arb procedure in its arbitration rules, other 
international arbitration institutions normally provide separate mediation and arbitration 
rules to jointly govern the Med-Arb procedure.599 0RUHRYHULQFRQWUDVWWR&KLQD¶VSUDFWLFH
in which the same persons take the role of both mediators and arbitrators, other international 
                                                 
597 For a review of the opinions supporting and opposing the Med-Arb procedure, see Houzhi Tang (2005), 
supra note 590, pp. 547-555. See also Emilia Onyema, 'Current Development: the Use of Med-Arb in 
International Commercial Dispute Resolution', 12 (2001) American Review of International Arbitration, 
pp. 411-422; Kun Fan, 'The Risks of Apparent Bias When an Arbitrator Acts as a Mediator: Remarks on 
Hong Kong Court's Decision in Gao Haiyan', 13 (2011) Yearbook of Private International Law, pp. 535-
556. 
598 Michael E. Schneider, 'Combining Arbitration with Conciliation', 1 (2004) Transnational Dispute 
Management, pp. 1-53; Emilia Onyema (2001), supra note 597, pp. 411-422; James T. Peter, 'Med-Arb in 
International Arbitration', 8 (1997) American Review of International Arbitration, pp. 83-105; Barry C. 
Bartel, 'Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and Potential', 27 (1991) 
Willamette Law Review, pp. 691-692. 
599 Other major international arbitration institutions also provide proceedings similar to the Med-Arb 
procedure in China. But, western-style Med-Arb proceedings are more close to a stand-alone mediation 
procedure followed by a stand-alone arbitration procedure, rather than two mediation and arbitration 
procedures integrated with each other in China. This is probably why procedural rules for Med-Arb 
proceedings are normally provided in separate mediation rules in western arbitration institutions instead of 
directly adding Med-Arb rules in the arbitration rules like they are in Chinese arbitration institutions. For 
the discussion on the differences between western-style and Chinese-style Med-Arb proceedings, see e.g. 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Jung Yang, Jay Welsh, Chen Qiming and Peter Robinson, 'East Meets West: An 
International Dialogue on Mediation and Med-Arb in the United States and China', 9 (2009) Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal, pp. 398-400. 
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arbitration institutions normally prohibit the mediators from continually acting as the 
arbitrators in subsequent proceedings, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.600  
Responding to the concerns on the issue that mediators and arbitrators are normally 
the same in the Med-Arb procedure, Article 47 (8) of CIETAC Rules 2014 permits the 
parties to conduct mediation without the auspices of the arbitration tribunal, which 
indirectly enables the parties to appoint different persons to hold mediation and arbitration 
proceedings respectively. Some local arbitration institutions go further towards 
internationalization regarding the Med-Arb procedure. Article 67 (2) of the 2014 BAC 
Arbitration Rules directly permits the parties, upon the approval of the chairman, to appoint 
new arbitrators for the following proceedings when mediation efforts fail. 
In short, the Med-Arb procedure, compared to court mediation, is generally more in 
accordance with the voluntary and consensual nature of mediation proceedings. To a large 
extent, the usage of the Med-Arb procedure itself may not be problematic, as long as the 
parties are provided with enough freedom to weigh the strength and weakness and to make 
their own decisions accordingly. However, due to the general emphasis on mediation in 
China, the parties are still more or less forced to follow the Med-Arb procedure under the 
intangible pressure caused by repeated proposals, proactive arbitrators and the general 
atmosphere favouring mediation.601  More importantly, concerns may be raised on the 
practice of private caucusing and using the same persons as both mediators and arbitrators. 
The seamless integration of mediation and arbitration in the Chinese-style Med-Arb 
procedure also renders it difficult for arbitrators to clearly separate the information acquired 
in mediation and arbitration proceedings. From this perspective, it seems necessary to 
reconsider the usage of mediation in arbitration proceedings and upgrade the design of 
Chinese-style Med-Arb procedure, so that procedural fairness can be better ensured. 
6.4.3 Judicial Transparency and Arbitral Confidentiality: Gaps between Law and 
Practice 
                                                 
600 )RU H[DPSOH $UWLFOH  RI WKH  ,&&0HGLDWLRQ 5XOHV VWDWHV µXQOHVV DOO RI WKH SDUWLHV DJUHH
otherwise in writing, a mediator shall not act nor shall have acted in any judicial, arbitral or similar 
proceedings relating to the dispute which is or was the subject of the proceedings under the rules, whether 
as a judge, an arbitrator, an expert or a represHQWDWLYHRUDGYLVRURIDSDUW\¶6LPLODUO\$UWLFOHRIWKH
+.,$&0HGLDWLRQ5XOHVDOVRFRQILUPV WKDW µWKHSDUWLHVXQGHUWDNH WKDW WKHPHGLDWRU VKDOOQRWEH
appointed as adjudicator, arbitrator or representative, counsel or expert witness of any party in any 
subsequent adjudication, arbitration or judicial proceedings whether arising out of the mediation or any 
other dispute in connection with the same contract. No party shall be entitled to call the mediator as a 
witness in any subsequent adjudicatioQDUELWUDWLRQRUMXGLFLDOSURFHHGLQJVDULVLQJRXWRIWKHVDPHFRQWUDFW¶ 
601 F. Peter Philips (2009), supra note 579, pp. 2-3. 
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Generally, litigation and arbitration are different from each other with regard to the 
openness of the proceedings. On the one hand, judicial transparency requires courts to 
provide the public with the necessary access to their judicial work, including proceedings, 
trials and decisions in a narrow sense and personnel, funds and statistics in a broad sense. It 
also enables the public to scrutinize the courts and helps the courts to gain the trust of the 
public. On the other hand, arbitral confidentiality emphasizes the privacy of arbitration 
proceedings, which provides the parties with a more business-style dispute resolution 
mechanism. As discussed below, gaps remain between the general recognition of these two 
principles in law and their substantial implementation in practice. 
(1) Progress and Limits in Judicial Transparency 
As an important principle in litigation, judicial transparency receives general 
recognition in Chinese Law. Its basic requirement, namely open trial, is explicitly stated in 
both the Constitution and the CiPL. 602  Apart from the confirmation in laws, judicial 
transparency has also been one of the main focuses of the judicial reforms in the past decade. 
From 1999 to the present, the SPC has promulgated a series of special provisions to enhance 
WKHRSHQQHVVRIFRXUWV¶ZRUNFRYHULQJFDVH-filing work, open trials, court decisions, judicial 
enforcement and other important sectors of judicial work.603 The promulgation of these 
special provisions has gradually established a relatively complete regulatory framework for 
judicial transparency in China. 
One strategy that is particularly emphasized by the SPC is the usage of information 
technology. In 2013, the SPC established three information platforms for court trials, court 
decisions and judicial enforcement, which are designed to provide the public with an easy 
access to the information regarding these three issues through the internet.604 Specifically, 
a specialized website, namely China Judicial Process Information Online, has been set up 
                                                 
602 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2004), Article 125; Civil Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2012), Article 134. 
603 7KHVHVSHFLDOSURYLVLRQVPDLQO\LQFOXGH6HYHUDO3URYLVLRQVRIWKH6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶VFRXUWRQ6WULFWO\
,PSOHPHQWLQJ WKH 2SHQ 7ULDO 6\VWHP  6HYHUDO 2SLQLRQV RI WKH 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V FRXUW RQ
(QIRUFHPHQW'LVFORVXUHE\3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV6HYHUDO2SLQLRQVRIWKH6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶VFRXUWRQ
6WUHQJWKHQLQJ WKH7ULDO'LVFORVXUHE\3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV 6L[3URYLVLRQVRI WKH6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V
FRXUWRQ-XGLFLDO7UDQVSDUHQF\6HYHUDO2SLQLRQVRQRIWKH6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶VFRXUWRQ3URPRting 
WKH&RQVWUXFWLRQRI7KUHH3ODWIRUPVIRU-XGLFLDO7UDQVSDUHQF\3URYLVLRQVRIWKH6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V
FRXUWRQ3XEOLVKLQJ-XGJPHQWV9HUGLFWVDQG5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ6WDWHPHQWVRQWKH,QWHUQHWE\3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV
(2013), Several Opinions of the Supreme PHRSOH¶VFRXUWRQ(QIRUFHPHQW3URFHVV'LVFORVXUHE\3HRSOH¶V
Courts (2014). 
604 Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Promoting the Construction of the Three Platforms 
for Judicial Transparency (2013) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ᧘䘋ਨ⌅ޜᔰйབྷᒣਠᔪ䇮Ⲵ㤕ᒢ᜿㿱), ⌅ਁ 
[2013]13ਧ (Fa Fa (2013) No.13), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 21 November 2013  
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as the main platform for the publication of the information regarding court trials and 
enforcement proceedings, including the basic introduction to courts and judges, guidance 
materials for litigation proceedings, sample litigation documents and announcements of 
court trials.605 Meanwhile, starting from the case-filing phase, the parties can log on this 
website with the credentials provided by the courts and obtain the necessary information 
about their cases, such as the case-filing information, the contacts of judges in the collegial 
panel, the schedules of court sessions and enforcement-related information. Besides, to 
enhance the openness of court hearings, selected cases are broadcast live on the internet.606 
Court hearings can be attended through prior appointment. Court hearings are also required 
to be recorded via multi-media devices and stored electronically by the courts. The parties 
can gain the access to these electronic documents by submitting requests to the courts.607 
Since 2014, all the court decisions are required to be published on a specialized 
website (China Judgements Online). 608  However, the actual publication rate of court 
decisions is still relatively low in practice. As shown in Table 8, the average online 
publication rate of court decisions in China is only around one third. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the courts in economically-developed coastal areas also do not deliver a 
convincing performance in publishing court decisions, the online publication rate of which 
is even lower than the average number at the national level (Table 8). Considering that not 
all the cases are required to be published online, and the courts may need time to sort out 
court decisions before online publication,609 the exact publication rate may be higher than 
                                                 
605 %\QRZPRVWFRXUWVKDYHIROORZHGWKH63&¶VRUGHUVDQGSXEOLVKHG WKHUHTXLUHG LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKH
specialized website. The website is ѝഭᇑࡔ⍱〻ؑ᚟ޜᔰ㖁 (China Trial Process Information Online) 
and the address is http://www.court.gov.cn/zgsplcxxgkw/. Last visited in June 2016. 
606  This specialized website is ⌅䲒ᓝᇑⴤ᫝㖁  (China Live Trial Online) and the address is 
http://ts.chinacourt.org/. Last visited in June 2016. 
607 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH63&¶VUHSort in 2015, all the 1783 courts in Zhejiang province and 2279 courts in 
Jiangsu province had already achieved the goal of recording all the court hearings with multi-media devices, 
while the courts in other provinces which have reached such goal amounted to 11740. See Judicial 
Transparency of Chinese Courts (2015) (ѝഭ⌅䲒Ⲵਨ⌅ޜᔰ), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 
10 March 2015, p. 10. 
608  The specialized website is ѝഭ㻱ࡔ᮷Җ㖁  (China Judgements Online) and the address is 
http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/Index. Last visited in June 2016. Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on 
the Online Publication of Court Decisions of People's Courts (2013) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒൘ӂ
㚄㖁ޜᐳ㻱ࡔ᮷ҖⲴ㿴ᇊ), ⌅䟺[2013]26 ਧ (Fa Shi (2013) No.26), issued by the Supreme People's 
Court on 21 November 2013, Article 4.  
609 )RUH[DPSOHFDVHVWKDWDUHLQYROYHGZLWKQDWLRQDOVHFUHWVSHUVRQDOSULYDF\DQGMXYHQLOH¶VFULPHDV
well as cases that are settled through meditation are not required to be published on the internet. Ibid.  
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the numbers shown in Table 8. 610 But, the current status of online publication of court 
decisions is still far from the requirements in law. 
Table 8: Online publication rate of court decisions of concluded civil and commercial 
cases in 2015 (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong and nationwide)611 
Area 
Published court decisions/ 
concluded cases 
Rate of online publication 
of court decisions 
Nationwide 3,044,905/9,575,000 31.8% 
Beijing 96,144/373,810 25.7% 
Shanghai 101.583/406,700 25.0% 
Jiangsu 243,235/901,264 26.9% 
Guangdong 239,016/673,700 35.4% 
 
The SPC has also actively built connections with the public in recent years. Through 
the IM (instant messaging) technology, such as Weibo (a twitter-type website in China) and 
WeChat (a popular mobile app for instant messaging in China), the SPC periodically 
broadcasts the latest developments of the judiciary and receives comments and suggestions 
from the public, which is especially welcomed by new generation legal workers and young 
people. Pushed by the SPC, local courts are also implementing similar measures to enhance 
the connections between the courts and the public. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the SPC and local courts do not deliver a 
convincing performance in the publication of judicial statistics and the openness of internal 
management. Official statistics published by courts are quite unsystematic, which is even 
evident in the most authoritative official releases (the annual work reports of the SPC to the 
NPC). Some factors mentioned in this year may be omitted in the next year, which may 
                                                 
610 It is plausible that the heavy caseload of the courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong is one possible 
reason for their relatively lower publication rate, as these courts may be too busy to sort out court decisions 
and publish them on the internet.  
611 The data is obtained and calculated based on the data in the work reports of the SPC, the work reports 
of the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong HPCs, and China Judgements Online. 
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come back again a few years later.612 Such an unsystematic style of publication naturally 
leads to doubts whether the published data is artificially selected or even tampered with.613  
Moreover, the internal management of courts remains secret for the public. The public 
knows little about the actual mechanism for the selection and promotion of judges. So are 
their punishments and removal. Many judges are investigated for suspected violation of law 
and discipline, but such information is barely known by the public, unless the investigated 
judges are criminally convicted and exposed by the media.614 The financial issues of courts 
are non-transparent. The education level and working experience of judges are normally 
omitted. For most of the time, personnel, funds and other important yet sensitive issues in 
courts are seldom touched upon in official releases. Some aggregated numbers may be 
irregularly found in the reports of courts or the speeches of high-level court officials. But, 
they are rarely presented in a detailed and systematic manner. 
,QJHQHUDOGXHWRWKH63&¶VFRQVWDQWHIIRUWVLQHQKDQFLQJMXGLFLDOtransparency, some 
progress has been witnessed in recent years. The establishment of the three platforms is an 
important step towards the greater openness of courts. It is not difficult to understand the 
63&¶V HQWKXVLDVP LQ WKH SURPRWLRQ RI MXGLFLDO WUDQVSDUHQF\ 5HFRJQL]LQJ WKH SXEOLF¶V
distrust in the professionalization, independence and integrity of courts, the SPC is willing 
to gain back the reputation of the judiciary with enhanced judicial transparency. In 
comparison with fundamentally strengthening independence, competence and integrity, 
judicial transparency, as one of most effective ways of building social trust and establishing 
connections between the courts and the public, seems to be a relatively feasible and quick 
route for the SPC to build social trust in courts. However, more efforts are still needed to 
ensure that the transparency requirements in law can be substantially implemented in 
SUDFWLFH6LPLODUO\PXFKKDVWREHGRQHRQWKHRSHQQHVVRIWKHFRXUWV¶LQWHUQDOZRUNZKLFK
may be more important than simply listing aggregated numbers and unconvincing 
DFKLHYHPHQWVLQWKHUHSRUWVRIWKHFRXUWV¶ZRUN 
(2) Practical Constraints of Arbitral Confidentiality 
In China, arbitral confidentiality is confirmed in both procedural laws and institutional 
arbitration rules. Article 40 of the Arbitration Law provides that arbitration should be 
                                                 
612 For example, the number of judges who violate law and discipline is not available in the corresponding 
work reports of the SPC in 2003 and 2008. 
613 See e.g. Donald C. Clarke (2003), supra note 19, pp. 166-170. 
614 See the previous discussion in Section 6.3.3. 
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principally conducted privately, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.615 CIETAC adopts 
a stricter approach on the issue of confidentiality. Even if both parties agree to arbitrate the 
case openly, the arbitration tribunal still has the right to deny such request, as long as the 
case is considered by the arbitration tribunal to be inappropriate to be tried publicly. 
Moreover, when a case is arbitrated privately, all the arbitration participants, including the 
parties, attorneys, arbitrators, witnesses, translators, experts and appraisers, should not 
disclose any information regarding the case to the outside, be it substantive or procedural.616  
Nonetheless, the implementation of these confidentiality requirements may encounter 
constraints in practice. First, arbitration cases may need to be reviewed by courts when there 
are disagreements between the parties on the validity of arbitration agreements or the 
enforceability of arbitration awards. Under such circumstances, the information of the 
arbitration cases will be more or less disclosed due to the publication of court decisions. 
Generally speaking, such disclosure is legal, though it does objectively limit the realization 
of arbitral confidentiality in practice.617 However, it should be noted that Article 134 of the 
CiPL permits the courts to hear cases involving trade secrets privately. Similarly, the SPC 
also clarifies that information regarding trade secrets should be removed from court 
decisions when published online.618 From this perspective, it can be expected that the courts 
will pay due respect to the confidential needs of arbitration and make technical omissions 
before the publication of court decisions.  
Second, arbitration institutions may publish example arbitration awards, which can 
function as guidance or reference materials for practitioners. These published arbitration 
awards may contain information about the parties and their disputes. But, it should be noted 
that CIETAC generally takes a prudent attitude in the publication of arbitration awards. 
Possible identifying information is always carefully concealed.619  
Third, specialized arbitration participants, such as arbitrators, experts, appraisers and 
translators may disclose the information of arbitration cases when they make formal or 
informal speeches in conferences, lectures and discussions. But, these specialized 
                                                 
615 If the case involves state secrets, the arbitration proceedings then should not be open to the public, 
regardless of whether the parties agree or not. 
616 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 38. 
Article 25 of the BAC Arbitration Rules 2014 also provides similar provisions as those in CIETAC. 
617 Alexis C. Brown (2001), supra note 112, pp. 972-975. 
618 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Online Publication of Court Decisions of People's 
Courts (2013), Article 7 (4). 
619 ,QSXEOLVKHGDUELWUDWLRQDZDUGV&,(7$&QRUPDOO\XVHJHQHUDOWHUPVVXFKDVWKHµEX\HU¶DQGWKHµVHOOHU¶
to conceal identifying information of the parties. See Zhengrui Han and Xiaoyu Li (2011), supra note 366, 
pp. 1380-1391. 
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arbitration participants normally have a strong incentive to maintain their reputation in the 
arbitration circle. Accordingly, they normally adopt a prudent attitude about their 
obligations in confidentiality, which motivates them to avoid unnecessary leakage of case 
information.620 
What really threatens arbitral confidentiality in practice is the information leakage 
intentionally done by the parties.621 $VPHQWLRQHGXQGHU&,(7$&¶VDUELWUDWLRQUXOHVWKH
parties are under the obligation to keep the case information confidential. However, 
motivated by self-interest, the parties may intentionally disclose case information to the 
media or to the public in practice. Such undue disclosure may happen during the arbitration 
proceedings, which is used by one party to exert pressure on the other party or the arbitration 
tribunal. It may also occur after the cases are decided, as the losing party may be dissatisfied 
with the results and thus wants to express its grievances in such way.  
For example, in the 2005 Sichuan Pepsi case (ഋᐍⲮһṸ), to gain the support of the 
public and exert pressure on the arbitration institutions and the courts, the parties violated 
the confidentiality requirements and disclosed sensitive business information to the 
media.622 Similarly, in the 2013 Guangzhou Wanglaoji case (ᒯᐎ⦻㘱ਹṸ), the parties 
constantly disclosed the details about the case and the contract, which stimulated heated 
open discussion on the case.623  
                                                 
620  Yong Wang, '䇪Ԣ㻱Ⲵ؍ᇶᙗ৏ࡉ৺ަᓄሩㆆ⮕  (An Analysis on the Principle of Arbitral 
Confidentiality and Corresponding Strategies)', 12 (2008) ᭯⋫о⌅ᖻ (Politics and Law), pp. 81-86. 
621 Ibid., pp. 82-84. 
622 In this case, a local Chinese company (Sichuan Yunlv) and a wholly foreign-owned company invested 
by Pepsi Co. (Pepsi China) reached a contract to establish an equity joint venture (Sichuan Pepsi). Later, a 
dispute arose between the parties, and the case was then arbitrated by SCC. During the process of dispute 
resolution, Pepsi China constantly disclosed to the media about the business operation details of Sichuan 
Pepsi to show hRZ3HSVL&KLQDZDVµPLVWUHDWHG¶LQWKHFRRSHUDWLRQ6LFKXDQ<XQOYFRXQWHUHGE\GLVFORVLQJ
WKH GHWDLOV RI WKH DUELWUDWLRQ SURFHHGLQJV WR VKRZ WKDW LW UHFHLYHG µXQGXH WUHDWPHQW¶ LQ DUELWUDWLRQ
proceedings. Lili Deng, '䀓᷀: ⲮһԢ㻱Ṹ (Analysis: The Pepsi Arbitration Case)', 12 (2006) བྷ㓿䍨 
(Foreign Business Monthly), pp. 72-73; Xiaoqiao Zou, '⍵᷀ഋᐍⲮһਸ֌㓿㩕ਸ਼Ԣ㻱ṸѝⲴࠐњ⌅
ᖻ䰞仈 (A Brief Analysis on Several Legal Issues Concerning Sichuan Pepsi Cooperative Joint Venture 
Arbitration Case)', 3 (2005) ेӜԢ㻱 (Beijing Arbitration), pp. 69-76. 
623 In this case, a Chinese company (Guangdong Pharmacy Group) and a Hong Kong company (Hongdao 
*URXSUHDFKHGDFRQWUDFWRQWKHXVDJHRIWKHWUDGHPDUNµ:DQJODRML¶/DWHUDGLVSXWHDURVHEHWZHHQWKH
parties regarding the usage of the trademark. The case was then arbitrated in CIETAC. During the process, 
both parties tried to win the support of the public by holding press conferences to show the public that their 
claims in the case should be supported. The case then became widely known by the public. CIETAC, 'Ԣ
㻱Ⲵ؍ᇶᙗଚ䟼৫Ҷ˛Ӿ⦻㘱ਹ୶ḷॿ䇞Ԣ㻱Ṹ䈤䎧 (Where Is the Confidentiality of Arbitration? A 
Discussion on the Wanglaoji Trademark Agreement Arbitration Case)', 124 (2013) Ԣ㻱о⌅ᖻ 
(Arbitration and Law), p. 10. 
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Such undue disclosure may exert negative effects on arbitral confidentiality. As 
mentioned, many commercial disputants choose arbitration because their privacy can be 
protected in arbitration proceedings and their involvement in disputes will not be directly 
acknowledged by the public. The assurance of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings can 
better maintain their reputation and keep their business information secret. However, if the 
parties are free to disclose information about the case and the counter party, the function of 
arbitration in privacy protection will not be adequately fulfilled. 
(3) Relatively Limited and Unsystematic Publication of Statistics Concerning Foreign-
Related Commercial Cases 
The aforementioned problem that the publication of judicial statistics is relatively 
unsystematic can also be witnessed in foreign-related commercial litigation. Some basic 
statistics on foreign-related commercial cases are rather inconsistent in the official 
publications. One example is the annual number of foreign-related commercial cases 
resolved in courtV,QWKHVWKH63&VWDUWHGWRSXEOLVKWKHQXPEHURIµIRUHLJQ-related 
FDVHV¶LQLWVDQQXDOZRUNUHSRUWVWRWKH13&+RZHYHUWKH63&GLGQRWVSHFLI\ZKHWKHU
WKHVH µIRUHLJQ-UHODWHG FDVHV¶ZHUH FLYLO FULPLQDO RU DGPLQLVWUDWLYH$IWHU  WKH63&
narrRZHGGRZQWKHVFRSHDQGVKRZHGWKHQXPEHURIµIRUHLJQ-related civil and commercial 
FDVHV¶LQRIILFLDOSXEOLFDWLRQV%XWWKHH[DFWQXPEHURIIRUHLJQ-related commercial cases 
was still not available. The number of foreign-related civil and commercial cases resolved 
by courts in 2000, 2001 and 2008 was also missing in the work reports of the SPC.624 
Furthermore, some important information on foreign-related commercial cases is not 
publicly accessible. For example, how many foreign-related commercial cases are accepted 
and concluded annually? How many are concluded via formal adjudication and how many 
are settled via court mediation? What are the appeal rates, enforcement rates and the average 
length of proceedings? The lack of this kind of information renders it difficult for 
practitioners to recognize the current status of foreign-related commercial litigation. 
Furthermore, as represented by the centralized jurisdiction and the excellence strategy, 
the judiciary lays a particular emphasis on foreign-related commercial litigation. 625 
However, this particular emphasis seems inadequately reflected in published materials and 
statistics. For example, under the centralized jurisdiction, only selected judges and courts 
can handle first instance foreign-related commercial cases and they are expected to be more 
                                                 
624 But, it should be noted that the SPC started to narrow doZQWKHVFRSHWRµIRUHLJQ-related commercial 
FDVHV¶LQLWVZRUNUHSRUWVLQUHFHQW\HDUV6HHSUHYLRXV)LJXUHV-3 and accompanying footnotes in Chapter 
4. 
625 For details on the centralized jurisdiction, excellence strategy and the Working Conferences for Foreign-
Related Commercial and Maritime Adjudication, see the previous discussion in Sections 4.2 and 4.4.1. 
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professional than average judges and courts. However, it is difficult to find a full list of 
courts that have jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related commercial cases, nor is it 
easy to find which courts have established specialized foreign-related commercial divisions 
and which judges are specialized in foreign-related commercial cases. 626  Similarly, 
systematic statistics on the education level of judges is not available. Some information can 
be found in high-lHYHO FRXUW RIILFLDOV¶ VSHHFKHV SXEOLVKHG LQ QHZVSDSHUVPDJD]LQHV RU
webpages. However, these aperiodic releases only shows the high education level of judges 
in certain courts or the achievements of these courts in resolving foreign-related commercial 
cases,627 and this kind of fragmented data can hardly show the average professional quality 
of judges who handle foreign-related commercial cases.  
The relatively poor performance of the judiciary in publishing materials and statistics 
on foreign-related commerFLDO FDVHV PD\ UDLVH GLVSXWDQWV¶ GRXEWV DERXW WKH TXDOLW\ RI
foreign-related commercial litigation. There is no effective channel for them to find reliable 
and systematic information to make their own judgements on whether they can count on 
Chinese courts WR UHVROYH WKHLU GLVSXWHV 'HVSLWH &KLQHVH FRXUWV¶ FRQWLQXRXV HIIRUWV WR
enhance the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation, it will still be difficult for 
foreign-related commercial disputants to build up trust in foreign-related commercial 
litigation in China, if these efforts cannot be directly reflected in published materials and 
statistics. 
In comparison with foreign-related commercial litigation, the situation seems to be 
less problematic in foreign-related commercial arbitration. Under the pressure of 
competition between arbitration institutions, both at the domestic and international level, 
Chinese arbitration institutions are generally active in advertising themselves to foreign-
related commercial disputants by showing the increasing number of foreign arbitrators in 
their arbitrator lists, the increasing caseload of foreign-related commercial cases they handle 
and the increasing influence they have in the international commercial arbitration circle. 
However, apart from this kind of general information, more detailed and concrete evidence 
that Chinese arbitration institutions are increasingly competent in handling foreign-related 
                                                 
626 It should be noted that the Jiangsu HPC clearly lists the courts in the Jiangsu province which have 
jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related commercial cases on its official website. Available at 
http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/pdf/ajgx.pdf. Last visited in June 2016. So far, the author has not found any other 
HPC follows the Jiangsu HPC in doing so. 
627 )RUH[DPSOHDVDQH[DPSOHSLORWFRXUWMXGJHV¶KLgh education level and ample practical experience in 
the Shenzhen Qianhai Court was highly praised by the media. For more details, see the previous discussion 
in Section 6.3.1. 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
 
194 
commercial case is still lacking. 628  At the same time, subject to the confidentiality 
requirements, Chinese arbitration institutions seems to be reluctant to directly show their 
improvements with published cases. From this perspective, more efforts can be made to 
increase the publication of arbitration cases, as long as the identifying information can be 
technically omitted to ensure the information of corresponding parties will not be disclosed 
in published arbitral awards. 
6.5 Efficiency and Enforcement 
6.5.1 Efficiency of Proceedings: The Trade-Off between Timeliness and Correctness 
Efficiency is an important value particularly emphasized by commercial disputants in 
both litigation and arbitration. They desire just results and they also expect just results can 
come in an expeditious way. After all, the substantial value of court decisions and arbitration 
awards may decrease significantly if they are delivered too late. 629  The principle of 
efficiency receives due respect in China. As discussed below, most cases can be concluded 
within the time limits set up in procedural laws and arbitration rules. Summary proceedings 
also provide the parties with additional options if they are willing to solve their disputes in 
a speedy way. However, delays may occur when the cases involve the trial supervision 
procedure and prior reporting mechanism. 
(1) General Timeliness in Litigation and Arbitration 
In litigation, the general time limit for ordinary proceedings, calculated from the 
acceptance of cases to the formal closure, is six months for first instance trials and three 
months for second instance trials, which can be extended upon the approval of court 
presidents when necessary.630 It should be noted that the general time limits do not apply to 
foreign-related commercial cases. However, as mentioned before, to ensure foreign-related 
commercial cases can be resolved within a reasonable length of time, some local courts in 
economically-developed areas actually set the same time limits for both domestic and 
foreign-related commercial cases.631 In practice, most cases can be concluded within the 
time limits set up by law. According to the statistics published by the SPC, the rate of cases 
concluded within legal time limits has been maintained at a high level throughout the years 
(Table 9). Recent statistics provided by local courts are also generally in accordance with 
                                                 
628 However, it should be noted that some local arbitration institutions, BAC for example, have recognized 
the importance of information publication and published detailed reports on their arbitral work and 
institutional development. 
629 See the previous discussion in Section 2.5.4. 
630 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 149 and 161. 
631 See the previous discussion in Section 4.4.2. 
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WKH63&¶VVWDWLVWLFV7Rtake Beijing courts for example, the average length of first instance 
commercial cases handled by courts in Beijing is 56 days, while the number in second 
instance commercial cases is 35 days.632  
Table 9: Rate of cases concluded within time limits in litigation (2006-2011) 633 
Year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Rate 99% 98.51% N/A 98.41% 96.06% 95.19% 
 
Slightly different from litigation, the time limits for arbitration cases are normally 
calculated from the formation of the arbitration tribunal instead of the acceptance of the 
cases, while the proceedings before the formation of the arbitration tribunal are normally 
bound by specific time limits as stated in arbitration rules. In CIETAC, the general time 
limit for foreign-related commercial cases is six months, which is the same as ICC and 
SCC.634 Since time is also consumed in pre-hearing proceedings (Table 10), the theoretical 
length of the whole process of foreign-related commercial cases arbitrated in CIETAC could 
be more than seven months. Similar to CIETAC, BAC also has a general time limit of six 
months for foreign-related commercial cases. 635  According to its recent work report 
published in 2016, the average length of its arbitration proceedings in 2015 was 91 days.636  
Table 10: Major pre-hearing proceedings and their time limits in CIETAC 
                                                 
632  The data is obtained from the official website of Beijing courts. Available at 
http://www.bjcourt.gov.cn/splc/index.htm. Last visited in June 2016. 
633 The data is obtained from the work reports of the SPC. The reports are downloaded from the database 
set up by the Peking University (www.pkulaw.cn). The number in 2009 is not available in the report of the 
corresponding year. The 2013 report specified the average enforcement rate (98.8%) in the past five years 
(2012-2008). But, it should be noted that the rate of concluded cases within the time limit was no longer 
GLVFORVHGLQWKH63&¶VZRUNUHSRUWVDIWHU0HDQZKLOHLWLVTXHVWLRQDEOHZKHWKHUVXFKDKLJKUDWHLV
creditable, which can really reflect the status of enforcement judicial practice. As an important criterion for 
evaluating the performance of courts, courts are motivated to maximize number of the rate of concluded 
cases with all available methods. It is possible that local courts may try to forge the data. The court may 
also try to turn away disputants, so that they can ensure cases that have already been accepted can be 
concluded in time. To some extent, the omission of the rate of concluded cases within the time limit in the 
63&¶VZRUN UHSRUWV VLQFH  LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH 63&GRHV QRW WDNH WKLV KLJK HQIRUFHPHQW UDWH DV DQ
achievement worth spreading any more, as it may be forged data or realized by sacrificing the quality of 
litigation services. 
634 Some leading international arbitration institutions, such as LCIA and HKIAC, do not set specific time 
limits for the arbitration procedure, see Baker & McKenzie (2014), supra note 116. 
635 Beijing Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014) (ेӜԢ㻱ငઈՊԢ㻱㿴ࡉ), issued by the 
Beijing Arbitration Commission on 9 July 2014, Article 68. 
636 Available at http://www.bjac.org.cn/news/view?id=2692. Last visited in June 2016. 
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Pre-hearing proceedings Time limits 
Case acceptance No specific time limit 
Statement of defence or 
counter claim 
45 days 
(After the receipt of the notice of the arbitration) 
Selection of arbitrators 
15 days 
(After the receipt of the notice of the arbitration) 
Challenge of arbitrators 
15 days 
(After the receipt of the notice of the formation of the 
arbitration tribunal) 
Objection to arbitration 
agreements or jurisdiction 
No specific time limit637 
(before the first hearing) 
 
(2) Summary Proceedings in Litigation and Arbitration 
In litigation, the courts can decide to use summary proceedings to handle simple cases. 
3DUWLFXODUO\HYHQLIWKHFDVHVGRQRWIXOILOWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIµVLPSOHFDVHV¶LQODZWKH
parties can still apply to use summary proceedings by agreement.638 Summary proceedings 
are designed to be simple, quick and convenient. The cases handled with summary 
proceedings should be adjudicated by a sole judge and concluded within three months. At 
the same time, many proceedings, such as the service of documents, the preparation for 
                                                 
637 But, as mentioned, the objection to arbitration agreements and jurisdiction do not necessarily affect the 
continuation of the proceedings in CIETAC. See the previous discussion in Section 6.2.2. 
638 µ6LPSOHFDVHV¶UHIHUWRFDVHVLQZKLFKWKHIDFWVDUHFOHDUERWKSDUWLHVKDYHVLPLODUVWDWHPHQWVRQWKH
facts), the rights and duties are explicit (the holders of duties and rights are already ascertained) and the 
disputes are minor (the parties have no fundamental disagreements on the disputes). But, it should be noted 
that if the cases fulfil one of the following conditions, summary proceedings then cannot be used: (1) the 
defendant is missing; (2) the cases are remanded for retrials; (3) the parties are numerous; (4) the cases are 
applicable to the trial supervision procedure; (5) the cases involve with state and public interest; (6) a third 
party request to modify or revoke the court decisions and (7) other inappropriate conditions. Civil 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Article 157; Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2015), 
Articles 256 and 257. 
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court hearings and the contents of court decisions can be simplified according to practical 
needs.639 
It should be noted that the CiPL only permits BPCs and its dispatched tribunals (⍮ࠪ
⌅ᓝ) to use summary proceedings (Article 157). Thus, foreign-related commercial cases 
that are handled by IPCs and HPCs are not qualified to be resolved with summary 
proceedings, even when the parties are willing to do so. It is plausible that the original aim 
of such legal design is that cases handled by IPCs and HPCs are normally important cases 
which are not suitable for summary proceedings. However, not all the foreign-related 
commercial cases are complicated ones that need relatively lengthy proceedings to secure 
the correctness of fact-finding and law application. It also seems more appropriate to 
provide the parties in high level courts with the rights to decide whether to use summary 
proceedings. Actually, some scholars have already suggested that the scope of courts which 
can use summary proceedings should be expanded to IPCs.640 
Slightly different from litigation, the main criterion for deciding whether a case can 
be arbitrated with summary proceedings is the disputed amount. In CIETAC, when the 
disputed amount of a case is less than five million RMB, the case should then be tried with 
summary proceedings, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Meanwhile, CIETAC also 
provides the parties with the autonomy to decide whether to use summary proceedings. The 
parties can select summary proceedings by agreement, regardless of whether the disputed 
amount is more than or less than five million RMB. Besides, when the disputed amount is 
unclear, the arbitration tribunal is authorized to decide whether to use summary proceedings 
based on the specific conditions of the cases. If it is decided that the case will follow 
summary proceedings, it should then be principally tried by a one-arbitrator tribunal with 
written hearings, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. At the same time, the time limit is 
also shortened from six months in ordinary proceedings to three months in summary 
proceedings.641 In general, compared to litigation, foreign-related commercial disputants 
are provided with more autonomy to choose between ordinary and summary proceedings 
according to their specific needs.  
                                                 
639 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 160 and 161; Interpretation of 
the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of 
China (2015), Articles 259-270. 
640 See e.g. Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 148. 
641 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2014), Articles 
56-63. 
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(3) Potential Delay in the Trial Supervision Procedure and the Prior Reporting 
Mechanism 
Although Chinese courts and arbitration institutions can basically ensure that cases are 
concluded within the time limits set by procedural laws and arbitration rules, delay may still 
occur in practice. Two mechanisms  designed for ensuring the correctness of court 
decisions on both litigation and arbitration issues, namely the trial supervision procedure 
and the prior reporting mechanism, are the main causes of potential delay. 
The trial supervision procedure provides an extra guarantee for the correctness of court 
judgments, court rulings and mediation statements. Following this procedure, any serious 
errors in effective court decisions, either sustentative or procedural, may lead to the retrial 
of the cases concerned.642 In essence, it is a trade-off between the correctness of court 
decisions and the efficiency of the proceedings and the finality of litigation outcomes. 
Although the trial supervision procedure may play a positive role in the supervision of the 
FRXUWV¶ZRUNDQGWKHDVVXUDQFHRIVXEVWDQWLYHMXVWLFH LWPD\DOVRFDXVHVHULRXVGHOD\LQ
practice and place effective court decisions in a relatively uncertain status. According to the 
CiPL, when court decisions become effective, the parties can raise retrial petitions within 
six months and the courts should decide whether to approve the petitions within three 
months. If the decisions to retry the cases are made, the enforcement of court decisions then 
should be suspended.643  
In other words, an effective court decision may stay in a relatively uncertain status for 
nine months if the trial supervision procedure is started, while there is no substantial time 
limit if the trial supervision procedure is initiated by the courts or the procuratorates instead 
of the parties. Besides, if it is decided that the case needs to be retried, the parties then need 
to face a new round of trials, which may theoretically extend the length of litigation to 18 
months or more.644 Such an uncertain status of court decisions and lengthy civil proceedings 
can be frustrating for the parties. Thus, it is debatable whether it is necessary and worthy to 
sacrifice the finality of court decisions and efficiency of civil proceedings in exchange for 
the correctness of court decisions. More importantly, the commencement of trial 
supervision procedure does not necessarily mean that the errors in court decisions are 
serious enough to turn over the original court decisions. In practice, many retrial cases end 
                                                 
642 See the previous discussion in Section 4.5.3 (3). 
643 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 200, 204 and 206. 
644 Article 207 of the Civil Procedure Law provides that if the court decision is made in first instance trial, 
the retrial should then follow the first instance trial procedure; if the court decision is made in the second 
instance trial, the retrial should then follow the second instance trial procedure. Accordingly, in the case of 
first instance trial court decisions, the theoretical length can amount to18 months (6+9+6). In the case of 
second instance trial court decisions, the theoretical length can also amount to 18months (6+3+9+3). 
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up with the same results as the original court decisions, while both parties feel exhausted 
and dissatisfied in the end.645 
Similarly, another mechanism which is designed to ensure the correctness of court 
decisions in foreign-related commercial arbitration, namely the prior reporting mechanism, 
may also cause delay in practice. The prior reporting mechanism is an important mechanism 
in the judicial review over the validity of arbitration agreements and the enforceability of 
arbitration awards, which plays a key role in ensuring the correctness of court decisions on 
these two issues. However, its level-by-level reporting and supervising mechanism is also 
rather time-consuming. When a judicial review request is submitted by the parties to an IPC, 
WKH,3&QHHGVWRH[DPLQHWKHFDVHDQGUHQGHULWVGUDIWGHFLVLRQDFFRUGLQJO\,IWKH,3&¶V
draft decision is negative, the IPC should report it to the corresponding HPC for further 
examination. If the HPC agrHHVZLWKWKH,3&¶VQHJDWLYHRSLQLRQWKH+3&VKRXOGIXUWKHU
report the case to the SPC for its final approval.646  
In practice, such a complicated procedure may take years before the final ruling can 
be made.647 For example, in the aforementioned Longlide case, the Chinese side submitted 
the judicial review request on the validity of the arbitration agreement to the Anhui Hefei 
IPC in October 2010. But, it took two and a half years for the case to go through the entire 
prior reporting mechanism procedure, which came to an end when the SPC issued the final 
reply in March 2013. The prior reporting mechanism is undoubtedly important in protecting 
WKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWVLQIRUHLJQ-related commercial arbitration. But, if the protection comes in 
such a lengthy manner, the substantial value of such protection for the parties then becomes 
questionable. 
6.5.2 Enforcement in Litigation and Arbitration: Mixed Facts and Controversial 
Voices 
The enforcement of court decisions and arbitration awards determines whether the 
parties¶ ORVVHV FDQ EH VXEVWDQWLDOO\ UHFRYHUHG DW WKH HQG RI OLWLJDWLRQ DQG DUELWUDWLRQ
proceedings. In China, when one party refuses to fulfil his/her obligations in a court decision 
or an arbitration award, the other party can apply to the courts for compulsory 
enforcement.648 
                                                 
645 Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, p. 24. 
646 For details, see the previous discussion in Section 5.4.1. 
647 Friven Yeoh (2007), supra note 185, p. 270. 
648 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 236 and 237. 
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Unlike court decisions which are directly enforceable, the enforcement of arbitration 
awards can be denied by the courts if the respondents to the enforcement requests can prove 
that the arbitration awards fulfil the legal conditions of non-enforcement. Generally 
speaking, the Chinese judiciary adopts a pro-enforcement approach to the enforcement of 
foreign-related arbitration awards.649 On the one hand, as a member state of the 1958 New 
York Convention, the legal grounds for the non-enforcement of foreign-related arbitration 
awards are generally consistent with the international standards set up in the Convention, 
which are mainly procedural. On the other hand, to ensure the correctness of court decisions 
on the enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards, the SPC also introduced the prior 
reporting mechanism to ensure the quality and correctness of court decisions regarding the 
enforcement of arbitration awards.650 
Empirical statistics show that the prior reporting mechanism plays a positive role in 
ensuring the enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards in practice. According to a 
recent survey conducted by the SPC, among 155 foreign-related arbitration awards which 
had been reviewed by the SPC under the prior reporting mechanism between 2002 and 2006, 
only 6 were eventually decided to be not enforced,QRWKHUZRUGVRYHURIWKH63&¶V
final decisions on foreign-related arbitration awards in the survey turned out to be in favour 
of the holders of the arbitration awards.651  
HoweveUWKHVWDWLVWLFVLQVFKRODUV¶HPSLULFDOVWXGLHVVHHPWREHLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKDW
LQ WKH 63& VXUYH\ )RU H[DPSOH LQ:XQVFKKHLP¶V HPSLULFDO VWXG\PDGH LQ  VKH
collected 30 publicly accessible foreign-related arbitration cases reviewed by the courts 
from 1994 to 2010 and found that around half of the arbitration awards received negative 
decisions from courts. Wunschheim argued that the contrast between her findings and the 
63&¶VVXUYH\ZDVSUREDEO\FDXVHGE\WKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHWZRVXrveys. 
Unlike the SPC which directly collected information from the case files of 17 surveyed 
HPCs in a relatively short period of 5 years, Wunschheim mainly relied on publicly 
accessible cases in a relatively long period of 17 years. She also argued that many publicly 
accessible cases were published by the SPC as examples to show local courts and arbitration 
practitioners what conditions might lead to the non-enforcement of foreign-related 
                                                 
649 Weixia Gu (2009), supra note 342, pp. 268-269. 
650 See the previous discussion in Sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.5.3. 
651 Honglei Yang, 'Ӫ≁⌅䲒⎹ཆԢ㻱ਨ⌅ᇑḕᛵߥⲴ䈳⹄ᣕ੺  (A Survey Report on the Judicial 
Review in Foreign-Related Arbitration in People's Courts)', 1 (2009) ↖བྷഭ䱵⌅䇴䇪 (Wuhan University 
International Law Review), p. 308. The survey was carried out by the SPC and the results were summarized 
in this article. This article was written by a judge working in the fourth civil division of the SPC. 
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arbitration awards. Thus, the proportion of cases with negative decisions may be larger than 
the SPC survey based on random samples.652 
6LPLODUWR:XQVFKKHLP¶VHPSLULFDOVWXG\DQHDUOLHUVXUYH\FRQGXFWHGE\3HHUHQERRP
LQ  DOVR VKRZHG WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ RIILFLDO VWDWLVWLFV DQG VFKRODUV¶ ZRUN ,Q
3HHUHQERRP¶VVXUYH\, he found 53.2% (25/47) of foreign-related arbitration awards were 
not enforced in the end. He noticed that his result was relatively different from the survey 
made by the Arbitration Research Institute (a research branch under CIETAC), in which 77% 
of CIETAC arbitration awards were eventually enforced by the courts. Again, 
methodological differences can be an important reason for explaining the differences 
EHWZHHQ&,(7$&DQG3HHUHQERRP¶VILQGLQJV:KLOVW&,(7$&GLUHFWO\DVNHGWKHFRXUWV
for information, Peerenboom mainly relied on the information obtained from his direct 
contacts with the parties and attorneys.653 
The mixed facts in empirical surveys reflect an unclear status of the enforceability of 
foreign-related arbitration awards reviewed by courts. In practice, the situation may become 
HYHQ PRUH FRPSOLFDWHG LQ WKH HQIRUFHPHQW SKDVH 7KH FRXUWV¶ FRQILUPDWLRQ RI WKH
enforceability of arbitration awards is only a pre-condition for the enforcement of arbitration 
awards. Similar to court decisions, whether arbitration awards can eventually be enforced 
ultimately relies on whether the courts have effective measures and sufficient authority to 
ensure the compulsory enforcement.   
For a long time, Chinese courts were criticized by scholars for their inability to ensure 
compulsory enforcement.654 Suffering from their relatively weak positions in the general 
socio-political system, incompetent court staff and outdated procedural designs, Chinese 
courts faced considerable difficulties in fulfilling their tasks in enforcement.655 Particularly, 
lacking sufficient power to confront local governments, the courts normally had limited 
methods to combat local protectionism, which thus became the main obstacle to the 
enforcement of court decisions and arbitration awards in practice.656  
                                                 
652 Clarisse Von Wunschheim (2010), supra note 342, pp. 21-23. 
653 Randall Peerenboom, 'Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
in the PRC', 49 (2001) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 250-270. 
654 See e.g. Donald C. Clarke, 'Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: the Enforcement of Civil 
Judgements', 10 (1996) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, pp. 1-92. See also Randall Peerenboom (2002), 
supra note 488, pp. 1-26; Randall Peerenboom (2010), supra note 462, pp. 221-233; Yuwen Li (2014), 
supra note 12, pp. 156-163. 
655 Donald C. Clarke (1996), supra note 654, pp. 81-92. Donald C. Clarke, 'The Execution of Civil 
Judgements in China', 141 (1995) China Quarterly, pp. 65-81. 
656 Randall Peerenboom (2001), supra note 653, pp. 325-327. 
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To strengthen the power of courts in the enforcement phase, a series of measures have 
been introduced into the CiPL. First, to streamline the enforcement proceedings and ensure 
the proficiency of court staff in enforcement work, enforcement proceedings are conducted 
by specialized court staff in enforcement divisions which are separated from adjudicative 
divisions. Second, a set of compulsory measures was set up to respond to different situations 
in enforcement. For example, if the respondents to enforcement fail to fulfil their obligations 
stated in legal documents, the courts can require corresponding institutions to provide the 
information on his/her assets, including savings, bonds, stocks and funds. The courts can 
also seize, freeze, transfer and sell these assets when necessary. Third, there are also 
punishment measures against deliberate non-performance. Court presidents can issue search 
warrants if the property involved is intentionally concealed. Double interest is required for 
delayed performance of monetary obligations. Restrictions on leaving the country, records 
in the credibility system and media publication are also possible coercive measures to 
punish intentional non-performance activities. In serious circumstances, fines and detention 
can be imposed to the parties who deliberately evade enforcement obligations.657 
Apart from the efforts in the legislative dimension, the SPC has also played an active 
role in enhancing the performance of courts in the enforcement sector. For example, a 
special judicial campaign had been launched by the SPC, in which over 330,000 
accumulated enforcement cases were resolved in a centralized manner from 2005 to 
2009.658 Particularly, to deal with the parties who maliciously refuse to cooperate with the 
courts, the SPC introduced a list of dishonest parties subject to enforcement (ཡؑ㻛ᢗ㹼
Ӫ਽অ) in 2013. Specifically, if the parties who are capable of performance refuse to follow 
their enforcement obligations, they will be included in the list, which is publicly accessible 
through the internet.659 In other words, under this new mechanism, the parties need to bear 
additional credit cost if they deliberately evade the enforcement obligations. It can be 
expected that the deterrence effect brought by the new mechanism will increase the coercion 
of courts in enforcement. 
Recent statistics released by the SPC reflect the improvement of courts in the 
enforcement sector. As shown in Table 11, the rate of concluded enforcement cases in recent 
years is over 80%.  Although the conclusion of enforcement cases does not necessarily mean 
                                                 
657 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2012), Articles 113, 228, 242, 248, 253, 255. 
658 Supreme Peoples' Court's Report on Strengthening Civil Enforcement Work and Safeguarding the 
Authority of Law and Judicial justice (2009) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ࣐ᕪ≁һᢗ㹼ᐕ֌㔤ᣔ⌅ࡦᵳေ઼ਨ
⌅ޜ↓ᛵߥⲴᣕ੺), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 28 October 2009. 
659 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Disclosing the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to 
Enforcement (2013) (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾޜᐳཡؑ㻛ᢗ㹼Ӫ਽অؑ᚟Ⲵ㤕ᒢ㿴ᇊ), ⌅䟺[2013]17 ਧ 
(Fa Shi [2013] No.17), issued by the Supreme People's Court on 16 July 2013. 
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that the winning parties can recover all their losses,660 the data at least can demonstrate that 
Chinese courts are now generally capable of fulfilling their basic roles in the enforcement 
phase.  
Table 11: Rate of concluded enforcement cases (2011-2015) 661 
Year Rate 
Number of concluded enforcement cases/ 
number of accepted enforcement cases 
2011 93.6% 2,394,000/2,557,000 
2012 98.2% 2,039,000/2,196,000 
2013 90.9% 2,718,000/2,989,000 
2014 85.2% 2,907,000/3,410,000 
2015 81.7% 3,816,000/4,673,000 
 
In terms of foreign-related commercial cases, the parties can again enjoy the 
advantages brought by the centralized jurisdiction. Court staff in coastal areas are generally 
more competent than those in inland areas, and the courts in economically-developed areas, 
the IPCs and HPCs in particular, are also relatively more independent. Compared to BPCs 
in less developed areas, these courts are more confident in confronting local governments 
and thus able to reduce the obstacles posed by local protectionism.662 Empirical statistics 
show that a large proportion of parties can find relatively satisfactory enforcement results 
in economically-GHYHORSHGDUHDV,Q+H¶VVXUYH\RYHURIVXUYH\HGOLWLJDQWVLQ
                                                 
660 For example, if the defendant is incapable of performance due to insolvency or other reasons, the 
enforcement case should then be concluded, ZKLOH WKHSODLQWLII¶VDFWXDO UHFRYHU\ LV OLPLWHG ,QDUHFHQW
empirical study, only 48% of respondents replied that the full amount of their arbitration awards were 
recovered, while the recovery rate is 76%-99% for 16% respondents, 51%-75% for 25% respondents and 
less than 50% for 11 respondents. Roger P. Alford, Julian G. Ku and Bei Xiao (2016), supra note 497, pp. 
23-24. 
661 The statistics were obtained from the annual work reports of the SPC. The reports are downloaded from 
the database set up by the Peking University (www.pkulaw.cn). Before 2012, the SPC did not 
systematically provide statistics on the issue of enforcement. One possible reason why the SPC started to 
show the enforcement statistics in its work reports is that the statistics are now much higher after the 
enforcement campaign from 2005 to 2009. 
662 Randall Peerenboom (2008), supra note 71, p. 17; Xin He, 'The Enforcement of Commercial Judgments 
in China', (2008) FLJS (Foundation for Law, Justice and Society) 'Rule of Law in China: Chinese Law and 
Business' programme reports, pp. 3-5. Available at http://www.fljs.org/content/cietac-forum-resolving-
business-disputes. Last visited in June 2016. 
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the Pearl River Delta (an economically-developed zone in Guangzhou province near Hong 
Kong) at least recovered part of their losses.663 Similar results are shown in two other 
empirical studies in Shanghai and Nanjing (the capital city of Jiangsu province) courts, 
which are 81% and 81.5% respectively.664 
However, the potential threat from judicial corruption still merits attention. Empirical 
evidence suggests that court staff in enforcement divisions are more frequently found to be 
involved in corruption activities, as the enforcement work is directly connected to the 
material interest of the parties, and it is also less transparent than the adjudicative work.665 
Thus, the potential risk of judicial corruption cannot be ignored in foreign-related 
commercial cases, in which the significant interest may become the inducement for 
corruption. 
To sum up, due to the lack of reliable and systematic statistics, it is difficult to reach 
a solid conclusion on the status of the enforcement of court decisions and arbitration awards 
at the current stage. Restricted by the limited available information, scholars have to adjust 
their methodologies to the data available, and they normally have to approach the issue from 
a specific angle or focus on a specific geographical area. By contrast, enjoying the 
advantage of data collection, official research organs can directly conduct research with 
more random data on a large scale. However, the remarkable numbers in official reports 
still inevitably raise doubts about its creditability. If the enforcement situation works so well, 
why are there still many complaints from the parties? Simply put, the methodological 
differences between different empirical studies naturally lead to the relative inconsistency 
in the findings. Perhaps, this is also why many scholars tend to make positive comments on 
the improvements in the regulatory dimension, while they are still cautious when discussing 
the actual situations of enforcement in practice.666 To some extent, reliable conclusions can 
only be made when a more transparent and accessible data collection system for 
enforcement is established in China, though the advent of such a system seems unlikely to 
be seen in the near future. 
                                                 
663 Xin He, 'Enforcing Commercial Judgements in the Pearl River Delta of China', 57 (2009) American 
Journal of Comparative Law, p. 456. 
664 Minxin Pei, Guoyan Zhang, Fei Pei and Lixin Chen (2010), supra note 500, pp. 221-233; Donald C. 
Clarke, Peter Murrell and Susan H. Whiting, 'The Role of Law in China's Economic Development', in 
Thomas Rawski and Loren Brandt (eds.), China's Great Economic Transformation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pp. 375-428. 
665 Xiaolou Zheng (2013), supra note 512. See also Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, pp. 159-160. 
666 See e.g. Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 115-124; Yuwen Li (2014), supra note 12, pp. 157-162; 
Fiona D' Souza (2007), supra note 299, pp. 1318-1359; Ellen Reinstein (2005), supra note 342, pp. 37-72. 
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6.6 Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Foreign-Related Commercial 
Litigation and Arbitration: A Summarizing Analysis 
6.6.1 Accessibility of Procedures 
In both litigation and arbitration, accessibility is the key pre-condition for following 
proceedings. A comparison in this regard can clarify whether the parties can find the 
required access to the two procedures. 
The examination mechanism in the case-filing phase used to be the main procedural 
obstacle to the accessibility of litigation. Under the examination mechanism, court staff in 
case-filing divisions examined both substantive and procedural issues. They had the power 
to decide whether or not to file the cases submitted by the parties and tended to unduly use 
such power to turn away the parties before the courts, so that the number of cases accepted 
by the courts could be reduced and a high rate of concluded cases could be achieved. 
Changes have been made with the introduction of the registration mechanism. Under the 
registration mechanism, court staff in the case-filing divisions are now required to only 
conduct a prima facie check and to file the case on the spot accordingly. The right to dismiss 
the suits for substantive reasons is now rightly allocated to judges in adjudicative divisions. 
More importantly, the central authorities decided to remove the rate of concluded cases 
from the court performance evaluation criteria. Accordingly, the incentives of courts to 
improperly turn away disputants can be reduced. This reform measure may help to enhance 
the accessibility to courts in a more fundamental manner. 
In essence, the case-filing proceedings in arbitration also follow the registration mode. 
Since the validity of arbitration agreements is the basis of the mandate and jurisdiction of 
the arbitration tribunal to handle the disputes, the power to rule on the validity of arbitration 
agreements and the arbitral jurisdiction over the disputes are crucial to arbitral accessibility. 
In China, the parties need to face the demanding requirement of the clear designation of the 
arbitration commission in arbitration agreements. The authority of the arbitration tribunal 
to rule on its own jurisdiction is also limited and subject to the power of arbitration 
institutions and courts. Although the mitigating efforts made by the SPC and CIETAC may, 
to some extent, help to reduce the legal barriers in practice, they cannot fundamentally 
UHPRYHWKHVHWZRREVWDFOHVZKLFKPD\EORFNWKHSDUWLHV¶SDWKVWRDUELWUDWLRQSURFHHGLQJV667 
In general, as both courts and arbitration institutions follow a similar case-filing 
registration mechanism now, the parties may find fewer barriers in the case-filing period 
than before. But, the particular legal designs on the validity of arbitration agreements and 
                                                 
667 )RUWKHGLVFXVVLRQRQ&,(7$&¶VHFOHFWLFDSSURDFKWRDUELWUDOMXULVGLFWLRQVHHWKHSUHYLRXV6HFWLRQ 
Foreign-Related Commercial Dispute Resolution in China 
 
 
206 
arbitral jurisdiction may pose potential risks to arbitral accessibility. From this perspective, 
the parties need to be more careful in drafting their arbitration agreements if they want to 
ensure their accessibility to arbitration proceedings. 
6.6.2 Competence of Adjudicators 
The competence of adjudicators directly determines the quality of the legal services 
provided in litigation and arbitration. A comparison in this regard can illustrate which 
mechanism is in advantage with regard to the professionalism, independence, impartiality, 
integrity and neutrality of adjudicators. 
(1) Professional Quality 
Generally speaking, Chinese judges are better educated than before. The proportion of 
judges that have received legal education in universities has experienced a considerable 
increase in the past decade. The compulsory requirement that judges must pass the National 
Judicial Exam also guarantees that judges master the necessary legal knowledge for 
adjudication. The improvement seems to be more evident in economically-developed 
coastal areas, and foreign-related commercial disputants thus may receive better quality 
litigation services, as their cases are mainly handled by judges in coastal prosperous areas 
who are generally more educated than those in less developed inland areas. However, the 
emerging problem of the outflow of judges may lead to a decrease in the overall quality of 
judges. Whether the new quota system introduced in the recent round of legal reforms can 
UHWDLQWDOHQWVLQFRXUWVZLOOEHWKHNH\WKDWGHFLGHVMXGJHV¶SURIHVVLRQDOTXDOLW\LQWKHQH[W
few years.668 
Arbitration has a clear advantage in the professional quality of adjudicators, though 
the improvement in the education level of judges, to some extent, shortens the distance 
EHWZHHQOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQ(LJKW\HDUV¶OHJDOZRUNLQJH[SHULHQFHDQGVHQLRUWLWOHVLQ
the legal field, these relatively strict entry-level requirements in the Arbitration Law for 
Chinese arbitrators already surpass the average level of Chinese judges. Moreover, judges 
are normally generalists in terms of professionalism, while arbitrators are not only legal 
experts, but also specialists in certain commercial industries. Accordingly, the specialized 
expertise of arbitrators enables the parties to select arbitrators who are suitable for their 
cases according to their own specific needs. These factors further strengthen the 
advantageous position of arbitration in terms of the professional quality of arbitrators.  
(2) Independence, Impartiality, Integrity and Neutrality 
                                                 
668 The main measure is the introduction of the new quota system for judges. See the previous Section 6.3.1. 
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The effects of the bureaucratic feature of the judicial system render judges vulnerable 
to both internal interference from adjudication committees and higher level courts, and 
H[WHUQDOLQWHUIHUHQFHIURPWKH3DUW\SHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVWKHPHGLDDQG
the public. Since courts in economically developed areas, in comparison with inland courts, 
have shown increasing independence in recent years, it seems that foreign-related 
commercial disputants can be less worried about the issue of judicial independence. 
However, as long as the judicial system is still negatively affected by the bureaucracy in the 
judicial system, judges in both domestic and foreign-related commercial cases will still be 
more or less subject to the threat of undue interference and judicial corruption. 
In comparison with the questionable performance of the Chinese judiciary in the 
aspects of independence, impartiality and integrity, arbitrators seem to be able to provide a 
more convincing performance in these aspects. It is plausible that the authorities can still 
exert indirect control over Chinese arbitration through the connections in personnel and 
financial issues, and arbitrators are also more or less subject to the influence of arbitration 
institutions due to the existence of the panel list arbitrator system.669 However, unlike 
judges and courts, the connections between arbitrators and arbitration institutions are 
generally looser. Accordingly, arbitrators, foreign ones in particular, can basically maintain 
their independence and impartiality in the decision-making process. In terms of neutrality, 
the absence of the nationality restriction rule in the appointment of the sole or presiding 
arbitrator may raise concerns on the overall neutrality of the arbitration tribunal. But, at 
least, foreign parties have the chance to select foreign arbitrators. In comparison with facing 
a collegial panel composed of three Chinese judges, having at least one foreign arbitrator in 
the arbitration tribunal may, to some extent, ease the distrust of foreign parties on the 
adjudicators. 
6.6.3 Diverging Procedural Designs: Formality v. Flexibility, Transparency v. 
Confidentiality and Appealability v. Finality 
As two different adjudicative mechanisms, litigation and arbitration have several 
diverging procedural designs. As a public mechanism, litigation puts more emphasis on the 
role of courts and their authority. Formalized rules are strictly followed to guarantee due 
process. Transparency requirements are set up to enable public scrutiny. Court decisions are 
appealable to rectify potential errors. By contrast, as a private mechanism, arbitration 
focuses more on the role of the parties and their autonomy. Flexible proceedings are 
DGMXVWDEOH WR VDWLVI\ WKHSDUWLHV¶ QHHGV&RQILGHQWLDOLW\ LV HQVXUHG WRSURWHFW WKHSDUWLHV¶
privacy. Appealability is removed in exchange for the finality of arbitration awards. With 
                                                 
669 For detailed discussion on the panel list arbitrator system, see the previous Section 6.3.4. 
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regard to these issues, the choice between litigation and arbitration depends RQWKHSDUWLHV¶
specific needs and their calculations on the trade-off between formality and flexibility, 
transparency and privacy, and appealability and finality. 
(1) Formality v. Flexibility 
Litigation emphasizes the formality of proceedings. To ensure procedural fairness, 
fixed procedural rules are required to be followed in a relatively rigorous manner. With the 
modernization of the litigation system, China has gradually established a relatively 
complete regulatory framework for governing litigation proceedings, which can fulfil the 
EDVLF UHTXLUHPHQWV RI GXH SURFHVV DQG SURYLGH QHFHVVDU\ SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
procedural rights. However, the advancement in law seems to be more or less hindered by 
the lagging-behind practice. As exemplified by the practice of pre-hearing conferences and 
ZLWQHVVHV¶ WHVWLPRQ\ WKH SURFHGXUDO UXOHV LQ ODZ DUH QRW DOZD\V VWULFWO\ IROORZHG LQ
practice.670 Again, compared to judges in underdeveloped areas, judges in prosperous areas 
generally have a stronger sense of procedural justice and are more willing to follow due 
process requirements, while foreign-related commercial cases are also normally treated with 
a prudent attitude by judges and courts. Thus, foreign-related commercial disputants can, to 
some extent, benefit from the enhanced implementation of procedural rules in practice. 
Unlike litigation, arbitration pays more attention to the flexibility of proceedings and 
the autonomy of the parties in tailoring their own arbitration proceedings. Generally 
speaking, party autonomy is recognized in Chinese law. CIETAC has also constantly 
revised its arbitration rules to increase the autonomy of the parties in procedural matters. 
But, China still insists on an institution-only approach which limits the autonomy of the 
parties to choose ad hoc arbitration and foreign arbitration institutions for cases seated in 
China. Similarly, the compulsory panel list arbitrator system which strengthens the 
connections between DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGDUELWUDWRUV LVDOVRUHVWULFWLQJ WKHSDUWLHV¶
freedom to select the arbitrators they prefer.671 In general, despite the general recognition 
in law, the realization of autonomy and flexibility in arbitration may still encounter several 
obstacles in practice. 
(2) Transparency v. Confidentiality 
%HQHILWLQJ IURP WKH 63&¶V UHIRUP HIIRUWV MXGLFLDO WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ &KLQD KDV
experienced considerable development in recent years. The establishment of the three 
platforms and the emphasis on the usage of the new information technology substantially 
                                                 
670 For the detailed discussion on the practice of these two issues, see the previous Section 6.4.1. 
671 For the detailed discussion on the practice of these two issues, see the previous Section 6.4.1. 
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HQKDQFHG WKHSDUWLHV¶ DQG WKHSXEOLF¶V DFFHVVLELOLW\ WR WKH LQIRUPDWLRQRQ MXGLFLDOZRUN
though further efforts are still needed to enhance the publication of court decisions, judicial 
statistics and internal management of courts. For the parties who want to take advantage of 
the public pressure to tackle potential problems such as local protectionism, judicial 
corruption and enforcement difficulties, judicial transparency has already become a more 
effective tool than before.  
Correspondingly, the parties who prefer not to expose their disputes to the public can 
also find a relatively satisfactory answer in China. Confidentiality requirements are clearly 
stated in both the Arbitration Law and institutional arbitration rules. To maintain the 
reputation in the arbitration circle, arbitration institutions, arbitrators and other specialized 
arbitration participants tend to strictly follow the confidentiality requirements. The judiciary 
is also showing a supportive attitude to the protection of the trade secrets of the parties in 
arbitration cases. Perhaps, what the parties should be really worried about is whether the 
counterparties may intentionally disclose the information of the cases to the public for their 
own interest, as the parties are de facto µIUHH¶ WR GR VR GXH WR WKH DEVHQFH RI HIIHFWLYH
supervision and punishment mechanisms.672 
(3) Appealability v. Finality 
China provides the parties with multiple chances to challenge court decisions in 
litigation. Decisions rendered by first instance courts can be appealed to the higher level 
courts for review in second instance trials. Apart from the appeal procedure, the parties can 
also apply for retrials through the trial supervision procedure, if they have the evidence to 
prove that there are serious errors in the court decisions concerned. This multi-level judicial 
review design can be useful for the parties who pay particular attention to the correctness 
of court decisions. 
By contrast, arbitration awards in China are principally final and directly binding and 
enforceable once rendered by arbitration tribunals. The only exception is that if the courts 
set aside the arbitration awards or deny their enforceability, the parties can then bring the 
disputes to arbitration institutions or courts for re-arbitration and re-litigation. But, the legal 
grounds for non-enforcement or revocation of foreign-related arbitration awards are rather 
limited. Following the provisions in the 1958 New York Convention, the non-enforcement 
or revocation of foreign-related arbitration awards can only be based on serious violation of 
                                                 
672 For more details on the role of the parties in arbitral confidentiality, see the previous Section 6.4.3.  
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WKHSURFHGXUDOUXOHVRUSXEOLFLQWHUHVW7KH63&¶VSULRUUHSRUWLQJPHFKDQLVPDOVRKHOSVWR
ensure the correctness of court decisions regarding foreign-related arbitration awards.673   
6.6.4 Efficiency of Proceedings and Enforcement of Outcomes 
In both litigation and arbitration, the parties desire to resolve their disputes with less 
time and expense, while they also expect the adjudicative results can be substantially 
enforced in the end. A comparison in this regard can show which mechanism delivers a 
better performance with regard to efficiency and enforcement.   
(1) Time and Expense 
The time limits for litigation and arbitration proceedings are generally the same in 
China, namely six months for ordinary proceedings and three months for summary 
proceedings. Arbitration may have a slight advantage on the issue of time, as summary 
proceedings can be freely selected by the parties in arbitration, while the cases handled by 
IPCs and HPCs are not allowed to follow summary proceedings. The removal of time limits 
for foreign-related cases in the CiPL may also raise the concerns of the parties. However, it 
should also be noted that some courts in coastal areas have already clarified that the general 
time limits for domestic cases should also be principally applicable to foreign-related 
commercial cases. What is more worrisome for the parties is the trial supervision procedure 
and the prior reporting mechanism which may cause serious delays in both litigation and 
arbitration. In general, litigation and arbitration seem to be rather similar to each other with 
regard to the issue of time.  
In terms of expense, both Chinese courts and CIETAC follow a similar fee schedule 
with an ad valorem basis. As shown in Table 12, litigation has a clear advantage when the 
disputed amount is less than 50 million RMB. Only when the disputed amount is over 2 
billion does the litigation fee become larger than the arbitration fee. Besides, in CIETAC, 
the parties need to pay a case acceptance fee of 10,000 RMB and they may also have to pay 
WKHH[WUDµVSHFLDOIHH¶IRUDUELWUDWRUVLIWKH\ZDQWWRDSSRLQWUHQRZQHGDUELWUDWRUV674 From 
this perspective, litigation seems to have a relative advantage in expenditure. 
                                                 
673 For discussion on the prior reporting mechanism, see the previous Section 5.4.1. 
674 It should be noted that unlike other leading international arbitration institutions, which separate the fees 
for arbitrators and the fees for arbitration institutions, CIETAC charges a one-off arbitration fee based on 
the disputed amount. Accordingly, CIETAC has a considerable advantage when the disputed amount is 
relatively small (less than 50 million USD). But, as the disputed amount rises, CIETAC begins to lose its 
advantages. When the disputed amount is large (more than 500 million USD), CIETAC becomes the most 
expensive arbitration institution among major international arbitration institutions. See Louis Flannery and 
Benjamin Garel, 'Arbitration Costs Compared: The Sequel', 8 (2013) Global Arbitration Review, pp. 1-22. 
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Table 12: Fee schedules of Chinese courts and CIEAC 
Disputed amount: X Arbitration fee: Y  Litigation fee: Z 
X <= 10,000 
X*4%, Y>= 10,000 
Z=50 
10,000 < X <= 100,000 X*2.5% 
100,000 < X <= 200,000 X*2% 
200,000 < X <= 500,000 X*1.5% 
500,000 < X <= 1,000,000 X*1% 
1,000,000 < X <= 2,000,000 X*3.5%+40,000 X*0.9% 
2,000,000 < X <= 5,000,000 X*2.5%+75,000 X*0.8% 
5,000,000 < X <= 10,000,000 X*1.5%+150,000 X*0.7% 
10,000,000 < X <= 20,000,000 
X*1%+225,000 
X*0.6% 
20,000,000< X<=50,000,000 
X*0.5% 
50,000,001<=X<=100,000,000 X*0.5%+625,000 
100,000,001<=X<=500,000,000 X*0.48%+875,000 
500,000,001<=X<=1,000,000,000 X*0.47%+2,795,000 
1,000,000,001<=X<=2,000,000,000 X*0.46%+5,145,000 
2,000,000,001<=X 
X*0.45%, 
Y<=15,000,000 
 
(Unit: RMB) 
(2) Enforcement 
The main difference between litigation and arbitration with regard to the issue of 
enforcement is that court decisions can be directly enforced, while the enforceability of 
arbitration awards is subject to the risk of being denied by the courts. From this perspective, 
litigation seems to have a slight advantage in the certainty of enforceability. However, for 
foreign-related commercial disputants, the internationalized judicial review standards and 
the prior reporting mechanism can help to ensure that foreign-related arbitration awards will 
be carefully reviewed by courts, and they can only be revoked with the approval of the SPC.  
Another difference is that preservation measures can be directly implemented by 
courts in litigation, while the application for preservation measures in arbitration should be 
                                                 
But, it is also interesting to notice that CIETAC has introduced a new fee schedule for its Hong Kong 
headquarters in its latest arbitration rules in 2014, which separates arbitrator fees and arbitration institution 
fees. It is plausible that CIETAC is willing to use its Hong Kong headquarters as a pilot zone to find out 
ZKHWKHU WKLVFRPPRQZD\RI IHHFKDUJLQJ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHFDQEHDOVRZRUNDEOH LQ&,(7$&¶V
system. This could be a start for its further reform towards internationalization on the issue of fee collection. 
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forwarded by the arbitration tribunals to the corresponding courts for approval and 
implementation. Considering that preservation measures can be effective tools to prevent 
the parties from transferring their assets in advance, litigation thus has an advantage to 
tackle the problem of enforcement evasion. 
To a large extent, the compulsory enforcement of foreign-related court decisions and 
foreign-related arbitration awards fundamentally falls into the same discussion. When 
voluntary enforcement fails, the parties in both litigation and arbitration can apply for 
compulsory enforcement before the courts. Whether their losses can be substantially 
recovered to a large extent depends on the enforcement FDSDFLW\RIFRXUWV'XHWRWKH63&¶V
continuous efforts in enhancing enforcement, Chinese courts are now generally more 
capable of fulfilling their roles in enforcement than before, though the exact status of the 
enforcement of foreign-related court decisions and arbitration awards still awaits more 
systematic and reliable statistics to reveal.675
                                                 
675 For more details on the mixed empirical statistics, see the previous Section 6.5.2. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Responding to the challenge of the increasing number of foreign-related commercial 
disputes brought by the rapid development of foreign investment and trade after the 1978 
reform, China adopts a dual-track approach which separates the governance of domestic 
and foreign-related commercial disputes in litigation and arbitration. Whilst foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration share many common legal settings with the general 
litigation and arbitration systems, these two foreign-related adjudicative mechanisms also 
have many special characteristics that are different from the domestic ones. To provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of these two mechanisms and to find out their remaining 
deficiencies at the current stage, the previous chapters identify the core principles of 
litigation and arbitration, examine the connections and differences between domestic and 
foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, depict the proceedings of foreign-
related commercial litigation and arbitration, assess these two mechanisms in the light of 
the pre-identified core principles and compare them to show their relative advantages and 
disadvantages. 
This chapter aims to draw together the findings and thoughts from previous discussion 
and responds to the research questions in a summarized manner. Following this introduction, 
the second part of this chapter reviews the advancements in foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration during the past few decades and points out the remaining 
deficiencies which plague the further development of these two mechanisms. Several 
possible solutions to these deficiencies are then proposed in the third part. In the fourth part, 
the thesis is concluded with a few comments on the status quo of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration and the role of the dual legal system in the future development of 
these two mechanisms. 
7.2 Main Findings: Advancements and Remaining Deficiencies in Foreign-Related 
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
The previous chapters show the advancements in foreign-related commercial litigation 
and arbitration over the past three decades. The advancements came from both the gradual 
development of the general litigation and arbitration systems and the positive changes 
brought by the specifically designed legal settings for foreign-related litigation and 
arbitration. All these positive changes have considerably enhanced the performance of 
courts and arbitration institutions in terms of accessibility, competence of adjudicators, 
fairness of proceedings, and efficiency and enforcement. However, several deficiencies still 
remain in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, which plague the further 
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development of these two mechanisms. The advancements and remaining deficiencies can 
be summarized from the following four aspects.  
7.2.1 Positive Development and Unsolved Problems in Accessibility, Efficiency and 
Enforcement 
Generally speaking, legal reforms have brought impressive changes with regard to 
accessibility, efficiency and enforcement over the past three decades, though further 
improvements are still needed to counter unsolved problems. First, many obstacles blocking 
GLVSXWDQWV¶ DFFHVV WR FRXUWVDQG DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQVKDYHEHHQ FRPSOHWHO\RU DW OHDVW
partly removed. In litigation, the original case-filing examination mechanism left room for 
courts to turn away disputants by not filing their cases in the case-filing period. Replacing 
the examination mechanism, the newly introduced registration mechanism largely restricted 
the power of courts in the case-filing period. Cases brought by the parties should now be 
registered by courts on the spot, as long as the submissions can fulfil the procedural 
requirements in the prima facie check. Moreover, judges used to be motivated to improperly 
reduce the number of accepted cases and in turn maximize the rate of concluded cases, so 
that they could obtain a better annual evaluation result which is connected to their bonuses 
and awards. In 2015, the rate of concluded cases was announced by the central authorities 
WREHUHPRYHGIURPWKHFRXUWHYDOXDWLRQFULWHULD7KLVFKDQJHUHGXFHGMXGJHV¶LQFHQWLYHVWR
abuse their rights in the case-filing period. However, the additional caseload brought by the 
enhanced accessibility seems to be a challenge to the courts in the transition from the 
examination mechanism to the registration mechanism. Under the pressure of heavy 
caseORDGV MXGJHV¶ WLPH DQG HQHUJ\ VSHQW LQ HDFK FDVH ZLOO EH LQHYLWDEO\ UHGXFHG
Accordingly, even though the cases are filed and accepted by courts, they may not be well-
adjudicated in following litigation proceedings. In that case, the positive effects brought by 
enhanced accessibility will be more or less reduced. 
In arbitration, arbitration agreements may turn out invalid if the parties cannot fulfil 
the demanding requirement that an arbitration commission must be clearly designated in 
arbitration agreements. Meanwhile, as Chinese law does not fully recognize the principle 
of competence-competence, arbitration tribunals cannot independently rule on their own 
jurisdiction, which, to some extent, obstructs arbitral accessibility in China.676 Similar to 
                                                 
676 Following the principle of competence-competence, arbitration tribunals should have the power to 
independently rule on their own jurisdiction and decide whether an arbitration agreement is valid and 
whether a jurisdictional objection should be approved. However, under Chinese law, these issues are 
decided by arbitration institutions or courts instead of arbitrDWLRQ WULEXQDOV ,QRWKHUZRUGVGLVSXWDQWV¶
access to arbitration may be blocked if corresponding courts or arbitration institutions render negative 
decisions regarding the validity of arbitration agreements, even though the arbitration tribunals which 
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litigation, the negative effects of these two obstacles have been gradually mitigated. The 
SPC issued judicial interpretations in 2006 to relax the strict requirements of the clear 
designation of the arbitration commission in arbitration agreements, while CIETAC started 
to partially follow the principle of competence-competence in its 2005 arbitration rules and 
conditionally delegated the power to arbitration tribunals to enable them to rule on their 
own jurisdiction. More importantly, the prior reporting mechanism which is particularly 
designed for foreign-UHODWHGDUELWUDWLRQHQVXUHVWKDWDQ\FRXUWGHFLVLRQEORFNLQJGLVSXWDQWV¶
access to arbitration must be reported and reviewed level-by-level and ultimately approved 
by the SPC. However, these mitigating efforts, to some extent, still cannot touch the core of 
the problems in arbitral accessibility, and the two aforementioned obstacles are still 
unchanged in the Arbitration Law. 
Second, improvements can also be witnessed in terms of efficiency. Cases are now 
basically concluded within the specified time limits in procedural laws and arbitration rules. 
Courts and arbitration institutions in economically-developed areas such as Beijing can 
provide efficient proceedings, where the average length of case-handling is two or three 
months. 677  However, it should be noted that the general timeliness in litigation and 
arbitration does not necessarily mean that all the cases can be resolved timely and efficiently. 
Delays may still occur in litigation and arbitration, especially when the cases need to follow 
the trial supervision procedure or the prior reporting mechanism in practice. 
Third, the enforcement issue seems to be at least less problematic than before. On the 
one hand, the prior reporting mechanism ensures that the enforceability of foreign-related 
arbitration awards is not negatively influenced by improper judicial review. Any court 
decision denying the enforceability of foreign-related arbitration awards can only become 
effective with the final confirmation of the SPC. On the other hand, the chronic problem 
that Chinese courts lacked sufficient capability and authority in enforcing court decisions 
has been gradually solved. With the development of the judiciary and legal reforms in the 
field of enforcement, Chinese courts are showing increasing capacity in enforcement. This 
is particularly evident in prosperous areas where most foreign-related commercial cases are 
handled. However, as an issue surrounded by mixed facts, the current status of enforcement 
seems to be still relatively complicated and unclear. At least, the improvements in the sector 
of enforcement should not be overstated without the support of reliable and systematic 
statistics. 
                                                 
actually arbitrate the cases rule that they have the jurisdiction over the cases concerned. For a more detailed 
discussion on this issue, see the previous Section 6.2.2. 
677 See the previous discussion in Section 6.5.1. 
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7.2.2 Enhanced Professional Quality and Questionable Independence under the 
Shadow of Bureaucracy 
The professional quality of judges and arbitrators has been improving in the past few 
decades. The introduction of the National Judicial Examination and the minimum 
professionalism requirements into the Judges Law ensures that judges at least master the 
basic legal knowledge required in litigation. Chinese courts, especially those in prosperous 
areas, are increasingly equipped with highly educated legal graduates from law schools. 
Similarly, the professional quality of arbitrators is also guaranteed by relatively strict 
requirements in the Arbitration Law. Moreover, facing the increasing competition pressure 
at both domestic and international level, CIETAC and other Chinese arbitration institutions 
have hastened their steps in institutional development and raised their standards in the 
recruitment of arbitrators. In general, although the emerging issue of the outflow of judges 
from courts and the relatively small proportion of foreign arbitrators may still raise concerns, 
judges and arbitrators in China are showing increasing professional quality in litigation and 
arbitration. 
In comparison with the professional quality of adjudicators, a more controversial issue 
is the independence of adjudicators in litigation and arbitration. On the one hand, although 
undue interference from both internal and external sources may still exist,678 it has become 
less common in individual cases, especially those ordinary ones that are not socio-politically 
sensitive. Judges and courts in economically-developed areas, by which most foreign-
related commercial cases are handled, are also showing increasing independence in 
adjudication. On the other hand, independence seems to be still shadowed by the 
bureaucracy in litigation and arbitration, through which the authorities can exert their 
influence on courts and arbitration institutions.  
Within the courts, ordinary judges, division chiefs, adjudication committees and court 
presidents form a hierarchical chain. Between the courts, lower level courts tend to follow 
WKHµLQVWUXFWLRQV¶RIKLJKHUOHYHOFRXUWV2XWVLGHWKHFRXUWVMXGLFLDOZRUNLVWRVRPHH[WHQW
exposed to the interference from RWKHU VWDWH RUJDQV VXFK DV SHRSOH¶V FRQJUHVVHV DQG
governments organs. Fundamentally, all the state organs including the judiciary are under 
the leadership of the central authorities. In such a hierarchical structure and bureaucratic 
environment, obedience and collectivism is deeply buried in the mind of judges, while 
disobedience and individualism is avoided by judges as those may affect their career 
prospects in the long run. The bureaucratic feature of the judicial system may bring many 
                                                 
678 In litigation, internal sources mainly refer to senior judges, adjudication committees, court officials and 
KLJKHUOHYHOFRXUWV([WHUQDOVRXUFHVPDLQO\UHIHUWRSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQVWKHPHGLD
and the public. For more details, see the previous Section 6.3.3. 
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negative effects. Individual thinking and decision-making are suppressed, which undermine 
MXGJHV¶LQGHSHQGHQFHDQGHYHQSXVKHVWDOHQWVDZD\IURPFRXUWV. The hierarchical structure 
also provides court officials with too much power in judicial work, which leaves room for 
judicial corruption. To some extent, the origins of many practical problems that affect the 
independence of judges and courts can be traced back to the bureaucratic feature of the 
judicial system.679 
By the same token, bureaucracy can also be found in arbitration. It is common to see 
high-level officials of Chinese arbitration institutions who are directly appointed or 
indirectly decided by the authorities. The panel list arbitrator system increases the 
DUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶LQIOXHQFHRYHUDUELWUDWRUVDQGUHVWULFWVSDUWLHV¶IUHHGRPLQDUELWUDWRU
selection. Arbitration tribunals are more or less subject to arbitration institutions and courts, 
since they cannot independently rule on their own jurisdiction under Chinese law. The 
institution-only approach actually places all arbitration cases seated in China under the 
monopoly of Chinese arbitration institutions, which enables the authorities to exert their 
influence when necessary, EXWOLPLWVWKHSDUWLHV¶IUHHGRPLQFKRRVLQJad hoc arbitration or 
foreign arbitration institutions. All these drawbacks suggest that independence is still 
VKDGRZHGE\WKHEXUHDXFUDF\LQ&KLQD¶VDUELWUDWLRQZKLFKDOVo affects the realization of 
party autonomy and neutrality in practice. 
7.2.3 Particular Emphasis on the Usage of Mediation and Relatively Limited 
Information Publication in Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
Both litigation and arbitration have experienced a considerable development in the 
past few decades. With the amendment of the CiPL and the promulgation of supplementary 
judicial interpretations by the SPC, procedural rules in litigation have become increasingly 
detailed and sophisticated. In arbitration, arbitration rules in CIETAC and other Chinese 
arbitration institutions have also become increasingly modernized and internationalized. 
Benefiting from the improvements at the regulatory level, disputants can find enhanced 
procedural protection in litigation and arbitration, though further efforts are still needed to 
ensure the implementation of procedural rules in practice,  
1RQHWKHOHVV WZRLVVXHVPD\VWLOOUDLVHGLVSXWDQWV¶FRQFHUQVLQWKHSURFHGXUDOILHOG
One issue is the particular emphasis on the usage of mediation in litigation and arbitration. 
Under the central policy favouring social harmony and stability, court mediation and the 
Med-$UESURFHGXUHLVJLYHQKLJKSULRULW\LQ&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQ,QOLWLJDWLRQ
court mediation tends to be coercive and adjudicative rather than voluntary and consensual. 
                                                 
679 For a more detDLOHGDQDO\VLVRQWKHEXUHDXFUDWLFQDWXUHRI&KLQD¶VMXGLFLDOV\VWHPVVHHWKHSUHYLRXV
Section 6.3.2. 
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In the Med-Arb procedure, the parties are also more or less forced to accept mediation 
proposals that are repeatedly raised throughout arbitration proceedings. The practice of 
informal separate meetings and the same person acting as both the mediator and the 
judge/arbitrator may also infringe upon WKHSDUWLHV¶SURFHGXUDO ULJKWVRI LQIRUPDWLRQDQG
contest. Court mediation and the Med-Arb procedure may bring positive effects of 
relationship preservation, enhanced efficiency and voluntary enforcement. However, it also 
seems inappropriate to blindly integrate it into every case only for the reason that it is 
favoured by the authorities and emphasized in the central policy.680 
The other issue is the relatively limited publication in the foreign-related sector. Since 
2010, the establishment of the three platforms (trial process, court decisions and 
enforcement information) and the increasing usage of information technology have largely 
enhanced the connections between the courts and the public, and increased the openness of 
judicial work. However, these improvements in judicial transparency seem to be less 
reflected in foreign-related commercial litigation. There was only limited published 
information on foreign-related commercial cases, which only covered basic factors such as 
the annual number of foreign-related civil and commercial cases handled by courts. It is 
also disappointing to see that even this kind of basic statistics was still rather unsystematic 
and incomplete.681  
The relatively poor performance of courts in the transparency of foreign-related 
commercial litigation inevitably raised doubts of foreign businessmen and lead to their 
reluctance to use the system, as they have no direct and reliable sources of information 
which they can rely on to evaluate the system. Similar drawbacks are also evident in 
DUELWUDWLRQ UHODWLYHO\ OLPLWHG SXEOLVKHG LQIRUPDWLRQ LQFUHDVHV GLVSXWDQWV¶ GLIILFXOWLHV LQ
understanding the practice of foreign-related commercial arbitration in China. China may 
have already made encouraging progress in developing foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration. However, restricted by the relatively poor performance in 
transparency, the progress seems to be inadequately presented to the public, which may 
reduce the willingness of foreign businessmen to use these two mechanisms. 
7.2.4 Positive Role of the Dual Legal System at the Current Stage and Its Limitations 
in the Long Run 
Under the dual legal system, the resolution of domestic and foreign-related 
commercial cases is separated in litigation and arbitration. This separation or, more 
precisely, the special legal settings designed for foreign-related commercial cases has 
                                                 
680 For the detailed discussion on these two procedures, see the previous Section 6.4.2. 
681 For more details, see the previous Section 6.4.3. 
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played an important role in enhancing the performance of courts and arbitration institutions 
in the resolution of foreign-related commercial cases.  
In litigation, the SPC introduced the centralized jurisdiction to ensure that foreign-
related commercial cases can be handled by more competent judges. Under the centralized 
jurisdiction, only selected courts can have the jurisdiction over first instance foreign-related 
commercial cases. In practice, a large portion of foreign-related commercial cases are 
handled by IPCs and HPCs in economically-developed coastal areas. Judges in these courts 
generally show greater competence in adjudication than those in inland rural areas. 
Moreover, specialized foreign-related commercial divisions have been established in these 
courts, which are composed of judges specialized in the adjudication of foreign-related 
commercial cases. Under this special jurisdictional design which is centralized at the 
vertical level and specialized at the horizontal level, only selected courts and judges with 
professional knowledge and experience can handle foreign-related commercial disputes, so 
that the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation can be ensured. 
Similarly, although there are no explicit legal arrangements in law, leading Chinese 
arbitration institutions such as CIETAC, BAC, SAC, SZAC, SHIAC and SCIA are all 
ORFDWHGLQ&KLQD¶VWKUHHPRVWGHYHORSHGPHWURSROLVHV%HLMLQJ6KDQJKDLDQG6KHQ]KHQ
They have the best personnel and financial resources and represent the highest quality 
arbitration services in China. All these arbitration institutions lay special emphasis on 
foreign-related arbitration cases, which is well reflected by their considerable progress 
towards modernization and internationalization in the past two decades. Benefiting from 
this natural centralization, most foreign-related arbitration cases can be resolved by 
professional Chinese or foreign arbitrators with modernized and internationalized 
arbitration rules. 
Furthermore, apart from the centralization of judicial or arbitral resources, other 
special institutional and procedural designs also contribute to the enhancement of the quality 
of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. For example, the prior reporting 
mechanism introduced by the SPC guarantees the correctness of court decisions on the 
validity of foreign-related arbitration agreements and the enforceability of foreign-related 
arbitration awards. As a member state of the 1958 New York Convention, Chinese courts 
are required to follow international standards and to only examine procedural issues in the 
judicial review of foreign-related commercial arbitration awards. All these major and minor 
special legal designs for foreign-related commercial cases play a role in enhancing the 
quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. 
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Overall, the introduction of the dual legal system into the litigation and arbitration 
systems proves to be, at least at the current stage, a useful measure for enhancing the quality 
of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. However, the dual legal system also 
has its limitations in the long run. As exemplified by the aforementioned remaining 
deficiencies in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, simply providing 
preferential treatment to foreign-related commercial disputants can only partially and 
temporarily solve the problems in the general litigation and arbitration systems. It is also 
unrealistic to establish fully independent foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration systems, which are entirely separated from the general litigation and arbitration 
systems. 
Furthermore, the enhanced quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration is to a large extent achieved on the basis of a forced separation of domestic and 
foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration. In comparison with domestic 
disputants, foreign-related commercial disputants enjoy the advantages of the centralization 
of judicial and arbitral resources and receive preferential treatment in litigation and 
arbitration proceedings. Such separation under the dual legal system inevitably creates an 
unequal status between domestic and foreign-related commercial disputants. The existence 
of the special legal settings may also affect the unity of the litigation and arbitration systems 
in the long run.  
7.3 Recommendations: Towards a High Quality Foreign-Related Adjudicative Regime 
The following recommendations can be made to tackle the aforementioned remaining 
deficiencies in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration.  
7.3.1 Further Enhancing Accessibility, Efficiency and Enforcement by Refining 
Current Legal Settings 
Despite the encouraging development in accessibility, efficiency and enforcement, 
further efforts are still needed to address unsolved problems. Firstly, supporting measures 
need to be introduced to help the courts to handle the growing caseload in the transition 
from the examination mechanism to the registration mechanism in the case-filing period. 
Current legal rules on the case-filing registration mechanism lay more emphasis on 
VSHFLI\LQJFRXUWV¶REOLJDWLRQVLQWKHFDVH-filing period, but pay less attention to the practical 
difficulties that judges may face for implementing these rules in practice. It seems 
unrealistic to simply recruit more judges to handle the additional caseload. More efforts 
should be made to reduce the workload of judges in unnecessary administrative tasks, so 
that judges can have more time and energy to concentrate on adjudicative work and deal 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
221 
with the increasing caseload.682 Otherwise, although disputants can gain better access to 
courts under the new case-filing registration mechanism, they may still find their disputes 
not well-resolved, since judges do not have sufficient time and energy to deal with them, 
Arbitral accessibility can be further improved through the amendment of the 
Arbitration Law. To a large extent, the fundamental causes of existing obstacles still lie in 
the out-dated legal provisions in the Arbitration Law which has remained unchanged for 
over twenty years since its initial promulgation in 1994. The strict requirements in Articles 
16 and 18 of the Arbitration Law should be removed, and the failure of the parties in clearly 
designating an arbitration commission should not directly lead to the invalidity of their 
arbitration agreements. The competence-competence principle should be recognized by the 
Arbitration Law, and arbitration tribunals should be given the authority to independently 
rule on their own jurisdiction. Without these necessary changes in the Arbitration Law, the 
63&DQGDUELWUDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶HIIRUWVWRPLWLJDWHWKHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVEURXJKWE\WKHVH
obstacles will remain limited. 
Secondly, correctness of court decisions and efficiency of proceedings need to be 
better balanced in the trial supervision procedure in litigation and the prior reporting 
mechanism in arbitration. Whilst these two mechanisms may play a role in rectifying errors 
in court decisions, they also undermine the finality of court decisions and may cause serious 
delays in practice. Considering their positive functions in ensuring the correctness of court 
decisions, it is not necessary to directly abolish these two special proceedings. However, 
their procedural designs need to be modified to reduce unnecessary delays. For example, 
the time limits for the proceedings in these two mechanisms could be shortened. 
Thirdly, although it is difficult to describe the exact status of enforcement due to the 
lack of reliable and systematic statistics, it is at least clear that more efforts are still needed 
WRIXUWKHUHQKDQFHWKHFRXUWV¶FDSDELOLW\DQGDXWKRULW\LQHQIRUFHPHQWVRWKDWWKHFRXUWVFDQ
more effectively fulfil their roles in enforcing court decisions and arbitration awards, and 
help the parties to substantially recover their losses. More innovatory enforcement measures 
such as the enforcement information publication mechanism and the list of dishonest parties 
subject to enforcement should be introduced to provide courts with more effective tools to 
coerce the parties to fulfil their obligations in enforcement.  
                                                 
682 This approach is also in accordance with the main strategy of the newly introduced Quota System which 
is to keep or even reduce the number of judges who are in charge of adjudication, but to add to the number 
of court staff on administrative posts to support the judgeVLQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHZRUN$FFRUGLQJO\MXGJHV¶
caseload can be reduced as they can focus on the adjudicative work and save their time and efforts in 
administrative work. See the previous discussion in Section 6.3.1. 
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7.3.2 Reducing Negative Effects of Bureaucracy and Enhancing Independence and 
Freedom in Litigation and Arbitration  
As noticed by many scholars, the true independence of judges and courts in China 
would be a challenging objective which needs fundamental institutional changes and 
decades of efforts to achieve.683 At the current stage, the pursuit of this long-term goal can 
be started by gradually reducing the negative effects of bureaucracy and hierarchy in the 
judicial system. To be more specific, the power of court officials, including adjudication 
committees in a broad sense, should be restricted and supervised. The scope of their power 
and obligations should be explicitly specified in law. Their leading functions should be more 
reflected in guiding and supervising ordinary judges in a general sense instead of giving 
specific opinions on individual cases. Effective channels should be established to enable 
ORZHUOHYHOMXGJHVWRUHSRUWFRXUWRIILFLDOV¶PLVEHKDYLRur when they are pressured by court 
RIILFLDOV WR FKDQJH WKHLU GHFLVLRQV LQ LQGLYLGXDO FDVHV -XGJHV¶ SURPRWLRQ DQG ERQXVHV
should be less affected by the opinions of court officials. Judges should be evaluated by 
their performance in adjudicative work rather than by their attitudes in obeying orders and 
IXOILOOLQJSROLWLFDOWDVNV7KHSUDFWLFHRILQIRUPDOµLQVWUXFWLRQV¶EHWZHHQKLJKHUDQGORZHU
level courts, courts and other state organs should be restrained. At least, the interactions 
between them should not directly affect the decision-making in individual cases. In short, 
bureaucracy and hierarchy should be less emphasized in the judicial system. Independent 
thinking and decision-making should be protected by law and respected in practice, so that 
judges can independently make their own decisions in adjudication without worrying about 
the adverse results they may face, if they do not follow the opinions of court officials or the 
instructions from higher level courts and other state organs. 
By the same token, more independence and freedom should be given to the parties and 
arbitrators in arbitration. As argued by many scholars, the independence of arbitrators and 
the autonomy of parties are now mainly obstructed by the institution-only approach, the 
panel list arbitrator system and the limited recognition of the competence-competence 
principle, which are explicitly stated or implicitly expressed in the Arbitration Law, and a 
necessary step to be taken now is to remove these three obstacles at the legislative level by 
revising the Arbitration Law.684 If the direct and complete removal of these obstacles from 
the Arbitration Law encounters resistance, the SPC should then continue to follow the pro-
arbitration reform route and reduce the effects of these obstacles with its judicial 
                                                 
683 Yuwen Li, Judicial Independence in China: An Attainable Principle? (Eleven International Publishing, 
2013), pp. 33-35; Bin Liang (2008), supra note 132, pp. 180-183; Randall Peerenboom (2010), supra note 
462, pp. 18-22. 
684 Weixia Gu (2013), supra note 5, pp. 130-131; Xiuwen Zhao and Lisa A. Kloppenberg (2006), supra 
note 305, pp. 451-452. 
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interpretations and decisions on influential cases. The removal of these three obstacles could 
HDVH WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQWURORYHUDUELWUDWRUV DQGDUELWUDWLRQ WULEXQDOV¶ DXWKRULW\ZLOOQR
longer be subject to arbitration institutions and courts when deciding their own jurisdiction. 
The parties could also gain more freedom when their disputes are seated in China and select 
their preferred arbitration modes, arbitration institutions and arbitrators, be it ad hoc or 
institutional, Chinese of foreign, listed or off-list. In short, a more open and liberal 
arbitration environment, in which the private nature of arbitration is fully respected, would 
be a necessary and solid basis for the further development of foreign-related commercial 
arbitration in China. 
7.3.3 Reducing Policy-Oriented Emphasis on the Usage of Mediation and Improving 
Transparency in Foreign-Related Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
The usage of mediation in litigation and arbitration should be less policy-oriented. 
Court mediation and the Med-Arb procedure are useful procedural techniques which can 
reserve relationships, enhance efficiency and increase voluntary enforcement. However, 
they may also negatively affect procedural fairness, if they are not properly regulated in law 
or blindly emphasized to fulfil policy goals in practice. A more proper approach to the usage 
of court mediation and the Med-Arb procedure is to return the decision-making right to the 
parties rather than to force the parties to cooperate with policy goals. Sufficient legal 
guidance should be provided to the parties, so that they can weigh the balance and make 
their own decisions according to their specific needs. At the same time, the procedural rules 
for court mediation and the Med-Arb procedure also need to be carefully designed to ensure 
procedural fairness. At least, the practice of the same person acting as the mediator and the 
judge/arbitrator, and the informal session of separate questioning should be limited. 
3DUWLFXODUO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ &KLQD¶V Wraditional culture, Chinese parties may be more 
accustomed to Chinese-style court mediation and Med-Arb procedure, while foreign parties 
who are more familiar with western-style mediation are not necessarily in the same position. 
From this perspective, as argued by some scholars, the usage of these two procedures in 
foreign-related commercial cases should not be equally emphasized as it is in domestic 
cases.685 
The transparency of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration needs to be 
improved. More statistics, reports and white papers that are specifically prepared for 
foreign-related commercial cases need to be published, and they need to be easily accessible 
to both Chinese and foreign scholars. Published information should not only cover basic 
facts such as the annual number of foreign-related commercial cases handled by courts or 
                                                 
685 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan (2008), supra note 590, pp. 490-492; Philip C. C. Huang 
(2006), supra note 579, pp. 310-314. 
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arbitration institutions, but also more specialized factors such as the appeal rate, 
enforcement rate and average length of proceedings. More importantly, published 
information on foreign-related commercial cases needs to be more systematic to increase 
the creditability and completeness. In short, scholars and practitioners, foreign ones in 
particular, need more consecutive, detailed, specialized and publicly accessible information, 
based on which they can better understand and in turn build trust in foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration. 
7.3.4 Gradually Reducing Special Legal Settings for Foreign-Related Commercial 
Cases on the Premise of More Developed Litigation and Arbitration Systems 
Considering the positive role the dual legal system plays at the current stage and the 
SRWHQWLDOQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVLWPD\H[HUWLQWKHORQJUXQWKHUHLVQRVLPSOHµ\HV¶RUµQR¶DQVZHU
for the reform of the dual legal system. The current litigation and arbitration systems still 
cannot adequately protect the interests of foreign-related commercial disputants and 
effectively resolve their disputes. Existing special legal settings are still necessary tools for 
enhancing the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. At least in 
the near future, it is neither realistic nor necessary to directly remove these special legal 
settings and to emphasize too much on the equal treatment of domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputants.  
Nonetheless, the dual legal system should not be taken as a permanent solution. The 
special legal settings for foreign-related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration 
should be gradually reduced in future legal reforms, so that both domestic and foreign-
related commercial disputants can receive equal treatment in courts and arbitration 
institutions. However, the removal of the special legal settings should be conducted in a 
gradual and careful manner. The retreat of the dual legal system should be on the premise 
of more developed litigation and arbitration systems, which can provide reliable litigation 
and arbitration services and adequate legal protection to both domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputants. 
7.4 Final Remarks 
To a large extent, the status quo of foreign-related commercial litigation and 
arbitration reflects both progress and limitations in law and practice. On the one hand, the 
core principles of litigation and arbitration are generally recognized in law and, for most of 
the time, they are also basically followed in practice. On the other hand, remaining 
deficiencies still affect the realization of the core principles in practice. The potential threat 
of inaccessibility, injustice, inefficiency and non-enforcement caused by these deficiencies 
still raises the concerns of foreign-related commercial disputants.  
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
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Consequently, further reforms seem necessary and inevitable, and the reforms need to 
be undertaken in both general and foreign-related litigation and arbitration systems. 
Although there are some special legal settings which distinguish foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration from domestic ones, the resolution of both domestic and foreign-
related commercial disputes is largely under the same institutional and procedural 
framework. To some extent, the further development of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration can only be achieved with the corresponding improvements in the 
general litigation and arbitration systems. 
The dual legal system also seems to meet a dilemma in its development route. On the 
one hand, since the fundamental advancement of the general litigation and arbitration 
systems can only be achieved with unremitting efforts and a relatively lengthy time, it seems 
reasonable to introduce more special legal settings designed for foreign-related commercial 
disputes, so that the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration can be 
enhanced more easily and rapidly. On the other hand, the introduction of too many special 
legal settings will inevitably widen the gaps between the resolution of domestic and foreign-
related commercial cases in litigation and arbitration, which would be detrimental to the 
unity of the litigation and arbitration mechanisms in the long run. 
Despite this dilemma, the dual legal system still shows its particular importance in 
enhancing the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration, which is vital 
to the protection of foreign-related commercial disputants¶ULJKWVDQGWKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKHLU
disputes. In the long run, domestic and foreign-related commercial cases may no longer be 
clearly separated in litigation and arbitration. However, this can only be achieved when the 
RYHUDOOTXDOLW\RI&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRn and arbitration systems reaches a reasonable and widely 
recognized level, and high quality litigation and arbitration services can be guaranteed for 
both domestic and foreign disputants. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix I: Major Laws and Judicial Interpretations Concerning Foreign-Related 
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration 
Promulgation date 
(amendments) 
Title 
(Chinese title) 
Laws 
8 July 1979 
(amended on 4 April 
1990 and 15 March 
2001) 
Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's 
Republic of China 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭѝཆਸ䍴㓿㩕Աъ⌅) 
12 April 1986 
(amended on 31 
October 2000) 
Wholly Foreign-2ZQHG(QWHUSULVH/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭཆ䍴Աъ⌅) 
13 April 1988 
(amended on 31 
October 2000) 
Sino-)RUHLJQ&RRSHUDWLYH-RLQW9HQWXUH/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭѝཆਸ֌㓿㩕Աъ⌅) 
9 April 1991 
(amended on 28 
October 2007 and 31 
August 2012) 
&LYLO3URFHGXUH/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁һ䇹䇬⌅) 
31 August 1994 
$UELWUDWLRQ/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅) 
15 March 1999 
&RQWUDFW/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭਸ਼⌅) 
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28 October 2010 
/DZRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDRQWKH$SSOLFDWLRQRI
Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations 
(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⎹ཆ≁һޣ㌫⌅ᖻ֯⭘⌅) 
Judicial Interpretations 
20 August 1995 
Notice of the SXSUHPH3HRSOH
V&RXUWRQ3HRSOH¶V&RXUWV
Handling Foreign-Related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration 
Issues 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾӪ≁⌅䲒༴⨶о⎹ཆԢ㻱৺ཆഭԢ㻱һ
亩ᴹޣ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕) 
26 March 1997 
Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᇎᯭǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅Ǌࠐњ䰞
仈Ⲵ䙊⸕) 
25 February 2002 
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Jurisdiction of Foreign-Related Civil and 
Commercial Cases 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ⎹ཆ≁୶һṸԦ䇹䇬㇑䗆㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ㿴
ᇊ) 
29 December 2004 
Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Strengthening the 
Jurisdiction Work of Foreign-Related Commercial Cases 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ࣐ᕪ⎹ཆ୶һṸԦ䇹䇬㇑䗆ᐕ֌Ⲵ䙊
⸕) 
23 August 2006 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭԢ㻱⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞
仈Ⲵ䀓䟺) 
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4 August 2010 
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Adjudication of Cases Relating to Foreign-
Invested Enterprise Disputes-I 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᇑ⨶ཆ୶ᣅ䍴Աъ㓐㓧ṸԦ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ
㿴ᇊ(а)) 
28 December 2012 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on the Application of Laws to Foreign-
Related Civil Relations-I 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⎹ཆ≁һޣ㌫⌅
ᖻ䘲⭘⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺 (а)) 
30 January 2015 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China 
(ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁һ䇹䇬⌅ǊⲴ
䀓䟺) 
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Appendix II: Major Special Legal Settings for Foreign-Related Commercial Cases in 
Litigation and Arbitration  
Legal 
issues 
Source of legal 
provisions 
Special legal settings for foreign-related 
commercial cases 
(corresponding legal settings for domestic 
cases, if applicable) 
Special legal settings in foreign-related commercial litigation 
Centralized 
jurisdiction 
Provisions of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the 
Jurisdiction of Foreign-
Related Civil and 
Commercial Cases 
(2002) 
Notice of the Supreme 
People's Court on 
Strengthening the 
Jurisdiction Work of 
Foreign-Related 
Commercial Cases 
(2004) 
First instance foreign-related commercial 
cases should be adjudicated in selected BPCs, 
IPCs and HPCs which are mainly located in 
economically-developed areas.  
Specialized foreign-related commercial 
adjudication divisions or collegial panels 
should be established in these courts. 
(There is no special jurisdiction arrangement 
for domestic litigation cases. The jurisdiction 
level of first instance domestic litigation cases 
is determined based on the disputed amount in 
the cases concerned. Most first instance 
domestic litigation cases are handled by 
BPCs.) 
Selection of 
foreign 
courts and 
special 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
Interpretations of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on the 
Application of the 
Civil Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic 
of China (2015), 
Article 531 
Civil Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic 
The parties in foreign-related commercial 
cases can reach written agreements to select 
foreign courts to litigate the cases, provided 
that the selected foreign courts have the actual 
connections with the cases concerned. 
However, when the cases concerned are 
involved with Sino-foreign equity joint 
venture contracts, Sino-foreign cooperative 
joint venture contracts or Sino-foreign 
cooperative exploration and development of 
natural resources contracts, the parties can 
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of China (2012), 
Article 266 
only choose Chinese courts if they want to use 
litigation to resolve the disputes. 
(Domestic litigation cases should be handled 
by Chinese courts. Since FIEs are deemed as 
Chinese legal persons in China, cases 
involving FIEs are also deemed as domestic 
litigation cases if there is no other foreign 
element recognized by Chinese law in the 
cases concerned.) 
Special 
territorial 
jurisdiction 
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 265 
If the defendants in foreign-related 
commercial cases have no domicile in China, 
the plaintiffs can still submit the cases to 
Chinse courts located in the places of subject 
matter, contract performance or signature, 
GHIHQGDQWV¶GLVWUDLQDEOHDVVHWVDQG
representative offices. 
Applicable 
law 
Law of the People's 
Republic of China on 
the Application of 
Laws to Foreign-
Related Civil Relations 
(2010), Articles 2, 4, 5 
and 41 
Contract Law of the 
People's Republic of 
China (1999), Article 
126 
The parties in foreign-related commercial 
cases can expressly select foreign laws as the 
applicable law, provided the application of the 
selected foreign laws are not against the 
mandatory rules in Chinese law or the public 
interest of China. 
If the parties do not select the applicable law 
by agreement, the law which have the most 
significant relationship with the disputes 
concerned should be applied. 
(Domestic litigation cases are governed by 
Chinese law.) 
Language 
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 262 
Interpretations of the 
Supreme People's 
The litigation proceedings in Chinese courts 
should be conducted with a language that is 
commonly used in China (normally mandarin 
Chinese). 
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Court on the 
Application of the 
Civil Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic 
of China (2015), 
Article 527 
Foreign parties can request for translation 
services, provided that they can pay the 
translation fees. 
Agent ad 
item 
Civil Procedure Law of 
the PHRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 263 
Interpretations of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on the 
Application of the 
Civil Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic 
of China (2015), 
Article 528 
Foreign parties can only choose Chinese 
lawyers to represent them in Chinese courts. 
But, foreign persons can represent the parties 
in Chinese courts, provided that they are not 
doing so with the identify of foreign lawyers. 
Service of 
documents 
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 267 
Documents in foreign-related commercial 
cases can be served to foreign parties who has 
no domicile in China via their authorized 
agent ad items, representative/branch offices, 
business agents, diplomatic channels or public 
announcement, in case that direct service via 
fax, email and post are not feasible. 
(In principle, documents in domestic litigation 
cases should be directly handed over by courts 
to the parties, or served via fax, email and 
post if agreed by the parties.) 
Time 
Periods 
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 270 
The adjudication of foreign-related 
commercial cases is not subject to the general 
time limits for domestic litigation cases (six 
months for first instance cases and three 
months for second instance cases). 
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Special legal settings in foreign-related commercial arbitration 
Prior 
reporting 
mechanism 
Notice of the Supreme 
People's Court on 
People's Courts 
Handling Related 
Issues Concerning 
Foreign-Related 
Arbitration and Foreign 
Arbitration (1995) 
Interpretation of the 
6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V
Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the 
Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China (2006), Articles 
12 and 19 
Issues regarding the validity of arbitration 
agreements and enforceability of arbitration 
awards in foreign-related arbitration cases 
should be decided by IPCs in judicial review. 
If an IPC decided to render a denying decision 
on such issues, the IPC should report the case 
to the HPC for further examination. If the 
HPC agrees with the opinion of the IPC, the 
case should then be further reported to the 
SPC. Only with the approval of the SPC, the 
denying decision of the IPC can become 
effective. 
(Such issues in domestic arbitration cases 
should also be decided by IPCs. However, the 
IPCs can directly render its decisions and do 
not need report the case to higher level courts 
for approval.) 
Legal 
grounds for 
the non-
enforcement 
of 
arbitration 
awards 
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 274 
Arbitration Law of the 
PeRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China (1994), Article 
70 
When deciding the enforceability of foreign-
related arbitration awards, Chinese courts can 
only render denying decisions based on the 
legal grounds that the basic procedural 
requirements as stated in the 1958 New York 
Convention are not fulfilled in the cases 
concerned. 
(Chinese courts can deny the enforceability of 
domestic arbitration awards based on both 
procedural and substantive reasons as stated in 
Chinese law) 
Selection of 
foreign 
arbitration 
institutions 
Interpretations of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on the 
Application of the 
Civil Procedure Law of 
The parties in foreign-related commercial 
cases can choose foreign arbitration 
institutions to arbitrate their cases, provided 
that the arbitration seat of the cases concerned 
is not within China. 
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the People's Republic 
of China (2015), 
Article 531 
(The parties in domestic cases should arbitrate 
their cases in Chinese arbitration institutions) 
Applicable 
law to 
substantive 
issues 
Same as the issue of 
µDSSOLFDEOHODZ¶LQ
foreign-related 
commercial litigation 
listed above 
6DPHDVWKHLVVXHRIµDSSOLFDEOHODZ¶LQ
foreign-related commercial litigation listed 
above 
Applicable 
law to the 
validity of 
arbitration 
agreements 
Interpretation of the 
6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V
Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the 
Application of the 
Arbitration Law of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China (2006), Article 
16 
The parties in foreign-related commercial 
cases can select the applicable law to the 
validity of arbitration agreements by 
agreement. If the parties fail to do so, the law 
of the selected arbitration seat should be 
applied. If the parties also fail to select the 
arbitration seat, the law of the place of the 
court (lex fori) should be applied. 
(Domestic arbitration cases should be 
governed by the Chinese law.) 
Preservation 
measures  
Civil Procedure Law of 
WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (2012), 
Article 272 
Arbitration Law of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China (1994), Article 
58 
Preservation measure issues in foreign-related 
commercial cases should be handled by IPCs. 
(Preservation measure issues in domestic 
arbitration cases should be handled by BPCs) 
Hearing 
records 
Arbitration Law of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China (1994), Article 
48 
The parties in foreign-related commercial 
cases can choose whether to keep the hearing 
recording during the arbitration process. 
(Hearing records are compulsory to be made 
in domestic arbitration cases.) 
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Summary 
The significant increase of foreign investment and trade has been an important impetus 
IRU &KLQD¶V HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW VLQFH WKH  UHIRUP 7KH SURVSHULW\ RI IRUHLJQ
investment and trade in China brings both opportunities and challenges: accompanied with 
the increasing investment and trade opportunities is the rise in the number of commercial 
disputes between foreign businessmen and their Chinese partners. However, as two 
UHODWLYHO\LPPDWXUHV\VWHPVWKHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRIZKLFKPHUHO\EHJDQLQWKHV&KLQD¶V
litigation and arbitration systems have been criticized for their incapability of providing 
adequate legal protection to foreign investors and traders.  
7RVROYHWKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVDQGWUDGHUV¶XUJHQWGHPDQGVIRU
reliable and quality litigation and arbitration services and the relatively underdeveloped 
litigation and arbitration systems, China adopts a dual legal system in which the resolution 
of domestic and foreign-related commercial cases (commercial cases with foreign elements) 
is separated. Special, if not preferential, legal settings for foreign-related commercial cases 
have been introduced into the litigation and arbitration systems to enhance the quality of 
foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in a more effective manner.  
Nonetheless, the limited number of special legal settings for foreign-related 
commercial cases cannot solve all the problems in the litigation and arbitration systems. 
The sole establishment of special legal rules in law also does not necessarily ensure an 
effective implementation of these rules in practice. More importantly, as a result of the 
FRQVWDQWOHJDOUHIRUPVLQWKHSDVWWKUHHGHFDGHV&KLQD¶VOLWLJDWLRQDQGDUELWUDWLRQV\VWHPV
have witnessed a considerable development in both the general and foreign-related sectors. 
Therefore, it seems necessary to investigate whether and to what extent can the current 
foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration systems provide reliable and quality 
litigation and arbitration services to foreign-related commercial disputants. 
This research aims to conduct a systematic and comprehensive examination and 
evaluation on the current status of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration 
systems, and to find out the remaining deficiencies in these two mechanisms which hinder 
the further development of these two systems. The central question of this research is: how 
can foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration be assessed and compared, and 
what are the remaining deficiencies in these two mechanisms at the current stage in China? 
By adopting the methodologies of classic doctrinal legal analysis, data analysis and 
comparative analysis, this research approaches the aforementioned questions with the 
following four steps.  
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First, by reviewing the core principles of litigation and arbitration in authoritative 
international legal documents and literature, the research summarizes the core principles 
and the corresponding requirements that litigation and arbitration systems should follow 
and meet, based on which a common analytical framework for the evaluation of litigation 
and arbitration systems is established. Second, the research examines the institutional and 
procedural settings of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration to illustrate how 
foreign-related commercial cases are resolved in litigation and arbitration, and what are the 
main differences between domestic and foreign-related commercial cases. Third, by 
connecting the core principles with the law and practice of foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration, the research conducts an evaluation analysis to find out whether 
and to what extent the core principles are fulfilled in these two mechanisms. Meanwhile, 
these two mechanisms are also compared to show their relative advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of the core principles. Fourth, the research summarizes the previous 
findings and points out the remaining deficiencies in foreign-related commercial litigation 
and arbitration, based on which the recommendations for reforming these two mechanisms 
in the future are made. 
Apart from the introduction (Chapter 1) and conclusion (Chapter 7), this thesis 
consists of 5 chapters. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical review on the issue of the core 
principles of litigation and arbitration. The similar statements on the core principles of 
litigation and arbitration in international legal documents and literature demonstrate that 
litigation and arbitration, in a general sense, share a similar set of core principles, though 
they may have different designs in certain procedural issues. These similarities provide the 
basis for the establishment of a common analytical framework for evaluating litigation and 
arbitration systems, in which the following four sets of core principles can be the evaluation 
criteria. They are (1) accessibility (access to litigation and arbitration procedures), (2) 
competence of adjudicators (independence, impartiality, integrity and neutrality), (3) 
fairness of proceedings (due process, formality/autonomy and transparency/confidentiality), 
and (4) efficiency (time and expense) and enforcement (finality and enforceability). 
Chapters 3-5 provides an overview on the institutional and procedural settings of 
foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration in the context of the dual system. With 
RYHU WKLUW\ \HDUV¶ GHYHORSPHQW &KLQHVH FRXUWV DQG DUELWUDWLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH PRUH
developed than before, while the litigation and arbitration proceedings in China are also 
increasingly modernized. Furthermore, foreign-related commercial disputants can benefit 
from the positive effects brought by the special legal settings in the dual legal system. In 
comparison with disputants in domestic cases, foreign-related commercial disputants 
generally have more freedom in choosing applicable laws and venues for resolving their 
disputes. Special procedural arrangements, such as the centralized jurisdiction in litigation 
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and the prior reporting mechanism in arbitration, also play an important role in enhancing 
the quality of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration. 
Chapter 6 provides an evaluation analysis on the status quo of foreign-related 
commercial litigation and arbitration. On the whole, the core principles of litigation and 
arbitration are generally recognized in law and basically followed in practice. 
$GYDQFHPHQWV FDQ EH IRXQG LQ PDQ\ DVSHFWV REVWDFOHV EORFNLQJ GLVSXWDQWV¶ DFFHVV WR
courts are removed; most cases are concluded within the time limits; judges and arbitrators 
are more professional than before. However, there also remain many deficiencies which still 
plague the development of litigation and arbitration systems in China: the independence of 
judges and arbitrators is questionable under the shadow of bureaucracy; the autonomy of 
parties is more or less limited in arbitration proceedings; the policy-oriented usage of 
mediation in litigation and arbitration threatens the procedural fairness; unsystematic 
information publication in foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration raises 
doubts. Although the special legal settings for foreign-related commercial cases can to some 
extent reduce the negative effects brought by these deficiencies, it seems difficult to 
conclude that foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration can provide reliable and 
quality dispute resolution services to foreign-related commercial disputants at the current 
stage. 
The comparison of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration shows that 
DUELWUDWLRQKDV WKHUHODWLYHDGYDQWDJHV LQ WHUPVRIDUELWUDWRUV¶H[SHUWLVH LPSDUWLDOLW\ and 
independence, while litigation is free from the problems caused by the disagreements 
regarding the validity of arbitration agreements and enforceability of arbitration awards. 
Meanwhile, the parties can also choose between litigation and arbitration according to their 
specific needs in formality/flexibility, transparency/confidentiality and 
appealability/finality. However, if the remaining deficiencies in foreign-related commercial 
litigation and arbitration cannot be tackled, the value of such comparison will be reduced. 
In that case, the parties may choose one forum only because there are less pitfalls in the 
selected forum, not for the reason that the selected forum suits their disputes better. 
Therefore, efforts need to be made in the following four directions to tackle the 
remaining deficiencies in future legal reforms. First, demanding requirements in law should 
be removed to ensure the accessibility of arbitration proceedings, while efficiency and 
enforcement should be further enhanced in litigation and arbitration to provide disputants 
with timely and substantial legal remedies. Second, the negative effects of bureaucracy 
should be reduced, so that the independence of judges and arbitrators can be enhanced. 
Third, the policy-oriented usage of mediation in litigation and arbitration proceedings 
should be reduced or at least regulated by more concrete and detailed procedural rules. The 
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information publication of foreign-related commercial litigation and arbitration should also 
become more systematic and standardized, so that scholars and practitioners can find more 
reliable sources to evaluate these two mechanisms. Fourth, the special legal settings for 
foreign-related commercial cases should be gradually reduced to ensure the unity of the 
litigation and arbitration systems and the equal treatment for domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputants.  Although the dual-track approach plays a positive role in promoting 
the development of litigation and arbitration systems, it is neither a panacea at the current 
stage nor a permanent solution in the long run. In the future, a more fundamental solution 
should be the establishment of well-developed litigation and arbitration systems which can 
provide reliable and quality dispute resolution services to both domestic and foreign-related 
commercial disputants. 
Samenvatting
De significante groei van het aantal buitenlandse investeringen en handel vormt sinds 
de hervormingen in 1978 een belangrijke stimulans voor de economische 
ontwikkeling van China. De welvaart die buitenlandse investeringen en handel 
hebben gebracht, biedt zowel kansen als uitdagingen: de toenemende investeringen en 
handelsmogelijkheden gaan gepaard met een stijging van het aantal handelsgeschillen 
tussen buitenlandse ondernemers en hun Chinese partners. Om de uitdagingen het 
hoofd te bieden, heeft China een tweeledige rechtsgrondslag ingevoerd waarbij de 
beslechting van binnenlandse en buitenlandgerelateerde handelsgeschillen 
(handelsgeschillen met buitenlandse elementen) is opgesplitst in procesvoering en 
arbitrage. Dientengevolge zijn er voor buitenlandgerelateerde handelsgeschillen 
speciale wettelijke kaders ingevoerd om de kwaliteit van de dienstverlening met 
betrekking tot procesvoering en arbitrage voor partijen in buitenlandgerelateerde 
handelsrechtelijke geschillen te verbeteren. 
De invoering van speciale wettelijke kaders alleen biedt echter geen oplossing 
voor alle problemen met betrekking tot de systemen van procesvoering en arbitrage. 
Bovendien leidt het opnemen van speciale regels in de wetgeving niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs tot de effectieve tenuitvoerlegging ervan in de praktijk. 
Belangrijker nog is dat de voortdurende juridische hervormingen gedurende de 
afgelopen dertig jaar de systemen van procesvoering en arbitrage in China ingrijpend 
hebben veranderd, zowel in de algemene als in de buitenlandgerelateerde sectoren. 
Het lijkt derhalve nodig te onderzoeken of op basis van de huidige 
buitenlandgerelateerde systemen van commerciële procesvoering en arbitrage een 
betrouwbare en kwalitatief goede dienstverlening kan worden geboden aan partijen in 
buitenlandgerelateerde handelsrechtelijke geschillen.
Dit onderzoek beoogt een systematische en geïntegreerde evaluatie te geven van 
de huidige stand van zaken ten aanzien van commerciële procesvoering en arbitrage 
in China. Hierbij worden de volgende vier stappen doorlopen. Ten eerste worden in 
het onderzoek de kernbeginselen van procesvoering en arbitrage samengevat aan de 
hand van internationale juridische documenten en literatuur, om op basis daarvan een 
gemeenschappelijk analytisch kader vast te stellen voor de beoordeling van systemen 
van procesvoering en arbitrage. Ten tweede wordt in het onderzoek gekeken naar de 
institutionele en procedurele kaders voor buitenlandgerelateerde handelsrechtelijke 
geschillen, om te illustreren op welke wijze deze zaken door middel van 
procesvoering en arbitrage worden beslecht en wat de voornaamste verschillen zijn 
tussen binnenlandse en buitenlandgerelateerde handelsrechtelijke geschillen. Ten 
derde worden in het onderzoek de kernbeginselen gerelateerd aan de wetgeving en de 
praktijk van buitenlandgerelateerde commerciële procesvoering en arbitrage, om zo te 
komen tot een evaluatieanalyse waaruit blijkt of en in hoeverre de kernbeginselen in 
deze twee systemen worden gerealiseerd. Ten vierde worden in het onderzoek de 
eerdere bevindingen samengevat en de nog bestaande tekortkomingen op het gebied 
van buitenlandgerelateerde commerciële procesvoering en arbitrage beschreven, en 
worden op basis hiervan aanbevelingen gedaan voor de hervorming van deze twee 
systemen.
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat over het geheel genomen de kernbeginselen van 
procesvoering en arbitrage in de wetgeving algemeen worden aanvaard en in beginsel 
in de praktijk worden toegepast. Er zijn echter ook verschillende resterende 
tekortkomingen, die een negatief effect hebben in termen van toegankelijkheid van 
arbitrage, de onafhankelijkheid en integriteit van geschillenbeslechters, procedurele 
autonomie, de publicatie van informatie alsook doelmatigheid en handhaving. Er zijn 
derhalve nog steeds verdere inspanningen vereist om deze tekortkomingen bij 
toekomstige juridische hervormingen weg te nemen. De tweeledige rechtsgrondslag 
speelt in de huidige fase een positieve rol bij het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van 
buitenlandgerelateerde commerciële procesvoering en arbitrage, maar de toepassing 
ervan dient op lange termijn geleidelijk te worden teruggebracht. Een meer 
fundamentele oplossing is de vorming van goed ontwikkelde systemen van 
procesvoering en arbitrage op basis waarvan een betrouwbare en kwalitatief goede 
dienstverlening kan worden geboden aan partijen in buitenlandgerelateerde 
handelsrechtelijke geschillen.
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